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Preface
The Management and Technology Area of IIASA has been studying large-
scale planning programs since early 1975. A major research effort has been
devoted in particular to national programs designed to lead to integrated
regional development. The first two research efforts in this line dealt with the
Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States and the Bratsk-llimsk
Territorial Production Complex in the Soviet Union.
The general procedure followed was to organize an international conference
on the program in question in order to present the basic techniques of the
planning and management systems utilized, the organizational characteristics
of the programs, and the application of mathematical models and computer
systems.
The proceedings of the Shinkansen Conference presented in this volume
represent the initial stage of research on the Shinkansen high-speed rail
network of Japan and the impact that such a system has had on the mobility of
the Japanese people and on the development of regions surrounding the
Shinkansen system. The papers presented have served as a basis for more
extensive study of the Shinkansen as a system and, together with the
forthcoming results of an international field study team of IIASA scientists,
should help to clarify both the internal and external effects of a highly efficient
and rapid transportation system.
The proceedings focus on the Shinkansen as a planning program for the
application of advanced technology in rail transport and its development into
a safe, reliable and acceptable means of mass transport in Japan. Of special
importance in these proceedings is a compilation of several attempts designed
to determine the effect the Shinkansen has had, and will have, on regional and
cross-regional development in Japan.
These proceedings present the Shinkansen as a total system of planning,
organization and management. All too often transportation systems are
examined only as transport systems - separate from the environment in which
they operate. Subsequent effects are often not considered during the planning
phase and only become evident after the transport system becomes
operational. In this respect, the experience of the Japanese in anticipating and
in planning for the subsequent effects of a modern transport system may be
valuable for many countries considering the introduction of a technologically
advanced mass transport system.
The editors wish to thank all of those people involved in both the
preparations for the conference itself and for the processing of the proceedings
for publication. This includes the secretarial staff of the Management and
Technology Area - especially Ms Anna John and Eryl Ley, and the editorial
v
vi
and publication department of IIASA - Ms Jeanne Anderer, Barbara Lewis,
and Anne Drew. Without their combined efforts, this volume would not have
been possible.
Summary
The Shinkansen Conference was the third IIASA conference on large-scale
planning projects. As a new concept of a high-speed, mass-transit railway
system, the Shinkansen was originated by the Japanese National Railways
(JNR) in the late 1950s, and was pushed through the Japanese governmental
and legislative apparatus for approval and financial support in December
1958. Some of this financial support included a loan from the World Bank.
Construction of the first Shinkansen line between Tokyo and Osaka (515
km) commenced in August 1959 and was completed in June 1964. After an
initial period for testing and training, the Tokaido Shinkansen was officially
opened for commercial operation on 1 October 1964, closely coinciding with
the opening of the Tokyo Olympic Games. The original time allocated for all
phases of the Shinkansen - research, technological development, and
construction - was only 5 years. This target was met with no more than a few
months'delay.
The technical and economic success of the Tokaido Shinkansen induced
further expansion of the Shinkansen system to include Okoyama, Hiroshima
and Fukuoka - a total distance of 1069 km. The Japanese Government,
realizing the broad nature of the effects of such a mass transport system as the
Shinkansen, passed the Nationwide Shinkansen Law in 1970 - a recognition
of regional as well as national demands. It has become evident, however, that
the Shinkansen system as a transport technology has generated new
environmental and societal problems. In response to these problems, the
Japanese Shinkansen program has been debated on all levels of Japanese
society and is still topical.
The Proceedings of the Shinkansen Conference concentrate on examining
the Shinkansen as a system embedded in the Japanese socio-economic
structure, and not as an isolated example of technological applications to rail
transport. This technological aspect of the Shinkansen is, of course, included
as part of the Conference material, but the main purpose of the Conference
was to examine the effect of a system such as the Shinkansen on regional and
national development and to determine or indicate how transport systems in
general contribute to the growth of a region or nation.
The Conference material is divided into six main sections: general features
of the Shinkansen; socio-economic impact: models and applications;
environmental problems associated with the Shinkansen; implications of
national development in Japan; planning and organization of the Shinkansen;
high-speed operation, train safety, and operational management of the
Shinkansen.
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Introduction

1. Welcoming Address
R.E. LEVIEN
It is my great privilege to welcome all of you to the Institute for the next few
days of discussion on the Shinkansen Project. I feel that this is one of the most
interesting of the nASA conferences scheduled for 1977, and represents the
third in a series of conferences on retrospective development programs around
the world. My role in introducing the Institute and in welcoming you to it is to
provide a background in which the deliberations for the next few days can
proceed.
nASA stands for the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
We are a multidisciplinary, nongovernmental international East-West research
institute, founded in October 1972 on the initiative of the academies of
sciences or equivalent institutions in twelve countries. Current membership
now includes scientific organizations from seventeen countries.
As stipulated in nASA's Charter, "The Institute shall initiate and support
collaborative and individual research in relation to problems of modern
societies arising from scientific and technological development". There are
two aspects of nASA's research strategy. First, nASA sponsors
interdisciplinary studies of "global" issues, such as energy and food, that
directly affect many nations and can be resolved only by their joint action, and
of "universal" issues, such as regional development matters, that lie within the
boundaries of single nations but which all nations share. Second, there are
four research areas that provide the disciplinary base for these
interdisciplinary studies. They are:
Resources and Environment, concerned with the earth's natural
endowment;
Human Settlements and Services, concerned with the earth's human
endowment;
System and Decision Sciences, concerned with mathematical and
computational methods of analyzing system and decision problems; and
Management and Technology, concerned with man-made social,
economic, and technological mechanisms.
The fourth research area, Management and Technology, is the sponsor of
this Shinkansen Conference. I wish to extend a very warm and personal
welcome to all of you for this third in our series of conferences on large-scale
regional development, and the impact of major technologies on it. This has
been an interesting and important series of activities at nASA; beginning with
3
4
our work on the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States, then the
Bratsk-Ilimsk Territorial Production Complex in the Soviet Union, and now
choosing the Japanese example of Shinkansen development. I am personally
looking forward to this conference and to what we shall learn from the
Japanese scientists in their presentations concerning the development of this
major transport system and its impact on the regions through which it passes.
2. The Shinkansen as Part of the
Management and Technology Area Studies
on Large-Scale Planning Projects
A.STRASZAK
Large-scale development programs play an increasingly important role in
modern societies and economies. The fulfilment of current and future needs of
existing societies requires a better utilization of all possible resources:
minerals, energy, water, air, as well as labor and technology.
Management of development is a key management problem of today. The
diversity of development areas is very broad and each development
undertaking has its own nature and rules of the game. Nevertheless, some
universal features of large-scale development programs can be found.
Management of development must be more and more comprehensive and
integrative, more advanced on technical, managerial, institutional and societal
levels.
Programs arose as new tools for socio-economic or technological
development only a few decades ago. The GOELRO program in the USSR
began more than 50 years ago and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
program in the U.S. more than 40 years ago. However, widespread
implementation of the development program approach occurred only during
the last 10 to 20 years as a result of modern economic and technological
achievements and their increasing complexity. Change, progress, and planning
are integral parts of our entire way of life and are crucial elements of our
managerial process.
It was not by accident that the first major task of the Management and
Technology Area has been concerned with large-scale development programs.
Regional development carries universal attributes which can be considered by
other countries where specific programs are being carried out or considered.
Examination of individual regional development programs may permit better
planning and management of such large projects - profiting from the
experience of others.
It was not easy to choose the proper development programs for our studies.
IIASA is a relatively new organization, both in its makeup and its approach to
solving problems. We need strong support from scientists from the country in
which research is to be undertaken. Previous subjects of our research have
been the TVA in the U.S. and the Bratsk-Ilimsk Territorial Production
Complex (BITPC) in the USSR. Scientists involved with these programs
helped us considerably, both in the preparation of their respective conferences
5
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[1,2] and in the subsequent field study. The present conference is also an
example of the cooperation and willingness of Japanese scientists to assist
nASA's research efforts.
The TVA case study was recommended to nASA by the U.S. National
Academy of Sciences. It was to some extent a successful and world-famous
program of regional development, unique in U.S. history, and has served as
the predecessor of many U.S. regional and national development programs. In
addition, specific aspects of this program have been emulated by other
nations. The general concept of the TVA was designed by predecessors of
today's policy engineers and, of course, it had the highest national policy
support.
The BlTPC case study was recommended to nASA by the USSR State
Committee for Science and Technology, and is another example of a
successful program of large-scale regional development. The BITPC is the
predecessor of many regional development programs in the USSR and is a
world-famous concept designed for the fulfilment of this program. It has been
generalized by Siberian scientists and is now being tested in other regions of
Siberia. The Bratsk-Ilimsk program has also been carried out with the
highest national policy support.
The methodology of our case studies was developed at nASA by an
international, interdisciplinary team of scientists from both East and West led
by Professor Hans Knop, the previous leader of the nASA Management and
Technology Area.
The present case study, the Shinkansen, was recommended to us by the
Japan Committee for nASA. It is a successful program of transport
development with an indirect influence on regional development. This is
another world-famous example of development undertaking and has also been
carried out with the highest national policy support.
The driving forces for the TVA and the BITPC programs were the
utilization of water and mineral resources as well as the fulfilment of stated
national goals. In the case of the Shinkansen we propose to consider the
utilization of human and technical resources and the fulfilment of national
goals as the driving force. This conference and the subsequent field study
should help in understanding the goals of the Shinkansen.
All development programs considered by nASA currently and in the future
have achieved outstanding worldwide technical advances. For the TVA,
technical advances have been made in electric power generation, flood control,
fertilizer production, as well as in new agricultural techniques. The Bratsk-
llimsk experience has led to new technical advances in the construction of
industrial complexes such as the world's largest aluminum plant, huge timber
complexes, hydroelectric power stations, and electrical generators.
The Shinkansen has also had its share of technical advances, and still
represents the peak of technical development in railroad transport
technology. This aspect of the Shinkansen will become evident as the
presentations are studied.
All of these development programs have made significant contributions to
the national and regional economies. The power generation capacity of the
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TVA is over 23,000 MW, from hydroelectric and thermal power stations. The
value of flood-damage prevention is estimated in excess of 1 billion dollars.
These are only a few of the results of the TVA program. The BITPe complex
has a power generation capacity of 12,500 MW from hydroelectric stations
alone. The timber-processing capacity has reached the level of 7 million mJ per
year.
Both the TVA and the Bratsk-llimsk programs have contributed
tremendously to national and regional economies in monetary terms. Both of
these programs have contributed to national and regional economies in ways
difficult to measure. The Shinkansen program is no different: it is well known
that it is profitable, with total revenues received of approximately 7.5 billion
U.S. dollars. Its extraneous effect on national and regional economies,
however, is somewhat difficult to measure, and the problem of determining
this is discussed in a separate section.
The TVA and the Bratsk-Ilimsk development programs are considered to be
successful, but work on them is continuing. Shinkansen could be considered
an exception if one only considers the initial phase of the project as seen in
1958, when only the construction ofthe Tokyo-Osaka line was proposed.
Today, the Shinkansen is a development program with much more ambitious
goals and is a topic of considerable debate in Japanese political and social
spheres.
It is interesting to note that all of these three development programs
considered for study by the Management and Technology Area have an
internal goal-setting ability. These large-scale development programs are
involved in real socio-economic structures and have their own "rules of the
game" which can generate new problems and can even result in some conflicts.
We have to consider development programs as a complex socio-economic and
technical sub-system, having many interactions with other sub-systems, and its
own dynamic and institutional mechanisms.
Our small team cannot yet carry out a full systems analysis of large-scale
development programs. We do not have enough manpower, time, money or
support; and, on another level, some methodological problems have to be
solved.
Given these limitations, we have developed a multifocus and multifactor
system of analysis, concentrating on the following aspects of a development
program: goals and strategies, organization and planning, models and
computer utilization, environmental management, use of technology, and
resource management.
For each focus an analytical methodology is developed. This methodology is
discussed in several papers by our team members in these Proceedings. It is
also possible to consider the Shinkansen as a large-scale transport development
program and as a growing large-scale transport system. In this context, the
organizational capacity and the ability of the Japanese National Railway
(JNR) and the Japanese Government has to be considered as one of the main
reasons for the success of the Shinkansen.
If the Shinkansen is considered from a IIASA viewpoint of matrix
interactions, as explained by Dr. Levien, our Director, the IIASA matrix
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structure could be used as a problem generator.
Let us consider, for example, the problem of mobility. The high mobility of
the present Japanese population can be partly attributed to the success of the
Shinkansen, but without the factor of potential mobility, the Shinkansen
would most likely be a failure. Mobility is still increasing in Japan as well as in
other countries, and is likely to continue to increase in the next few decades.
Mobility appears to be a function of economic growth, and if we agree with
one of the optimistic versions of our future, mobility will increase far more
than just up to 100 years. If we agree with the more pessimistic versions of our
future, mobility should be limited very soon.
Relations between time, geographical distances and development is a subject
of much research. The Shinkansen case study should enhance our knowledge
along these lines.
Human settlement patterns also appear to be crucial to transport
development. It is probably no coincidence that express motorways started in
the Cologne-Bonn region and the Shinkansen in the Tokaido megalopolis.
According to some moderp researchers, however, Japan is not fully
megalopolized. It is not certain that the megalopolis era will be a feature of our
future, but the possibility cannot be excluded. It is also possible that the
Shinkansen concept may become worldwide.
It is apparent that at this point in our research on the Shinkansen we have
more questions than answers. This conference and the field study conducted in
late 1977 should give us more answers than questions.
During the three days of this conference we shall have the opportunity to
discuss all of these questions with the co-authors of the Shinkansen success
and with Japanese experts who have already studied the impact of the
Shinkansen.
I would like to thank all of our Japanese delegates for their work in
preparation of the papers and for their valuable cooperation.
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General Features of
the Shinkansen

3. History of the Shinkansen
M. NISHIDA
Introduction
When the Shinkansen started commercial operation between Tokyo and
Osaka, a newspaper wrote: "The Shinkansen is a myth of modern times." Mr.
Reisuke Ishida, the president of the Japanese National Railways (JNR),
however, made the following statement (translation).
The successful construction of the Shinkansen undoubtedly represents a
permanent landmark in railway history, and this can be attributed to JNR's
long experience and untiring efforts in technical development. It is by no
means the result of chance. I cannot forget the very great hardships endured
by those who participated in the work of construction. This can only be
described as a desperate fight. When I look at the Shinkansen trains running
lightly and smoothly, I am aware of the hopes and the personal dedication
of the staff of the project. After five years' desperate fight, the Shinkansen
has been brought to successful operation, and we can congratulate ourselves
frankly and with pride.
In recent years, the functions of the railway have been rediscovered and
re-evaluated. In the U.S.A., railway construction plans, such as the Bay
Area Rapid Transit (BART) and the high-speed railway between Boston and
Washington, are reported to be making progress. It may well be that the
success of the Shinkansen will provide the impetus for a bright future and
that the railways of the world are entering a new age.
However, we must not rest on our laurels. The Shinkansen is only one of
the means chosen to augment JNR's carrying capacity in the most economic
and efficient way. We should not talk about its technical superiority, but use
it effectively for carrying passengers.
The reason for constructing the Shinkansen was to increase the carrying
capacity of the Tokaido Line, one of the most important conventional trunk
lines in Japan, and to free its traffic congestion. About 34% of the total
population and 60% of Japan's industrial products are concentrated in the
area along this line. The area can well be considered the heart of Japanese
industry and economy, and the Tokaido Line can be said to play the role of
an artery connecting northern and western Japan. This line, although it was
less than 3% of the total national route length, carried 25% of JNR's total
volume of traffic. The threat to Japan's national life if this Tokaido Line
should be blocked rendered construction of the Shinkansen a matter of
extreme urgency. Thus, the Shinkansen was never meant to compete with
II
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the airplane and the automobile in luxury and speed, but to meet the traffic
demand, qualitatively and quantitatively. The Shinkansen adopted the
standard gauge so that JNR's highly developed technology could be utilized
in the new system.
The Shinkansen has proved to be an epoch-making means of
transportation owing to its high speed, safety, comfort, punctuality, and
frequency. Its advent can be considered a revolution in the history of the
railway.
To achieve a technological innovation in the context of social
development, such factors as demand, technical feasibility, and the
technical skill and level of the work force are three basic prerequisites.
However, I should like to add three more factors: organizing ability (ability
to create new objectives and to organize manpower); economic power
(ability to raise the necessary funds); and the determination and drive of top
management.
Government backing and favorable public opinion are also desirable.
Regrettably, these were not clearly seen in the early days of the project.
Transportation in Japan
Japan is situated in the western part of the Pacific Ocean and to the east of
the Asian Continent, and consists of four main islands - Honshu, Hokkaido,
Shikoku and Kyushu - and about 1000 small islands in the form of an arc.
The total area of this archipelago is approximately 370,000 km2 and the
population is 110 million. Most of the population is concentrated on the four
main islands, especially on Honshu. Honshu is a long, narrow island extending
from north to south, with mountain ranges running through its center and
long, narrow plains along the coast.
The Pacific coast area is blessed with a milder climate than the Japan Sea
coast area and, therefore, major cities such as Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka are
located on this side. Consequently, the principal means of transportation are
also well developed along this side. The distribution of means of
transportation in Japan is shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
TABLE3.!. Distribution 0/means 0/ transportation/orpassenger traffic
(in JOspassenger-kmj
1960 (070) 1965 (070) 1970 (070) 1975 (070)
JNR 1240 51 1740 45 1897 32 2153 30
Private railways 604 25 814 21 991 17 1085 15
Buses 440 18 802 21 1029 17 1101 16
Private cars and taxis 115 5 406 11 1814 31 2508 35
Airlines 7 29 1 93 2 191 3
Ships 27 1 34 1 48 1 66 1
Total 2433 100 3825 100 5872 100 7104 100
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TABLE 3.2. Distribution ofmeans of transportation for freight traffic (in J(P t-km)
1960 010 1965 010 1970 010 1975 010
JNR 536 39 564 30 624 18 466 13
Private railways 9 1 9 1 10 8
Trucks 208 15 484 26 1359 39 1297 36
Domestic freighters 616 45 806 43 1512 43 1836 51
Total 1369 100 1863 100 3505 100 3607 100
Japanese National Railways
The first railway in Japan was opened by the State between Tokyo and
Yokohama in 1872. Since then, the State Railways developed as a system
operated by a government department until 1949, when the present Japanese
National Railways (JNR) was established as a public corporation under the
Japanese National Railways Law. With its capital wholly invested by the State,
JNR is operated under the supervision of the Ministry of Transport.
The route length is about 21,000 km; roughly 28,000 trains run every day,
and the number of employees is about 430,000. In recent years the revenue has
been about 2000 x 1()9 yen, with expenditure exceeding this figure by about 30%.
Measures to improve the financial situation are therefore being investigated,
such as state subsidies and increased charges. However, the basic passenger
and carload freight rates are determined by the National Diet in accordance
with the provisions of the Japanese National Railways Tariff Law, and the
Minister of Transport authorizes revisions of passenger and freight charges.
Of the total route length of 21 ,000 km, about 36070 is electrified and
approximately 26% is double or quadruple tracked. About 13,000 men are
assigned to such work as electrification, double tracking and the construction
of the Shinkansen, and about 800 are engaged in research and development
work at the Railway Technical Research Institute.
Railway-Downfall Theory
The phrase "Railway-Downfall Theory" became popular some 25 years ago,
when civil aviation reopened in Japan (1951) and super-highway construction
plans began to be discussed.
The theory is that, just as horse-drawn carriages and sailing ships were
superseded by trains and steamships early in the nineteenth century, the latter
half of the twentieth century sees the supremacy of automobiles and airplanes,
and the railway is now on the road to decline and extinction. About a quarter
of a century ago, automobile production was gradually increasing and the
construction of superhighways was about to start. Many people, impressed by
the high speed of the airplane, concluded too hastily that the improved roads
would render the railways useless. Many JNR personnel even took a negative
view of the future of the railway.
The "High-Speed National Road Law" and "National Land Development
Traversing Road Law" were passed in 1957 and construction of the national
superhighway network began. The construction of Japan's first high-speed toll
road started between Tokyo and Kobe through Nagoya: the Nagoya-Kobe
section and the Tokyo-Nagoya section opened in 1962 and 1965, respectively.
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Congestion on the Tokaido Line - Inability to Meet the Traffic
Demand
The area along the Tokaido Line (590 km, from Tokyo to Kobe) is about
60,000 km2 , only 160/0 of the total area of Japan. This area, however, includes
three of the four great industrial zones of Japan and seven of the ten large
cities with a population of one million or more. In this area, the population
density is 2.6 times that of the national average and accounts for 34% of the
nation. The economy is therefore brisk, and the industrial output and national
income produced in this region represents over 60% of the whole country. The
volume of traffic on the Tokaido Line has therefore always been remarkably
high, accounting for 25% of the passenger traffic and 24% of the freight
traffic, and their large annual increment was also noticeable. In comparison
with the annual national growth rate of 6.1 % for passenger and 4.1 % for
freight, that of the Tokaido Line was 7.6% and 4.8%, respectively.
The Tokaido Line lies in the center of the JNR network, acting as the main
artery of national transportation. Blockage of this line would paralyze the
transport system of the entire nation. JNR made every effort to keep the
traffic flowing by such measures as construction of additional tracks,
electrification and other improvements, giving it priority over other lines.
However, the maximum daily number of trains that could be operated one way
on a double-tracked railway was 120, with passenger and freight trains
operating together and trains of different speeds - limited express and express
- operating simultaneously. The Tokaido line, in 1952, was approaching this
upper limit.
Improvement Study
In May 1956 JNR set up the Tokaido Line Build-Up Investigation
Commission and launched a comprehensive study, under the direction of the
Vice President of Engineering, of the following: future traffic demands,
quality transportation service, measures for increasing transport capacity, and
type of motive power, rolling stock, repair system, etc., to adopt.
After a year of study, the forecast of traffic demand was completed and the
need to increase transport capacity was agreed, but the decision to adopt
narrow or standard gauge was not yet taken. In view of the enormous cost of
the project, irrespective of the gauge chosen, the Commission concluded that
the subject should be dealt with as an integral part of the Government's
national transportation policy, in parallel with superhighway construction and
other plans.
In July 1957 Mr. Shinji Sogo, then President of JNR, asked the Government
to study improvements of the transport capacity of the Tokaido Line.
Technical Feasibility - 3 Hours from Tokyo to Osaka
A little earlier, in May 1957, a public lecture was given at the Railway
Technical Research Institute to commemorate its 50th anniversary, and the
subject was "The High-Speed Railway of the Future", based on studies
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undertaken at the Institute. The gist of the lecture was that results obtained
from technological studies on rolling stock, track, electric facilities, etc.,
indicated that it was possible to cover the 550 km between Tokyo and Osaka in
3 hours by electric train, at a maximum speed of 250 km/h. This was an epoch-
making announcement. I was then a young researcher, studying systems
engineering at the Institute, and I certainly found the idea quite unbelievable.
My main reasons were:
The maximum speed of any train in the world at that time was 160 km/h.
One year earlier, the French National Railways attained a maximum speed
of 331 km/h in an experiment, but it was reported that sparks had quickly
melted the trolley wire.
It was generally believed at that time that even if a speed of 200 km/h or
more were possible, the repair of tracks and trolley wires, etc., would cost
too much and the railway would not pay.
The Railway Technical Research Institute proposed to create a completely
new technology and standards, for all the facilities - track, signal, trolley
wire, safety devices, etc. - far from traditional railway concepts. Those
responsible were fully confident in announcing an entirely new image of the
railway and its technical possibilities.
The Government's Decision
The Minister of Transport, accepting JNR's request, established the JNR
Trunk Line Investigation Commission in August 1957. The Commission, after
2 years of survey, made the following decisions at intervals as follows:
November 1957
A new Tokaido Line should be constructed and the start of
construction work should be hastened, in view of the anticipated
blockages on the existing Tokaido Line and the time required for
construction.
March 1958
The new line should be standard gauged.
April 1958
The necessary funds would be 194,800 million yen, the expenditure
being fully covered by future revenue.
The Government, from the findings of the JNR Trunk Line Investigation
Commission, set up a Council of Ministers Concerned in Transportation in the
Economic Planning Agency, but it was not until December 1958 that they
decided to construct the Shinkansen.
The reason for this delay was to make sure that the investment in
construction of the Shinkansen would not conflict with that for the
superhighway from Tokyo to Kobe, which was already under way.
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Narrow or Standard Gauge? - Resolution by Top Management
The first railways in Japan were narrow gauge and almost all subsequent
railways were therefore constructed in narrow gauge, except for some private
railways and subways in and around large cities. The JNR lines were
constructed in narrow gauge without exception. There was, however, an
argument for rebuilding them standard gauge to increase transport capacity.
Within JNR the factions for and against standard gauge had been arguing
some 60 years ago.
Since then, the JNR network had extended allover the country and
reconstruction in standard gauge had become impracticable. In any case, after
the war, JNR had to concentrate on restoring facilities devastated by the war
or simply worn out. A new standard-gauge railway on a completely new system
was out of the question. However, Mr. Shinji Sogo, then President of JNR,
had been an advocate of the standard gauge all his life, and was waiting for the
opportunity to adopt it.
As for measures to increase the transport capacity of the Tokaido Line, the
first question was whether or not the new line should be built side by side with
the existing line. There were 122 stations on the Tokaido Line between Tokyo
and Osaka, each of them situated at the center of a city. It would therefore be
difficult and costly to acquire the necessary land for a new line in the city areas
along the existing line. Moreover, the Tokaido Line had level crossing over
roads at 1100 places, which would impede high-speed trains. It was therefore
decided to take a different route for the new line.
Next, the pros and cons of narrow and standard gauge were studied.
Construction and rolling stock for narrow gauge is cheaper than for standard
gauge. But when a new line is constructed in narrow gauge, it has to be
connected at some places to the existing line; otherwise it would not make
sense to make the line uniformly narrow gauge. It would then be necessary to
construct connection facilities, and the cost would increase accordingly.
The AC system of electrification was ascertained to be more economic than
the existing DC system. From an overall point of view the standard gauge was
judged more advantageous for transport capacity, train speed, construction
cost, etc. One disadvantage of the standard gauge, that it could not be
connected to the existing narrow-gauge line to move rolling stock from one
line to another, could be overcome by improving facilities for passenger
transfer. Thus, the adoption of the standard gauge was decided.
However, many JNR personnel opposed the standard-gauge proposal on the
grounds that the construction of the 500-km-Iong railway would cost a vast
amount; that building the new narrow-gauge line parallel with the existing line
would enable the work to advance gradually, in step with the amount of
money available; and that the new line could be utilized immediately after
completion of each section.
The selection of the new railway was one of the most important decisions for
national transportation policy as well as for JNR management. If Mr. Sogo
had not been the highest executive, the conclusion would have been quite
different and the Shinkansen would probably never have been constructed. He
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convinced many opponents of the idea within JNR and outside; he pursued the
bold course of constructing the Shinkansen in a difficult financial climate; and
he achieved its realization. Now, he is much admired for his far-sightedness,
and his achievement must be a supreme example of the importance of a top
executive's judgement and courage based on long-term vision and firm
management philosophy.
Five Years for Construction
JNR started construction ofthe Shinkansen in 1959, aiming at completion
within 5 years. The predicted volume of traffic demanded completion at the
earliest possible date, and a period of 5 years was estimated to be required for
the construction of the Shin-Tanna Tunnel (7950 m) - the bottleneck of the
whole line.
However, it would be an unprecedented achievement to complete a 5OO-km-
long railway for a perfectly new system in such a short time, while
simultaneously developing new technology. Five years was by no means a
generous estimate since, for example, land purchase, civil engineering, work
on the electric facility, signals and station facilities all had to be carried out in
stages, even when the final details had been planned.
Just about that time I was transferred from the Railway Technical Research
Institute to Tokyo Shinkansen Construction Division as a chief engineer.
Frankly, I had no idea whether the project could be completed by the target
date or whether the speed of 200 km/h would be possible after the
construction had been completed.
To create something great, a long period of research is usually required
before starting the actual work. But in this case construction work had to be
started immediately. Therefore, the working schedule, limited to 5 years, was
planned so that the research work would finish early enough to avoid delaying
any construction work; and each phase of construction work was adjusted to
finish within a minimum period so that the necessary time for research could
be ensured.
When adopting new technologies, it is essential to make field tests to check
safe operation, since the first duty of a railway is to operate with perfect
safety.
The following progress was made between the survey and research stage and
the start of commercial operation:
Survey and research started April 1958
Purchase of land and construction started August 1959
Model track completed and test run started June 1962
A record of 256 km/h speed established March 1963
Line completed and training operation started June 1964
Commercial operation started October 1964
All branches of the JNR - research, planning, execution, civil engineering,
electrification, rolling stock, train operation, etc. - united their efforts,
explored the unknown and created an entirely new railway. Tribute should be
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paid to their great efforts and pioneering spirit which accomplished the
project, quite apart from the tremendous value of the railway itself.
Basic Study and Accumulation of Technology
Some part of the success of the Shinkansen was due to the body of basic
study and technology on the existing narrow-gauge lines which had been
amassed over many years.
The high speed of 200 km/h was expected to create many problems, in such
areas as train-running resistance, vibration and brakes. Consequently, such
fundamental problems as the contact relations between rail and wheel,
pantograph and trolley wire had to be solved, and, of course, the structure of
the track and rolling stock demanded special attention. Also, to ensure safety
at high speed, an automatic brake control was required in order to avoid
depending upon fallible human judgement. Certain basic studies initiated by
JNR in 1945 were of great value in integrating comprehensive technologies.
They comprised:
study of rolling stock for comfort;
development of AC electrification technology;
study of new track - concrete sleepers, long rails, etc.;
study of application of electronics.
One factor that contributed to the success of the Shinkansen's high speed and
safety was that, on the basis of these studies, each technology was developed to
the same level and harmoniously integrated into one system.
The Railway Technical Research Institute
The Railway Technical Research Institute's publication of its studies on the
technical feasibility of linking Tokyo and Osaka in 3 hours encouraged the
start of construction of the Shinkansen. This Institute played an important
role in technical developments and in subsequent studies on the test track. If I
remember correctly, the Institute then had over 1000 researchers and
assistants. Frankly speaking, they were by no means well paid, owing to the
difficult financial situation of JNR in those days. They were working in old
and cramped buildings with antiquated research facilities, and suffered from
scanty research funds.
Mr. Sogo made the important decision to increase research funds
considerably and to construct a new Research Center on a large area in the
suburbs of Tokyo. Researchers moved into the new facilities in October 1959
and started energetically to develop a new railway system in the well-equipped
Research Center.
Raising the Construction Funds
The cost of constructing the Shinkansen was at first estimated at 194.8 x
1()9 yen and the whole sum had to be borrowed. The funds were raised in the
form of government loan, railway bonds and a low-interest loan of $80 million
from the World Bank.
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Surveying, planning, study, technical development and construction all
proceeded simultaneously, and the work schedule was limited to a short period
of time. Consequently, the land-purchasing cost drastically increased.
Moreover, owing to changes in construction plans and the sharp increase in
domestic prices of commodities and wages, the total cost amounted to 380 x
109 yen, twice as much as originally planned. This increase in construction
cost was met by additional borrowing.
The drastically increased cost coincided with a train collision in a suburb of
Tokyo in which many passengers were killed or injured. Mr. Sogo
consequently retired from the presidency of JNR after 8 years of service (two
terms) with t~e Shinkansen very near completion. His retirement was much
regretted by all who had been engaged in this project which he had done so
much to promote.
The New System and the Operational Organization
The organization of a new system for management and safe operation of the
Shinkansen was an epoch-making event in JNR's lOO-year history.
The traditional car-inspection system, for example, had been to inspect the
cars from top to bottom, one at a time. Under the new system, the bogie and
the car body are separated and the bogie is thoroughly inspected and repaired,
while the car body, after a somewhat simpler inspection, is mounted on a spare
bogie which has already been inspected and repaired, and thus the car leaves
the shed and returns into service without delay.
The traditional method of inspecting track and trolley wire depended on
human hands and eyes. Under the new system, an inspection car is run
continuously at high speed to check and accurately record the conditions of the
facilities and, if anything is found wrong, it is repaired immediately by repair
groups.
The Shinkansen is more than a high-speed railway; its special features are
safety, comfort and punctuality, made possible by its method of operation,
which combines new technologies and systems.
Conclusion
The creation of the Tokaido Shinkansen represents a revolution in land
transportation which was brought about by the technology of JNR and the
courage and hard work of its personnel. The successful operation of the
Shinkansen has firmly established the importance of Japanese railway
technology throughout the world.
After inauguration, the new railway was extended to 1000 km, and another
800 km are now under construction. About 1700 km are under survey and
study; construction work and early completion are earnestly awaited by
residents along the projected routes. In some districts, however, residents
along the Shinkansen route are taking legal action against JNR on the grounds
that their environment is being disrupted by the noise and vibration of
20
speeding trains. JNR is therefore making efforts to develop methods to
minimize such noise and vibration, and noise-proof walls are being installed
along the line. In some cases houses are purchased outright by JNR, or
compensation is paid.
In conclusion, I sincerely hope that the results of the experience obtained by
Japan's Shinkansen will be of value to the studies of all concerned.
4. Installations, Operation, and
Management of the Shinkansen
Y. OGURA and S. YAMANOUCHI
Organization for Control and Operation
Unlike the narrow-gauge lines, which are organized regionally, the
Shinkansen, using standard gauge, is operated and controlled as a complete
line, in order to make full use of its outstanding characteristics as a means of
high-speed mass transport. However, the entire network of the Japanese
National Railways (JNR) will be in ideal working condition only when the
Shinkansen and the narrow-gauge lines are operated together. JNR is
therefore coordinating the Shinkansen operation with the narrow-gauge lines.
Moreover, to avoid duplicating passenger services between the two systems,
such local operations as facilities for passengers at stations and relief and
repair work are performed under the supervision of the Railway Operating
Divisions in charge of the narrow-gauge lines.
The Shinkansen personnel alone number about 15,000 men, to run 275
trains a day covering a total distance of 180,000 km.
Transportation Plan and Train Diagram
TRANSPORTATION PLAN AT THE TIME OF CONSTRUCTION
Construction of the Shinkansen was planned on the basis of a traffic volume
determined by the Trunk Line Investigation Committee set up within JNR in
1957. Passenger and freight traffic along the vitally important Tokaido
Main Line had been steadily increasing (see Table 4.1), passenger traffic
reaching 24070 and freight 23% of the total domestic traffic. Train frequency
was expected to reach the upper limit in the 196Os. Estimated traffic
volume was 13,000 million passenger-km for the opening year 1964 and 20,000
million for 1975. Although the traffic did not reach the estimated figure during
the first years, the rate of increase later rose far above the estimate, and in
1975 reached about twice the estimated figure for the Tokyo-Shin-Osaka
Section. • The amazing growth of the national economy was undoubtedly
responsible for this.
·Shin-Osaka is the name of the station in Osaka City.
21
TA
B
LE
4.
1.
Tr
aff
ic
o
n
th
e
To
ka
id
o
M
ai
n
Li
ne
pr
io
rt
o
o
pe
ni
ng
th
eS
hi
nk
an
se
n
Pa
ss
en
ge
rt
ra
ff
ic
Fr
ei
gh
tt
ra
ff
ic
To
ka
id
o
M
ai
n
JN
R
(a
)
Li
ne
(b)
To
ka
id
o
M
ai
n
N
um
be
r o
fd
ow
n
tr
ai
ns
be
tw
ee
n
Pa
ss
en
ge
r-
Pa
ss
en
ge
r-
R
at
io
JN
R
(a)
Li
ne
(b
)
R
at
io
N
um
az
u
a
n
d
Sh
iz
uo
ka
Fi
sc
al
km
km
(b
/a)
To
n-
km
To
n-
km
(b
/a)
Pa
ss
en
ge
r
Fr
ei
gh
t
ye
ar
(m
illi
on
s)
In
de
x
(m
ill
ion
s)
In
de
x
(07
0)
(m
illi
on
s)
In
de
x
(m
ill
ion
s)
In
de
x
(07
0)
tr
ai
ns
tr
ai
ns
To
ta
l
N
19
50
69
,1
00
10
0
15
,3
00
10
0
22
.2
33
,3
00
10
0
59
00
10
0
17
.7
31
27
58
N
19
51
79
,0
00
11
4
17
,4
00
11
3
22
.0
39
,9
00
12
0
76
00
12
8
19
.1
19
52
80
,5
00
11
7
18
,7
00
12
2
23
.2
39
,3
00
11
8
85
00
14
3
21
.6
19
53
83
,6
00
12
1
19
,5
00
12
7
23
.3
41
,0
00
12
3
90
00
15
1
22
.0
38
38
76
19
54
87
,0
00
12
9
20
,3
00
13
2
23
.3
39
,9
00
12
0
87
00
14
7
21
.8
40
40
80
19
55
91
,2
00
13
2
21
,4
00
14
0
23
.5
42
,6
00
13
1
95
00
16
0
22
.3
41
43
84
19
56
98
,1
00
14
2
23
,3
00
15
2
23
.7
46
,9
00
14
1
10
,7
00
18
3
22
.8
46
47
93
19
57
10
1,
20
0
14
6
24
,1
00
15
8
23
.8
48
,2
00
14
5
11
,0
00
18
6
22
.8
53
52
10
5
23
TRAFFIC VOLUME AND CAPACITY AFTER THE OPENING YEAR
The number of passengers carried on the Shinkansen rapidly increased after
its opening and recently reached over 150 million a year (see Fig. 4.1). The
total passengers carried since its opening in 1964 exceeded 1000 million on 25
May 1976. Since the line was extended to Hakata in March 1976, it has begun
to average about 500,000 passengers a day, with the record number of
1,030,000 passengers a day on 5 May of that year. It has become the most
important rail line in Japan and, although it accounts for only 5.6070 route-km
of the total JNR system, it carries 25070 of the JNR traffic volume.
TRAIN DIAGRAMS AFTER THE OPENING
The train diagram of the Shinkansen has been rewritten 16 times to meet the
traffic demand. At the same time the train diagram of the narrow-gauge lines
was revised to fit the new diagrams of the Shinkansen and carryon the high-
speed train service of the entire network. Consequently, in 1975 the number of
scheduled trains had increased four-fold and train-km eight-fold, compared
with the opening year 1964. Typical diagram revisions are as follows:
1 October 1964 (for the opening). The number of scheduled trains per day
was 60 up- and down-trains operating in a 1-1 pattern, or in a pattern of
one Hikari and one Kodama every hour. The traveling time between
Tokyo and Shin-Osaka was held down at 4 hours by the Hikari and 5
hours by the Kodama owing to poor roadbed conditions.
1 November 1965. Progress in improving the track condition reduced the
traveling time to 3 hours and 10 minutes by Hikari and 4 hours by
Kodama, as originally planned. The pattern was then changed to 2-2, i.e.
two Hikaris and two Kodamas every hour.
15 March 1972. With the Shinkansen extended down to Okayama from
Shin-Osaka, train operations in the 4-4 pattern began. At first, through
operation of the Hikari between Tokyo and Okayama was not considered
feasible, and three types of operation for these trains, with variations in
the number of stopping stations, was decided.
10 March 1975. On completion of the Shinkansen, a little over 1000 km
between Tokyo and Hakata, the timetable of JNR, including the narrow-
gauge lines, was drastically revised. A 5-5 train diagram pattern was first
adopted for the Shinkansen. Four Hikaris and four Kodamas, at most,
were operated to augment its transport capacity.
As a rule, through operation of the Hikaris leaving and arriving at Tokyo
station for and from a station below Shin-Osaka was scheduled in a train-
stopping pattern, W, A, Band H (see Fig. 4.2).
In July 1975 the diagram was rewritten again. Today nine trains are
operated every hour on the Shinkansen: five Hikaris at most and four
Kodamas. They are run at the rate of 275 a day, which is almost the limit of the
Shinkansen capacity.
10 9
-
;:
8
S c 0 0 S
6
"
C .~ ~ ~ "u ~ ~ v
4
'"c v ~ ~ ~ 0.
.
'0 0 Z
2
9.
77 I / /
8
.2
0
/
/ /
6.
87
/ I / /
5.
59
/
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
to
ta
l
/
/
/
4
.4
9
//
/
3.
6
4
/r
'"
/
l.
7
9
//
/
l.
0
7
~/
1
.4
1
/
/
,.
.11
"
0
.8
(v
'"
P
a
ss
e
n
0
4
/
'
g
e
rs
c
a
r
r
ie
d
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
-
0.
11
.:.;
?~
~
"
1
5
7
~
0.
44
0.
55
0.
66
0.
72
0.
85
0.
85
1.
10
1.
28
1.
33
.
,
~
.
.
'
64
'
65
'
66
'
67
'
68
'
69
'
70
'7
1
'
72
'
73
'
74
'
75
(F
is
ca
l
y
ea
r)
Fi
g.
4.
1.
A
nn
ua
li
nc
re
as
e
in
n
u
m
be
ro
fp
as
se
ng
er
sc
ar
rie
d
o
n
th
eS
hi
nk
an
se
n.
~
'"
'"
'"
'"
'"
'"
;T
0
;J>
;::
'"
:r:
'"
z
C1
;::
:>:
'"
'"
z
:r:
;p
0
;T
"
1
;::
:r:
;T
'"
0
;T
:>
:
:r:
'"
"
,
"
a
5
a
.
p;
;T
•
a
.
·
-
<
;T
;T
§:
,.
-
5
"
;;:
5"
a
""
5
a
•
.
n
•
,.
-
·
~
""
3
-
<
""
;:
a
5
5
~
3
•
,.
-
"
,.
-
a
,.
-
,.
-
:>:
n
-
<
3
::
r
a
a
C'
;T
-
<
"
•
a
"
"
'"
"
•
;T
""
-
<
~
"
•
;;
"
"
.
:>:
~
.
0
0
·
"
"
3
0
;T
-
<
:r:
·
0
:>:
•
-
<
"
?
-
<
;T
"
.-
5
a
a
."
0
"
,.
-
3
•
•
~"
"
~
a
;J>
"
"
3
"
.
•
;T
•
•
•
a
.
0
,.
-
~
·
"
3
3
"
0
•
•
•
•
•
C"
,.
-
•
•
3
,.
-
3
;;-
;T
;T
3
,.
-
.
•
"
.
"
•
0
.
"
"
"
•
"
;T
.
0
0
0
.
3
"
.
;T
'"
~
•
"
"
. "
-
T
o
k
y
o
-
H
ak
at
a
,
.
.
L I
--
~
:>
-<
4
-
0
:r:
N
ag
oy
a
-
H
ak
al
a
1
0
0
--
0
0
0
0
0
~
S
h
in
O
sa
k
a-
H
ak
at
Z
0
n
~
Q
:>
:
T
o
k
y
o
-
S
hi
n
O
sa
k
a
10
0
0
0
--
0
;J> '"
T
o
ky
o
H
ak
at
a
9
0
~
Z
T
o
k
v
o
-O
k
ay
an
1
a
3
T
o
k
y
o
-
H
ir
o
sh
im
a
3
J
0
-
0
-
0
T
o
k
v
o
-O
k
av
aO
la
15
0
0
0
0
--
0
-0
-0
-
0
0
T
o
k
a
-
S
h
in
O
sa
k
a
3
0
Q
--
--
-Q
--
--
O
-o
T
o
k
y
o
-S
h
in
O
sa
k
a
41
0
-
0
-
-
T
o
kv
o
-
N
ag
oy
a
6
0
--
0
0
--
0
--
0
-0
'
0
:>
:
T
o
k
y
o
-S
h
iz
u
o
k
a
Z
Q
--
Q
--
-<
r-
o
0
--
0
0
T
o
ky
o-
M
is
h
im
a
7
0
--
-0
0
--
0
0
::
;
M
1S
"
l!i
(;"
n
.
k
,
I
0
--
0
--
0
--
-0
-0
--
0
--
-0
--
0
--
-0
;J>
S
hi
zu
ok
a
-
~
o
-
-
o
-
-
o
-
o
-
-
o
-
-
o
-
-
-
o
-
o
-
O
;:: ;J>
a
g
a
y
-
.
Z
0
-0
I:>
n
1n
v
s
a
'U
';
""
4
0
--
0
I.
:>
n
ln
LJ
!f
ft
ra
o~
sh
im
a
3
0-
--
0-
-0
0
--
0
O
k
ay
am
a-
H
ak
al
a
1
~
0
-
0
-
0
lr
O
S
n
H
n
a
-
1
o
--
-o
--
-<
r-
:r
--
c
-
-
0
--
-0
Fi
g.
4.
2.
Tr
ai
n
st
op
pi
ng
st
at
io
ns
(as
o
fM
ar
ch
19
75
).
N U
l
26
Transportation Control
DISPATCHING SYSTEM
The outstanding features of the Shinkansen are high speed, mass transport,
and high efficiency. The trains are run at the top speed of 21 km/h, with an
average distance between stations of 40 km. For smooth operation, therefore,
the trains must be meticulously controlled and the data needed for dispatching
must be collected and transmitted promptly and accurately. A General Control
Center links up all trains in operation, stations, operating depots in the field,
and the Railway Operating Divisions, which collect and transmit data. The
salient points of the Shinkansen dispatching system are given below.
United control ofthe whole line. The whole line of some 1100 km is under
the united control of the General Control Center.
Overall dispatching. Passenger service dispatchers, train operating
dispatchers, track and structure dispatchers and electric dispatchers are all
housed under the same roof; this enables them to keep in touch at all times.
Direct dispatching. The General Control Center and the trains operating on
the line are linked by train wireless. (Dispatch data are transmitted to the
narrow-gauge line trains via the stations.) Thus, dispatching instructions are
transmitted directly.
DISPATCHING FACILITIES
For the operation of the Shinkansen dispatching system (see Fig. 4.3 for a
diagram) as described above, up-to-date technical devices and several kinds of
dispatching installations have been introduced, which are described in detail in
the paper by Y. Ogura, Chapter 34 of these Proceedings. Briefly, they are as
follows.
Centralized Traffic Control (CTC). There are indication panels and control
panels for safe and efficient operation and control of all the trains in groups.
Centralized Substation Control (CSC). This is for the operation and remote
control of all unmanned substations and their sectioning posts.
Computer-Aided Traffic Control (COMTRAC). To deal with the growing
number of trains, the diverse types of trains in use, and the increasing
complexity of the dispatching work, computers have been introduced which
control train routes automatically and adjust train operation efficiently. The
new system has been in regular operation since 1975.
Train wireless. Connected directly to the General Control Center, train
wireless is fully exploited in assisting the work of the dispatchers. Part of the
circuit is used for the public telephones aboard the trains.
Equipment for emergency use. To protect trains in case of earthquakes and
heavy rain, seismometers, rain gauges and anemometers are set up along the
line to transmit data to the General Control Center, so that emergency action
can be taken.
N '-
J
IRec
o
;d
er
l
I
I
:
_
.
.
l..
-
.
J
I
(A
T
C
)
I
IC
5
C
)
I
-
-
-
,
-
-
-
(C
T
C
) ip
- ,
S
u
ll
on
.
~
I
.
t-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1,
~
O
pr
ra
ti
D
I
d
rp
ot
.
G
en
e.
.
a
l
C
on
tr
ol
I
~
C
on
du
ct
or
.'
R
al
1
_
y
I
C
en
te
r
/
r
d
ep
ot
s
r
-
o
p
e
r
.
t
~
f-
L_
...
,
~
.
.
.
.
.
.
~
T
ra
ck
m
a
in
le
-
I
d
lv
ld
on
.
I
-
n
a
n
e
r
d
rp
ot
.
f-
I
H
ea
d
I
I
O
ff
ic
e
-
-
-
iCO
M
T
R
A
C
~-
--
--
--
I
-
-
-
-
iEl
ec
tr
ic
d
ep
ot
.
~
I
-
-
I l
R
ai
lw
ay
I
o
p
er
at
in
.
'
-
-
I
'
'
\
-
_
-
-
-
-
_
_
_
_
.
1.
.
.
d
iv
i.
io
n
.
I I I
(P
I
C
)
L
J
Fi
g.
4.
~.
Bl
oc
k
di
ag
ra
m
o
fS
hi
nk
an
se
n
di
sp
at
ch
in
g
sy
ste
m
.
28
Operation Safeguards
BASIC CONCEPT OF SAFEGUARDS
A safeguards system has been adopted for the Shinkansen high-speed trains.
Six basic points of the system are:
1. To design and manufacture rolling stock and facilities which will ensure
safety and comfort on trains operating at a maximum speed of 210
km/h.
2. To introduce high-level technology for the safety devices so that the
operators' dependence on their own attention and judgement can be
mitigated by multiple automatic operational systems for vital functions,
which would enhance the reliability of machinery. (That is, safety devices
are made fail-safe.)
3. To repeat model testing for the safety of track and rolling stock until safe
performance is confirmed.
4. To provide higher education and training for the operators and improve
their qualifications for service on high-speed trains, thus adding to their
integrity and judgement.
5. For protection against natural disasters, such as storms and flood, to
provide adequate facilities, taking local conditions and past records into
consideration.
6. For prevention of interruptions to the service due to obstacles such as
automobiles and rocks lying on the track, to set up guard rails and nets
and to enforce regulations against trespassing on the track.
TRAIN OPERAnON SYSTEM
Spacing control of the distance between trains and control of train routes
are basic safety requirements. These are enforced by the following:
Train distance spacing control. Instead of the signal system, which depends
on a man's eyesight (as for the narrow-gauge lines), the Shinkansen operation
has adopted the ATC system. Under this system, operations such as reducing
speed from 210 km/h to 30 km/h (depending on the distance between two
running trains) and bringing a train to a stop behind the preceding train are
performed automatically, so that all trains running can be kept a certain
distance apart, according to their speed. For further safeguarding, should
ATC fail, JNR has an alternative system ready to go into action for emergency
train operation.
Train route control. Train route control and collection of data on train
operation are performed by CTC. In 1972 COMTRAC was introduced to set
train routes automatically and increase the safety of operation.
The deceleration control of trains on the Shinkansen is almost completely
automated under ATC, CTC and COMTRAC. Still to be automated are:
acceleration control, adjustment of train operation time, braking for coming
to a stop at a station, and operation of trains during an emergency, all of
which are still performed by the motorman.
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TRAIN ACCIDENTS AND INTERRUPTION OF OPERATION
Railway accidents are extremely rare on the Shinkansen, and no passengers
have been killed or injured since its opening in October 1964. (As more than
1000 million passengers had been carried by May 1976, the standard of safety
of the Shinkansen can be considered high.) There was, however, a high rate of
operation interruptions in the initial period, though they had no very far-
reaching effects. The number of interruptions rapidly decreased, and today,
the cases per million train-km is only about a quarter of those on the narrow-
gauge lines, which is a very satisfactory situation. However, the effect of the
large number of trains on the line every day cannot be ignored, and overall
improvements are now in progress, with 60-kg rails replacing the earlier ones,
roadbed and ballast improved and renewed, contact wire replaced by wire of
larger cross-section, etc.
Passenger Service
The Shinkansen runs through the most densely populated area in the world
and its passenger revenue represents over one-third of the entire passenger
revenue of JNR. Two kinds of train are operated: the Hikari and the Kodama,
both of which run between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka. Between Shin-Osaka and
Hakata, however, the Hikaris usually run from Tokyo for through operation.
The stopping stations and the traveling hours of the Hikari and the Kodama
are shown in Fig. 4.4. The traveling time of the fastest trains between Tokyo
and Hakata is 6 hours, 56 minutes and the scheduled speed is 155 km/h. The
number of passengers alighting and boarding are shown by station in Fig. 4.5.
ROLLING STOCK
The Hikari and the Kodama are both sixteen-car trains. The Hikari, with a
seating capacity of 1342, is made up of eight ordinary cars with all reserved
seats, four ordinary cars with unreserved seats, two "green" cars (with higher-
grade accommodation, corresponding to previous first class), a diner, and a
buffet car. The Kodama, with a seating capacity of 1483, consists of four
ordinary cars with reserved seats, ten with unreserved seats, one "green" car
and one buffet car. All the ordinary cars have five seats sideways with an aisle
between two seats and three seats; the "green" cars have four seats sideways
with an aisle between. There is a lavatory and a wash room to each unit of two
cars. The Hikari cars have accommodation for the handicapped.
TRAIN SERVICES
The Shinkansen was built primarily for long-distance traveling, hence, it is
not available to season-ticket holders, but only to ordinary passengers,
coupon-users, group tourists and parties traveling on a reserved car basis.
A passenger pays the basic fare plus the limited express surcharge. The basic
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fare and surcharge are the same for the Hikari and the Kodama, and transfer
may be made from one to the other. For a seat in one of the unreserved cars,
the limited express surcharge is 200 yen less than for the reserved section, and
the limited express surcharge for a seat on a connecting narrow-gauge line
train is 50010 less. If a Shinkansen train is delayed by more than 2 hours the
passengers are refunded the full amount of the limited express surcharge.
SALE OF LIMITED EXPRESS TICKETS
Limited express tickets for both the Shinkansen and the narrow-gauge line
trains are sold (up to a week in advance sometimes up to three weeks) before
the date of departure through the Magneto-Electronic Automatic Reservation
System (MARS) at the Green Windows· in stations and at the offices of
authorized travel agencies.
CATERING SERVICE
The Hikari has a diner coupled on for meals at all times. Both the Hikari
and the Kodama have a buffet car for snacks. Lunch, coffee, tea, fruit juices,
beer, cigarettes, etc., are also available from vendors aboard the train. Public
telephones are installed aboard from which passengers can reach the principal
cities along the line.
Rotation
MOTORMEN
Two motormen are assigned to each Hikari between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka.
The Kodama has a motorman and an inspector for running inspection, but the
motorman on the down-train is relieved at Nagoya, and the motorman on the
up-train at Shizuoka. The Hikari through trains between Shin-Osaka and
Hakata are manned by two motormen all the way. All other Hikaris and all the
Kodamas originating from or terminating at one of the intervening stations in
the Shin-Osaka-Hakata Section are manned by one motorman and one
inspector, the motorman being relieved both ways at Hiroshima station.
About 1200 motormen are assigned to the Tokyo, Osaka, Hiroshima and
Hakata bases. The running inspectors number approximately 300. As long-run
rotation is adopted, one man's duty period averages 410 km a day.
TRAIN CREW
The standard crew for both Hikari and Kodama is four, normally consisting
of one Chief Conductor, two Supervisory Conductors and one Conductor.
The total number of train crew is about 1400. Their trips are so arranged that
·Ticket offices where reservations are made, so called because of their green front.
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their duty period averages 7 hours a day through 4 weeks. The conductors'
depots are located at Tokyo, Osaka, Hiroshima and Hakata. The W-type
Hikari crew between Tokyo and Hakata is relieved at Shin-Osaka.
ROLLING STOCK
At present the Shinkansen vehicles total 2336 in 146 train sets, as shown in
Fig. 4.6, a six-fold increase over the number during the initial period. Of these,
about two-thirds are for the Hikaris. The vehicles are distributed among the
three bases in Tokyo, Osaka and Hakata, where they are daily inspected,
repaired and cleaned for use the next day.
The main details of Shinkansen electric railcar rotation are as follows:
The two kinds of trainset, Hikari and Kodama, are used as units in rotation.
The operating kilometerage of each train is very high, reaching about l300
km per day.
By using pools under COMTRAC, a higher serviceability coefficient and
greater efficiency in inspection and repair is attained.
The fluctuation of seasonal and week-end travelers and tourist parties
complicates the rotation of electric railcars.
The daily inspection is performed during the non-operational night period.
When shuttling, all the trains are cleaned and serviced. This makes for faster
car rotation, especially at Tokyo station.
The number of space cars for replacement of those undergoing inspection
and repair is 9-12070 of the total Shinkansen vehicles.
Fixed Installations and Rolling Stock
TRACK AND STRUCTURES
The Shinkansen between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka, extending 516 km, was
completed in 5Yi years, beginning in 1959. The construction cost 380,000
million yen. Its extension from Shin-Osaka to Hakata, 562 km, took 8 years,
beginning in 1967, and cost 942,000 million yen. The construction criteria for
the Tokyo-Shin-Osaka Section and for the Shin-Osaka-Hakata Section are
compared in Table 4.2. The Shin-Osaka-Hakata Section was constructed with
a future increase in train speed taken into consideration. As it was constructed
for a planned speed of 250 km/h, it was designed with larger minimum
curvature radius, a less steep maximum gradient, and larger longitudinal
curvature radius and a distance between track centers than the Tokyo-Shin-
Osaka Section.
The percentages of various track structures are shown in Table 4.3. The
topography of the Shin-Osaka-Hakata Section called for many tunnels,
accounting for as much as 50% of the whole line. Fewer embankments and
more viaducts man stronger track structure. The track is designed to endure an
axle load of 16 tons and, for high-speed trains, 43 sleepers per 25 meters are
used. Between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka, 53-kg rails were laid, but in view of the
rising costs of maintenance and since higher-speed operation was envisaged,
w ~
23
36
~
J
o
i
n
t
u
s
e
c
=
J
K
O
D
A
M
A
~
H
I
K
A
R
I
75
2
N
o.
o
f
v
e
h
ic
le
s
I
,
n
,
16
92
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
I,
OO
J
I,
;m
1,
40
0
I,
OO
J
1,
!lX
l
l,
00
0
l,
;m
l,
40
0
i
i
i
i
i
'
i
i
'
,
i
,
80
70
60
50
85
90N
o.
o
f
l
r
a
in
s
e
ts
10
0
47
13
3
14
61
47
I
99
l'
lb
l
15
84
I
75
2
I
Fi
g.
4.
6.
N
um
be
ro
ft
ra
in
se
ts
an
d
v
eh
ic
le
s.
TABLE 4.2.
Item
Planned max. speed, km/h
Gauge,mm
Min. curvature radius, m
Max. gradient, 0/00
Longitudinal curvature radius, m
Distance between track centers, mm
Formation level breadth, m
Rails
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Comparison ofconstruction criteria
Tokaido Shinkansen Sanyo Shinkansen
(Tokyo-Shin-Osaka) (Shin-Osaka-Hakata)
210 250
1435 1435
2500 4000
20/1,000 15/1,000
10,000 15,000
4200 4300
10.7 11.6
SOT (53 kg/m) 60 kg/m
Kind
Embankment, etc.
Viaduct
Bridge
Tunnel
Total length
TABLE 4.3. Use of various track structures
Tokaido Shinkansen Sanyo Shinkansen
(Tokyo-Shin-Osaka) (Shin-Osaka-Hakata)
(km) (0/0) (km) (%)
274 53 70 12
116 23 164 29
57 II 48 9
69 13 280 50
516 100 562 100
6O-kg rails were laid between Shin-Osaka and Hakata. Those between Tokyo
and Shin-Osaka are now being replaced by 6O-kg rails. As rail joints promote
discomfort and encourage track deterioration, long rails, about 1.5 km long,
have been laid with expansion joints fitted at both ends. For the roadbed
between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka, crushed stone ballast was used. However, as
the track deteriorates faster than expected and as maintenance cost is high,
slab track has been adopted as the standard for the Okayama-Hakata Section,
with very good results. For the turnouts, the movable nose crossing is used, so
that the train can run smoothly at over 200 km/h on the straight side of the
turnout.
STATIONS
There are twenty-eight passenger stations and eight rolling stock bases
between Tokyo and Hakata. The principal terminals, Tokyo and Shin-Osaka
stations, have three platforms with five tracks and three platforms with six
tracks, respectively; the other stations at which all trains stop have two island
platforms with four tracks. The intermediate stations have a side platform
with pass-through track, although, for topographical reasons, Atami and
Shin-Kobe stations have only the main line.
The minimum curvature radius at and near some stations is smaller than
that of the main line, since many obstacles occur in downtown districts. The
effective length of the main line is 500 m and that of the platforms 410 m, with
an allowance of 10 m given for the effective length of a train measuring 400 m.
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FIXED ELECTRIC INSTALLATIONS
The Shinkansen is electrified with single-phase AC, 60 Hz, 25 kY. For the
power supply to the overhead wire system, feeder substations are set up every
20 km on the Tokaido side and every 50-70 km on the Sanyo side to maintain
the required voltage. Switching sections are also set up so that the trains can
pass through the sections by power running. The overhead wire system
between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka is of the composite compound type; for that
between Shin-Osaka and Hakata, the so-called heavy compound type has been
adopted.
ROLLING-STOCK BASES
These bases are set up at various places, according to the forms of transport,
local conditions, rolling-stock rotation and staffing situations. They are
intended to accommodate rolling stock, make up trains, undertake servicing,
inspection and repair, and attend to the needs of the powered-car crews.
For maximum efficiency in reassembling cars for train makeup, shifting cars
from one track to another, and all the operations that have to be performed
during inspection and servicing, the tracks must be laid in the most systematic
possible way, within the limitations imposed by the requirements for entry and
departure tracks, inspection and servicing tracks and accommodation track.
ROLLING STOCK
All cars on the Shinkansen are motorized. A train is made up of 16 cars with
a motorman's cab at both ends. Its total length is 400 m, the longest electric
railcar train in the world. Electrically, two cars make a unit. The ATC
apparatus is installed on the first car of the train. Table 4.4 compares the main
elements of the apparatus on Shinkansen trains with those of narrow-gauge
line trains.
Fixed Installations and Rolling-Stock Maintenance
FIXED INSTALLATIONS
To operate the Shinkansen safely every day, every effort is made to know
the condition of each fixed installation, to introduce machine power to the
greatest possible extent, and to carry out reasonable maintenance work on the
line at those times of night when no trains are running. The maintenance bases
are laid out at key points along the line. The conditions of the track and
electric fixed installations are inspected by the general electric and track
inspection cars, rail-flaw detector car, and by patrolling. Based on the data
obtained, the plans for servicing the track and electric fixed installations are
drawn up. Efficient maintenance work is facilitated by the use of multiple tie
tampers, track liners, an overhead trolley tretching car, a maintenance car of
electric facilities and other large machines.
Wheel diameter
Main motor type
Max. operating speed
Gear ratio
Control system
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TABLE 4.4. Main elements ofthe Shinkansen railcar train compared with narrow-gauge line train
Type Shinkansen railcar train Narrow-gauge train of 485 type
No. of main motors 4 x 2 cars 4 x 2 cars
Output (I unit) Continuous rating Hourly rating
185 kW x 8 = l480kW 120kW x 8 = 960kW
MT 200 MT200A MT200B MT54B MT54D
210 km/h 120 km/h
22:63 = 1:2.17 22:77 = 1:3.50
Low-voltage tap changer type Rheostat series parallel control,
weak field, 40010
910 mm (870 mm for calculation) 860 mm (820 mm for calculation)
Brake system
ATC
Manual
handling
Train set output
Weight
Output per ton
ROLLING STOCK
Electro-magnetic-controlled pneu-
matic brake (for all speed ranges)
Electric brake (over 50 km/h) in Electric brake (over 30 km/h) in
combination with electro- combination with electro-
magnetic-eontrolled pneumatic magnetic-eontrolled pneumatic
brake for all speed ranges brake for all speed ranges
6M,I480kW x 8unil = 1I,840kW8M4T,960kW X 4unit = 3840kW
970 t (16 cars with seat capacity 529 t (12 cars with seat capacity
load) load)
12.3 kW/t 7.3 kW/t
The unique character of the Shinkansen required a new and unconventional
approach to the inspection and repair of its rolling stock. The following
principles were adopted: the most durable and reliable materials must be used
and all electric apparatus must be equipped with protective devices. A special
"bogie inspection" of the main motors, bogies and running gear, which are
the most important components in ensuring safe operation, must be made
every 300,000 km between general overhauls. These general overhauls, of
other less vital components, take place every 900,000 km. Details of the
inspection system are given in Table 4.5.
The main characteristics of Shinkansen rolling stock maintenance are as
follows:
Maintenance ofA TC pick-up apparatus
The ATe apparatus, which is of great importance in ensuring safe operation
at 210 km/h, has numerous electronic parts. As these parts can be used over a
long period and are not particularly subject to passive wear-out, they are not
disassembled at each inspection period, although their working operation and
characteristics are checked.
Maintenance ofbogies and running gear
As fail-out is likely, bogies and running gear are inspected and repaired with
scrupulous care under an elaborate system. For maximum use of the costly
train set, the carbody is removed from its bogie and mounted on another,
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TABLE4.S. Details ofthe Shinkansen inspection system
Where
inspected
Workshop
Car operating
and repair
depot
Car operating
and repair
depot
Car operating
and repair
depot
Frequency of
inspection
Whenever
deemed ne-
cessary
Description
Inspection when deemed necessary, e.g. when a car is
out of order
Inspection with ultrasonic flaw detector to check for
flaws in car axles
Overall inspection at the given frequency of the con-
dition and characteristics of on-board installations of
CTC, leaving the trainset as it is
Inspection prior to use of the car exterior; replenish
expendable items at a certain frequency; check panto-
graphs, bogies, running gear, brake systems, electric
machines, door locks and interior installations, for
condition, serviceability and functioning
Riding on train to inspect active conditions of accelera-
tion, deceleration, vibration, oscillation, etc., of train
in operation, the serviceability in general and the func-
tioning of all machines and installations
Inspection at the given frequency, depending on utili- Over 30
zation of pantographs, specially high-pressure circuits, days, or
main circuits, auxiliary circuits, control circuits, door within
locks, brake systems, bogie, running gear, carbody, 30,000 km
gauges, interior installations and auxiliary installations,
to check condition, serviceability and functioning, as
well as insulation and resistance of electric parts
Inspection at the given frequency, depending on utili- Within 12
zation, to check main motors, power-transmission months or
apparatus, brakes, trucks, springs, by dismounting or within
by disassembling their main parts for close examination 300,000 km
Overall inspection in detail at the given frequency, Within 30
depending on utilization, to check the principal com- months, or
ponents of electric railcars by dismounting or dis- within
assembling 900,000 km
Prior to ATC use, inspect at the given frequency the Designated, Car operating
condition and functioning of all the parts of on-board according to and repair
installations from the exterior what the rol- depot
ling stock are
to be used for
Within 3 Car operating
months, or and repair
within depot work-
60,000 km shop
When deem- Car operating
ed necessary and repair
depot
At daily, May be con-
bogie and sidered part
general over- of any regular
haul inspec- inspection
tions
70,000 km as May be con-
standard, sidered part
but whenever of any regular
deemed ne- inspection
cessary
Inspection to keep wheel tread and flange in normal
shape, using wheel tread lathe flange grinder for train-
set
Bogie
inspection
Car axle
flaw detec-
tion
ATC
operation
inspection
Regular
inspection
Car wheel
tread grind-
ing
Kind
Daily
inspection
General
overhaul
ATC
characteris-
tics inspec-
tion
Interim
inspection
On-board
inspection
Note: The above types of inspection are conducted at the Hakata Car Maintenance Center.
which has already been serviced. In addition, active performance is checked as
follows:
Bogie running control. The vibration of the bogie on the run is measured.
The carbody's vibration acceleration is measured, taking a 70,OOO-km run as
standard.
Measuring ofratio between axle load and lateral force (QIP). Since the risk
of derailment is governed by the ratio between the lateral force (Q) and the
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axle load (P), this ratio is ascertained by measuring the axle load and the
lateral force throughout the whole line at the rate of once in about 2 months.
Wheel axle-flaw detection. To guard against wheel axle breakage, quality
control of the material and its processing is tightened, and wheel axle
inspection with an ultrasonic flaw detector is periodically conducted.
Wheel-tread grinding. Periodic correction of wheel tread and prevention of
flats from skidding are undertaken by grinding or wheel lathe, which can be
done with the car intact.

5. Achievements and Future
Problems ofthe Shinkansen
M.KAMADA
Introduction
Tokaido was the name given in olden days to the region and to the road along
the Pacific coast between Tokyo, then called Edo, the seat of the Shogunate
government, and Kyoto, then capital of Japan. Thus, Tokaido, as a region
and a route, assumed great importance from early days. Today, the region is
highly industrialized and contains the densest population and five of the
largest cities in Japan; consequently, the traffic in the region is also the
heaviest in the country.
The Japanese National Railways (JNR) used the name Tokaido for two of
its railway lines because they more or less followed the old route. The older,
narrow-gauge line, opened in 1889, is known as the Tokaido Line, and the
newer standard-gauge line, opened in 1964, is called the Tokaido Shinkansen
(Shinkansen literally meaning "new trunk line") to distinguish it from the
older one.
Achievements
HIGH MASS TRANSPORT PERFORMANCE
The Shinkansen has a very high capacity for mass transport, due to the high
carrying capacity, high speed, and high frequency of its trains. Without this
high mass transport performance of the Shinkansen, it would be difficult to
achieve the huge volume of passenger flow in the Tokaido region. The growth
of passenger traffic and the number of trains operated on the Tokaido
Shinkansen and the Sanyo Shinkansen* is given in Fig. 5.1.
In the planning stage of the Tokaido Shinkansen, however, such high
performance was not anticipated. The future traffic growth then estimated
was based on the predicted growth in national income announced by the
Economic Planning Agency in 1956, with adjustments for the volume to be
shifted over from the Tokaido Line, the impact of the parallel expressway to
·Used in contradistinction to the parallel narrow-gauge Sanyo Line.
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be constructed, and the traffic to be induced by the Shinkansen. It turned out,
however, that the actual growth in national income and traffic volume far
surpassed what was predicted, as shown in Fig. 5.2.
HIGH-SPEED PERFORMANCE
The Shinkansen halved the duration of a railway trip. The time between
Tokyo and Osaka by the Shinkansen, an express bus and an aircraft is
compared in Table 5.1, and it is clear that for this distance of about 500 km
there is not much to gain by flying. This is reflected in Fig. 5.3, which shows
the trend of traffic between these cities by the Shinkansen and by air. For
shorter distances, such as between Tokyo and Nagoya, aircraft are no match
for the Shinkansen.
The greater accessibility through higher speed, together with the greater
frequency and reliability of service, had the effect of inducing traffic, as
shown in Fig. 5.4. It is hard to tell, however, how much of the increase was
diversion from other means and how much the generation of new traffic.
Another effect of the high speed was the change it brought about in travel
patterns. As shown in Figs 5.5 and 5.6, for return trips between Tokyo and
Osaka, the itinerary became shorter for Shinkansen travelers, and less use was
made of night trains.
HIGH-SAFETY PERFORMANCE
Initially, there was some apprehension as to the safety of the Shinkansen, a
completely new system, but it has proved to be the safest way to travel. There
has not been a single casualty from an accident on the Shinkansen since its
inauguration over 12 years ago, in spite of the extremely heavy traffic. The
number of deaths by various carriers, given in Table 5.2, shows the
effectiveness of the railway, especially the Shinkansen, in reducing the social
cost of accidents.
TABLE 5.1. Travel time between Tokyo and Osaka
Source: Japan Travel Bureau, Timetables, May 1977.
Carrier
Shinkansen (Hikari)
Express bus
Aircraft
Time
3h 10min
8h
50 min
Time to, from and at
airport
Tokyo 60 min
Osaka 25 min
At airport 20 min
lOla! time
3 h 10 min
8h
2h 35 min
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National income
50 (in trillion yen)
Traffic volume
(in 100 million
psgr. -km)
7l
National
{
__ Actual
income
(at 1950 ---G-~-. Predicted
prices)
40
30
20
10
Trallic
volume
{
..............- Actual (Tokaido Shinkansen)
_.~- Actual (Tokaido Shinkansen + Sa.nyo Shinkansen)
--~-IiJ--- Predicted
500
400
300
200
100
1955 '60 '65 '70 '75
Fig. 5.2. Growth of predicted and actual traffic volume on the Shinkansen and national income.
Source: JNR, Trunk Line Investigation Office, Basic Data on Tokaido Shinkansen Project, Jan.
1959.
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Fig. 5.3. Effect of the Tokaido Shinkansen on air transport: number of passengers per day
between Tokyo and Osaka by JNR and air in percentages. (Figures in columns indicate
percentages.) Sources: JNR, Rai/way Statistics Yearbooks, and Ministry of Transport, Air
Transport Statistics Yearbooks.
(in tens of
thousands)
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Tokaido
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J h 10 min
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j
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Fig. 5.4. Traffic induced by the Shinkansen. (Passengers counted only one way between
Shizuoka and Hamamatsu.) Source: JNR, Tokaido Line and Shinkansen Passenger Report,
monthly.
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Fig. 5.5. Effect of the Shinkansen on itinerary. (For Shinkansen trains the survey was conducted
in November 1964, and for the Tokaido Line Limited Express in October 1963.) Source: JNR,
Survey ofPassenger Traffic Characteristics.
Night
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/
/
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/
/
Day
train 82.4%
55.5'!c
Oct. 1963 Nov. 1964
Fig. 5.6. Use of day and night trains by passengers traveling from Tokyo to Osaka. Source:
JNR, Survey ofPassenger Traffic Characteristics.
TABLE 5.2. Safety ofvarious means of transport (1965-1974)
Sources: Rikuun Toke; Yoran (Land Transport Statistics Handbook); JNR Unten Jiko Tokei
(Operational Accident Statistics); Private Railways Shitetsu Tokei Yoran (Private Railways
Statistics Handbook); Automobile and Aircraft Kotsu Anzen Hakusho (Transport Safety White
Paper).
Traffic volume Deaths Incidence
(A) (B) of deaths
(100 million passenger-km) (persons) (B/A) Index
Railway JNR 19,019 54 0.003 1
(Shinkansen) (2551) (0) (0.000) (0)
(Other lines) (16,468) (54) (0.003) (1)
Private railways 9748 146 0.015 5
Automobile 24,715 45,338 1.834 611
Aircraft 878 437 0.498 166
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HIGH EARNING PERFORMANCE
The cost to the rail traveler consists of the basic fare according to distance,
which is uniform for all JNR trains, plus a surcharge based on the speed of the
train and quality of accommodation. The surcharge for the Shinkansen trains
is, of course, higher than for other lines, so it earns more revenue per unit of
traffic. Costs of travel by the Shinkansen, aircraft and motor vehicles are
given in Table 5.3. Taking into account the additional cost of travel to and
from the airport and the reliability of the services, the Shinkansen is highly
competitive. The Tokaido Shinkansen produced 37010 of JNR's total passenger
revenue in fiscal 1975.
Efficient utilization of facilities has lowered the fixed operating costs per
unit of traffic. As an example, the Tokaido Shinkansen train covers 1.7 times
the distance per day of the limited express on the older Tokaido Line. Labor-
saving methods and simplification of operations have reduced the ratio of
personnel costs on the Shinkansen, as shown in Fig. 5.7, and have increased
productivity per employee, as shown in Fig. 5.8. Energy consumption per unit
of traffic is comparatively small, in spite of the high speed, as shown in Table
5.4, and this is a merit in our energy-sensitive age. The trend in the earning
performance of Shinkansen is given in Fig. 5.9.
EFFECTIVE USE OF MARGIN CREATED ON THE TOKAIDO LINE
The Tokaido Line had already reached a state of saturation in 1964 when the
Tokaido Shinkansen was inaugurated. By absorbing most of the daytime and
nighttime ordinary expresses and all of the daytime limited expresses, the
Tokaido Shinkansen created a margin in the capacity of the Tokaido Line.
This was used for operating more express freight trains and long-distance
sleeping-car limited expresses, which enabled JNR to meet previously
unfulfilled demands. The number and kinds of trains on the Tokaido Line,
before and after the inauguration of the Tokaido Shinkansen, is given in Fig.
5.10.
Impact 00 Regioos A100g the Lioe
REDUCTION OF TIME-DISTANCE
The reduction of time-distance by the Shinkansen widened the scope of a
day's journey. Only now can a businessman leave Tokyo or Osaka by train in
the morning, do business at the other end, and return the same day. Surveys
show that after the opening of the Shinkansen, the number of business trips
has increased while their duration has shortened. Tourism has also been
affected. Tourists tend to make use of the time saved by the Shinkansen by
traveling further, and this is seen in the greater number of vacationers from the
Tokyo area to the Osaka area, and vice versa. However, some hotel operators,
for example, have been adversely affected by the Shinkansen. They find that,
while more people were visiting their localities, less of them needed to stay
overnight in their hotels.
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TABLE 5.3. Cost oftravel between Tokyo and Osaka by various means oftransport
Source: Japan Travel Bureau, Timetables, 1977.
Cost (yen)
Oct. 1964 Apr. 1976 Remarks
Shinkansen (ordinary car)
Aircraft
Express bus
Automobile (per car)
2480
7000
5510
10,400
4200
13,400
Cost of gasoline
+ toll •
·Cost ofgasoline based on 120 yen/liter, at 8 km/liter.
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Fig. 5.7. Composition of Shinkansen and other lines (1974). Source: JNR Shinkansen
Administration, Status ofShinkansen Operation. 1975.
Table 5.5 shows the time saved by using the Tokaido Shinkansen instead of
a limited express on the parallel Tokaido Line, and gives the value of this time,
computed in monetary terms.
URBANIZATION
The Tokaido Shinkansen has not only accelerated the growth of the major
cities on the line, but has also speeded up the transformation of the corridor
into a huge megalopolis. In addition, the ease of travel on the Shinkansen had
an impact on city functions, strengthening or weakening their administrative,
financial and other controlling functions. As a general trend, it may be said
that in the Tokaido region the controlling influence of Tokyo and Osaka,
especially that of Tokyo, is becoming stronger, while that of Nagoya,
sometimes called "the middle capital" , is weakening.
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Fig. 5.10. Tokaido line trains before and after opening of the Shinkansen. Up-trains only between
Shizuoka and Hamamatsu daily. (Figures in parentheses are for sleeper trains and have been
included in the total.) Source: JNR, Train Operation Data.
TABLE 5.4. Energy consumption ofdifferent carriers
Source: Data computed by JNR from Ministry of Industry and Trade, Energy Tokei (Energy
Statistics); Ministry of Transport, Rikuun Tokei Yoran (Land Transport Statistics Handbook);
JNR, Information Systems Department Data.
Passenger
Railway (incl. private
railways)
Shinkansen
Bus
Automobile
Aircraft
kcal/passenger-km
80 (I)
100 (1.3)
120 (1.5)
700 (8.8)
780 (9.8)
Freight
Railway (incl. private
railways)
Truck
Coastal ship
kcal/ton-km
190 (I)
1210 (6.4)
350 (1.8)
Note: Figures in parentheses are indices with railway as I.
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TABLE 5.5 Value of time saved by the Shinkansen
Source: JNR, Impact ofthe Tokaido and Sanyo Shinkansen, 1976
Scheduled Value of time
No. of Average ride speed of Time saved Valueoflhrt saved
passengers per passenger Shinkansen· (million (yen at 1975 (in 100 mil-
Year (thousands) (km) (km/h) hours) prices) lion yen)
1964 11,018 355 112.5 11 542 60
1965 30,%7 343.9 144.4 50 567 284
1966 43,784 330.9 144.4 68 629 428
1967 55,250 324.2 144.6 84 708 595
1968 65,903 319.1 143.5 98 800 784
1969 71,574 318.1 137.1 99 888 879
1970 84,628 329.6 136.5 120 988 1186
1971 84,509 314.0 134.8 112 1075 1204
1972 97,551 304.0 134.9 125 1192 1490
1973 113,080 299.3 136.4 146 1192 1740
·Scheduled speed on non-Shinkansen lines = 86 km/h.
t Value of I hour = GNP/(Working population x 300days x 8h/day).
Expansion of the Shinkansen
EXTENSION TO OKAYAMA AND HAKATA·
The coastal area from Osaka to Fukuoka, consisting of six prefectures,
accounts for 20070 of Japan's population and 33% of her industrial output.
The density of traffic in the area has therefore always been very high,
approaching that of the Tokaido region, and it was feared that the railway line
here would reach saturation point over the entire route by 1973 or 1974. JNR
therefore decided to build the Sanyo Shinkansen as a major project of its
Third Long-Range Seven-Year Plan (1965-1971). After obtaining the Transport
Minister's approval, construction was started in 1968 on the first half from
Shin-Osaka t to Okayama and, 2 years later, on the second half from
Okayama to Hakata. Details of the Sanyo Shinkansen are as follows:
Construction
cost Date of
Section Length (km) Station (billion yen) opening
Shin-Osaka-Okayama 160.9 5 224 15 March 1972
Okayama-Hakata 392.7 10 718 10 March 1975
Sufficient data are not yet available for the Okayama-Hakata section, but,
on the Shin-Osaka-Okayama section, traffic has grown as shown in Table 5.6.
LEGISLATION FOR CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONWIDE SHINKANSEN NETWORK
The rapid economic growth from the latter half of the 1950s was
accompanied by excessive concentration of population and industries in the
major cities, and sparsity of population and decreasing economic activity in
·Hakata is the name of the station in Fukuoka City.
t Shin-Osaka is the name of the Shinkansen station in Osaka City.
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TABLE 5.6. Traffic volume on the Sanyo Shinkansen (Passengers carried in millions; figures in
parentheses indicate passenger-km in 100 mil/ions)
Source: JNR Shinkansen Administration, Railway Statistics, 1975.
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
Total
Between Shin-Osaka
andOkayama
27 (42)
32 (49)
35 (53)
49 (79)
143 (223)
Between Okayama
and Hakata
44 (102)
44 (102)
Between Shin-Osaka
and Hakata
77(181)
77 (181)
rural and outlying areas. On the assumption that a Shinkansen network was
essential to correct this social strain and regional imbalance, the Diet initiated
legislation to this end, which took the form of the Law for Construction of a
Nationwide Shinkansen Network, enacted in May 1970.
Under this law, the Minister of Transport determines the basic plan of the
lines to be constructed, after consulting the Railway Construction Council
which is an advisory to the Minister. This council is composed of Diet
members, vice-ministers of the ministries concerned, experts, the President of
JNR and the President of the Japan Railway Construction Public
Corporation. The basic plan for a 7000-km network, as shown in Fig. 5.11,
was thus conceived. Construction priorities are determined for the routes
making up the network, and construction is then carried out either by JNR or
the Japan Railway Construction Public Corporation. JNR is obligated to
operate all the lines thus built.
LINES UNDER CONSTRUCTION
The first lines designated to be built under the law were: the first stage of the
Tohoku Shinkansen (Tokyo-Morioka, approx. 500 km), the Joetsu
Shinkansen (Tokyo-Niigata, approx. 300 km) and the Narita Shinkansen
(Tokyo-Narita, approx. 65 km). The Tohoku Shinkansen will become a part
of the vital artery along the length of Japan, from Hokkaido to Kyushu. A
section of this line is to be completed early as a test track for further
development of safety measures, environmental preservation measures, and
new technology for the future Shinkansen. The Joetsu Shinkansen will become
the first to cut across the main island from the Pacific to the Japan Sea side.
The Narita Shinkansen will become a high-speed link between the Tokyo city
center and the new international airport to open soon. The construction tempo
of these lines has slowed down in the last few years owing to the Government's
policy of cutting down public spending.
LINES TO BE CONSTRUCTED
It was subsequently decided to construct the following lines, which are being
investigated and surveyed for the preparation of detailed construction plans:
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Second stage of Tohoku Shinkansen
Hokkaido Shinkansen
Hokuriku Shinkansen
Kyushu Shinkansen
Morioka-Aomori
Aomori-Sapporo
Tokyo-Osaka (via Toyama)
{
Fukuoka-Kagoshima
Fukuoka-Nagasaki
170
370
590
270
120
The Hokkaido and the Tohoku Shinkansen will be connected by the Seikan
Undersea Tunnel at present under construction. Linking the main island of
Honshu and Hokkaido, it will be approximately 54 km long, and on
completion will be the longest tunnel in the world.
OTHER LINES PROPOSED IN THE BASIC PLAN
Twelve more lines, totaling 3500 km, are proposed in the basic plan, two of
which are to link Honshu and Shikoku islands via a series of double-decked
railway-highway bridges. Of these bridges, the Akashi Kaikyo Bridge, with
a center span of 1780 meters, will be the world's longest suspension bridge.
Future Problems
ENVIRONMENTAL
It was rapid economic growth that gave rise to the urgent need for the
Shinkansen and brought about its great success. This economic growth and the
resulting affluence, however, has changed people's attitudes and values. In the
early years of the Shinkansen, when the people concentrated more on making
a living, it was the high speed and convenience of the Shinkansen that caught
their attention. With the rise in living standards, their aspirations turned not
only to homes of their own, but homes in a good environment. Thus, the
problems of noise and vibration of the Shinkansen came to the fore, as was the
case with motor vehicles and aircraft. This problem now carries so much
weight that difficulties are being met in constructing new lines in built-up areas
and city peripheries. In 1975 the Environment Agency issued a notification
setting the noise limit at 70 dB (A) and 75 dB (A). While JNR has made some
progress in reducing noise as a result of research and development work in the
field, it is still technically difficult to meet the limitations in an economic way.
FINANCIAL
The success of the Tokaido Shinkansen brought new hope and confidence to
railroading, and, as expected, the Sanyo Shinkansen is also achieving good
results. This is why the Tohoku Shinkansen and the Joetsu Shinkansen are
looked forward to with the same expectations, and why a nationwide
Shinkansen network has been planned.
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Internally, however, this has brought about another problem, a financial
one. Difficulties are being met in the procurement of construction funds. In
addition, the lines to be constructed in the latter stage will not be so
remunerative as the earlier ones; some would possibly operate at a deficit,
since they will be routed through lighter traffic areas. The lines constructed so
far have been demand-following, but if, from social policy, demand-leading
lines, which are not always profitable, are to be built, there would have to be
some form of external subsidy. In this connection, it should be noted that JNR
as a whole has been showing a deficit since 1964, not because of the
Shinkansen, which has had very favorable financial results, but because of the
local lines operating in very light traffic areas, which cannot be closed. The
Government has started to give financial aid for this situation.
The Government is at present re-examining the Shinkansen network project
in the light of these conditions, and will announce its stand in the Third
Comprehensive National Development Plan, to be made public in the near
future.
ULTRA-HIGH-SPEED RAILWAY
The demand for high-speed transport is rising, and there has been a great
increase in the use of aircraft for long-distance travel. The disadvantage of
aircraft, however, lies in its small potential for mass transport. Existing
airports will need to be expanded or new ones built, but this will be extremely
difficult from the viewpoint of land procurement and environmental
preservation.
Research and development work is in progress in JNR for a non-
conventional railway system aiming at speeds up to 500 km/h. This is the
superconducting magnet-levitated, linear-motor propelled vehicle. In 1972 a
quarter-scale model was successfully tested, and a 7-km experimental
guideway is now being built to test a half-scale model. It is hoped that this will
also solve the noise problem.
When the Tokaido Shinkansen was built, it was called the "Dream
Superexpress". The day of the "New Dream Superexpress" may be coming.
Socio-Economic Impact:
Models and Applications

6. Determination of Socio-Economic
Impact: Problems for Consideration
M. ALBEGOV
The object of this section is to discuss the socio-economic impacts of the
Shinkansen; to this end four groups of problems that are important for IIASA
and for its international activities should be emphasized.
The first type of problem area deals with the impacts of large programs on
the economic and social life of a country. An approach to resolution of these
impacts is treated in the paper by S. Okabe where he examines the feasibility of
the growth of two regions in Japan after the completion of a Shinkansen trunk
line. The paper points out the influence of the Shinkansen on the growth of
tourism, and the effect this growth has on the size of hotels, restaurants, and
construction which in turn leads to increased demand for construction
products such as cement. Another approach which could also give similar
results would be to utilize calculations based on input-output balances. This
would, however, require a good knowledge of all types of impacts and
integrated input-output models corresponding to the task under investigation.
If one can estimate the impacts of large projects on a national economy on a
qualitative basis, the problem of measuring social impacts still remains. One
way to resolve this difficulty may be to formulate a scenario of regional
development and to compare the value of objective functions. The problem is
treated in the discussion part of this section.
The second area of concern to IIASA is the methodological problem of
estimating the economic effects of large programs. The first question in this
category is how to delineate the task under consideration from the viewpoint
of the national economy. How can we find boundaries of the problem in which
expansion does not influence the results of the analysis? How can approach
variants be compared in order to obtain the value of economic effectiveness?
K. Amano deals with these topics in his paper by comparing two variants with
Shinkansen and without Shinkansen. In his example the variants are different,
not only from the viewpoint of final results, but also from that of required
capital investment and other important data. It is not clear, though, what kind
of technical improvement might be included in the ordinary railway variant. It
may be that there exists an intermediate variant which is more effective than
the first two. The comparison of variants in order to obtain results concerning
the economic effectiveness of large programs is a very important matter.
The third area of concern deals with the mathematical modeling of large
economic programs. This problem is treated in the paper by N. Sakashita, and
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brings out some important characteristics. It is well known that many types of
models exist that deal with regional, industrial, transportation and other large
systems. These models are usually quite complicated and require significant
efforts in their application. Additional effort would be required on the part of
model-builders in general to pool knowledge on model building, incorporate
common characteristics of successful models, and apply the results in other
models designed to solve related but different problems. As an international
institute, IIASA is interested in spreading such knowledge and experience.
An additional problem is that most authors of models emphasize the
strengths of their models and avoid the weaknesses. This, of course, applies to
me and I think also to the majority of model-builders. It is indeed important to
stress the positive features of a model, but it is also important to point out
those aspects of a model which need improvement. It is well known that there
are many approaches and techniques which could be used to analyze large-
scale programs; it would appear beneficial to combine different approaches
and techniques in concrete situations in order to achieve a better
understanding of the problem.
The nature of this conference on the Shinkansen is basically retrospective,
but, as shown in the presentations in this section, IIASA and the international
community can use retrospective experience to improve future planning
processes: to determine what is useful for prospective planning, to determine
marginal time horizons, and to determine how far a model may be extended
into the future before validity is questioned.
The papers presented in this section, and the discussion which follows,
should help to clarify much of the current effort in Japan and other countries
to determine the socio-economic effects of large-scale planning programs.
7. Regional Economic Impact of the
Shinkansen
K.AMANO
Introduction
We proposed, in 1970, a model to estimate the long-term global economic
effects of transportation facility projects [1]. We also described the results
obtained from applying the model to a comparison of the economic effects of
hypothetical plans for alternative bridge construction between the Japanese
mainland and the Shikoku island. This model has already been applied for
estimating the regional economic effects of various large-scale projects for
transport facilities in Japan [2].
In this paper, the basic structure of the model is described and the economic
effects estimated by the model of the Tokaido Shinkansen are given as an
example.
Model of the Economic Effect of Improving Transportation Facilities
We proposed an econometric model to analyze the long-term total economic
effect and regional economic effect of improving transportation facilities. The
interregional 1-0 analysis has been expanded dynamically through this
research, modeling the variations in trade pattern coefficient and input
coefficient caused by improvement of transportation facilities. Thus the 1-0
analysis has been rid of its weakest point, which is formed by cross-sectional
data, and has been developed to become suitable for long-term estimation of
transportation facilities improvement.
A system chart of this model is shown in Fig. 7.1, and the main points are as
follows. The savings on interregional transportation costs by improving
transportation facilities changes the trade pattern coefficient and input
coefficient. First, this process was analyzed and clarified in a proposed
mathematical model. Then, using the econometric model, it was shown that
variation in these structural coefficients changes the present economic indices
as well as the future final demand and interregional trade pattern coefficient,
and that improvement of transportation facilities changes the regional
economic structure cumulatively year by year.
This econometric model has the following five features.
An econometric model for estimating the trade pattern coefficient, which
determines the trade pattern endogenously, was developed. In this model three
economic indices are used as variables: capital stock, interregional transport
cost, and other local conditions by region and industry.
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The variation of the input coefficient from the transport sector and the
additional value in each region and industry affected by the savings in
transport costs is given endogenously by a theoretical equation. Thus, by this
model we have solved the problem of the inelasticity of the input coefficient
and the trade pattern coefficient, which is usually considered the weakest point
in 1-0 analysis, and we utilized these two coefficients as policy variables for
including the saving in transport costs in the econometric model.
The model is constituted so that the vector of the regional final demands is
determined endogenously by the economic indices of the previous year. Thus a
time series continuity can be given to the model.
We could increase the precision of this model, using the interregional
transaction sum calculated by interregional 1-0 analysis, to estimate the
interregional traffic volume and the population migration. This can be
considered one of the great advantages of our model, which includes the
interregional 1-0 analysis.
Traffic capacity is checked endogenously, and it is ascertained that the
estimated interregional traffic volume is not a latent demand but a real
solution, and that transport costs between regions will be changed
mechanically as a result of a check on traffic capacity.
For example, three partial models in the econometric global model are given
below.
MODEL FOR INTERREGIONAL TRAFFIC ASSIGNMENT RAnos BY COMMODITY
The first problem is to estimate how each user responds to changes in money
costs and time costs.
Each user will select the most desirable transportation route. Consequently,
the interregional traffic assignment ratio of each facility will be changed. This
change is estimated by the following equation:
..!..+
n
frs
k i traffic assignment ratio of commodity i by transportation facility k
between regions rand s ;
n = number of transport routes existing between r and s ;
bi , ci positive constants for each commodity;
k w? = time cost by transport route k ;
km;s = money cost by transport route k.
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This suggests that if some traffic routes exist between two regions, the traffic
assignment ratio of each route will be determined as a function of the cost
differentials in terms of time and money.
TRANSPORT COST BETWEEN REGIONS
As a result of the variation in the traffic assignment ratio, the interregional
transport cost estimated by the next equation will be changed. This cost, vr.s,
which represents the total cost or loss of transporting one unit of commodity;
from region r to region s, is shown by
rs rs rs
V = m j + \w jj
n n
(2)
rs /'/ rs rs /'/ rsm = ~ kmj W ~ kWjj k = 1 j k = 1
In this equation, Xj is the transformation ratio of time cost to money cost.
Using bi and Cj of equ. (1), the value of Ai in equ. (2) is estimated by:
b.
Aj = -.!..c j
(3)
The reasoning is as follows. Each passenger or cargo owner selects the route
which minimizes the total transport cost after comparing the money cost and
time cost for each transport route. Assuming that this result is expressed in the
present traffic share, the ratio of the partial derivatives of the assignment ratio
with respect to time cost and money cost is
This can be regarded as the value ratio of time cost to money cost for cargo
owners or carriers.
MODEL FOR THE TRADE-PATTERN COEFFICIENT
In the perfect market a buyer will select freely from the same commodities
which many suppliers offer at their prices, and commodities of the same
quality will remain at the same price.
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For each business enterprise, the profit motive is a dominant factor to the
supplier, and therefore, whether or not a supplier offers his goods on the
market seems to depend on the difference
where c'S = p' + v'S
; 0; ;
P' dpro uction cost of commodity; in region, ;0;
V ,S ftransportation cost 0 the commodity; to region S ;;
pS : the price of the commodity; in market S •;
Since the price p/ appears to be determined subsequently by the equilibrium
of demand and supply, the dimensions of C~s can be said to control the
relative merits or competitive potential of each supply region r to the demand
region s.
Proceeds of sales for each supplier within a definite period of time will not
be estimated until the end of the period. A supplier for a demand region is
usually not single but multiple, since suppliers compete with one another, and
in that case, the larger the total cost C~s the weaker the relative competitive
potential to region s. So the supply shar~ from region r in the whole demand in
region s will decrease. We shall assume accordingly that
(4)
That is to say, if all indices except the total cost C~sare equal in each region
I
r, the supplying share will decrease through an exponential function accordjng
to C7 We assume the exponential function because it is convenient for the
calculation.
On the other hand, when the competitive potential of each supply region r to
demand region s is the same, i.e. that C;s are equal, the sales share forms a
supply region to the total demand from the demand region, which seems to be
in proportion to the productive capacity S~i in the region. So we assume that
'st.
I
0: S'
0; (5)
This can also be explained by the domain problem as follows. Assume that a
domain r which has productive capacity S~; is divided into two domains S~:
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and S:~. If these two domains have the same conditions except for
productive capacity, the trade pattern coefficients to a demand region s can be
said to be as follows.
t ~lS {~2S = S'l S'2
I I 0; 0;
provided that ' 1 S +
'2 S t~S .t; t i I
We prefer the sum of capital stock of the industry at the beginning of the
period as an index of the productive capacity in the region r, S~i in equ. (5).
Then, using equs. (4) and (5), we have
t'S k~ K r x b C'S; I F e i ;;
m
Substituting ~ 's =1t ,
, =1 ;
k~ 1
I m (6)~ K ' x b C~s
, =1 F e i I;
Thus the model for the trade pattern coefficient is written as:
K 'F;
m
~
, = 1
(7)
OTHER PARTIAL MODELS
Full details of the following partial models can be found in [I, pp. 300-306].
Space does not permit a description here.
Variation of input coefficient from the transport sector and variation of
value-added coefficient.
Output by region and industry.
Value-added, income-produced, and personal income.
Model for regional population.
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Improvement of
TransportationXl =< [1 - T, Atl-'
H!
", Facilities
dL - - - - L--!'C!'_j+------7----7----L ---.J:~- ,J r
L _
where
X = IX ',J = output vector;
1 = unit matrix;
T =< [//5 1= trade pattern coefficient matrix;
A = [a:i] = input coefficient matrix;
y, = [y;,], y, = [Y;;] = final demand vectors
----> = represents time lags.
Fig. 7.2. Summary of the model.
Employment by region and industry.
Freight flows between regions.
Capital stock by region and industry.
Final demand vector.
Balance between transport demand and transport capacity.
A summary of the entire model is shown in Fig. 7.2.
Application of the Proposed Model to the Tokaido Shinkansen
The proposed model for the traffic investment effect is on the expanded
interregional 1-0 analysis. In applying the model, we can therefore estimate
the economic effect of improving transportation facilities for all economic
indices by region and industry. All the economic indices are closely combined,
as shown in Fig. 7.1, and they are kept in a balanced condition in every cross-
sectional term.
In 1970 we estimated the regional economic effects of various large-scale
projects for transport facilities in Japan, applying this model. Output data on
these assumptions are shown in Table 7.1.
Case I: Various transportation facilities, including the Tokaido
Shinkansen, are actually improved.
Case 2: Supposed condition that the Tokaido Shinkansen is not
constructed.
The differences in regional economic indices (Case 1)-(Case 2) are
considered to be the influence which the Tokaido Shinkansen has produced
exclusively.
Japan was divided into nine regions, as shown in Fig. 7.3. All coefficients
and necessary data for this model, the outline of which was explained in
previous sections, were obtained for these nine regions. The estimate extended
from 1960 to 1970 in each case. The exogenous changes in interregional
transport money cost, time cost and capacity were given for 1961, 1965 and
1968. The estimated results for each case and the differences between cases
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TABLE7.l. Output data
Region Industry
l. Capital stock by region and industry 9 x 10
2. Final demand by region and sector 9 x 8
(demand sector)
3. Industrial capital investment by region and industry 9 x to
4. Sum of export by region and industry 9 x to
5. Interregional traffic assignment ratio by industry 9x9 x 7
6. Change of transport cost between regions by goods 9x9 x 7
7. Interregional trade pattern coefficient by goods 9x9 x 7
8. Increment of trade pattern coefficient by goods from 1960s 9x9 x 7
9. Input coefficient and additional value rate from transport
sector 9 x to
to. Production sum by region and industry 9 x to
II. Primary, secondary, tertiary production sum by region 9 x 3
12. Annual increasing rate of production sum by region and
industry 9 x to
13. Additional value by region and industry 9 x 10
14. Primary. secondary and tertiary additional value by region 9 x 3
15. Interregional transaction sum by goods 9x9 x to
16. Interregional migrating population 9x9
17. Production and individual income by region 9 x 2 (income)
18. Primary. secondary and tertiary industry-occupied
population by region 9 x 3
19. Interregional freight traffic volume by transport facilities and
goods 9x9 x 3x7
20. Interregional traffic volume of passengers by object 9x9 x 2
(section) (by object)
2l. Traffic volume of passing freight by section and traffic
route 14 x 3
22. Traffic volume of departure and arrival by region and
transport facilities 9 x 3
Fig. 7.3. Regional divisions.
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were obtained for each year. Figures 7.7 - 7.8 show an example of the
difference in effects between Case 1 and Case 2.
The trade-pattern coefficient showed what percentage of the total demand
for a particular commodity in a region was supplied from each region. For
example, the rate of self-supply of chemical goods in Tohoku, as shown in Fig.
7.4 (a), was forecast as 37.9OJo in 1970, and the remaining 62.1 OJo was supplied
from the other eight regions. But in Case 2 the rate of self-supply of Tohoku
would be decreased by 0.8OJo and dependence on Kanto and Kinki would be
increased by 0.1 OJo and 0.3OJo, respectively, in Case 2.
In Fig. 7.5 (a), the industrial output of the machinery industry for each
region is shown in Case 1 for 1960, 1966, and 1970, respectively. The
difference between Cases 1 and 2 is shown in this figure. For example, the
Tokai region had a larger output as a result of the construction of the Tokaido
Shinkansen, but the Tohoku, Shikoku, and Chugoku regions would
experience decreased industrial output. Similarly Fig. 7.5 (b) shows the effects
on total output. It is seen from the figure that the Tokaido Shinkansen is
advantageous to the total national output and, in particular, was to bring the
Tokai and Kinki regions an increase in output of 432 and 243 billion yen,
respectively, in 1970.
Figure 7.6 shows the effect of the Tokaido Shinkansen on the value added for
each region in 1970. In this figure we can see the great economic effect of the
Tokaido Shinkansen on the national total (except for agriculture and mining).
Two regions along the railway line receive particularly large positive impacts.
The number of workers by region and industry is shown in Fig. 7.7. The
national total number of workers was to be increased by 57,000 in 1970 due to
the construction of the Tokaido Shinkansen. But the converse is shown in some
regions. Figure 7.8 shows the number of travelers for business and pleasure
between Kanto and the other eight regions and between Kinki and the other
eight regions. The differences between Cases 1 and 2 are also shown. For
example, the business travelers from Kinki to Kanto number about 36.2
million persons in Case 1 for 1970. The Tokaido Shinkansen increases this
number by 9.9 million.
Similar data were obtained for other items: for example, total income
produced, individual income, population, and freight flow in each year and
region. The economic effects of the Tokaido Shinkansen can be judged from
these data.
Conclusions
The conclusions drawn from our assumptions on the regional economic
effects of the Tokaido Shinkansen are:
(a) The effect of the Tokaido Shinkansen on the national total in 1970
would increase by the industrial output by 220 billion yen ($730 million)
and increase production income by 62 billion yen ($207 million). Thus
the Tokaido Shinkansen will continue to make a great contribution to
the economic activity of Japan.
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National Totals:
1960 4,818.058(billionj
1966 10,624.394 yen
1970 16,075.488
National (billiO)
Totals yen
100,000
~ 90.DOO(b) Case 180,0007O.ClXI
National Totals:
1960 39,099.857 (billionl
1966 70,005.293 yen /
1970 97,307.940
National Totals:
1966 = 59,747 [million)
1970 = 49,966 yen
(million yen)
Case 1 - Case 2
-2,607.1
4320 .,
National Totals:
1966 = 422,819(million)
1970 = 225,841 yen
Fig. 7.5. (a) Output of machinery by region. (b) Total output by region.
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Fig. 7.8. (a) Business travelers, Kamo, 1970, for Case 1and Case 2. (b) Tourists, Kamo, 1970,
for Case I and Case 2. (c) Business travelers, Kinki, 1970, for Case I and Case 2. (d) Tourists,
Kinki, 1970, for Case I and Case 2. Note: Case 2 is indicated in parentheses and by shaded areas.
All figures in units of 1000 persons.
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(b) The Tokaido Shinkansen will accelerate the concentration of population
and industries on the central Pacific coast, for example in the Tokai,
Kinki, and Kanto regions.
The model seems to be capable of comparing the effects of improving
various transportation facilities if it is applied to various traffic projects in
Japan. We can therefore expect effective information when choosing an
optimum future transportation system in the context of regional planning.
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Appendix
A study was carried out under the direction of K. Amano for the Ministry of
Transportation and JNR on the future options for transportation system
development in Japan. In this study the trade pattern coefficient model was
used. Some characteristics of the study are given in this Appendix.
Shinkansen Railways
Expressways
Fig. 7A.\. Proposed layouts of transportation facilities.
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Shinkansen Railways
Expressways
Fig. 7A.1. (contd)
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TABLE 7A.I. Characteristics ofcases - cumulative length and construction costs
Shinkansen railways Expressways Total
Totallength Const. cost Totallength Const. cost construction
(km) (billion $) (km) (billion $) cost
Existing in 1971
Proposed {case I
for Case 2
1985 Case 3
Case 4
Outputs
(102 billion yen)
160
1540
3800
1540
3800
600
5667
13,933
5667
13,933
731
2509
2509
5974
5974
1700
5867
5867
13,933
13,933
2300
11,533
19,800
19,600
27,867
10
'i
6
4
6~24 2° Tohoku
2 -
_~ Ilokuriku
I
2~o .
-2 Hokka1do
Fig. 7A.2. Case deviations of outputs by region, 1987.
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8. Application of the Spatial Econometric
Model (SPAMETRI) to the Evaluation of
the Economic Effects of the Shinkansen *
N. SAKASHITA
1. Introduction
A number ofeconometric models have been developed in Japan which trace
the interregional structure of post-war economic growth and forecast the
impact of given regional allocations of public investment; see, for example,
Economic Planning Agency of Japan (1968), Amano and Fujita (1970), and
Fukuchi (1972). However, there exists in these models a certain imbalance
between the treatment of the demand side and the supply side, and this may
affect the accuracy of the long-range forecasting ability of the models. For
example, the model used by the Economic Planning Agency tended to
emphasize the supply side, even though use was made of somewhat
problematical income determination functions. By contrast, the Amano-Fujita
model was more or less biased toward the demand side, although this
approach was based on the input-output analysis.
Outside Japan a comprehensive forecasting model has been developed by
Meyer and others to evaluate the total effect of transport investment in a
particular area of a country; see Meyer (1971). This model made extensive use
of national and regional input-output techniques and of the concept of
regional productive capacities, thus permitting important spatial dimensions
to be included in the Macroeconomic Transport Simulation (METS) model.
Even this model, however, is not completely free from the aforementioned
problem of imbalance. In particular, changes in the spatial structure of a
national economy as a result of transport investment are not fully treated, and
this could be a fatal weakness in interregional simulation models of this kind.
Attention might also be drawn to the following less serious defects of the
model: the lack of interdependence between the quantity supplied and the
quantity demanded in each region which must be at least partially
interconnected through regional intermediate demand; the failure to
•A substantial part of this paper is a partial reproduction of a previous paper by the author.
Sakashita (1974).
Additional computation for the Shinkansen Study was performed in cooperation with the
Institute of Beh'avioral Science in Tokyo. Special credit should be given to Mr. Kunihisa and Mr.
Oka of the Institute for their kind help to the author.
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differentiate between regional income produced and regional disposable
income which ignores the question of interregional income flows (an
important factor for policy intervention); the oversimplified lag structure, etc.
In the study reported here an attempt has been made to overcome these
difficulties in the original METS model by making several major
modifications to the system, with particular emphasis on the role of distance
variables in the formation of regional productive capacities. At the same time
we have tried to utilize fully the available economic theories of intermodal
transport choice among competitive facilities. In estimating the large number
of parameters involved, the calibration method in the original METS model
was not adopted. Instead, a conventional econometric estimation technique
was employed. Overall application of the usual simultaneous estimation
method was out of the question in view of the tremendous size of the model,
relative to the availability of time-series data. In order to avoid this problem, it
was necessary to build a recursive structure into the model except in the
expenditure functions submodel. The model to be discussed here is referred to
as the Spatial Econometric Model for Japan (SPAMETRI). In the next
section, an outline of the model is provided by means of a flow chart, and all
symbols are defined in Section 3. The complete framework of our simulation
model is presented in Sections 4 through 11.
2. Analytical Purpose and its Outline of the Model
As indicated above, the analytical purpose of the model is to evaluate the
interregional effect of a nation-wide transport investment project. A project of
this dimension would undoubtedly change the spatial structure of the national
economy drastically, so that traditional techniques of cost-benefit analysis
which hinge upon ceteris paribus assumptions are hardly applicable to the
evaluation of the total impact of the project. The only available analytical
technique to deal with situations of this kind appears to be systems analysis,
and it was for this reason that the SPAMETRI was developed. This model
deals with the spatial and intertemporal allocation of transport investment, as
well as all other public investments. Social capital is divided into three parts:
Social Capital A, relating to transportation facilities; Social Capital B, relating
to industrial production; and Social Capital C (the remainder), relating mainly
to social welfare facilities.
The whole structure of SPAMETRI is divided into two major parts:
Production-Expenditure Model and Traffic-Transport Model. Outlines of
these two parts are presented as flow charts in Figs. 8.1(a), (b), (c), and Figs.
8.2(a),(b). In addition, a more understandable summary chart is given in
Fig.8.3. As can been seen from Fig. 8.3 particularly, the structure of
SPAMETRI is relatively simple and ordinary, except for a unique concept of
"time distance" or "accessibility of the region" variables which will be
explained in Section 4. Nevertheless, because of the multidimensional
character of the model resulting from its interregional setting, the number of
equations becomes extremely large.
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Reduced form of
the 8)(penditure
functions model
M = 1•...•9
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TC = E RCIMI
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Fig. 8.1. Flow chart of the production-expenditure model. (a)
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RV'(I,MJ
• RVII,M).{TV·/TVEWI
in market value
~-- -_L_-Irom
Fig, 8.1. (b)
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Fig. 8.1. (c)
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Fig. 8.2. Flow chart of the traffic-transport model. (a)
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Fig. 8.2. (b)
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VARIABLES
FLOW (X,Y,R)
FLOWP (X,Y,R)
DIST (X,Y,R)
DISTP (X,Y,R)
COST (X,Y,R)
COSTP (X,Y,R)
TVP (I)
TK(I)
TN (I)
TSB
TVP
RVP (I,M)
RK(I,M)
RN(I,M)
RSB(M)
RVP (M)
RW(M)
RV (I,M)
TIM
RC(M)
RH(M)
RPOP(M)
RINV (I,M)
RJ(M)
RGC(M)
RGJ (M)
RGINV(M)
TC
TINV
TJ
TGC
TGINV
TV (I)
TE
TIMP
RIMP (M)
RE(M)
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3. Notation
total commodity flow from location X to location Y
by transportation mode R;
passenger flow from location X to location Y by
transportation mode R;
time-distance for commodities from location X to
location Y by transportation mode R;
time-distance for passengers from location X to
location Y by transportation mode R;
= transport cost for commodities from location X to
location Y by transportation mode R;
transport cost for passengers from location X to
location Y by transportation mode R;
= national potential output of industry I;
national capital stock of industry I;
national employment of industry I;
national social capital stock of category B;
national potential output;
= potential output of industry I in region M;
capital stock of industry in region M;
employment of industry I in region M;
= social capital stock of category B in region M;
potential output in region M;
personal income in region M;
realized income produced by industry I in region M;
year by Showa calendar (1975 = S50);
private consumption expenditure in region M;
= private housing investment in region M;
population of region M;
private fixed investment of industry I in region M;
private inventory investment in region M;
government current expenditure in region M;
government inventory investment in region M;
government fixed investment in region M;
national private consumption expenditure;
national private fixed investment;
national private inventory investment;
national government current expenditure;
= national government fixed investment;
= national realized income produced by industry I;
national exports;
national imports;
= foreign imports into region M;
foreign exports from region M;
RDEM(J,M)
RSVP (J,M)
FLOW (J ,M,N)
FLOW (J,M,N,R)
RATIO (J,M,N,R)
FLOWP(M,N)
FLOWP (M,N,R)
RATIOP (M,N,R)
RKA(M,R)
RINVA(M,R)
RSZ(M)
GROWTH (X)
RN(M)
ACC(M)
ACCP(M)
DlSTO (M)
DlSTI (M)
FLOWD(J,M)
FLOWO(J,M)
PARAMETERS
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total demand for commodity J in region M;
total supply of commodity J in region M;
flow of commodity J from region M to region N;
flow of commodity J from region M to region N by
transportation mode R;
FLOW (J,M,N,R)/FLOW (J,M,N) = assignment
ratio of transportation for commodity J;
flow of passengers from region M to region N;
flow of passengers from region M to region N by
transportation mode R;
FLOWP (M,N,R)/FLOW (M,N) = assignment ratio
of transportation for passengers;
private capital stock of transportation facilities of
mode R in region M;
private fixed investment of transportation facilities of
mode R in region M;
social capital stock of category Z in region M;
Z = A(R),B,C;
growth rate of variable X;
total employment in region M;
accessibility of region M;
passenger accessibility of region M;
outer time-distance of region M;
inner time-distance of region M;
arrived flow of commodity J in region M;
generated flow of commodity J in region M.
Al(), Bl 0, ... , B2(), ... = constant coefficients of equations;
VA(I,M) = coefficient of value added of industry 1 in region M.
DIMENSIONS
I,J = 1,2,3 = industries or commodities (primary, secondary, tertiary);
M,N = 1, ... ,9 = regions of Japan (1 = Hokkaido,2 = Tohoku,3
Kanto, 4 = Tokai, 5 = Hokuriku, 6 = Kinki, 7 = Chugoku, 8 =
Shikoku, 9 = Kyushu);*
R = 1,2,3,4 = modes of transportation (railway, automobile, shipping,
aviation).
OBSERVAnON PERIODS OF VARIABLES
1955 1970 for economic and demographic variables;
1961 1970 for transport variables.
*In this classification, Hokkaido contains one prefecture, there are seven in Tohoku, nine in
Kanto, four in Tokai, three in Hokuriku, six in Kinki, five in Chugoku, four in Shikoku, and
seven in Kyushu, which make forty-six prefectures in Japan, excluding Okinawa.
89
4. Hierarcbical Definitions of tbe Time-Distance Variable
It is impossible to explain all the details of SPAMETRI in this short article.
We therefore concentrate on some key components of the model. Let us start
from the definition of the time-distance variables.
The time-distance variables play an important role as an argument of each
relevant production function. A concrete account of this will be given later.
BASIC DATA
DIST (MP,NQ,R) == time-distance (for commodities) from a central location
in prefecture P in region M to a central location in prefecture Q in region M by
transportation mode R (M ~ N; P *" Q).
INSIDE DISTANCE OF PREFECTURES
DIST (MP,MP,R) 1 ~ 41 DIST (MP,MPN,R)
NUM(MPN)MPN
= time-distance within prefecture P in region M
by transportation mode R;
MPN = neighboring prefecture to MP;
NUM (MPN) = number of MPNs.
The constant Y<! is derived from a theoretical assumption that the level of
economic activity at the point having a distance r from the center of the
prefecture is expressed by f(r) == a-br.
DISTANCE WITHIN AND BETWEEN REGIONS BY MODE
~ ~ FLOW· (MP,MQ,R) DIST (MP,MQ,R)
MP NQ
DIST (M,M,R) =
FLOW· (MP,MQ,k)
MP MQ
= time-distance within region M by transportation mode
R(P ;ZQ).
~ ~ FLOW· (MP,NQ,R) DIST (MP,NQ,R)
MP NQ
DIST (M,N,R)
~ ~ FLOW· (MP,NQ,R)
MP NQ
distance from region M to region N by transportation
mode R (M =1= N).
Note the asymmetry: DIST (M,N,R) =1= DIST (N,M,R).
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DISTANCE WITHIN AND BETWEEN REGIONS
~ FLOW· (M,N,R) DIST (M,N,R)
R
DIST (M,N) =
~ FLOW· (M,N,R)
R
= average time distance from region M to region N
(M*N).
Note the asymmetry: DIST (M,N) =1= DIST (N,M) when M =1= N.
DISTANCE OF REGIONS AND NAnON
~ FLOW· (M,N) DIST (M,N) + ~ FLOW· (N,M) DIST (N,M)
N N
DISTO (M) =------------------
~ FLOW· (M,N) + FLOW· (N,M)
N
(M *N)
DISTI (M) =
DIST
DIST(M,M)
~ ~ FLOW· (M,N) DIST (M,N)
MN
~ ~ FLOW· (M,N)
MN
(M;%N)
ACCESSIBILITY OF REGIONS
ACC(M) =
1 + DISTO (M) + DISTI (M)
In the above formulation, FLOW· implies that these terms are not actual flow
Quantities (i.e. FLOW) but smoothed values of the latter. If we express the
element of the origin and destination table concerning FLOW by xij, its row
sum by Xi., and its column sum by x.j, the smoothed values are calculated by
the following formula:
where
x.•
X. x·I. .]
x..
~ x· =I.
i
~ x·
.]
i
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TABLE 8.1. DlSTjor/963-/968 (hr)
1963
1964
1965
1966
1%7
1968
30.92
29.21
29.58
28.61
27.56
26.04
The first reason for this smoothing is that the individual elements of our
origin and destination data showed quite irregular fluctuations (especially
compared to their marginal sums), so that they could not be used as
appropriate weighting factors. A second and more important reason is that
these time-distance variables are assumed to represent potential accessibility
indices of the regions and not their actual weighted averages. For this purpose
the above formulation is felt to be more suitable. Some of the findings relating
to intertemporal changes in the distances of regions are shown in Table 8.1.
For the passengers' trip, the variables of DISTIP and DISTOP are treated
similarly. In the case of DISTOP, however, IFLOWp· (MP, NQ, R) +
FLOWp· (NQ, MP, R)J are used as weights in order to eliminate the
asymmetry regarding origin and destination so that DISTOP (M,N,R) =
DISTOP (N,M,R), etc.
The variables ACCP (M) derived from DISTOP (M) and DISTIP (M) play
an important role in the Shinkansen Study because they reflect the impact of
Shinkansen construction most directly.
5. Expenditure Functions Model
In this submodel, such real-term endogenous variables as RV, RW, RC,
RH, RGC, and RIMP are explained by a set of six linear expenditure
equations and one identity for each region. Using the data of 1955-1970, the
parameters of the structural equations are estimated by the two-stage least-
squares method applied to each region one by one. In this estimation, the
national income produced, TV, is treated as if it is a predetermined variable.
For that purpose, a nation-wide expenditure model is estimated by the 2SLS
method, and the time series of TV calculated from the final test of estimated
national model is used for the regional estimation of expenditure functions
model.
Sixty-three ( = 7 x 9 ) equations of the expenditure functions model with
one definitional relation of
TV = ~ RV(M)
M
are treated simultaneously in the expost facto simulation (fmal test) of this model.
If the result of this simulation is contrasted with that of the similar simulation
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performed with the national expenditure functions model, we observe very
small "disaggregation" biases ranging from -3.2l1Jo to 1.2l1Jo. This consequence
implies strong homogeneity among different regions in Japan with regard to
the expenditure behavior.
Needless to say, the model in this section is a typical Keynesian model of
effective demand.
6. Investment Functions Model and Capital Accumulation
For the secondary and tertiary industries, national investment functions of
the following form are estimated by the 1955-1970 data:
TINV (I) = ex (I) + 13 (I) { TV (I) - TVP (I) _.}
+ 'Y (I) TINV (I) -1 , I = 2,3.
Then TINV (I)'s are disaggregated into RINV (I,M) by the following formula:
RINV(I,M)
TINV (I)
= ex (I,M)
{RSA (M) + RSB (M)} -1
+ 13 (I)
1: {RSA (N) + RSB (N) }-1
N
+ 'Y(I)
RINV (I,M) -1
1: RINV (I,N) -1
N
1: ex (I,M) + 13 (I) + 'Y (I) == 1,
M
I = 2,3.
For the primary industry, the following investment functions are estimated
separately for all regions:
RINV(I,M) = ex (I,M) + 13 (I,M){RV(I,M)_1 -RVP(I,M)_d
+ 'Y (I,M) RINV (I,M) -1.
Capital accumulations are depicted by the following equations for both the
private capital stock and the social capital stock:
(capital stock) = ex (capital stock) -1 + (investment).
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7. Production Functions Model
The production functions with the variable elasticity of substitution are
estimated for three industries in all regions. Their general form is:
RV = exp {aD + a1 ACC -I} .{u (RK-1)} a2
RSZ
x (RN) a3 + as log --
RN
I RSZ+ a4 og--
RK_1
in which u is the degree of utilization of the capital stock. The values of u are
estimated by the actual time series of output-capital ratio for each industry.
To obtain the potential production functions in which RV is replaced by RVP,
u is set to be unity.
As RSZ variables, RSB is used for the primary and secondary industries,
and RSB or RSC is used for the tertiary industry. In addition, the ACC
variable is replaced by the ACCP variable in the tertiary industry in order to
clarify the role of Shinkansen construction.
8. National and Regional Input-Output Models
NATIONAL SUMMATION OF FINAL DEMAND
TC = ~ RC(M).
M
TlNV = ~ {~ RINV (I,M) + RH (M)} .
M I
TJ= ~{ RJ(M) + RGJ(M)}.
M
TGC = ~ RGC(M).
M
TGINV = ~ RGINV(M).
M
NATIONAL INCOME PRODUCED
The expressions TC, ... ,TGINV which are calculated above represent scalar
variables. Therefore, some type of commodity allocation vector is required in
order to obtain the vector-value of total output. Assuming only one final
demand scalar F, this relation can be shown as
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xl Xl xl f~
'"+M =A + F
Xn x n Xn
fO
n
'"in which M is a diagonal matrix of input -output ratios. The value-added
vector can be calculated as follows:
VI Xl f~ al
'" '" '" -1
=V = V [I - A +M] F= F
vn x n f n an
'"where V is a diagonal matrix of value-added coefficients. With regard to
imports, we have
Xl f~
'" =1'M [I - A +M] -1m =1'M F =bF
xn fOn
where l' is an addition vector of (l, ... ,1).
Finally, we have the following expression for the demand side of income
produced in each industry:
TV (I) d = A (I,C,T) TC +A (I,INV,T) TINV
+A (I,J,T) TJ +A (I,GC,T) TGC
+A (I,GINV,T) TGINV +A (I,E,T) TE.
The superscript d indicates that the expression represents quantities on the
demand side. The coefficients A( ) and B( ) correspond to OJ and b in the
previous equations. However, these are assumed to change through time, T.
Furthermore, these coefficients are subject to the following constraint:
~ A (I,Z,T) +B (Z,T) == I
I
RE (M) =TE
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for all T,Z = C, and INV,J,GC,GINV,E.
The realized value of TV(I) can be regarded as a weighted average of TV(I)d
and the corresponding potential output TVP(I). It is very difficult, however,
to determine the precise values of the weights and for this reason a simpler
formulation was employed:
TV (I) =Min [TV (I) d, TVP (I) ] ,
in which
TVP (I) =~ RVP (I,M)
M
in order to obtain the realized value of TV(I). In the case of imports it was
simply assumed that
TIMP =TIMP d.
In the forecasting procedure the pattern of change of A( ) and B( ) will be
projected by some variant of the RAS method.'"
REGIONAL DISAGGREGAnON OF PRODUCED INCOME AND EXPORTS
[
RV (I,M) -1
RV (I,M) = TV (I) AIO (I, T) ()~ RV I,M -1
M
+ BIO (I,T) RVP (I,MLI l
~RVP(I,MLI J
[
RE(MLI
A12 (T) ~ RE (MLI
~ RVP(I,MLI
+BI2(T) I
------
~ ~ RVP (I,MLI
M I
For consistency. it is necessary that
]
Ai [(I), T] + Bi [(I), T] == 1 (i = 10,11,12)
in this formulation of regional disaggregation.
-The method is called "Modified RAS Method of Sakashita".
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TOTAL REGIONAL DEMAND AND TOTAL REGIONAL SUPPLY
By the use of regional input -output analysis, the total regional demand and
the total regional supply of commodities, Le. RDEM(J ,M) and RSUP(J ,M),
are derived from RV(I,M), RC(M), RINV(I,M), RH(M), RGC(M),
RGINV(M), RE(M), and from RV(J,M), RIMPT(M), RJ(M) where J = 1,2.
The equations are as follows:
RDEM (J,M) RV(I,M)~ ~ C (J,I,M,T) + 0 (J,M,T) RC (M)
I I VA (I,M,T)
+ E (J,M,T){~ RINV (I,M) + RH (M)}
I
+ F (J,M,T) RGC (M) + G (J,M,T) RGINV (M)
+ H (J,M,T) RE (M)
RV(J,M)
RSUP(J,M) = VA(J,M) + I(J,M,T)RIMPT(M) - J(J,M,T)RJ(M).
The first items on the right-hand side of the first equation represent
intermediate demands for commodities. The term VA(I,M,T) is a value-added
coefficient and the C( ) terms are the usual input coefficients, both of which
are changeable over time.
9. Intraregional and Interregional Commodity and Passenger Flows
A rather complicated technique is used to derive the intraregional and
interregional commodity flows from RSUP(J ,M) and RDEM(J ,M) variables.
The basic idea is a mixture of the attraction model in the form of
FLOW (J,M,N) , RDEM (J'NJ{ A13 (J,M,N)
+ 813 (J,N) [RSUP(J,M) ~
[DIST (M,N) -d C13 Q
(J =1,2, M ~ N)
RSUP (J,O) ] }
[DIST (O,N) -1 C13
in general and the so-called Frator method.
On the other hand, intraregional and interregional passenger flows are
estimated by a rather simple gravity model:
FLOWP (M,N) + FLOWP (N,M)
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[DISTP (M,N) -tl AI4
[B14 (M,N){ RPOP (M) RPOP (N) }
+CI4(M,N){RV(M)_1 RV(N)_I}l
(Mil N).
Then the commodity and passenger flows are disaggregated into those flows
on different transport modes by the respective modal choice models. The basic
idea of the latter is as follows:
RATIO (I,M,N,R) = FJMNR { DIST (M,N,R), COST (M,N,R) }
DIST (M,N) COST (M,N)
FLOW (J,M,N,R) = RATIO (J,M,N,R) FLOW (J,M,N)
DIST (M,N), COST (M,N) = a simple average over R.
RATlOP (M,N,R) = CMNR {DISTP (M,N,R), COSTP (M,N,R) }
DISTP (M,N) COSTP (M,N)
{FLOWP (M,N,R) + FLOWP (N,M,R)} = RATIOP (M,N,R){FLOWP (M,N)
+ FLOWP (N,M)} .
In determining the actual functional forms of FJMNR and GMNR, such
theoretical models as those developed by Sakashita (1965), Quandt and
Baumol (1966), and Sasaki (1974) were considered. Finally, the following form
was adopted as a practical solution:
where Vj is the assignment ratio to mode of transportation i, Cj and tj are unit
transport cost and transport time by the same mode, and cand Tare simple
means of Cj and tj over i = 1,.. ,k. For the consistency of 1:ivj == I, it is
necessary that 1:ioj = 1. The following statistical model emerges:
VI = alQI + ... + ak-IQk-1 + b~1 - c) + d(t l - t)~ I
·
·•
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~k - C) (rk - t)
- Qk-l Qk- 1 + b \ c + d \ 1..
where (Qi) is a set of dummy variables which assume the following values:
1 for equation i (i = 1,2, ... , k-l);
Qi = -1 for equation k;
ofor other equations.
10. Distance Functions Model
The time- distance variables DIST(M,N) between regions M and N(M ;i N)
are explained by the congestion variables. A typical form of these equations is:
DIST (M,N,R)
L
x[ [M,N]
= a 0 (M,N,R) + a 1 (M,N,R)
[
; {FLOWO (J,X,R) + FLOWD (J,X,R)~ a2
RSA (X,R) + RICA (X,R) J .
In this equation, (M,N) means the set of regions whose transport facilities are
related to the traffic from region M to region N.
Actually a different and a little more complicated form is considered for the
distance functions in order to obtain more satisfactory fitting of estimation.
Similar functions are designed for DISTP(M,N,R) variables.
COST(M,N,R) and COSTP(M,N,R) variables are derived from the time
distance variables by the following formula in general:
b. COST (M,N,R) = A21 (M,N,R) b. DIST (M,N,R)
+ B21 (M,N,R) TIM
b. COSTP (M,N,R) = A22 (M,N,R) b. DISTP (M,N,R)
+ B22 (M,N,R) TIM .
In the above formulation, we need the specification of the factors which
explain the time behavior of RKA(M,R). We specify it as:
in which
RINVA(M,R)
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AI7 (M,R) 6 FLOW (M,RLI
+ BI7 (M,R) 6 FLOWP (M,RLI
+ CI7 (M,R) TIM
FLOW (M,R) ~ FLOW (M,N,R) + ~ FLOW (N,M,R)
N N
FLOWP (M,R) ~ FLOWP (M,N,R) + ~ FLOWP (N,M,R)
N N
RKA (M,R) = AI6 (M,R) RKA (M,RLI
+ RINVA (M,R) .
11. Regional Population Growth and Employment
The basic idea in this model section is given by the following set of
equations:
GROWTH [RPOP (M)]
RN(M)
RN(I,M)
o(M)
+ A23 (M) {GROWTH [RV (M)]_I
-GROWTH [TV (MLI}
+ B23 (M) 6 {DISTP - DISTP (M}...I
+ C23 (M) {GROWTH [RSC (M)]_I
- GROWTH [TSC] -I }
= {A24 (M) + B24 (M) TIM} RPOP (M)
{A25 (I,M) + B25 (I,M) TIM} RN (M)
where EIA25(I,M) = I and EIB25(I,M) = O. Here GROWTH(X) refers to
the annual growth rate of variable X.
Again the actual estimation deviates from the above general formulation
and some exogenous information is utilized to forecast the future movement
of the population and employment variables.
12. Ex Post Facto Simulations and Application of tbe Model to tbe
Shinkansen Study
As stated in Section 3, 1955-1970 time series data are available for the
economic and demographic variables, but only 1961-1970 data are available
for the transport variables. Therefore, the equations which contain some
transport variables have to be estimated by the data for shorter periods.
Because of this limitation, together with other technical difficulties, the
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joint ex post/acto simulation (final test) with the production-expenditure
model (PEM) and the traffic-transport model (TTM) is possible only for 1963-
1968. However, a single ex post/acto simulation with PEM can be performed
with exogenous supply of DISTIP(M) and DISTOP(M) variables extrapolated
backward by the available data. This single simulation with PEM was carried
out for the years 1956-1963 which cover the major construction periods of
Shinkansen. •
In order to evaluate the economic effects of Shinkansen construction, we
performed simulations of three types in which one is actual and two are
hypothetical, so to speak.
The first simulation is a so-called final test in which we use actual time series
of the exogenous variables, particularly RGINVA(1 ,M), government fixed
investment in the railway that includes the construction investment of
Shinkansen especially for M = 3,4, and 6. We call this simulation
Shinkansen Simulation (S-SIM).
The second simulation is a hypothetical one in which the same time series of
the exogenous variables are used but the endogenous DISTIP(M),
DISTOP(M), and ACCP(M) variables are replaced by exogenously given less
efficient values for 1965-1968. This change means that we are assuming non-
existence of Shinkansen for the same period in spite of the unchanged
investment series for the National Railway (JNR) in the preceding years. In
other words, we are assuming that the same amounts of railway investment
were put into other directions than Shinkansen. The hypothetical values of
DISTIP(M), etc., are given by the comparison of the performance of the
ordinary railway with that of Shinkansen. This is called Non-Shinkansen
Simulation (NS-SIM).
Finally, the third simulation is the most hypothetical one. RGINVA(l,M)
for M = 3,4, and 6 in 1959-1965 are reduced to make allowance for the non-
existence of Shinkansen construction investment or equivalent investment in
the ordinary railway. DISTIP(M), DISTOP(M), and ACCP(M) variables for
1965-1968 become even less efficient because of the reduction of
RGINVA(l ,M) in the preceding years. We call this simulation Reference
Simulation (R-SIM).
Because of aforementioned separation between joint and single simulations,
we have the classification of simulations shown in Table 8.2.t
S-SIM 1 and NS-SIM 1 produce the same results because of the same time
behavior of exogenous variables. In R-SIM I and R-SIM 2, ACC(M) and
ACCP(M) are conveniently endogenized by their relations to RSA(M) and
{ERSM(N)}.
The relative benefit -cost analyses are performed at the time point of 1965
by comparing the difference of benefits between S-SIM and R-SIM with that of
·The construction investment for the Shinkansen was implemented from 1959 to 1965. The cost of
construction in nominal terms is given in Table 8.3.
t For the overlapping period of 1963. the results of the Joint Simulation are adopted. Furthermore,
the results for 1956-1962 are also adjusted in connection with the comparison between 1963 results
of the Single Simulation and those of the Joint Simulation.
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TABLE 8.2. Classification ofsimulations
Shinkansen simulation
Non-Shinkansen simulation
Reference simulation
1956-1963
(Single)
S-SIM I
NS-SIM I
R-SIM I
1963-1968
(Joint)
S-SIM 2
NS-SIM 2
R-SIM 2
TABLE 8.3. Cost ofconstruction
Shinkansen
construction Total construction (A)/(B)
cost investment of JNR (070)
1959 21(8) 1076 2
1960 103(31) 1164 9
1961 524(233) 2071 25
1962 1027(202) 2518 41
1963 1448(98) 2914 49
1964 657(15) 2593 25
1965 32(3) 3312 I
Total 3812(590) 15,648 24
Notes: Unit: 100 million yen. Land purchase costs are included in the figures and are shown in
parentheses.
benefits between NS-SIM and R-SIM. The present value of benefits in each
case is calculated by the following formula with some suitable benefit
variable(s) X.
B
3
= L X(1965 + t)
t =- 6 (1 +r)t
r : discounting factor
Naturally, X can be the national income produced, and (B(S-SIM)-B(R-
SIM)j and (B(NS-SIM)-B(R-SIM)) should be contrasted with the present value
of costs in the form:
3 Y (1965 + t)
C L
t =-6 (I + r)'
in which Ys are differences between (RGINVA(I,M)} for S-SIM (or NS-SIM)
and that for R-SIM.
At the same time, the regional concentration pattern of population, income
produced and so on are compared among different simulations by the
technique of Hoover index.
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13. Numerical Results and Conclusion
Numerical results of the above simulations and benefit-cost analyses are
given in Table 8.4. Some interesting conclusions regarding the economic
effects of Shinkansen construction are derived from these results.
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9. Impact o/the Sanyo Shinkansen on
Local Communities
S.OKABE
Introduction
Improved means of transport shortens economic distances by reducing the cost
and time of transport and induces greater potential for intensive use of land by
promoting industrial development and urbanization.
As a means of transport unlike any other the Shinkansen has its own
peculiar influence over the region through which it runs.
First, the Shinkansen is a new high-speed transport system. As such, it
reduces the time-distance between regions and cities, and contributes to the
enhancement of their cultural and economic interchanges.
Second, the Shinkansen is a long- and medium-distance means of passenger
transport only: it does not undertake freight service. This means that its
impact on the places it goes to is different from that of railway lines and
highways that carry both passengers and freight. In creating the right
conditions for plant location, for instance, opening a conventional railway or
expressway can be a direct inducement, but this does not apply to the
Shinkansen since it does not carry freight. What the Shinkansen can do is
encourage the interregional flow of people and speed up the transmission of
information, and this in turn brings about social changes in the local
communities. The Shinkansen has brought about a number of changes in the
local communities. The number of travelers on the line has increased; it
encourages the flow of passengers between places which had been isolated; it
changes passenger transport routes to the hinterland and affects the passenger
traffic volume of competing carriers. The impact of such a change in the
passenger flow spreads to the environs and the hinterland of the cities at which
Shinkansen trains stop. For instance, the increase in the influx of tourists
increases the need for a new tourist route to link the train-stopping city and its
hinterland and to enlarge existing tourist facilities or establish new ones.
Third, the Shinkansen has established its stations at 30- to 4O-km intervals,
usually in cities. This means that city functions might eventually be
reorganized and redistributed between the "train-stopping cities" and the
"non-stopping" cities. The reduction of time-distance by the Shinkansen leads
to greater social and economic interchange between the local train-stopping
cities and the major central cities, and enables the local cities to undertake
more of their own city functions. On the other hand, part of a local city's
extensive commercial functions is likely to be taken over by the central cities.
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This will eventually lead either to the concentration or to the dispersion or
shifting of city functions, with some cities prospering and others declining. At
any rate, the Shinkansen triggers changes in the regional setup, which was
previously based on slower transport (mainly the non-Shinkansen railway
lines). These changes take place, for instance, in the distribution of the
extensive city functions, intercity relationships, and in the connection between
a city and its hinterland.
It is in this context that the actual impact of the Sanyo Shinkansen* upon
local communities is discussed in this paper. The Sanyo Shinkansen, however,
has been in operation for only a few years. Hence, only the earliest perceptible
trend in changes in transport service, the impacts therefrom and the measures
taken by local communities to cope with the changes can be given.
The Localities Concerned
The Sanyo Shinkansen line extends from Osaka to Hakata. It also has
connections with other lines and with bus and ferry routes, so its influence is
far-reaching. The characteristics of the localities along the line and the
hinterland areas will be briefly described.
The region has been well developed since olden days and has become a
traffic artery linking Kyushu, Osaka and regions further east. Cities,
prefectures and regions mentioned in this paper are listed in Table 9.1. The
localities along the Sanyo Shinkansen are highly urbanized and enjoy great
economic activity, particularly in the concentration of manufacturing plants,
ranking next to the region along the Tokaido Shinkansen. The region contains
few cities with a population higher than 500,000. The largest are Kobe with a
population of 1,300,000, Okayama with 500,000, Hiroshima with 800,000,
Kita-Kyushu with 1,000,000, and Fukuoka with 950,000. There are a large
number of small or medium-sized cities with a population of under 200,000,
but many of them have very considerable industrial activity.
Thus, the localities along the Sanyo Shinkansen have all the features of
advanced areas, while the surrounding prefectures are less developed,
relatively low in population, and poor in industrial activity. The income per
capita here is far below the national level, as shown in Table 9.2. The impact
of the Sanyo Shinkansen on these surrounding prefectures is, therefore, of
interest.
Impact on Passenger Transport
REDUCTION OF TRAYEUNG TIME
The maximum speed of 200 km/h on the Shinkansen (average 161 km/h by
Hikari) corresponds to almost twice that of other lines, where the top speed is
·The name of Sanyo Shinkansen is not officially used. For convenience, however. the section
between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka is called the Tokaido Shinkansen and that between Shin-Osaka
and Hakata the Sanyo Shinkansen.
TABLE 9.1.
Regions
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Cities, regions, and area divisions in West Japan
Prefecture Principal cities
_
_________[OSaka
Kinki .
Hyogo
Osaka·
Kobe·, Himeji·
Nishi
Nippon
(West
Japan)
Chugoku
Kyushu
Okayama
Hiroshima
Sanyo
---{
Tottori
Sanin
Shimane
i FukuokaKita Kyushu SagaNagasaki
-{
Oita
Naka Kyushu
Kumamoto
[
Miyazaki
Minami Kyushu Kagoshima
Okinawa
Tokushima
Kagawa
Okayama·, Kurashiki·
Fukuyama·. Onomichi, Mihara·,
Hiroshima·
Iwakuni·, Tokuyama·. Ogori·,
Yamaguchi, Hagi, Shimonoseki·
Tottori, Yonago
Matsue, Hamada, Tsuwano
Kita Kyushu·, Fukuoka·
Saga, Karatsu
Nagasaki, Sasebo
Oita, Beppu
Kumamoto
Miyazaki
Kagoshima
Naha
Tokushima
Takamatsu
Shikoku---------1
Ehime
Kochi
Matsuyama, Imabari
Kochi
Notes: (1) ·indicates cities at which Sanyo Shinkansen trains stop. (2) Cities east of Osaka are not
included.
100 km/h and the average 86 km/h. The first effect is thus the reduction of
time-distance between regions and cities.
It formerly took 11 hours and 50 minutes to travel by train between Tokyo
and Hakata. The Shinkansen reduced this to 6 hours and 56 minutes. Between
Tokyo and Hiroshima the time has been cut from 7 hours and 40 minutes to 5
hours and 10 minutes and between Osaka and Hakata from 8 hours and 30
minutes to 4 hours and 40 minutes, as shown in Table 9.3.
The time-distance reduction has affected not only the cities along the line
but also those in the hinterland. This is largely attributable to the
reinforcement and improvement in the service of the connecting narrow-gauge
lines effected before and after the opening of the Shinkansen. When the
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TABLE 9.3. Traveling time from Tokyo and Osaka before and after the Sanyo Shinkansen
opening
Source: JNR data.
Departure station
Tokyo Shin-Osaka
After After
Before After opening to Before After opening to
Arrival opening opening to Hakata opening opening to Hakata
station (a) Okayama (b) (a)-(b) (a) Okayama (b) (a)-(b)
Okayama 5:30 4:10 4:10 1:20 2:10 1:00 1:00 1:10
Hiroshima 7:40 6:30 5:10 2:30 4:20 3:20 2:00 2:20
Hakata 11:50 10:20 7:00 4:50 8:30 7:10 3:50 4:40
Matsue 8:50 7:40 7:40 1:10 5:30 4:20 4:20 1:10
Takamatsu 7:20 6:00 6:00 1:20 4:00 2:50 2:50 1:10
Matsuyama 10:30 9:00 *7:30 3:00 7:10 5:50 *4:20 2:50
Kumamoto 14:00 12:20 9:00 5:00 10:30 9:10 5:50 4:40
Nagasaki 14:50 13:10 9:40 5:10 11:20 9:50 6:30 4:50
*Via the Mihara Shinkansen station.
Shinkansen was opened down to Okayama in 1972, hovercraft were
introduced for the Uno-Takamatsu Ferry Route to reduce the traveling time
by 37 minutes to 23 minutes, and additional express trains were put into service
from Takamatsu Station. For connection with the Sanin region, the track
capacity of the Hakubi Line (between Okayama and Yonago) was raised and
additional express trains put into service. When the extension down to Hakata
was completed, the number of buses operating between Hiroshima and
Hamada to connect with the Shinkansen was increased, and high-speed ferry
boats from Mihara to Shikoku Island were introduced. Additional express
trains were put into service from Mihara Station to the Sanin region.
This augmentation of the main connection lines, together with the opening
of the Shinkansen, has done much to reduce the traveling time-distance to and
from the hinterland. From Kyoto to Yonago, for instance, the shortest route
used to be the Sanin Line, taking 5 hours and 20 minutes. Now that the
Shinkansen is open, this is reduced to about 4 hours by the Hakubi Line,
changing at Okayama. To reach Western Shikoku (to Matsuyama City and
others) from Osaka, it used to take 7 hours and 10 minutes by the shortest
route, but this is now cut to 4 hours and 20 minutes via Mihara, using the high-
speed ferry.
Naturally, this reduction in time-distance increases what can be done in a
day. Assuming the longest time-distance for the sphere of activity coverable in
a day to be 4 hours one way, all the localities along the Sanyo Shinkansen,
including Osaka and Fukuoka, lie within the sphere. A round trip between
Okayama and Tokyo, Matsue and Osaka, or Matsuyama and Osaka also is
possible within the same day, though there will be little time to spare.
This expansion of a day's activity not only encourages the flow of
passengers but also changes the weight of interregional passenger traffic. JNR
has investigated the changes brought about by the Shinkansen opening in the
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travel of city .dwellers in the regions west of Osaka [1]. According to this
investigation, the percentage of those traveling to the Osaka and Kobe district
rose from 10070 before the opening to 17% afterwards in the North Kyushu
region, from 16% to 24% in the Yamaguchi and Hiroshima region, from 4%
to 28% in the Sanin region, and from 19% to 26070 in the Shikoku region.
Travel originating in the Sanin region to the Yamaguchi and Hiroshima region
rose from 13% to 19%, that originating in the Okayama district and
terminating in the Sanin region from 1% to 10%. Thus, the changes that have
taken place in the travel destinations after the opening of the Shinkansen
clearly reflect the merits and greater convenience of the time-distance
reduction. These tendencies can be interpreted as a sign of the changes that will
take place in the established interrelationship between regions and cities.
INCREASE OF TRAFFIC AND CHANGES IN TRANSPORT ROUTES
The Shinkansen, with its high speed, comfort, and safety, was expected to
be well patronized from the start. JNR has estimated the traffic volume before
the opening of the Shinkansen down to Hakata, taking into account the
natural increase oftraffic, the inducement it would offer to users, the possible
diversion of rail travelers to the expressway and from other competitive means
of transport to the railway, and the distribution of rail travelers between the
Shinkansen and the narrow-gauge lines.
According to JNR's study [1], the number of passengers using express trains
between Okayama and Hakata in 1975, the first year of opening, would
increase as much as 40% over 1971. The traffic by section (one-way daily
average) would reach 55,000 passengers between Shin-Osaka and Shin-Kobe,
this being the greatest number, and the number would grow smaller toward
Kyushu, falling to 28,000 between Shin-Shimonoseki and Kokura, as shown in
Fig. 9.1. These estimates are compared with the actual number of passengers
carried after the Shinkansen was opened, as shown in Fig. 9.2. As shown in
these figures, the actual traffic by section is above the estimate. The total
number of passengers carried between Shin-Osaka and Hakata increased by
about 20% over the same period the year before.
The diversion and inducement of users after the Shinkansen opened down to
Hakata, as shown in Fig. 9.3, are 55% from the narrow-gauge lines, 30% from
other modes of transport, the inducement accounting for 6%. The cause of the
remaining 9% increase is unknown. Of the diversion from other modes of
transport, the largest is 23% from airlines. The Sanyo Shinkansen certainly
had a good start.
IMPACT ON OTHER COMPETITIVE MODES OF TRANSPORT: AIRLINE ROUTES
The greatest impact of the Shinkansen has been on the airlines. Table 9.4
and Fig. 9.4, showing the air traffic between cities along the Shinkansen before
and after its opening down to Hakata, disclose that the intercity air passenger
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Fig. 9.1. Number of passengers using narrow-gauge railways and the Shinkansen.
traffic on the main air routes all registered a decline, although to varying
degrees. The most adverse effect was on the Hiroshima-Fukuoka and Osaka-
Hiroshima routes, and air service on these two routes were closed soon after
the opening of the Shinkansen down to Hakata. The next most adversely
affected were the Osaka-Ube and Osaka-Kita-Kyushu air routes. As of
January-March 1976, the passenger traffic here was still on the decline. The
number of air passengers on the Tokyo-Ube, Tokyo-Hiroshima, Nagoya-
Fukuoka, and Osaka -Fukuoka routes remained constant. The Tokyo-
Fukuoka route declined for a year after the Shinkansen opening down to
Hakata, but is now slowly picking up.
It is not easy to determine how permanent the impact of the Shinkansen will
be on the competitive modes of transport, for public interest in the initial
novelty of the line must be taken into account. Nevertheless, the prospects are
dim for airlines on short-distance flights along the Shinkansen route.
Comparison of the fare and traveling time by rail and airline after the
Shinkansen was opened is given in Table 9.5 and reveals the following:
1. The rail fare for a distance over 1000 km is about 30070 lower than the air
fare, but the traveling time puts the railway at a disadvantage compared with
the flight time, including access. When the railway traveling time is one and
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Fig. 9.3. Use of the Shinkansen after it was opened to Hakata.
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Fig. 9.4. Data of increase or decrease of airline passenger traffic against preceding year.
one-half or more times the flight time, including access, the decline in air
passenger traffic might be only temporary or almost nil.
2. Between cities 700 km or less apart by rail, the train's advantage in fare
over the airline diminishes, but so does the airline's advantage in traveling
time. When the rail distance is less than 500 km, the traveling time by
Shinkansen is less than by air, including access time. Hence, the decline of
airline traffic between such cities becomes conspicuously large.
3. On routes where passengers must transfer from the Shinkansen to a
narrow-gauge line for nearby and hinterland cities, this advantage weakens,
and for routes to Shikoku, which involve transfer to ferryboats, the airplane
has an advantage over the train.
It seems, then, that the only airline route along the Shinkansen that is
capable of recovering the traffic lost to the new rail line in a short time is the
Tokyo,-Fukuoka route. For the other routes along the line, it seems that the
airlines will require a long time to recover their lost traffic. It may be that the
loss of air passengers to the cities beyond Fukuoka in Kyushu is only a
temporary phenomenon, as airplanes have an advantage over trains here in
traveling time.
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Impact on Local Communities
TOURISM
In tourism, the Shinkansen economically affects local communities in many
ways. It increases the number of incoming sightseers. Tourism thrives when
people are prosperous. When the Shinkansen was opened to Okayama, in
1972, the Japanese economy was growing and there was a rush of tourists to
the environs of Okayama and the Sanin districts. However, when the
Shinkansen was opened down to Hakata, in 1975, a recession had set in,
triggered by the oil crisis, and the attraction of the Shinkansen was not strong
enough to promote a tourist boom.
Nevertheless, the Shinkansen does encourage sightseers. According to a
survey on reasons for traveling, conducted before and after the opening down
to Hakata, the proportion of 15070 for sightseeing before the opening rose to
25070 afterwards. In most of the prefectures along the Shinkansen and those
nearby the number of people coming from other prefectures also increased
from the year before after the opening in 1975, as seen in Table 9.6.
As the number of tourists to the prefectures not listed in Table 9.6 has
declined from the year before, it may well be concluded that the Shinkansen
has some effect in encouraging tourists.
Another notable change is that the Shinkansen has shortened the tourists'
travel schedule. Before the opening, for a distance of 301-400 km, for
instance, 13070 of the visitors returned on the same day and 44070 after one or
two days' stay. This increased to 34070 and 45070, respectively, after the new line
was opened down to Hakata [2]. This shows, on one hand, that tourists are
trying to cut expenses because of the recession and, on the other hand, reflects
TABLE 9.6. Influx of visitors to the prefectures along the Shinkansen after its opening in 1975
Outside Inside Lodging
Prefecture Total no. visitors visitors visitors
Along Hiroshima 26,370 16,818 9552 6044
the (7.9) (13.2) (-0.2) (14.0)
line Yamaguchi 19,914 13,771 6143 4111
(1.3) (13.8) (-11.6) (3.1)
Fukuoka 52,247 21,128 31,119 4463
(11.8) (31.6) (1.4) (-19.9)
Hinter- Shimane 16,472 11,572 4900 2534
land (-6.5) (6.5) (-6.6) (-10.8)
Saga 17,351 11,113 6238
(5.7) (5.5) (6.1) NA
Nagasaki 20,019 10,855 9164
(4,3) (4.6) (4.1) NA
Kumamoto 22,914 13,650 9304 6399
(8.0) (7.0) (10.1) (2.4)
Oha 32,794 23,250 9544 7628
(-0.4) (1.0) (-3.9) (0.2)
Miyazaki 8018 4,846 3172
(-2.8) (-6.8) (4.0) NA
Kagoshima 7545
NA (-8.2) NA NA
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the time saved in traveling by the Shinkansen and the improvement in transfer
facilities.
Tourists no longer visit only established and well-known places, but also
those of historical and scenic interest in the hinterland - even on remote islets.
Northwestern Kyushu and central Yamaguchi, close to the Sanin, which were
not formerly taken seriously as places for sightseeing, are now becoming
popular, as shown in Table 9.7. This may be partly due to a change in the class
of sightseers (age, income level, etc.), but the great contribution of the
Shinkansen cannot be ignored. These new localities lie mainly in the
economically retarded areas, so the greater influx of tourists has benefited the
residents economically.
Some cities along the Shinkansen line have seen a big drop in the number of
visitors because the trains do not stop there. A typical example is Onomichi
City, which has many old temples and shrines and notable beauty-spots and
served as an important port for ferries plying between Honshu and Shikoku.
In 1964 the city had as many as 1,764,000 visitors and this dropped to
1,605,000 (by almost 100,70) in 1975, the year the Shinkansen was opened.
The growth of tourism, however, was not without problems; for instance,
smaller places could not always provide lodging for all their visitors. Hotels in
large cities were often booked up in advance. In Fukuoka City, where the
TABLE 9.7. Growth ofnumber of tourists from otherprefectures to principal new places of
attraction, 1975
Source: Kanko (Sightseeing), Japan Tourist Association, Nov. 1976.
Visitors from Increase over Rate of
other prefectures preceding year increase
(thousands) (thousands) (070)
Hiroshima Prefecture
Hiroshima City 7156 2459 52.3
Miyajima, Ono 2797 438 18.5
Fukuyama City 570 10 1.8
Mihara City 119 35 41.6
Etajima 163 11 7.2
Onomichi City 1605 -179 -9.0
Yamaguchi Prefecture
Iwakuni City 2113 245 13.1
Yanai City 110 12 12.2
Tokuyama City 258 29 12.3
Yamaguchi City 1147 83 7.8
Akiyoshidai 2095 282 15.5
Nagatokyo 411 33 8.7
Hagi City 1810 216 13.6
Nagato City 1209 88 7.9
Susa 71 20 39.2
Toyoura 380 43 12.8
Toyokita 279 38 15.7
Shimane Prefecture
Saginoya Hot Spa. (Yasuki City) 117 48 69.5
Kiyomizudera (Yasuki City) 154 9 6.2
Sanbesan (Ota City) 365 24 7.0
Omori Ginzan (Ota City) 61 6 10.9
Masuda, Banryuko 318 70 28.2
Tsuwano 1194 85 7.7
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TABLE 9.7. Continued
Visitors from Increase over Rateof
other prefectures preceding year increase
(thousands) (thousands) (ClJo)
Fukuoka Prefecture
Fukuoka City 7468 3608 93.5
Tsuyazaki Town 358 192 122.4
ShinguTown 26 7 36.8
Maebaru, Itoshima 644 94 19.1
Dazaifu Town 2794 311 12.3
Chikushino Town 204 53 35.1
SoedaTown 310 230 287.5
BuzenCity 90 10 12.0
Yukuhashi City 25 12 92.3
TagawaCity 73 43 141.7
KurumeCity 520 38 7.8
AmagiCity 345 274 385.9
Yanagawa Town 180 28 18.4
Saga Prefecture
SagaCity 1637 51 3.2
YamatoTown 193 54 38.8
Hamatama Town 423 21 5.2
Karatsu City 2210 377 20.5
Chinzei, Oenkai Town 368 74 29.6
AritaTown 612 27 4.6
Ureshino City 971 11 1.1
Nagasaki Prefecture
Nagasaki City 3296 192 6.2
Sasebo City 1720 130 8.2
HiratoCity 895 94 11.7
ObamaTown 2298 69 3.1
Takaki Town 70 19 37.2
Iki 333 7 1.8
Ooto 294 14 5.0
Kumamoto Prefecture
Kumamoto Town Sphere 4593 221 5.1
Aso Area 3232 194 6.7
Amakusa Area 2119 41 1.9
Tsuedate, Oguni Area 302 42 16.1
Kikuchi Area 890 58 7.1
Hitoyoshi, Kuma Area 560 198 54.5
UkiArea 385 278 259.8
Oita Prefecture
Beppu City 12,035 48 0.4
Takeda City 593 63 11.8
Kunisaki Peninsula 394 18 1.3
Yabakei 2004 74 3.8
Shinkansen terminates, hotel construction boomed in anticipation of an influx
of tourists and businessmen, and the number of hotel rooms had doubled by
1975, as shown in Fig. 9.5. However, statistics indicate that the number of
visitors staying overnight has decreased since the Shinkansen was opened, and
there is keen competition today among the hotelkeepers there.
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Fig.9.S. Increase in hotel capacity in Fukuoka City (report by Fukuoka City Government).
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MORE INTENSIVE USE OF LAND
The introduction of the Shinkansen and other trunk modes of transport has
been a visible and invisible incentive to city and regional development. As far
as the Shinkansen is directly concerned, development took place around a
station, in its plaza, underground shopping center and surface shopping
centers. This construction started a chain reaction - existing shopping centers
in other parts of the cities were improved and the shopping centers in cities
where the Shinkansen does not stop were redeveloped and extended.
Examples of the effect of the Shinkansen combined with the expressways
under construction are the development of leisure resorts in the Inland Sea and
Okayama Prefecture, the housing projects planned in anticipation of the
future prosperity of the Shinkansen "train-stopping cities", the construction
of distribution centers and large-scale diary farms.
Returning to city development around Shinkansen stations, the idea of city
rehabilitation was taken up in almost all the Shinkansen train-stopping cities.
Most enthusiastic was the City of Okayama, which produced a rehabilitation
project for the district around the station. As early as 1970, the plan to expand
the plaza in front of the Okayama Shinkansen station has been decided and the
earthwork started. In the course of work, the idea of building an underground
shopping center was conceived. The outline of the plan is shown in Table 9.8.
In Fukuyama, elevation work has already been completed around the
station and the renewal of the station front is now under way. In Mihara, since
the city has gained importance as a Shinkansen station and transfer station for
Shikoku, a redevelopment plan is under way, centering on the 1. I-hectare city-
owned land where the old Monopoly Corporation used to be. The total area
covers about 2.7 hectares. At a cost of some 6400 million yen, construction of
two buildings, 4500 m2 in area (for shops, offices, hotels, amusement parlors
and homes), and of a pedestrian deck linking Mihara station and the Mihara
Inner Port, is planned and is about to be implemented.
Creation of these commercial nuclei centering on stationfront development
exerts considerable impact on the local economy, particularly on retail
businesses in the city.
TABLE 9.8. Outline ofplan for renewal ofOkayama station front
Station Plaza: Expand it from 12,500 m' to 19,700 m'
Construct sidewalks, car roads, parking lot, taxi stops, bus stops, green belts
Use part of the land of the former Okayama Freight Station
Cost, about 100 million yen, to be shared equally by the city and JNR
Underground Shopping Center
Two underground floors, 23,800 m'
To house 120 to 130 shops on the first underground floor
Center operator: Okayama Station Center, a joint stock company, registered in April 1972
Stockholders: JNR, Retired Railway Workers Welfare Work Association, Railway Hall Co.,
Commerce & Industry Chambers of Okayama Prefecture and City, local financiers
Construction cost, 3800 million yen
Opening day, 1974 year end
121
There are, however, many cities where no development is in progress. At
Shin-Kurashiki, Shin-Iwakuni, Ogori, Shin-Shimonoseki, for instance, the
new Shinkansen stations are built away from the city centers or at the back of
existing stations. While there are many ideas for development, little work has
been done on the station plaza, and wide-scale development is not yet ready to
begin.
Haste is not always the best policy, but the problem of small-scale land
ownership must be solved, and rising land prices checked so as to clear the way
for development.
EFFECT ON CITY FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURE
Distribution and setup ojextensive economic junctions. A city is a
conglomerate of political, economic and cultural units. Cities can be classified,
by the extent of their functions, into national cities, block nucleus cities, and
local central cities. Here, in order to see the setup of cities along the Sanyo
Shinkansen, the concentration of economic organizations will first be
explained.
In Table 9.9 distribution is shown by city of head offices, branch offices,
branch stores, business offices, and sub-offices of those companies listed in
the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The table shows that most
head offices are concentrated in Tokyo, and then in Osaka and Nagoya. These
three cities have the greatest number of branch offices and sub-offices.
The next rich in number of branch offices and stores are the local nucleus
cities, which have a wider jurisdiction than business offices and sub-offices
and act as block-control organs. Thus, the local nucleus cities clearly have a
high degree of concentration of extensive economic functions. Moreover, the
extensive functions of these cities are not confined to economic activities; the
central government offices also have their block-control organs distributed
among them.
Hiroshima and Fukuoka are the two biggest central cities in the regions
through which the Sanyo Shinkansen runs. How big is the territory controlled
by the economic functions of these two cities? In Hiroshima City, 13% of the
branch offices there have control over only Hiroshima Prefecture, 13% over
only a part of the Chugoku Region, and 73% over all the Chugoku Region [3]
In Fukuoka City, 74% of the branch offices control the whole Island of
Kyushu [4].
In comparing the two cities some allowance must be made for the fact that
the surveys were not made at the same time and different methods were used.
To see more clearly the territory controlled by the extensive economic
functions and to grasp the interterritorial relationships, use should be made of
Figs 9.6 and 9.7, which show the location of the exchanges where large
numbers of telephone calls originate and the exchanges at which such calls
are concentrated. It is seen from the figures that in Kyushu the large number of
calls from local offices are taken first by the exchange offices in Kagoshima,
Kumamoto, Nagasaki, Sasebo and Kita-Kyushu and then by the Fukuoka
exchange office, and, from there, even to Shimonoseki. This indicates that
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TABLE 9.9. Establishment ofbranch offices and stores, business offices andsuboffices in
principal cities
(Number of offices) ("70)
No. of Branch Business Total of Branch Business Total of
head offices & offices & branch of- offices & offices & ~ranch of-
offices stores suboffices flees etc. stores suboffices flees, etc.
1964 1972 1964 1972 1964 1972 1964 1972 9641972 1964 1972 1964 1972
National total S61 718 1900 2898 138S 2717 328S S610 100 100 100 100 100 100
Three Tokyo 30S S09 389 S20 9S IS8 484 678 20.S 17.9 6.9 S.8 14.7 12.1
biggest Osaka 94 116 336 4S6 67 86 403 S42 17.7 IS.7 4.8 3.2 12.3 9.7
cities Nagoya 23 23 234 33S 119 139 3S3 474 12.3 11.6 8.6 S.I 10.8 8.S
(Total) 422 S48 9S91311 281 383 1240 1694 SO.S 4S.3 20.3 14.1 37.8 30.2
Other Yokohama 10 17 46 77 39 83 8S 1(iO 2.4 2.7 2.8 3.1 2.6 2.9
principalKyoto 12 12 18 24 19 SI 37 7S 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.9 1.1 1.3
cities Kobe IS 13 SO 61 3S 71 8S 132 2.6 2.1 2.S 2.6 2.6 2.4
Kawasaki 9 12 8 12 6 9 14 21 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
KitaKyushu 7 6 67 61 SI 73 118 134 3.S 2.1 3.7 2.7 3.6 2.4
(Total) S3 60 189 23S ISO 287 339 S22 10.0 8.1 10.8 10.6 10.3 9.3
Local Sapporo I 2 144 20S 104 136 248 341 7.6 7.1 7.S S.O 7.6 6.1
nucleus Sendai 2 2 89 lSI 79 129 168 280 4.7 S.2 S.7 4.8 S.I S.O
cities Hiroshima 2 2 8S 162 84 lSI 169 313 4.S S.6 6.1 S.6 S.I S.4
Fukuoka 3 4 IS3 22S 106 137 2S9 362 8.1 7.8 7.7 S.1 7.9 6.S
(Total) 8 10 471 743 373 SS3 844 1296 24.8 2S.6 26.9 20.4 2S.7 23.1
Other Takamatsu I I 3S 64 47 97 82 161 1.8 2.2 3.4 3.6 2.S 2.9
cities Saga
- -
2 I 1 I 3 2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nagasaki - I 11 10 18 30 29 40 0.6 0.3 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7
Kumamoto - - 2 S 9 31 11 36 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.1 0.3 0.6
Oita - - 2 S I 31 3 36 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.1 0.1 0.6
Kagoshima - - 2 3 10 28 12 31 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.0 0.4 0.6
(Total) I 2 S4 88 86 218 140 306 2.8 3.0 6.2 8.0 4.3 S.S
Notes: (I) Enterprises: those listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange First Section, but not including
insurance and banking business. (2) Source: compiled from the Stock Company Annual published
by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun
Fukuoka City has close connections with all of Kyushu except the eastern part,
and with the western part of Yarnaguchi Prefecture.
In the Chugoku Region, with the major call-origin zone cut into the south
and north, the Hiroshima Exchange is slightly weaker in the central function
than the Fukuoka Exchange and the territory it covers is somewhat smaller.
There are more differences between the two cities. The greatest number of
out-of-territory calls to the Fukuoka Exchange, for instance, originate in
Tokyo and the next in Osaka and Shimonoseki. Hiroshima Exchange's
greatest number of out-of-territory calls are from Takamatsu, and then Osaka
and Matsuyama. Hiroshima City thus has a peculiarity in its extensive
economic functions: its close link with the cities along the Inland Sea coast of
Shikoku.
The Shinkansen will no doubt also have some effect on this territorial
situation.
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1. Hiroshima
2. Tokuyama
3. Yamaguchi
4. Ube
5. Shirnonoseki
6. Kita-Kyushu
7. Fukuoka
8. Saga
9. Sasebo
10. Nagasaki
11. Olta
12. Kururne
13. Kumamoto
14. Nobeoka
15. Miyazaki
16. Kagoshima
Fig. 9.6. Origin and concentration of telephone calls by telephone exchanges in Yamaguchi
Prefecture. Note: Automatic direct calls, based on volume of long-distance calls per day-time peak
hour. Source: Data of the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation.
Effect on retail business. Among the cities along the Sanyo Shinkansen where
retail trade is highly concentrated (excluding Osaka) are Kobe, Fukuoka, Kita-
Kyushu, Hiroshima, Okayama and Himeji; in other cities the sales figures are
far less, as shown in Table 9.10.
The effect of the Shinkansen on the retail trade in these cities is diverse.
Direct favorable effect, however, especially rapid growth of sales, is extremely
restricted. According to an investigation made in 1975 [5] the cities in which
10% or more of the shops reported a rise in sales after the Shinkansen opening
were only Yamaguchi (43.1 %), Ogori (21.4010), Hagi (12.5%) and Tokuyama
(11.3 %). Of these, only Ogori and Tokuyama are located along the
Shinkansen; the rest are tourist resorts in the hinterland. In Hiroshima,
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TABLE 9.10. Retail sales in cities along the Shinkansen
Source: Commercial statistics.
Sales (in million yen) Sales per
Rate of head of Sales per
1970 1972 1974 increase population retail shop
(a) (b) (b)/(a) 070 (in 1000 yen) (in 1000 yen)
National total 21,773,483 28,292,696 40,147,810 84.4 366.4 25,958
Tokyo 2,880,000 3,586,756 4,818,177 67.2 568.5 40,943
Osaka 1,188,989 1,478,065 1,919,807 64.1 696.0 37,439
Kobe 341,310 455,507 618,661 81.2 472.1 33,298
Akashi 40,790 5~,362 79,634 106.4 352.8 26,722
Himeji 113,208 152,753 208,710 84.3 487.5 32,909
Aioi 11,706 15,869 23,523 85.6 376.8 29,693
Okayama 133,578 166,096 253,666 89.9 512.9 26,828
Kurashiki 74,009 98,607 156,992 112.1 405.3 22,631
Fukuyama 72,431 90,426 125,476 94.7 446.0 36,951
Mihara 20,382 24,981 36,786 80.4 431.2 26,753
Hiroshima 185,477 255,624 408,936 120.4 544.1 39,495
lwakuni 28,336 35,016 46,420 63.8 424.0 25,491
Tokuyama 31,443 41,707 60,459 92.2 580.6 36,553
Yamaguchi 24,420 29,298 44,356 81.6 434.0 29,809
Shimonoseki 58,244 74,999 99,539 70.9 384.6 25,167
Kita Kyushu 228,504 338,327 425,190 86.0 404.6 27,652
Fukuoka 262,022 342,976 482,933 84.3 532.0 35,452
competing with Fukuoka City in retail sales along the Sanyo Shinkansen, sales
are reported [6] to have risen only by some shops in its central shopping center
(10.7%) and the shopping district in front of Hiroshima station (9.2%).
Elsewhere, the rise in sales is negligible. Others (9.9070) in the central shopping
center reported a decline, this being more conspicuous (34.2070) in the district
in front of the station.
This implies that the opening of the Shinkansen does not immediately lead
to a growth of retail sales in the train-shopping cities, and that, even when a
growth is noted, it is only by some of the retail shops in front of the station;
many others, even in the same district, find their sales declining due to keener
competition.
The effects or the incentives in a wider sense are quite large. The following
trends are likely to affect the retail trade in the cities along the Shinkansen:
1. The Shinkansen speeds up the arrival of new fashions in clothes from the
principal cities. Stores selling women's clothes that are out of fashion,
particularly juvenile clothes, are soon ignored.
2. What flows in is not only new fashion. Shorter time-distance facilitates
business liaison, interchange of personnel and collection of information.
Speciality retail chain stores, department stores and supermarkets begin to
make aggressive inroads into the Shinkansen train-stopping cities. Half the
shops in the underground shopping center of Okayama station are branches of
large retail stores in Tokyo, Osaka and other cities. Enlarged and newly built
department stores in the cities along the Shinkansen after its opening down to
Okayama are shown in Table 9.11. The greatest inroads have been in cities
with over 300,000 inhabitants.
3. In the Shinkansen train-stopping cities, the districts in front of the
stations are being redeveloped and shopping centers constructed. When
TABLE 9.11.
City
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Establishment and enlargement ofdepartment stores in principal cities (after 1972)
No. of stores Sales floor space (m')
Kobe
Himeji
Okayama
Kurashiki
Fukuyama
Hiroshima
Tokuyama
Ube
Yamaguchi
Shimonoseki
Kita Kyushu
Fukuoka
Total
4
2
3
I
I
2
I
I
I
I
4
5
25
80,362
27,309
33,807
6966
8532
41,022
5000
6244
5724
12,948
68,978
93,346
383,238
completed, these will present a challenge to local retail shops. In front of
Okayama station an underground shopping center produced a department
store, a supermarket and 130 speciality shops after the Shinkansen was opened
down to Okayama. This has changed the course of the shoppers' flow in the
existing central shopping center (Omotemachi) to the underground shopping
center in front of the station, and has exerted a delicate influence on the
location of shops.
Thus, the Shinkansen has the effect of inducing the capital of outside
retailers to the principal cities located along the line and creating a new
commercial nucleus within those cities. Moreover, it speeds up the
popularization of new fashions and refines the taste and preferences of the
customers.
Local retailers have to cope with these impacts. To keep up with new
fashions, they have to link up with designers or stores in larger central cities.
To satisfy increasingly refined tastes, they must keep a rich assortment of
goods in stock and even remodel their shops. When a new commercial nucleus
emerges or when the flow of customers changes, they may have to consider
moving out or opening a new shop. According to the investigation [3] in
Hiroshima City, the number of shopkeepers planning to enlarge, remodel,
move out, or open new shops was as high as 50.2070 in the central shopping
districts, and for the city as a whole, it reached 45.8070. In Yamaguchi
Prefecture the figure reached 40070, as disclosed by the Yamaguchi Prefectural
Commerce and Industry Association.
Impact on wholesalers. The Shinkansen opening has also affected wholesalers
in the cities along the Shinkansen, as shown in Table 9.12. Among the cities
along the Sanyo Shinkansen, those where wholesalers are concentrated are
Osaka City, which serves a nation-wide commercial area, and Fukuoka and
Hiroshima Cities, which have extensive wholesale functions. The impact on
other cities varies, depending on the degrees of wholesaler concentration, and
the varying size and characteristics of the cities.
When the Shinkansen opened down to Okayama, the city retailers (in
fabrics, stationery, machines, etc.) tended to order stock directly from Osaka
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TABLE 9.12. Wholesalers in cities along the Shinkansen
Source: Commercial statistics.
Sales amount (in million yen)
No. of Rate of Sales per capita
shops growth in 1974
(1974) 1970 1974 '74/'70 (070) (thousand yen)
National 292,254 88,330,893 173,671.813 96.6 1585
Tokyo 54,642 31,695,404 58,758,717 85.3 5183
Osaka 26,574 17,746,093 34,172,054 92.5 12,389
Kobe 4227 1,212,855 2,253,655 85.8 1719
Akashi 349 46,419 78,011 68.0 345
Himeji 1807 307,243 603,870 96.5 1410
Aioi 52 3374 9654 186.1 230
Okayama 1563 398,176 782,559 96.5 1582
Kurashiki 1020 214,417 417,680 94.7 1078
Fukuyama 1108 153,704 357,130 132.3 568
Mihara 219 15,744 48,462 207.8 1266
Hiroshima 4296 1,403,115 3,355,001 139.1 4464
Iwakuni 263 31,561 57,096 80.9 521
Tokuyama 515 94,654 243,317 157.0 2336
Yamaguchi 171 19.988 55,752 178.9 545
Shimonoseki 952 159,414 270,286 69.5 1044
KitaKyushu 2876 701,191 1,096,444 56.3 1044
Fukuoka 5586 2,618,240 5,114,265 95.3 5634
and Tokyo, and this tendency was followed by retailers in the cities around
Okayama. As a result, some wholesalers in Okayama, especially fabric
dealers, registered a decline in sales. An investigation conducted before the
Shinkansen opened to Hakata has also revealed that the retailers in Hiroshima
Prefecture intended to order much of their stock from Tokyo and Osaka after
the opening [4J. as shown in Table 9.13.
These changes may have been only temporary and transitional phenomena
before and after the opening. However, when considering the reduced time-
distance, only 1 hour between Okayama and Osaka, 1 hour and 35 minutes
between Fukuyama and Osaka, 1 hour and 56 minutes between Hiroshima and
Osaka, it may well be that local retailers would tend to purchase more and
more stock from Tokyo and Osaka. Apart from this inclination toward the
large central cities, retailers in many cities will change their wholesalers, and
TABLE9.13. Changes expected in places 0/purchase due to the Shinkansen
Source: Investigation on effects of Shinkansen opening, association of Chambers of Commerce
and industry in Hiroshima Prefecture.
Purchases Purchases
from Tokyo from Osaka No change
Total will increase will increase likely Others
Prefectural 480(100.0) 49(10.2) 62(12.9) 362(75.4) 7(1.5)
total
Fukuyama 84(100.0) 11(13.1) 14(16.7) 58(69.0) 1(1.2)
Onomichi 134(100.0) 9( 6.7) 5(3.7) 120(89.6) 0(0)
Mihara 47(100.0) 2(4.3) 5(10.6) 38(80.8) 2(4.3)
Kure 141(100.0) 16(11.4) 23(16.3) 99(70.2) 3(3.2)
Hiroshima 74(100.0) 11(14.9) 15(20.3) 17(63.5) 1(1.4)
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this will no doubt adversely affect wholesale businesses in the small and
medium cities along the line who depend on supplying their local areas.
This impact varies in degree from city to city. It depends to some extent on
how the local wholesalers cope with the situation caused by the Shinkansen.
Their counter-measures are to strengthen their organizational setup, especially
sales and information departments, to diversify or to specialize in their line of
business, and to deal in higher-class goods. In brief, they will have to hold on
to their clientele by being attractive wholesalers. Another problem is whether
they will be able to keep their original areas of commercial activity. What is
interesting here is the fact that the wholesale businesses in Okayama, the city
that has been brought much closer to Osaka by the Shinkansen, has continued
to grow after the Shinkansen opening. This is because they have retained the
demand in their city and at the same time developed new markets in the
districts along the Hakubi Line, seizing the opportunity of its improved train
service.
The effects on Fukuoka City, which has the greatest wholesale
concentration of all the cities along the Shinkansen, and which serves as the
Shinkansen terminal in Kyushu, are as follows [4]:
Of the 317 wholesalers investigated in Fukuoka City, 110 (or 35010) reported
a gain from the Shinkansen; 44 (or 14%) were unfavorably affected, and 172
(or 51 %) did not know. When asked about sales, nine wholesalers reported a
considerable increase, and 41 reported a slight increase (16% altogether). As
many as 246 wholesalers (78%) reported "no effects felt". Nine (3%) reported
that sales had gone down. This means that the Shinkansen has neither sharply
increased nor decreased sales in Fukuoka City. The general effects of the
Shinkansen are varied. Favorable effects reported are: frequent liaison
between head office and branches increased human contact, opportunity to
enlarge businesses, easier collection of information, easier location of
enterprises along the Shinkansen, as pointed out by 149 (47%) of the 317
wholesalers approached. An adverse effect, reported by 49 wholesalers (16%),
is keener competition among themselves and with large enterprises moving in
from the central cities. Six wholesalers (2%) pointed out rising land prices and
wages.
In the final analysis, the Shinkansen has brought new benefits to Fukuoka
City which enjoys the advantage of being the terminal of the Sanyo
Shinkansen. Since the city wholesalers purchase their goods from Tokyo and
Osaka and sell them extensively throughout Kyushu, they are undoubtedly
helped by the Shinkansen.
Although it is too soon to know in detail how wholesale business will be
affected, the following may be pointed out. First, the extensive wholesale
businesses in Fukuoka and Hiroshima Cities could become even more
concentrated. Second, if the wholesalers in the small and medium cities along
the Shinkansen are to continue to grow, the Shinkansen stations ought to be
junctions to other lines, since there is an extensive hinterland for commercial
activity. Third, cities where the Shinkansen trains do not stop, even those with
traditionally strong commercial characteristics, will probably see their
wholesale business gradually dwindle.
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Conclusion
The Sanyo Shinkansen has, by the changes it has brought about in
transportation, had diverse effects on local communities along the line. These
are not effects that have an immediate and direct bearing on income level, but
rather, the kind that alter the city structure and functions and the relationship
between regions and cities. These effects must be correctly assessed and proper
steps taken to cope with them, otherwise, city functions might deteriorate or
be lost.
Important in this connection is the policy to be taken to develop the station
front of such cities as Shin-Kurashiki, Shin-Iwakuni and Shin-Shimonoseki,
which are located far from the city center. The cities of Iwakuni and
Shimonoseki, in particular, whose stations have already been moved several
times, are now cities of very little charm because their centres are so dispersed.
Development of their station fronts should be encouraged with this in mind.
. Another important point is the necessity of strengthening the relationship
between the cities along the Sanyo Shinkansen and the hinterland.
Fortunately, the Chugoku Highway (Osaka-Shimonoseki) is under
construction to stimulate development of the hinterland. The highway is
helping to induce to the hinterland some of the economic activity and
population distribution of the Sanyo Region that has tended to concentrate on
the Inland Sea coast. This is interesting, as it suggests the advantages of
combining an expressway with the Shinkansen and developing the land two-
dimensionally. Moreover, the cities along the Sanyo Shinkansen should make
every effort to secure the means of transport to the inland cities to keep them
within their spheres of influence. That is the only way for the smalI and
medium-sized cities along the Shinkansen to expand their areas of activity.
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10. Socio-Economic Impact Models
as Tools for Aiding Decision-Making
Assessments
J.OWSINSKI
The impact of a certain action undertaken as a result of policy decision should
be analyzed with regard to the initial goals of the undertaker. Two classes of
undertaking realization effects may be distinguished. The first is related to
direct goal definition and evaluation measures which were applied by some
decision-making body in choosing this particular policy. The second are more
general, outside the scope of evaluation and choice mechanisms of the above
decision-maker, more difficult to evaluate quantitatively, but which must
necessarily be considered at some higher level of decison-making.
Two distinct assessment questions arise (see Figs. 10.1 and 10.2):
What was the undertaking's performance with respect to its specific goals
and evaluation measures?
What were the undertaking's impacts on more general socio-economic
processes and how are they (can they be) evaluated?
It is obvious that the really best action can be chosen when the predictions of
the performance (and impact) are uniformly close enough to an actual
situation. These predictions refer, first of all, to the development of the
situation in the sense of changes brought about by implementation of an
action. Furthermore, as the attitudes and values evolve over time, so will the
goal formulations, and therefore they should also be predicted with sufficient
accuracy to ensure the positive outcome of the policy, whatever form of action
it specifies: project, program or other.
Images
The predictions are based upon images which the decision-making body has
of the system being the decision object (national economy, transportation
system, JNR) and of the goals. These images and their interplay define to a
large extent the decision-making procedure (as shown in Fig. 10.3), which
provides a generalization of various loops from Fig. 10.1, and in Fig. 10.4,
which is a deployed version of the loop.
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POLICY
ACTION
GOALS AND
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t
HIGHER LEVEL
DECISION MIlKER PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
IMPLEMENTATI ON
IMPLEMENTATION
ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROCESSES
Fig.IO.1. Effects of policy implementation and their assessment.
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INDIRECT SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT
D
Fig. 10.2. Transportation system development policy: effects and their assessment.
PROBLEM EMERGENCE AND PERCEPTION
IMPLEMENTATIONSEARCH
SOLUTION
Fig. 10.3. Decision procedure loop.
Decision Process
Both types of assessment lead to the recognition of a decision problem,
whenever there is a discrepancy between the state of the object system, as
perceived through its model image, and the goals of the decision-maker,
together with their quantitative achievement measures, as made explicit in a
certain model or planning approach. The solution search is initiated by the
decision-maker, and it consists in specification of various policy instruments
alternatives, estimation of their influence on the object system, and choice of
the best on the basis of goal achievement measures. The search is in general an
iterative process which finally produces a solution, Le. an action specification
in the form of a policy statement. The policy is then implemented through
activation of real controls operating on the object system.
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Ca-IPAR I SON OF
PERCE (VED STATE
A!'V FUTURE BE-
HAvIOR WITH THE
GOALS
o IJ-'AGES
[gJ REAL ENTITIES
Fig. lOA. Decision process elements and their functioning in the loop.
Performance and impact assessment therefore represent the closures of the
loop effected on two different levels. The lower-level loop is shaped by the
higher-level loop through influence on goals, controls and object system
assignment.
Interests
Within this area of the study, analysis is focused on images (computerized or
just formalized models, or less structured representations). It is interesting to
see how the different elements of the decision-making procedure are
represented and what their relations are in the functioning of the procedure.
Are all the necessary image-type elements available? Do they correspond to
each other? Can they form a functioning solution search procedure? These are
the questions to be asked.
In many cases the decision-maker has (potentially) at his disposal more than
one model for an element. The question then arises whether the models or
other images do represent the same real entity, in which case a classification or
even choice must be made among them (through validation, etc.) to arrive at
the best representation, or whether they correspond to different entities
(objects, aspects), in which case they should rather be combined to form a
more comprehensive image.
The models for various effects should be constructed in recognition of the
different types of effect that implementation of policies may have, and then
subsequent various types of appropriate assessments, as mentioned before.
These models would reflect the hierarchical structure of organizing decision-
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making processes within the management system. The questions here are: can
the existing models be assigned to various levels of effects and evaluation and,
if so, what would be the connections between subsequent loops?
Functioning of the Decision Procedure
The decision procedure loop from Fig. 10.3, and especially the solution
search working iteratively over time, moves from the problem definition phase
to the solution determination phase. In this process the structure of goals and
their measures, as well as of policy alternatives, are first established, and then
appropriate decisions are chosen (see Fig. 10.5). The interplay of deployment
of goal achievement measures and policy instruments into achievement
conditions and alternatives is of the utmost importance, because it results in
policy statement and it shapes the lower-level decision procedure. The images-
models should therefore also be analyzed from the point of view of the
deployment spectra which they provide (what are they?, how are they
generated?) and from the point of view of mutual correspondence of
deployments, both within individual procedures and between the levels
(whether the subgoals and subpolicies actually realized do correspond to
explicitly stated higher-level goals and policies? , can the latter be
reconstructed?).
Shinkansen
In Fig. 10.6 some of the notions introduced so far are exemplified for the
Shinkansen. Of the levels already mentioned, monitoring and control aspects
PROBLEM DEFINITICN
CCNDITICNS
SOLUTION DETERMINATION
.,
I
~
-C====:""t 'I-----~. SPEC~CN
IOBJECT SYSTEM'S IMAGE]
POLICY
STATEMENT
ALTERNATIVES
CI-OICE
OBJECT SYSTEM'S IMAGE
Fig. 10.5. Deployment into conditions and alternatives in the decision procedure functioning.
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Fig. 10.6. Exemplification for Shinkansen of some notions introduced.
have been dropped. To the elements of decision procedure, "problem
sources" are added reflecting these factors in the object and management
system (differing for various levels) which make the specific goals appear.
Problem sources are usually the superposition of lingering effects of previous
action, changes in exogenous variables of the object system and shifts in goal
and policy formulations at the higher levels.
Each entry represents in itself a problem for the modeller, a submodel or a
separate model. Thus, for example, achievement measures within performance
assessment may consist of a set of tables and graphs showing growth and
shares of traffic, its cost and revenues. On the other hand, there might be a
submodel in a transportation system model, showing changes in overall users'
time and monetary cost (including shifts among modes), with breakdown into
extrapolated and additional induced traffic, as weighted against revenues
(depreciating investment and operations included), over time. For a longer
time horizon, this projection would account for the growing marginal cost of
carrying additional passengers (freight) or losses incurred by too low
utilization of capacity. Such projections, generated for various transportation
system configurations, could then be compared and evaluated.
In accordance with the meaning of Fig. 10.5, the goals and therefore also
goal achievement measures on various levels, should be broad enough to
enable the appropriate policy to be chosen. Thus, the imposing and costly
technological project could not be chosen were it not for the sufficiently
considered time horizon and such goals as the prestige of JNR or even Japan's
image.
The paradigm behind the classification in Fig. 10.6 is the one that results
from decision procedure requirements. An adequate image system must be
formed that reflects the nature of the object system, management system and
the goals pursued. This can be ensured by the creation of linkages between
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(consistent) levels and elements and by precise enough structuring of these
elements. The models and analyses presented were regarded from this point of
view.
Models and Analyses
In Fig. 10.7 models and analyses are placed against levels.
The SPAMETRI model spans a whole hierarchy of levels. It comprises a
transportation submodel, mainly oriented at choice of transportation mode.
Driving this submodel are economic and social potentials: regional inflows and
outflows of commodities which have to be addressed, and regional
populations and incomes creating interregional tensions. On the other hand,
effective transported flows influence society and economy through the
generalized idea of distance, which has its share in the shaping of production
function values and of regional populations. The regional capacities and needs
(investment, demand) are aggregated to produce national outputs. These are
then allocated among regions. Regions in turn define their supplies and
demands, so that the loop is closed. The model as a whole centers on economic
considerations. Its main features to be analyzed are interconnections between
levels, effected mainly through individual, aggregate variables of somewhat
abstract character.
The trade pattern coefficient model does not contain an explicit national
level. The economy "occurs" primarily as an interregional phenomenon
whose parameters are directly shaped by costs and distances of the
transportation system.
The mechanisms utilized in both models are, however, obviously not meant
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for the type of microanalysis which was illustrated in the paper on impacts on
local communities. It is on this microlevel that the first-order social effects
appear, connected with the flow of people and information, with accessibility
to jobs, goods (in a broad sense) and service. Second-order effects would then
include such by-produced phenomena as, for example, environmental
impacts. In the third, and least measurable, order one would place inducement
of technological progress as well as changes in attitudes towards development
of the country and its character.
SPAMETRI
CONNECTIONS
As mentioned, connections are maintained through a limited number of
aggregate variables. To estimate their role one should know:
Transportation system - economy and social structure) what are the
relative weights of atACC (at ACCP) - accessibility - in production
function as compared to ao?
What do they represent in terms of technical or other change? How does
RKA (regional private capital stock in transportation) appear in
production function, what is its weight, how does it develop over time
(parameters of corresponding equation: al7' b17 for various regions)?
How was the influence of flows themselves (and not only distances) on
transportation investment accounted for in the model?
What changes in regional populations (RPOP) did the model predict, how
do they relate to the changes delineated in, for example, T. Kuroda's
paper?·
(National- Regional economy) What was the basis for adopting a fairly
inertial national production allocation submodel, which highly influences
equity indices?
(Economy and social structure - transportation system) What were the
relative differences of gravity parameters a14, b14, Cl4 among various
pairs of regions? How did these look compared to flow differences? What
inducement could be observed for "Shinkansen" as compared to other
simulative runs?
POLICIES
How does the distance (DIST) develop over time for a certain project,
involving some government expenditure (RGINVA) and a steplike change in
fare costs and time of travel? Should a separate submodel be run to account
for the influence of RKA and flow changes?
Do fare rates only influence the model choice and not the effective volume?
Where has the investment gone in case of reference simulation (if nowhere,
then simulations are not comparable)?
·For an example of additional material obtained during the Conference see the Appendix in the
Summary of Discussion for this session.
138
GOAL-ACHIEVEMENT MEASURES
How can the total cost of meeting (given) demand be derived (like, for
example, the submodel proposed here)?
PROJECTIONS
Smail differences between the three projections illustrated - as compared
to the divergence with relation to the actual growth curve - imply that the
model should be utilized for longer (~ 10 years) time horiwns. It is not
certain, however, whether even for such a time horizon the noise will not
exceed or equal the policy effects (one year "noise" difference in a given
example may exceed several years' sum of effects). On the other hand,
establishment of technical parameters appropriate for this model for such a
long time projection into the future may not give accurate results. Perhaps this
level of assessment is not the right one for Shinkansen?
The econometric model SPAMETRI is obviously meant for general tracking
of economic trends and, operating on the interregional basis, it can produce
potentialities for interregional flows, and - from its model choice submodel
- a share of individual modes. It is better adapted to absorb investments that
are non-specific or broad in character than very specific and narrow ones. As
the work on SPAMETRI's application to transportation projects has just
begun, one must await future even greater accomplishments in the domain,
mainly connected with policy formation, manipulation and sensitivity
analysis, as well as the cost/benefit - more normative - side of the model
utilization.
Trade-Pattern Coefficient Model
This model has a similar general methodological character to SPAMETRI,
being a combination of econometric and 1-0 formulations. In the problems
which arise, and which are exemplified below, a certain number of more
general comparative considerations are included.
CONNECTIONS-EQUITY
There is a considerable difference between equity development predictions
as provided by the two models. Some of this is certainly due to the national
allocation mechanism of SPAMETRI, already mentioned, which is absent in
the trade-pattern model, where economy - and ultimately also the allocation
- is looked upon as an interregional phenomenon. There might be some
further causes, like the more' 'linear" character of the influence of cost and
time coefficients in the trade-pattern model than in SPAMETRI. In the latter
there is a whole recursive mechanism involving congestion, private capital
inducement, etc., influencing the distance variable which then appears in the
population and production function submodels, and it can make the whole
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investment effect saturate very soon. With regard to the trade-pattern model,
it is interesting to note that according to the Shinkansen network-highway
network comparative study (see Appendix to the paper of K. Amano),
Shinkansen lowers the equity, while the highway system enhances it. Why?
There is a more general question of the appropriate regions's size for
catching all relevant economic and social phenomena. While it is true that the
basic social changes along the Shinkansen occur at the prefecture level, these
units cannot be directly treated in an economic model, for lack of data if for
no other reason. On the other hand, it is often argued that break-down into
units, each of which does not sufficiently weigh in national economy, would
not give additional accuracy of a model's results. It can therefore be proposed
that the major regions, especially those relevant to a given project, be
subdivided, while others be kept as basic spatial units.
CONNECTIONS - TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM - ECONOMY
The trade-pattern coefficient model does not include (as SPAMETRI does)
any direct capital influence on or inducement by transportation system
characteristics. There is, on the other hand, a cost adjustment mechanism for
cases of supply-demand imbalance. To what extent are these two approaches
substitutive?
PROJECTIONS
It is difficult to assess on the basis of the paper whether the simulation runs
performed are at all comparable. If they are, however, they yield a number of
interesting results. Taking the Tohoku region as an example, we can see that
not only is it under the relatively strong influence of the Shinkansen -
although not directly affected by it - but that with the existence of the
Tokaido Shinkansen it is economically more isolated than without it. What
can be the rationale behind this result (centering of aligned regions on
themselves)?
Conclusions
This short paper is not meant to provide any conclusions, as these can only
be formulated after closer examination of the problems and further study. The
increase in the number of model studies for evaluation of alternative policies
(in transportation particularly) in Japan and elsewhere demonstrates that the
question of adequate design of models for decision-making purposes is crucial.

11. Discussion
1. Model Types and Characteristics; Connections
(a) A very general question was raised and discussed which concerned the
adequate choice ofmodels (e.g. input/output as compared to scenario type)
for various situations, and the balance ofpossible techniques to be used
(related to the elements of the decision procedure introduced in a discussion
paper - e.g. econometric compared to optimization).
(b) Concerning the time stretch covered by models it was stated that the
SPAMETRI model as presented at the conference was expressly utilized for
ex-post simulation, and that the runs reported in the paper are being extended
to 1971 - the year of the Sanyo Shinkansen opening, and beyond. Previously,
forcasting uses of the model were concerned with a macroanalysis of less
specific governmental road investment allocation over regions. In general,
however, forecasting has recently become more difficult for the Japanese
economy because of the structural changes which the economy undergoes. The
limits to the time horizon, which are set by changes in technical parameters
and by policy horizons, are a subject for analysis in themselves.
(c) As far as the data sources for such complex modelling undertakings are
concerned, the usual procedure in Japan is to utilize the official interregional
input/output tables which are published every 5 years. The tables are used in a
direct, aggregated, or disaggregated form. (The trade pattern coefficient
model was based on the 1960 input/output tables. The 1965 and the 1970
tables are now available.)
An additional important source of data are the origin destination tables
compiled for forty-six prefectures in Japan, published for passengers and
commodities.
(d) The question of model convergence does not apply to the studies
presented because they do not use simultaneous estimation techniques as a
whole (only for some parts) and their deployment is to a large extent recursive.
(e) The discount factor of 70/0 used in the SPAMETRI model is an average
of the credit rates of city banks over the simulation period.
(f) An illustration of the relative significance of relations and parameters
used to connect different levels is shown in Table 11.1 of this summary. The
table presents production functions of tertiary industries in the SPAMETRI
model.
2. Adequacy to Object System
(a) Some discussion was devoted to the problem of the boundaries of
problem analysis, in other words, the extent of the phenomena that was
considered.
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(b) A related question of adequate regional breakdown was also raised.
Although many societal processes induced by the Shinkansen occur on a
prefectural basis, the economic models - especially those of the input/output
type which use prefectures as basic units - may show too high a sensitivity to
phenomena which is statistically negligible. From this point of view, a
breakdown of Japan into nine major regions appears to be sensible. In
addition, the amount of computation would increase dramatically if
prefectures were used as the basic units for analysis - on the order of a factor
of 25 to 30 for each matrix (46/9)2. Reliable input/output and other tables
already exist for a nine-region breakdown of Japan. The studies which
incorporate this data, however, also include subregional considerations. The
trade-pattern coefficient model, for example, initially included a total of
twenty-four "zones" which were later aggregated into regions. For the
purpose of Shinkansen analysis, it was suggested that those regions that lay
along the Shinkansen lines could be divided into two or three "sub-regions" in
order to obtain a more beneficial analysis.
3. Projections and Policies
(a) A question of comparability ofpolicies which were analyzed was raised
for general discussion. The specific example of analyzing the proposed
highway in comparison with the Shinkansen was raised. It was mentioned that
highways may be more environmentally and socially disruptive than a railroad
system, in part due to the larger amount of land needed, increased pollution
load, and highway death rates. It was emphasized by several delegates that
these extraneous effects of highway construction are often not entered into a
comparative analysis, thus inducing a false bias for highway construction.
(b) The level of sensitivity of the model results to changes in policy
formulation turned out to be much higher for regional growth allocation than
for summary output indices. This sensitivity can be easily derived from the
results cited in the papers. In addition, the sensitivity to endogenous changes in
policy variables was greater than the sensitivity to manipulation of exogenous
variables.
For computation of model results with respect to interregional changes an
illustration is given (see Appendix) of changes in regional populations
according to both models.
(c) Shinkansen was defined in the SPAMETRI model as a new mode of
transportation (see Table 11.2) utilizing the same parameters but incorporating
differing dependent variables.
(d) The relationships of time and monetary costs for both the SPAMETRI
model and the trade pattern coefficient model are shown in Tables 11.2 and
11.3.
(e) The inducement level of Shinkansen as predicted by the trade-pattern
coefficient model was about 10-20070; the entire system was accounted for. The
figure of 6% given in the paper "Impact of the Sanyo Shinkansen on Local
Communities" refers to the actual situation on the Sanyo line. The 20-30%
4
DISTP (M,N,R) = y., ~ DISTP (M,N,R)
R=I
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TABLE 11.2. SPAMETRl: Relation ofmonetary and time cost ofpassenger transportation
Modal Choice Model for Passengers (Modes: (1) Railway; (2) Automobile; (3) Shipping; (4)
Aviation)
RATiOP (M,N,R) = a l (M,N)'QI + aiM,N)'Q2+ a 3(M,N)'Q3 +aiM,N)·Q. +C(M,N)'
P(M,N,R) +T(M,N)'q(M,N,R)
P(M,N,R) = { COSTP (M,N,R) - COSTP (M,N,R)} / COSTP (M,N,R)
q (M,N,R) = { DISTP (M,N,R) - DISTP (M,N,R) } / DISTP (M,N,R)
COSTP (M,N,R) = \4 4
~ COSTP (M,N,R)
R=I
Q\, Q2' Q3' Q4: Dummy variables corresponding to the transport modes
A portion of(aJ table
O·D a l a2 a 3 a 4 C T R2
I-I 0.13260 0.31405 0.28292 0.27043 0.06557 0.34636 0.9976
(2.883) (2.657) (3.115) (-2.760) (3.136)
1-2 0.97772 0.02471 0.02044 -0.01587 0.01361 -0.01459 0.9998
(4.681) (0.702) (0.562) (0.699) (-0.506)
1-3 0.42254 -0.25861 -0.09701 0.93308 -0.26000 0.16181 0.9933
(3.6'1'0) (-1.135) (-0.378) (-1.825) (0.911)
1-4 0.93330 -0.06485 -0.07828 0.20983 -0.10922 0.03094 0.9999
(4.683) (-1.907) (-1.807) (3.302) (1.201)
1-5 0.80954 -0.26761 -0.11012 0.56819 -0.24795 0.13783 0.9993
(4.580) (-2.198) (-0.705) (-2.507) (1.397)
1-6 0.88284 -0.11356 -0.04570 0.27642 -0.10946 0.06376 0.9999
(4.678) (-0.897) (-0.897) (-3.251) (1.722)
Notes: (1) The figures in parentheses mean T-values. (2) The traffic assignment ratios for the O·D
combination for which no estimated values of coefficients are available were estimated by the
extrapolation of trend. (3) Estimated by 1961-1970 data. (4) a4 is estimated by the relation of a 4
= I-al a2 a3.·0 = origin; D = destination.
TABLE I1.3. Trade pattern coefficient model: relation (A) of monetary cost to time
cost of commodity transport.
Ai (yen/time) Sector
35.1 Agriculture, fishery
18.0 Mineral industry
28.2 Textile industry
20.0 Chemical industry
31.0 Metallurgical industry
31.0 Machine industry
28.2 Miscellaneous
inducement rate for the Tokaido Shinkansen also refers to actual conditions
during the line's first period of operation.
(t) Thepay-ojjperiod for Tokaido Shinkansen investment was estimated
by the trade pattern coefficient model as approximately 7 years in terms of
national output. The actual pay-off period for the Tokaido Shinkansen,
without taking into account external factors, was 5 to 6 years.
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4. Goal-Achievement Measures
The type of simple cost/benefit analysis performed by SPAMETRI was the
first attempt to use this model in such an analysis. In future studies the analysis
will be extended to include such items as the range of policies and the
comprehensiveness of measures; for example, in the determination of
environmental costs, the cost of noise insulation, etc., would be included.
Appendix
CASE 1 - CASE 2
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Fig.IIA.I. Regional population growth: trade pattern coefficient model.
TABLE IIA.I. Actual and predicted regional population changes in SPAMETRI (thousands)
Region
I Actual
Predicted
2 Actual
Predicted
3 Actual
Predicted
4 Actual
Predicted
5 Actual
Predicted
6 Actual
Predicted
7 Actual
Predicted
8 Actual
Predicted
9 Actual
Predicted
1963
5125
5113
11,601
11,596
27,528
27,536
10,611
10,572
2763
2761
15,030
14,984
6896
6891
4022
4011
12,578
12,584
1964
5169
5131
11,580
11,549
28,144
18,158
10,799
10,728
2763
2759
15,396
15,264
6868
6866
3998
3981
12,456
12,501
1965
5205
5150
11,531
11,502
28,846
28,787
10,996
10,886
2767
2756
15,738
15,547
6877
6845
3979
3952
12,366
12,421
1966
5221
5170
11,497
11,456
29,521
29,415
11,155
11,048
2768
2752
16,051
15,834
6873
6829
3959
3925
12,343
12,345
1967
5229
5192
II ,457
11,411
30,089
30,049
11,262
11,213
2761
2748
16,299
16,126
6874
6819
3945
3899
12,280
12,267
1968
5242
5216
11,387
11,367
30,568
30,692
11,405
11,380
2757
2744
16,380
16,422
6866
6813
3872
3875
12,179
12,188
Total Actual
Predicted
96,154
96,047
97,173
96,937
98,305
97,846
99,388
98,775
100,196
99,725
100,856
100,697

Environmental Problems Associated
with the Shinkansen

12. Introduction and Framework/or
Assessing the Environmental Impacts 0/
the Shinkansen
D. FISCHER
IIASA studies of the Shinkansen and other large-scale development programs
are undertaken in order to place the development environment interface into a
systems perspective. As a possible environmental management framework
linking the development and environment systems, Fig. 12.1 and 12.2 have
been prepared. It is a suggested approach to the problem of forming a
comprehensive and integrative environmental management system to respond
to the development on the environment.
Figure 12.1 shows the basic structure of the above framework and provides
an introduction to the papers that follow. Figure 12.1 is divided into two
separate programs, a development program and an environment program. The
key interface between these systems comes first from the development side as a
set of development activities impinge on the environment as a set of impacts
accompanied by development responses to those impacts. The second aspect
of this development-environment interface comes from the environmental side
to influence the development activities. This influence occurs through several
environment
response
--I
"
"\
environment'
program ;
I
--<
environment
response
development
response
\--/---
I
/ development
, program
I
\
\
"j--/
development
response
Fig. 12.1. The dual responses necessary for creation of an environmental management system.
149
150
OUTPUTS ENV INPUTS DEY OUTPUTSPROG. PROG.
ENV RES _"'-iLTI_ FEAS DEVFEAS ! DISCIP ! POSSI ~ +ENV PLAN
-
EIA DESIGN DEVOBJS ! ~ ! ALTS~ +ENV REG'N PUB APPVL DEYT-O ~ PARTIC I T-O~ ~ ~ENV MGT
- ROLES CONST/OPN IMPACTSALTS
l ~ ! !~ INFOOPN MON FLOW USE RECYCLE
~ ! ! ~DEY, CCI+I ACCTNG ENV,PUBLICS PUBLICS
Fig. 12.2. Elements of a comprehensive and integrative environmental management system.
approaches including standards, sanctions, impact assessment, monitoring,
etc. Both the environmental response and the development response are
involved in mitigating or eliminating the environmental impacts of
development activities. This dual response set comprises the environmental
management system. The adequacy of this system is determined via the
comprehensiveness of the responses and the degree to which they are
integrated into the development system.
Together these policy variables comprise a system that is capable of
responding to a set of impacts that affect the environment. One of the reasons
the development program has grown so large is the set of positive development
impacts that have been created and that propel the program over time. One of
the reasons the environment program has evolved is the set of negative
environmental impacts from these development activities that have given rise
to the creation of a program to offset such development pressures. The scope
of our studies is to ascertain the nature of the development and environment
responses connected with the large-scale development programs. In particular,
there is an interest in determining the linkages characterizing the interface
between the development and environment systems. These linkages would
comprise interprogram connection which could be joint responses envolving
into a comprehensive and integrated environmental management system.
The first figure contains the two programs of environment and
development, into which are embedded the essential variables of actors, their
values and responses that are activated by the potential impacts from the
development program. Each program is explicitly defined as shown in Fig.
12.2 with each stage briefly listed in the figure.
Figure 12.2 has a set of inputs which appear to be a necessary ingredient for
interfacing specific development and environment programs. The first input is
a multidisciplinary team to both environmental research and development
feasibility studies which provides a basis for determining a wide range of
environmental feasibHities and development possibilities, respectively. This
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information then feeds into the next stage as an input. The second input is an
environmental impact assessment to both the environmental planning and the
development design stages. This input provides a basis for forming
environmental objectives and development alternatives and is created from the
multidisciplinary input preceding it. The third input is public participation
from a wide range of publics that stems from the impact assessment and feeds
into the regulation and development approval stages to provide responses to
environment-development trade-offs. The fourth input consists of the
reticulist roles necessary to operate the interface as environmental
management and d~velopmentconstruction and operation actually occur over
time and as conflicts arise. Public participation is an additional basis for
generating environmental alternatives to expected and unexpected
environmental impacts from the development. The fifth and final input is the
flow of information from the reticulist roles into the monitoring of the
environment and development, including the users and users of the
development itself. The results of this information flow is to secure the
operation of these environmental alternatives and of the recycling,
conservation and environmental efforts of the developer. This information
flow also provides the basis for the communications and accounting flows for
each of the programs and to the publics as well as for each of the outputs
associated with each of the programs.
While the above description of Fig. 12.2 is quite brief, it does suggest the
outline of an environmental management system. It is the suggested approach
of our IIASA study team based on the models used and the information
collected for each part of our efforts.
Because of these major impacts associated with the Shinkansen, the
environmental management aspects have become important. The basic
activities in Fig. 12.2 comprising such an environmental program to meet these
impacts are shown below:
Research. The capability of identifying environmental problems, providing
the research design and analyses and communicating the results in a
practical format.
Planning. The capability to perceive and plan for mitigating long-term
effects of planned developments to the environment including the
possibility of eliminating the development altogether or proposing viable
alternatives thereto.
Regulation. The capability of controlling the construction, operation and
abandonment of the development with appropriate measures and
sanctions.
Management. The capability of managing the residual unmitigated adverse
impacts and integrating them into a general management program for the
environments options.
Monitoring. The capability of identifying the origins of impacts, their
environmental effects and the changes induced in the environment from
the development as well as the capability to translate these findings into
suitable inputs to support the other environmental activities listed above.
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Communications. The capability of translating and transmitting useful
environmental information to the traditional users, the publics, the
developers and the other environmentalists.
These activities, when taken together and when merged with development
responses, comprise the essential elements of an environmental management
system.
The adequacy of this combined response system can be assessed through the
criteria of comprehensiveness and integrativeness. Comprehensiveness can be
defined in two ways:
a comprehensive set of actor groups involved and assessing the adequacy of
the environmental management system, and
the full range of environmental program activities necessary to regulate the
development are included, such as research planning, regulation,
management, monitoring and communication.
Integrativeness can be equally defined in two ways:
an integrated set of relationships between development and environment
actor groups, and
an integrated communication and decision pattern giving similar weighting
to environmental information generated.
How the environment is considered in the Shinkansen program sets the stage
for many of the impacts emanating from it. If it is narrowly perceived as
simply pollution control then important environmental factors can be missed.
Such factors include not only the wider set of social environmental impacts
that are often difficult to perceive but also the set of environmental planning
opportunities available for restructuring and protecting the larger environment
of a specific extension of the system.
The basic approach to the study of large-scale systems was the premise that
environment and development are not always fundamentally incompatible. In
other words, there is often an environmentally sound way to develop a
technological system. This premise attempts to bring environment and
development together rather than allowing them to segregate into separate
conflicting compartments. Over time a growing convergence can often be seen
rather than conflict between environmental and development goals, activities,
strategies and actors involved. The conflict resolutions process is difficult
because of major problems in attempting to integrate the seemingly disparate
factors of environment and development. The assessment processes underlying
such conflicts and integration attempts are of interest through their linkage of
varying actors, goals and issues. The criteria underlying this approach are
designed to ascertain the possible convergence between development and
environment policy systems. This approach has as its purpose the
understanding of the Shinkansen development-environment case for
application of a systems view and subsequent analysis.
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The purpose of this approach is to move from a set of isolated and non-
comprehensive environmental functions housed in different agencies and to
bring them together in a comprehensive way so that a holistic look at the
environment is obtained for merging with a development program. A
development is already brought together because of the necessity of achieving
some set development goals, such as time-saving for the Shinkansen. The two
programs are integrated so that finally a development program is created
complete with an environmental program which is both comprehensive and
integrated into that development program. This approach then is the
generalized framework evolved at IIASA for studying large-scale development
programs.

13. Environmental Problems and the
Shinkansen
T. YORINO
Environmental Problems in Japan and Government Policy
THE BEGINNING OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVAnON ADMINISTRATION
The deterioration of the environment in Japan became increasingly serious in
the course of high economic growth, but some improvement is being made in
certain areas as a result of counter-measures. The problems remain serious,
and they are becoming more diversified and complicated.
The first case of environmental pollution was noted in the latter half of the
19th century when the smoke and liquid waste from mines damaged
agricultural products. The nation as a whole, however, showed little concern
about environmental problems until the end of World War II. As early as the
last half of the 1940s, pollution began to be a problem, related to the progress
in economic recovery, in the Keihin (Tokyo and Yokohama) and Hanshin
(Osaka and Kobe) districts,leading Tokyo to issue the Ordinance for the
Prevention of Environmental Pollution by Factories, and other local
authorities followed suit. These Ordinances, however, were concerned with air
and water pollution, dealing only with the procedure for obtaining permission
to build plants and workshops. No quantitative standards were set for the
discharge of smoke and liquid waste.
Environmental pollution became a national concern around 1955, when the
Japanese economy had finished its recovery period and entered into the
remarkable growth period. During the 18 years from 1955 to 1973, the
Japanese economy continued to grow at a rate unprecedented in the world,
and the real gross national product rose 5.4-fold. This was also the period
when environmental pollution spread to national proportions.
SYSTEMAnZAnON OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVAnON ADMINISTRATION
In 1967, to clarify the common principles, targets and setups of
environmental preservation administration that had become diversified among
various ministries and agencies, and in order to coordinate efforts, the Basic
Law for Environmental Pollution Control, based on a 2-year government
study, was promulgated to cope with aggravated environmental pollution.
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This law listed six environmental pollutions: air pollution, water pollution,
soil pollution, noise vibration, ground subsidence and offensive odor. Factory
operators and the state and local authorities were obligated to do their part in
prevention of these pollutions.
The environmental quality standards called for under the Basic Law for
Environmental Pollution Control were set out in 1969/1970 for sulfuric oxide,
carbon monoxide, cadmium and mercury, and this was followed by the smoke
and liquid-waste discharge standards for national application. The regulations
on water quality, smoke, underground water pumping, etc., were also
formulated. In 1968 the Noise Pollution Regulation for the control of
workshop and construction noise was enacted, followed by the Vibration
Pollution Regulation in 1976.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT AGENCY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATION
Along with the progress of legislation for preservation of the environment in
the second half of the 1960s, the establishment of an overall administrative
organ for this purpose was keenly desired, and the Environment Agency was
set up in 1971 to take over all the environmental administration work that had
been diversified among various ministries.
In 1972 an agreement was reached at a Cabinet meeting that in carrying out
various public works their effects on the environment should be studied
before-hand to avoid environmental deterioration, and that an environmental
assessment should be conducted. Various methods of assessment were then
studied in accordance with this Cabinet agreement. The Environment Agency
has recently made preparations for legislation to institutionalize
environmental assessment for application to all large-scale projects before
their commencement, and this is being discussed with the authorities
concerned.
The history of environmental pollution in Japan and measures taken to
control it are given in Table 13.1, which shows that the Shinkansen
environmental problem appeared late and is a part of the diverse
environmental problems.
Laws Controlling Environmental Pollution
Laws controlling environmental pollution, gradually put in order since 1890
when the Mining Ordinance was promulgated, are shown in Fig. 13.1. As is
shown, legislation is now almost completed, and much is expected of the
adequate application of these laws and regulations.
Current Problems of Environmental Pollution
The environmental pollutions complained of in Japan today are shown in
Tables 13.2-13.4. Complaints rose rapidly in number, reaching the peak of
about 80,000 cases in 1972.
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TABLE 13. I. History ofenvironmental pollution legislation
1956 "Minamata" disease (organic mercury poisoning) becomes a social problem
19.59 Construction of the Shinkansen begins
Water-quality Preservation Law
Numerous asthma cases in Yokkaichi City (petrochemical complex)
1962 Smoke and Soot Regulation Law
1964 Environmental Pollution Section set up in the Ministry of Health and Welfare
Shinkansen opens between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka
1967 Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control
Law for the Prevention of Noise at Public Airports
Lawsuit concerning Air Pollution in Yokkaichi City
1968 Air Pollution Control Law
Noise Regulation Law
1969 Lawsuit concerning "minamata" disease
Lawsuit against noise at Osaka International Airport
1970 Amendment Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control
1971 Environmental Quality Standards for Noise (in general district)
Environment Agency set up
Central Council for Control of Environmental Pollution set up
1972 UN Environment Conference
Nature Conservation Law
Recommendations of Urgent Steps on Shinkansen Noise Abatement
1973 Environmental Quality Standards for Airplane Noise
1974 Lawsuit at Nagoya against Shinkansen Noise and Vibration
1975 Environmental Quality Standards for Shinkansen
1976 Recommendation of Urgent Guidance Principles on Shinkansen Vibration
Vibration Regulation Law
Among the complaints of environmental pollution, those of noise and
vibration head them all, reaching 24,000 cases in 1974. Of these, 21,000
complaints were of noise and 244 of railway noise (about 1010). Complaints of
vibration reached 4000, of which 350 were of railway vibration, or about 9010.
Most of the complaints about railways were made of the Shinkansen.
Environmental Problems Involving tbe Sbinkansen: Background
The noise and vibration and impairment of TV reception caused by
Shinkansen trains have been complained of, individually or by group, since the
opening in October 1964, and some complainers have demanded
compensation. At the time of the opening, the train frequency was 30 round
trips per day and the number of complaints was small, but as the number of
trains raised and as more cars were put on each train (from twelve to the
present sixteen) complaints against the noise and vibration began to mount
annually. Organized movements started in various places along the line, the
League against Shinkansen Pollution taking the initiative. Complaints rapidly
increased and intensified among the residents along the line, so much as to
become a social movement. By the end of 1975 the total number of complaints
and petitions in writing had reached 550.
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TABLE 13.2. Number ofcomplaints ofenvironmental pollution by kind
Source: Environment Agency, Environment White Paper, 1976.
Kind 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Air pollution 4962 5621 5843 7558 12,911 13,798 15,096 14,234 12,145
Water pollution 2197 3014 3782 4665 8913 11,676 14,197 15,726 14,496
Soil pollution 67 262 408 466 478
Noise and vibration 8833 12,205 12,110 17,786 22,568 25,591 28,376 28,632 24,195
Ground subsidence 31 41 41 13 11 937 74 93 84
Offensive odor 3494 5073 5622 7983 14,997 17,750 21,576 19,674 17,140
Total 19,517 25,954 27,398 38,005 59,467 70,014 79,727 78,825 68,538
Note: Investigated by the Environmental Dispute Coordination Commission.
TABLE 13.3. Breakdown ofcomplaints ofnoise
Source: Environment Agency, Environment White Paper, 1976.
Kind of noise
Con-
Work- struc- Road Mid- Air-
Year shop tion traffic night plane Railway Others Total
1971 No. of cases 11,506 1983 479 720 341 63 3643 18,735
070 61 11 2 4 2 I 19 100
1972 No. of cases 14,828 3619 527 1026 166 162 3653 23,981
% 62 15 2 4 I 1 15 100
1973 No. of cases 14,908 3424 691 1205 249 144 3524 24,146
% 62 14 3 5 1 1 14 100
1974 No. of cases 12,567 2647 819 1179 265 244 3251 20,972
% 60 13 4 6 1 I 15 100
Note: Investigated by the Environment Agency.
TABLE 13.4. Complaints of vibration throughout Japan in 1974
Source: Environment Agency, Environment White Paper, 1976.
Kind of noise
Con-
strue- Road traffic Railway
tion High- Others Shin- Air-
Workshop work way kansen Other plane Others Total
No. of 2179 986 26 378 273 77 176 4095
cases (64) (I) (17) (28) (110)
% 53 24 I 9 7 2 4 100
Notes: Investigated by the Environment Agency. The numbers in parentheses represent those of
low-frequency aerial vibration, not included in total.
The complaints and petitions mainly desired the establishment of a buffer
zone between the rail line and built-up areas, prompt execution of work on
abatement of noise and vibration, compensation for pollution, and the slow-
down of trains. In extreme cases, the residents along the line in the Nagoya
area instituted lawsuits demanding the banning of Shinkansen noise and
vibration intrusion. Social trends had made residents aware of their right to
protect themselves against environmental pollution and complaints were
steadily increasing.
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The Shinkansen, however, was created to benefit human life. It is
reasonable to expect it to meet the transport demands and carry out its service
in the most efficient way. But how could a rail line of such vital importance as
the Shinkansen be constructed in a narrow land like Japan, with its population
and economic centers distributed as they are, and be completely free from
environmental pollution?
The question is how to keep a balance between the convenience of the
Shinkansen and the environmental deterioration. The problem can be solved
only on a national scale with the realities of the situation understood and with
the cooperation of residents along the Shinkansen line. Here, it is particularly
important to understand the nature of environmental deterioration. Noise and
vibration, unless at especially high levels, unlike air and water pollution, are
not directly linked to health harm. They are linked rather to mental harm or
annoyance to daily life. Hence, the balance between the influence on the
personal environment and the public nature or convenience of the Shinkansen
must be considered. Room is thus left for the factor of human endurance.
There is also the question of who is to bear the cost of environment
preservation and to what extent, and therefore a hasty conclusion should not
be drawn.
BACKGROUND TO THE SOCIAL PROBLEM
The public today reacts more sensitively than formerly to environmental
problems. In extreme cases, there is a tendency to think that mankind is even
imperiled.
Japan is a country high in population density, GNP, crude steel production,
electric power generation and motor-car ownership. Moreover, less than 30070
of Japan consists of flat land. In the region called the Tokaido Megalopolis,
which lies along the Shinkansen, nearly half the Japanese population and
about 70070 of the national industrial output is concentrated. It is one of the
most thriving regions in the world, densely populated and industrially
productive (see Fig. 13.2). In such a region, a mass transport system like the
Shinkansen is vitally necessary. Indeed the traffic on the Shinkansen speaks
for itself, and justifies its existence.
For the convenience of users and to facilitate a transportation network, it
was desirable to build a Shinkansen station close to the existing station, well
inside the urban district. Hence, the route had to pass through densely
populated areas in the vicinity of the station. Even when the route avoided
these areas, new houses would be built along the line after it was opened. The
Shinkansen trains forced their way into the existing urban districts to reach
their stations. It was not easy to provide a proper buffer zone between the line
and dwelling houses.
There is not much affinity between the Shinkansen and the residents along
the line, as the residents do not use the Shinkansen trains as often as the
conventional narrow-gauge line. This is one reason why many complaints are
made against the noise and vibration of the Shinkansen although the noise and
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Fig. 13.2. Megalopolitan Japan. Source: Kenzo Tange, Image ofJapan in the Future.
vibration levels are almost the same as those of the conventional narrow-gauge
line.
Most of the houses are made of wood and paper and cannot shut out noise
and vibration.
All these circumstances combine to make a serious environmental problem.
Most of them appear to be peculiar to Japan, as do most of the environmental
problems concerning the Shinkansen.
Environmental Quality Standards on Shinkansen Noise: Guidance
Principles on Vibration
Having decided that counter-measures must be taken against the Shinkansen
noise and vibration, which had become a social problem, the Environment
Agency recommended in December 1972, first of all, urgent steps on
Shinkansen noise abatement along the line, based on suggestion by the Central
Council for Control of Environmental Pollution. In July 1975, the Agency
formulated environmental quality standards for noise control, and in March
1976 recommended guidance for vibration. That these recommendations were
made outside the framework of the Noise and Vibration Pollution Regulations
in expectation of active efforts by the state and JNR was, presumably for the
following reasons:
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The operating body of the Shinkansen is JNR, a public corporation, and the
recommendations are directed to a specific body, unlike the case of road
transport where the persons to be regulated are unspecific; the technology for
prevention of noise and vibration at the source is well advanced; and the
impact of the regulations would be very great and it would not be easy to
balance the various interests.
RECOMMENDATION OF URGENT STEPS ON NOISE ABATEMENT
The urgent steps for noise abatement recommended in December 1972 were
as follows:
1. Take countermeasure at the sound sources, so that the Shinkansen noise
level is below 80 phons (A) in the residential area along the line.
2. For dwelling houses and others in an area where the noise level persists at
85 phons (A) or more after countermeasures are taken at the sound
sources, take steps to remove the nuisance, so that daily life is not too
much impaired.
3. Give special consideration to schools, hospitals and other institutions
that particularly need to be quiet.
4. For areas suffering from damage due to vibration, consider methods to
ease the suffering.
5. During night-time track maintenance work, endeavor to reduce the noise
level by improving the method of job execution.
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STANDARDS CONCERNING NOISE
The main points of the environmental quality standards for noise from the
Shinkansen, made public in June 1975, are shown in Tables 13.5 and 13.6.
Policyfor execution ofnoise abatement
1. In executing the countermeasure, give priority and weight to Area A of
Table 13.6.
2. For Areas Band C of Table 13.6, determine the execution method to be
taken, taking into account the progress of work execution on Area A.
TABLE 13.~. Standardvaluesjornoise
Classes of area Standard values
I. Mainly residential 70 phons or below
II. Commercial and industrial. but must be kept suitable 7~ phons or below
for living in
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TABLE 13.6. Target period ofattainment ofnoise standards
Target period of attainment
Classification of areas along
Shinkansen
Shinkansen
already in
operation
Shinkansen Shinkansen
under con- to be con-
struction structed
A Area of 80 phons or more Within 3 yr At the time of
opening
B Area above 7S phons (a) Within 7 yr Within 3 yr At the time of
and under 80 phons (b) Within 10 yr after opening opening
C Area above 70 phons up Within 10 yr Within S yr
to 7S phons after opening
The area (a) of B refers to the place corresponding to the Class I area or is an extension of it,
and the area (b) to places other than the area (a).
BASIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STANDARDS CONCERNING NOISE
The main points of the basis on which the environmental quality standards
were determined, as reported by the Experts' Committee of the Central
Council for Control of Environmental Pollution, are as follows:
Assessment unit
The elements to be specially considered in determining the assessment unit
are train frequency, peak level and duration. Among the assessment units for
noise, covering these three elements are Leq, expressing the quality of energy,
and ECPNL, used as the assessment unit of aeroplane noise. In the case of the
Shinkansen, the peak level alone is used at present, as no differences due to
train frequency can be noted in the degree of nuisance complained of by the
residents in their answers to questionnaires, and as the desirability of using
Leq or ECPNL has not yet been fully studied.
Standard value
Conceivable effects of noise are: the effect on hearing, the physiological
effect on pulse and blood constituents, the psychological effect, commonly
expressed as nuisance, and the effects on daily life, such as sleep and
conversation.
The effect on hearing and the physiological effect are produced by a level of
noise considerably higher than that which produces the psychological effect
and the effects on daily life. The range of levels of the Shinkansen noise,
except in special cases, is no higher than that causing the psychological effect
and the effects on daily life.
The psychological effect of annoyance and the effects on daily life, such as
sleep and conversation, have been studied from answers to questionnaires sent
in from residents along the Shinkansen, and the noise level has been set at a
point where the rate of the residents' complaints about some of the relevant
effects would be less than 30%. The noise level at which less than 30% of the
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Rail lineItem
TABLE 13.7. Residents' reaction to Shinkansen noise
Source: Experts' Committee Corcerning Noise, Central Council for Control of Environmental
Pollution, Basis ojEnvironmental Quality Standard Concerning Shinkansen Noise, March 1975.
Ratios of positive reaction
Investigated by 60070 50070 40070 30070 20070 10070
73
66
66
69
64
55
69
65
75
68
Tokaido Shinkansen
Sanyo Shinkansen
Tokaido Shinkansen
Sanyo Shinkansen
Tokaido Shinkansen
Being startled
Conversation
interference
Tohoku Univ. 87 84 82 80 77 75
Tohoku Univ. 82 78 75 71 67
Tohoku Univ. 87 85 82 79 76
Tohoku Univ. 80 77 74 71 69
Environment Agency 80 78 76 73 70
Tohoku Univ. 81 79 77 74 72
Sanyo Shinkansen Tohoku Univ. 79 76 73 70 67
Tokaido Shinkansen Environment Agency 79 77 74 71 66
Tohoku Univ. 80 77 75 73 71
Sanyo Shinkansen Tohoku Univ. 77 74 72 70 67
Tokaido Shinkansen Tohoku Univ. 88 85 83 80 77
Sanyo Shinkansen Tohoku Univ. 84 81 77 74 71
General assessment Tokaido Shinkansen Environment Agency 80 79 77 73 68
Prevention of
falling asleep
Disturbance of
restful sleep
Telephone
interference
Notes: (I) By "positive reaction", is meant: (a) according to the Environment Agency,
"Occasionally experienced" + "Rather frequently" + "Frequently"; (b) according to Tohoku
University, positive reaction by Likert measure. (2) The noise level is the average value of noise
level at the time the train passes the measuring point. (3) The Environment Agency has also
investigated, item by item, but the relation between the noise level and complaints has not been
sought for disturbance of sleep, etc., as the analysis revealed that there are many contributing
factors other than noise involved in the complaints.
residents complain of some effects is roughly calculated as 70-75 phons, as
may be seen from Table 13.7.
The psychological effect and the effect on daily life vary with residents'
varying environmental conditions and ways of life. Thus the standard value of
a mainly residential area, where more quiet is desired (a Class I area), is set at
70 phons, and that of other areas (Class II) at 75 phons. These values were
decided after a comparative study of environmental quality standards for road
traffic and aeroplane noise.
DOUBTFUL POINTS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STANDARDS
The environmental quality standards are stipulated under Article 9 of the
Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control. They are formulated by the
Government with the object of protecting man's health and preserving his
environment in good condition. In this respect the standard values are of a
somewhat different nature from the regulation values set for poisonous
materials injurious to health. This characteristic of being the target value gives
rise to a sort of intrinsic ambiguity in the meaning of its numerical value.
Conflicting opinions are therefore inevitable. One opinion holds that the
numerical value is difficult to attain but it must be set as high as possible; the
other insists that it is necessary to set an administrative target, i.e. with a
highly realizable value kept in mind. This ambiguity seems not to have been
properly clarified at the discussion of environmental quality standards for the
Shinkansen noise. Other problems that seem not to have been properly studied
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are: the definitive way of attaining the value; the impacts on the national
economy; whether the tempo of the investment to be made on the environment
preservation is reasonable or not in the light of the prevailing economic
situation; how far other kinds of noise are controlled; the effect on the
country's standard of living.
URGENT GUIDANCE PRINCIPLE RECOMMENDED ON VIBRAnON
The main points of the guidance principle on the Shinkansen vibration
recommended in March 1976 are given below.
Standard value
1. For the areas where the corrected acceleration level of the Shinkansen
vibration exceeds 70 dB, consider as promptly as possible counter-measures
against vibration sources and prevention of the nuisance to houses.
2. For the areas with hospitals, schools, and institutions that need to be
quiet, give special consideration and take proper steps as soon as possible.
Steps for the attainment ofthe standard value
1. As a counter-measure against vibration sources of the Shinkansen,
provide a means to reduce the vibration of structures. Even when such
measures have been taken, there may be occasions where it is not easy to
reduce the vibration with the presently available technology. Technical
development must be immediately undertaken, therefore, to devise the means
for the vibration-proofing of structures and for vibration interception.
2. Compensation for house moving and financial housing aid for
reconstruction or reinforcement are to be provided in the areas affected,
beginning with the area suffering most from vibration. In particular, technical
development should be undertaken as soon as possible for the vibration-
proofing of houses and steps taken to ease the nuisance of vibration by
repairing houses, and so on.
BASIS OF URGENT GUIDANCE PRINCIPLE ON VIBRATION
The main points of the basis on which the standards were determined, as
reported by the Experts' Committee of the Central Council of Environmental
Pollution, are given below.
Assessment unit
For the assessment unit, ISO-2631 on exposure of human body to vertical
vibration (see Fig. 13.3), is applicable and the vibration level unit dB is used.
In the case of ground surface vibration, the vertical vibration is larger than
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Fig. 13.3. Standards for vibration exposure (ISO-2631). Note: I. The solid line represents the
standards for vibration exposure to vertical vibration at the industrial place of work (the efficiency
diminution limit due to fatigue), the broken line, that to horizontal vibration. 2. The durability
limit is 6 dB higher than the standards; the comfort diminution limit is of a value 10 dB lower.
3. The standard for exposure to vertical vibration lasting 8 hours corresponds to 90 dB when
converted into corrected acceleration level. Source: Experts' Committee Concerning Vibration,
Central Council for Control of Environmental Pollution, Basis of Urgent Guidance Principle on
Shinkansen Vibration (ISO-263I) March 1976.
the horizontal vibration in many instances. Since, in the vibration frequency
zone related to pollution, the human body feels the vertical vibration more
strongly, this vibration alone is taken note of in order to accept vibration as an
environmental pollution.
Standard value
The basic thinking in setting the standard value is that the value be set so as
not to impair health or hamper daily life during the day and not to disturb
sleep at night. For this, the results of studies on physiological and
psychological effects and the effect on sleep, as well as the answers of the
residents to the questionnaire on vibration, have been used as reference in the
discussion. Also used as reference were the results of investigations on the
actual state of various kinds of vibration, the studies on the present state and
future prospects of the technology of vibration-proofing and the standards
adopted by local authorities. For the Shinkansen, the effect of disturbed sleep
is not considered as no trains run on it late at night.
The conditions considered in setting the standard value are given below.
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House-vibration characteristics
The relation between the ground-surface vibration and indoor vibration is
affected by the house vibration characteristics. Depending on the frequency,
the vibration is amplified or damped, which makes the assessment
complicated. Using the results of various investigations as reference, the
standard for vibration amplification is set at 5 dB.
Physiological and psychological effects
A variety of experiments have disclosed that the vibration exerting
significant effects on health are those over 90 dB (ground surface value about
85 dB) which is a very high level. In the ISO standards, the comfort-
diminishing limit is given as 80 dB (75 dB on the ground surface). This is a
value for 8 hours' exposure at the industrial place of work. The standard value
of vibration in the house must be set below that level.
Investigation ofresidents' reaction
An example of residents' reaction to workshop vibration, road traffic
vibration, and Shinkansen vibration is shown in Table 13.8.
Physical damage
The vibrations that inflict physical damage on ordinary houses at one
stroke, such as an earthquake, are presumed to be of a level higher than 85-90
dB. In the case of vibration as environmental pollution, the vibration is of long
duration and the frequency of occurrence is high. Therefore, the conditions
under which damage occurs are quite different from an earthquake. The actual
physical damage from vibration is not definitely known at present, since there
are various factors to be considered, such as the forms of vibration, the age of
the house, structure of the house, the foundation, etc. The investigation of
residents' reaction has revealed a notable correlation between the number of
complaints about the damage and the corrected acceleration level. When the
vibration level exceeds 70 dB, the feeling of damage is expressed but in most
cases the damage done is as slight as ill-fitting doors.
TABLE 13 .8. Residents' reaction to vibrations from three different sources
Source: Experts' Committee Concerning Vibration, Central Council for Control of
Environmental Pollution, Basis of Urgent Guidance Principle on Shinkansen Vibration
ISO-263I, March 1976.
Slightly sensed Distinctly sensed
30010 40010 50010 30010 40010 50010
Workshop 50dB 55 59 60 65 69
Shinkansen 48 51 54 65 70 75
Road tra ffic 50 62 65 69
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TABLE 13.9. Standard valuesfor workshop vibrations
Source: Experts' Committee Concerning Vibration, Central Council for Control of
Environmental Pollution. Standard Values for Workshop Vibrations and Upper Limit Values of
Road Traffic Vibration, March 1976.
Classes of area
Mainly residential
Commercial and industrial"
Day
Above 60 dB up to 65 dB
Above 65 dB up to 70 dB
Night
Above 55 dB up to 60 dB
Above 60 dB up to 65 dB
"Where conspicuous vibration must be prevented in order to preserve environment.
TABLE 13.10. Upper limit values ofroad traffic vibration
Source: Experts' Committee Concerning Vibration. Central Council for Control of
Environmental Pollution, Standard Valuesfor Workshop Vibrations and Upper Limit Values of
Road Traffic Vibration, March 1976.
Classes of area
Mainly residential
Commercial and industrial"
Day
65dB
70dB
Night
60 dB
65 dB
"Where conspicuous vibration must be prevented in order to preserve environment.
After all these points were considered, the conclusion was reached that it is
desirable to set the ground-surface value below 70 dB for the Shinkansen. For
reference, the standard values discussed at the same time for workshops and
road traffic are shown in Tables 13.9 and 13.10.
Method of Solution of Shinkansen Environmental Problems
REVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS
The greatest problem is the noise and vibration generated by running trains.
The noise level of 90 to 100 phons close to the Shinkansen track cannot be
helped, as steel sheels are running on steel rails at the high speed of 200 km/h.
This noise is, however, reduced by a sound-barrier wall for viaducts and
embankments and by sound-proofing work on steel girders, to slightly over 80
phons at a point 25 meters from the track center.
Vibration caused by a running train is generated by wheels of about 17 tons
axle load, run at 200 km/h. This also cannot be helped. The effects of
vibration on the surroundings vary widely with the conditions of structures
and foundation. When a rigid-frame viaduct is on an ordinary foundation, the
level is 70 dB at a point 10 meters from the track center. When a rigid-frame
viaduct is on an extremely soft foundation, the level exceeds 75 dB beside the
track, and even at a point 50 meters from the track center it sometimes exceeds
70 dB.
Besides the noise and vibration, complaints are made of impairment of TV
reception and obstruction of sunlight. But all these environmental
"pollutions" are not so serious as to directly injure man's health. They are
complained of as annoyances or as adverse effects on living environment. It is
desirable to cope with them as such.
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Suggested methods of solving the environmental problems associated with
the Shinkansen are:
Technical
The best way, undoubtedly, is to abate the noise and vibration at source.
The noise, however, comes from many sources; the contacting surface of rail
and wheels, the carbody, the contacting surface of contact wire and
pantograph and the structures. It is still extremely difficult to reduce the noise
to below 80 phons in areas along the Shinkansen. Analysis of the generation of
vibration and its propagation mechanism has only just begun. From now on,
technical development will have to be expedited to abate noise and lessen
vibration. Counter-measure (theoretically) proven effective must be put to
practical use.
Economic
So far as the environment problems of the Shinkansen are complaints about
annoyance, attempts should not be made to restrain the working of the
Shinkansen, for instance by reducing the train speed. even when the standards
set cannot be met in a short time by sound-proofing at the sources. However,
when the residents along the line desire reconstruction of their houses to
alleviate annoyances from noise and vibration, or, in worse cases, move out to
a locality less affected, financial aid should be given as occasion demands.
This will effectively settle the complaints.
Political
In the long term, it is desirable to move dwelling houses that are easily
affected by Shinkansen noise and vibration away from the line and leave the
places empty for the location of workshops and warehouses that are less
vulnerable, or for green belts, parks and roads which would make life more
pleasant. For this, the environmental problems concerning the Shinkansen
need to be solved as part of national land development and city planning
projects, so that the strips of land along the line could be turned into buffer
zones provided with public facilities.
As houses will continue to be built along a newly laid railway line in spite of
the effect of passing trains, some legal restrictions are needed to ensure at
least that new houses along the line are highly sound-proof and vibration-
proof.
14. Environmental Preservation and
the Shinkansen
T. YORINO
Environmental Problems
Although the Shinkansen was acting splendidly as the main traffic artery of
Japan, when it was opened the residents along the line unexpectedly began to
complain about the noise and vibration, and the complaints have gained
momentum with the rising voice of the public against environmental pollution.
How to keep a balance between the increased convenience the Shinkansen
provides and the environmental nuisance it causes is a problem to be solved
only in the national context, supported by the intelligent understanding and
cooperation of the residents in the affected areas, pointed out in my previous
paper in these Proceedings.
Complaints in writing received since the opening of the Shinkansen are as
shown in Table 14.1. The subjects of the complaints are diverse, as is shown,
but the main complaints are of noise and vibration. These are the two focal
points in this paper, the problem is localized to the Tokyo-Shin-Osaka section
of the line, where most of the complaints originate.
Environmental Problems and Counter-Measures Considered When tbe
Sbinkansen was Planned and Constructed
The environmental problems that the Shinkansen trains would give rise to
were carefully deliberated when the line was planned. The growth of the
problem to its present scale, however, was quite beyond expectations. At the
planning stage, it was considered that complaints about noise and vibration
TABLE 14.1. Petitions and complaints received annually (Tokyo-Shin-Osaka)
Source: JNR Shinkansen Administration, Ten- Year History ofthe Shinkansen.
Year
Complaint 1964 '65 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70 '71 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 Total
Noise 9 13 16 6 2 2 I 2 3 6 5 12 13 90
Vibration II 16 19 9 3 5 I 2 5 I 6 9 0 87
Noise and vibration 10 13 7 10 5 3 3 17 8 16 36 41 6 175
Wind pressure 2 4 1 1 2 10
Interference with
TV, and others I 4 4 6 6 I 6 6 I I II 10 10 67
Total 33 50 47 32 16 II II 27 17 24 58 72 31 429
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would not be very serious when levels could be reduced to those of the
conventional narrow-gauge lines. The target, therefore, was to keep the noise
and vibration down to that of the narrow-gauge line trains.
STUDIES ON NOISE AND VIBRAnON
Noise and vibration on the narrow-gauge lines have occasionally been
measured, on a small scale. After 1960 the noise and vibration was taken as
reference for the Shinkansen construction. The following steps were taken:
In September 1960 the noise level was measured of narrow-gauge line trains
running at speeds of 100 km/h or less.
In November 1960 tests were conducted with limited express trains running
on the narrow-gauge line at high speeds, over 160 km/h. The results of the
test were to be used in determining the details needed to design the track,
rolling stock, overhead wiring and signalling system for the Shinkansen.
A study on noise and vibration was included in these tests. Checks of the
noise and vibration on narrow-gauge lines at various places followed.
From 1963 to spring 1964 the noise and vibration caused by trains running at
200 km/h were studied, using part of a line laid for tests to confirm the
stability of Shinkansen trains.
Around 1955 tests to confirm the noise-abating effect of side walls set up on
a viaduct were conducted.
These tests and experiments revealed two points. First, that although the
noise level rises as the speed of the train increases, the growth of noise
considerably slackens when the speed is over 120 km/h. Second, even when
speed is increased to about 200 km/h, it is possible, by appropriate design of
rolling stock, track and structures, to keep down the noise and vibration levels
to that of a narrow-gauge line train run at speeds of 100 km/h or less.
MEASURES TAKEN
On the basis of the results of these numerous studies, the following counter-
measures were taken. Their effects were ascertained by tests on the model line.
Track. Adoption along the whole line of heavy long-welded rails (53 kg/m,
as compared with 50 kg/m for the narrow-gauge lines), movable nose turnout
and rail-fastening devices using rubber pads.
Rolling stock. Adoption of light-weight carbody, a new type air-spring
bogie, and equipment of carbody skirt.
Structures. Adoption of sidewalls, about 1meter high, made of concrete
blocks, on viaducts in urban areas.
Routes. When planning routes, urban areas were avoided as much as
possible. Consequently the extension of tunnels reached a considerable length.
Of the 515 km between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka, 130/0, or 68 km, consisted of
tunnels.
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Noise and Vibration after Shinkansen Opening
The noise level of the Shinkansen is shown in Table 14.2, and for
comparison, that of conventional narrow-gauge lines is shown in Table 14.3.
The vibration levels of the Shinkansen and conventional narrow-gauge lines
are shown in Tables 14.4 and 14.5, which show that there is not much
difference in the noise and vibration levels between the Shinkansen and the
narrow-gauge lines, as far as physical quantity is concerned. Nevertheless the
Shinkansen has given rise to numerous complaints (the reason is explained in
Chapter 13).
TABLE 14.2. Noise levels on the Tokaido Shinkansen
Source: Technical Committee for Prevention of Shinkansen Noise and Vibration. Committee
data.
Structure Track Sidewalls
Noise level dB (A)
70 80 90 100
Embankment
Viaduct
Steel girder bridge
With ballast
With ballast
With ballast
Without ballast
None
1.9m
None
1.9m
None
1.9m
None
With soundproof work ---'
Note: Measurements were taken outdoors 25 m from center of track 1.2 m above the ground.
TABLE 14.3. Noise levels on conventional narrow-gauge lines
Source: Technical Committee for Prevention of Shinkansen Noise and Vibration, Committee
data.
Sobu Main Line Prestressed Direct fastening 1.0 m
concrete bridge
Kagoshima Steel girder Without ballast
Main Line bridge
Hankyu Private Steel girder Without ballast
Railway bridge
Subway Tozai Viaduct
Line
Kisei Main Line Viaduct
Tokaido Main Embankment
Line
Hankyu Private Embankment
Railway
Chuo Line Viaduct
Line
Joban Line
Structure
Viaduct
Track Side walls
With ballast None
With ballast None
With ballast l.1m
With ballast 104m
With ballast 1.6m
Direct fastening 1.0 m
Noise level dBA
70 80 90 Remarks
t--l Electric railcar
SOkm/h
........ Electric railcar
lookm/h
Electric railcar
SOkm/h
Electric railcar
70km/h
I-----< Electric railcar
SOkm/h
Diesel railcar
6Okm/h
Electric railcar
60 km/h
Electric railcar
6Okm/h
t-lElectric railcar
SOkm/h
Note: Measurements were taken outdoors 25 m from center of track 1.0 m above the ground.
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TABLE 14.4. Vibration levels on the Tokaido Shinkansen
Source: JNR survey.
Type of structure
Viaduct (rigid frame type)
Viaduct (beam type)
Embankment
Vibration level (dB)
60 70 80
Note: Measurements were taken on the ground 25 m from center of track.
TABLE 14.5. Vibration levels on narrow-gauge lines (measurement by Environment Agency)
Vibration level (dB)
Line Structure 50 60 70 80
Takasaki
Chuo
Tobu Private Railway
Meitetsu Private Railway Level ground
Tokaido Main Line
Kansai Main Line Embankment
IGntetsu Private Railway Nagoya
I I
I I
t----t
Note. Measurements were taken on the ground 25 m from center of track.
Counter-Measures Taken after tbe Opening
Since the opening of the Shinkansen, JNR had been studying the best
methods to satisfy the complaints that began to come in from residents along
the line and had sought the advice of theoretical and practical experts. The
results of these studies were all successively put into practice.
In the meantime, the public was becoming increasingly concerned about
environmental pollution and the Government began to urge JNR to speed up
its counter-measures.
GOVERNMENT GUIDANCE
The Government issued the following:
1. Partial modification ofregulations on Shinkansen structure (1971, 1977).
Provisions for the prevention of noise and vibration were added to the
Regulations on the Shinkansen Structure by the Ministry of Transport
Ordinance.
2. Recommendations on Urgent Steps for Noise Abatement, by the
Director of the Environment Agency (December 1972). For details of this and
items (3) and (4), refer to my previous paper (Chapter 13) in these Proceedings.
3. Public Notice on Environmental Quality Standards Concerning Noise
(July 1975).
4. Urgent Guidance Principles Recommended on Vibrations by the Director
of the Environment Agency (March 1975).
5. Main Points of Counter-measures against Shinkansen Noise (as
approved at Cabinet Meeting in March 1976). In this document the national
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policy as decided by the Government in accomplishing the environmental
quality standards on noise is formulated. The main points are:
Steps to be taken on sound sources
Technical development of every kind must be continued on a well-planned
basis and effective use made of their results.
"Nuisance-prevention" on houses
When it is still deemed impossible to accomplish the Environmental Quality
Standards during the target period by taking counter-measures on sound
sources, "nuisance-prevention" work shall be done on the dwelling houses,
schools and hospitals located along the line.
For removing the nuisance, noise-abatement work shall be executed.
However, in those zones where the noise level still exceeds 85 phons after
counter-measures on sound sources that are reasonable at the time have been
taken, the demand for relocation of houses may be complied with when it is
found that the noise-abatement work is inadequate.
These stipulations are applicable to those houses and buildings standing on 9
March 1976 along the part of the Shinkansen already in operation and others
standing when the Shinkansen now under construction opens its commercial
service.
In executing the counter-measures, priority shall be given to dwelling houses
in those zones where the noise level exceeds 80 phons. On those schools and
hospitals located in zones where the noise level exceeds 70 phons, the work
shall be executed as soon as possible.
JNR shall exert its utmost efforts in building up a system of nuisance-
prevention for houses. It shall also endeavor to seek the cooperation of the
local authorities concerned.
Utilization ofland along the Shinkansen
The state and local authorities, in planning for the utilization of land along
the Shinkansen and in building public buildings and facilities, shall give due
consideration, where possible, to the preservation of the environment along
the Shinkansen.
Others
To the zones where the vibration generated by running trains is conspicuous,
adequate counter-measures shall be taken in conjunction with the work to be
done for noise abatement.
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NOISE-PREVENTION COUNTER-MEASURES AT SOUND SOURCES: TECHNICAL
DEVELOPMENT
Of the technical achievements on noise abatement accomplished by JNR,
the main points are as follows:
Noise sources can be roughly divided into two groups, as shown in Fig. 14.1.
The distribution of noise level, as transversely measured on typical viaducts, is
shown in Fig. 14.2. The noise level varies from one kind of structure to
another. An example is shown in Table 14.2. The duration of the noise peak
level when a train runs through is about 7 seconds. Even the duration of its
effect is as brief as 10 seconds or thereabouts.
To produce a thorough counter-measure, it is necessary to discover the
elements contributing to noise at the sound source and their characteristics.
These are summarized in Table 14.6.
Technical development and practical use ofachievements
In the initial period of service, the greatest emphasis in the studies of
counter-measures was placed on the sound-barrier wall and sound-proofing
work on ballastless steel girders. Rolling stock, track, and structures were next
in importance. The main results of these studies were as follows.
1. Rolling stock
(a) Vibration-proof wheels. Vibration-damping material was applied to the
wheels from the sides.
(b) Resilient wheels. Vibration-damping material such as rubber was partly
inserted in the wheels.
Both these types of wheel diminish noise by 1 to 2 phons where there is no
sound-barrier wall. With a sound-barrier wall, there is no apparent effect. The
Power collecting system
{
Car body
Auxiliary equipment
-{
Rolling stock Propulsion system
- Bogle
Upper noise - Wheel
-i Rail- Fastening device- Track _ Sleeper- Ballast(or) Track slab
-{
Embankment
- (or) Cutting
- (or) Concrete bridge
Lower noise -- Structure (or) Steel-concrete composite bridge
(or) Steel girder
Fig. 14.1. Noise-generating components.
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Fig. 14.2. Distribution of noise level around viaduct. Source: Technical Committee for
Prevention of Shinkansen Noise and Vibration, Committee data.
resilient wheel, in particular, has some deficiency in strength and requires
further improvement.
(c) Lengthening body skirt on bogie side. The lower part of the rolling stock
sides (body skirt) is lengthened to shut off the noise generated at the contacting
part of the rail and wheel. This has some effect when there are no sound-
barrier walls. With the walls, however, there is no apparent effect.
(d) Improvement ojpantograph insulator. The whistling sound caused by
the wind hitting the pantograph was eliminated by changing the shape of the
insulator, and this was done on all the pantographs.
2. Track
(a) Non-vibratory rail. Vibration-damping material was applied on the side
surface of the rail. Though there is some diminution of noise, the effect is not
felt when the sound-barrier wall is set up. Further improvement is needed.
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TABLE 14.6. Contribution to noise by sound source: counter-measures studied
Item Initial contribution
Counter-measure
intended
Essential measures
taken and their
effectiveness
D Aerodynamic noise of Smaller than A and B
carbody
C Pantograph-trolley line Smaller than A and B
sounds generated by
current collecting
B Secondary noise from Greatest, next to A, es-
structures caused by pecially great effect
propagation of vibra- on immediate neigh-
tion into solid form bor
I. Suppression of radi- I. Laying mats
ating energy by 2. Noise-proofing work
vibration damping on bridge
2. Damping by sealing In case of ballastless
the lower portion steel girder. 10-1 S
phons reduction
Improvement of the
noise generating me-
chanism of panto-
graph and trolley wire
under study
Improvement under
study
Vibrations of bogie,
wheel and track com-
ponents damped
2. Effective sound-
barrier wall set up
Average 86 phons
reduced to 80 phons
I. Difficult to suppress I.
generation, effect of
steps taken is small
2. Sound-barrier wall,
most effective
I. Difficult to suppress
2. Pantograph and trol-
ley wire to be
improved
I. Difficult to suppress
2. Improvement from
the standpoint of
carbodyaerodynamics
GreatestA Rail-wheel shock and
friction sound
(b) Ballast mats and slab mats. Rubber mats were inserted between the
lower surface of the ballasted track or slab track and the upper surface of the
viaduct slab to shut off the downward vibrations. Both methods have
considerable effect directly under the viaduct and are now in use. No effect,
however, is felt at a point away from the track. Also, it is difficult to place a
large number of mats under the track while trains are running.
3. Structures
(a) Ordinary sound-barrier walls. These are upright concrete walls 10-15 cm
wide. Between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka, flexible boards are used owing to
restrictions on structural strength and construction. The noise level of trains
running on the track near the measuring point varies somewhat depending
upon whether the wall is put up on the embankment or on the viaduct. At a
height of 1 meter, the wall has a diminution effect of about 5 phons and at 2
meters high, about 7 phons, although the effect on the trains running on the
opposite track is rather less. By combining mats and walls, a decrease of nearly
10 phons can be expected. The effect of raising the wall height to more than 2
meters is strong enough to withstand the winds, to say nothing of the
"sunshine obstruction" problem this would create.
(b) Sound-barrier wall with overhang. This is a roofed upright wall reaching
close to the carbody. As compared with the upright wall, this diminishes the
noise level by 2 to 3 phons in some places. A wall of this type is erected
between Okayama and Hakata, where slab track is mostly laid, though not
between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka, where the viaduct is not strong enough. Some
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of the sound-barrier walls have sound-absorbing material fitted to their inside
surface, but the effect of this has not yet been ascertained.
(c) Sound-barrier wall as close as possible to the train. The sound-barrier
wall could be put up as close to the train as the construction gauge permits.
Although this has the same effect as the sound-barrier wall, it is not desirable
from the standpoints of safety and maintenance, and it is therefore not used.
(d) Sound-proofing work on ballastless steel girders. The secondary noise
level due to vibration is high in the case of steel girders. Especially when
ballastless, the vibration is directly transmitted to the girder and the noise level
goes up, since there is open space under the girder. To check this, sound-
insulating material with non-vibratory support to the steel girder from its
under-surface is used, and the sound-barrier wall is put up to diminish the
noise of wheels and rails. By this method the noise level has been brought
down by 15 to 20 phons.
(e) Bridge hooding. Here a fulcrum is set on the top of a steel truss, and a
sound-barrier hood is hung down. This was tested on certain bridges. The
hooding reduces the noise level to about 70 phons. For practical use, however,
it has many drawbacks: The hooding obstructs sunshine, spoils scenic beauty
and is not desirable from the viewpoints of maintenance work and structural
strength.
4. Most effective results
The most effective of the counter-measures described above is the high-
quality sound-barrier wall. By using mainly this, the noise level previously
close to 90 phons has been reduced to an average of 80 phons, excluding
ballastless steel girders. The decrease by distance is shown in Fig. 14.3.
5. Targetsfor future technical development
As the result of the studies on the contribution of sound-source components
to noise, which were carried out at the same time as the studies described
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Fig. 14.3. Example of noise diminution by distance.
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above, the remarkable level of noise arising between the running parts of the
rolling stock and the track components, previously reaching 90 phons, has
been reduced to 80 phons. Now that the levels of noise coming from the four
main sound-source components, as shown in Fig. 14.4, are almost the same, it
appears safe enough to conclude (a) that no better result can be obtained
unless the levels of noise from all four components are equally reduced and (b)
that an attempt to bring down the level of noise from a single source would not
be satisfactory.
The targets for future technical development are: (1) in order to bring down
the total noise level, technical developments should be continued for the
improvement of all the sound-source components at the same time and the
effect of the whole ascertained; (2) as future counter-measures will call for
highly complicated technology, emphasis should be placed on the studies of
safe operation of trains, durability, and execution of work. For this,
experiments and tests will have to be conducted on the Shinkansen that is
already in operation. As tests using the Shinkansen which is operated for
commercial service are restricted, a part of the Tohoku Shinkansen now under
construction will also have to be earmarked as a test line and completed as
quickly as possible.
VIBRATION PREVENTION COUNTER-MEASURES AT VIBRATION SOURCES:
TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT
Railway vibration generation and propagation mechanism
In dealing with the vibrations caused by trains (unlike the case of noise) not
only the sources but also the means of propagation must be analyzed. The
CD Current collector(swishing, sparking,
etc. )
f2\ Contact of carbody
~ and air (aerodynamic
sounds around roof and
coupling components)
® Running cOlnponents
(sounds from rail-
wheel contact leaking
out from between sound-
barrier wall and carbody)
Exterior circumference
of structure
(secondary sounds from
viaduct and sound-barrier
wall vibrations)
Fig. 14.4. Noise generated by running train. Source: Technical Committee for Prevention of
Shinkansen Noise and Vibration, Committee data.
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reasons for ground vibrations caused by running trains may be roughly
grouped as follows:
(a) load repeated in a certain cycle due to axle arrangement;
(b) loading fluctuation stemming from flat tires, track irregularities, rail
joint, and variations in ground condition;
(c) vibrations peculiar to component elements concerned.
The vibrations caused by (a) and (b) are selected and amplified by (c).
The component elements concerned are rolling stock, track, structure
foundations, and the ground (see Fig. 14.5). Much is still unknown about the
part played by each of these elements.
The mechanism of vibration propagation from track to structure is
comparatively easy to trace. Vibration propagation from structure to ground,
or that in the ground, however, is complicated and varies according to the kind
of structure foundation, the characteristics and structure of the ground.
Characteristic ofground vibrations
Measurements of wave frequency along the Shinkansen viaduct disclosed
that 2-3 Hz and 15-25 Hz waves are predominant. The 2-3 Hz waves disappear
at a point 10 meters from the viaduct, but the 15-25 Hz waves do not.
---t CarbodyRolling stock BogieWheel
fRailTrack -------1 Rail fasteningSleeper-------,
Ballast (mat)-1 (or) Track slab (mat)
---{
~r;:)ba~:i:~t
- (or) Elevated track on viaduct
Structure - (or) Concrete bridge
- (or) Steel-concrete composite girder
(or) Steel girder
(or) Tunnel
Foundation f
Direct foundation
---..., (or) Pile foundation
(or) Caisson foundation
Ground ..,[ Dynamic characteristics of ground
Local geological structure
~ Wooden construction(or) Reinforced concrete constructionBuilding ----- (or) Steel frame concrete construction(or) Steel frame construction
Fig. 14.5. Factors giving rise to vibrations and their propagation.
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Much is now known about the variations in vibration caused by train speed,
kind of rolling stock, track, and other structures, as well as the varying
geological conditions, but this is too technical a subject for this paper.
Vibration counter-measures
Less is understood about vibrations and their theoretical analysis,
particularly their propagation mechanism, than about noise, and no precise
way of reducing vibration has yet been found. Counter-measures that have
been studied are as follows:
(a) ditches,
(b) increased volume of viaduct foundation,
(c) use of ballast mats,
(d) comparison of rigid-frame viaduct and girder bridge,
(e) comparison of different kinds of viaduct foundation.
Studies on (a), (b), and (c) are not yet complete, and further investigation is
still needed.
What has been clearly shown is that the adoption of girder bridges and the
driving of rigid piles down to the supporting ground have notable effects on
damping vibration.
PROGRESS MADE IN IMPLEMENTING SOUND AND VIBRATION SOURCES COUNTER-
MEASURES
Counter-measures against sound sources have been vigorously developed,
and some of the most successful are already in use. Particularly effective are
the sound-barrier wall sound-proofing work on steel girders, for which 900/0
and 75%, respectively, of the necessary work has been done.
No effective way of damping vibrations at their sources has been found. The
use of heavier rails and ballast mats is assumed to be effective, and the
progress made in carrying these out is 40% and 15%, respectively. Ballast mat-
laying takes time and manpower, and the rate of progress is therefore not at all
satisfactory.
"NUISANCE-PREVENTION" ON HOUSES
Although a wide variety of steps have been taken to diminish noise and
vibrations at their sources, it must be admitted that the Environmental Quality
Standards (below 70 or 75 phons) and the Recommendations on Vibrations
(below 70 dB) are hard to achieve.
In the ordinary sections of embankment and viaduct of the Tokaido
Shinkansen, the noise level has been reduced to 80 phons on average (at the
standard point of 25 meters from the center of track) but many 80-82-phon
sections remain. The area where the level is said to exceed 80 phons is assumed
to lie within 30 meters from the track center in the case of a viaduct and 20
meters in the case of an embankment. Around the ballastless steel girder the
noise level is kept to 86-87 phons.
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Vibrations differ widely from one type of ground to another. On average,
however, the vibrations are assumed to exceed the level of 70 dB along viaduct
sections in alluvial deposit areas, within 25 meters of the track center, and, in
diluvial deposit areas, within 10 meters of the track center. In an alluvial
deposit tract, the area subject to over 70 dB lies within 10 meters of the track
center along the embankment sections. In these cases, the steps to be taken on
the dwelling houses located along the line are indicated by the Noise Quality
Standards and the Recommendations on Vibrations (this is what is meant by
"nuisance-prevention" on houses).
Noise-abatement work on houses
In the Urgent Recommendations on Noise of December 1972, by the
Director of the Environment Agency, execution of nuisance-prevention on
houses is demanded on dwelling houses in those districts where the noise level
over 85 phons persists even after the counter-measures against noise at sound
sources have been enforced, as in the environs of ballastless steel girders. On
receipt of the Recommendations, JNR in April 1973 entrusted the Japan
Railway Engineering Association (JREA) with the study on the method of
executing noise-abatement work applicable to dwelling houses. In the spring of
1974 JREA, with cooperation from the Railway Architecture Association,
produced a method that would almost serve the purpose. The study was as
follows:
1. Investigation of the actual state of noise in buildings located along the
Shinkansen.
2. Experiments on reconstruction of existing buildings.
3. Experiments with the method on test houses.
Vibration-damping work on houses
The amount and characteristics of vibration on houses vary considerably
according to the ground on which the houses are built. Houses are of diverse
structure, which makes it difficult to find the right method of vibration-
damping on houses. Moreover, as little time was allowed for the development
of the method, the result is not entirely satisfactory, and further improvements
are essential.
Execution ofnuisance-prevention on houses
In line with the Urgent Recommendation, methods of noise-abatement work
on dwelling houses were first studied. Then, in conjunction with work on
counter-measures for sound sources, the procedure for the execution of work
on houses located in zones where the noise level was over 85 phons was decided
on, and the work was executed in June 1974. Later, however, the
Environmental Quality Standards on Noise and the Recommendations on
Vibration were successively issued. A new procedure for nuisance prevention
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for houses was decided on and the work began in December 1976.
The procedure called for work on houses in those zones where the noise level
reached over 80 phons, as stipulated in the Standards, and where the vibration
level was over 70 dB, as prescribed in the Recommendations. The main points
of the procedure were:
1. Eligible buildings and houses
(a) Buildings and houses existing on 9 March 1976 (for buildings and houses
located along the Tohoku Shinkansen at present under construction, those
existing on the day the section is opened for commercial service).
(b) Dwelling houses located in zones where the noise level is over 80 phons,
and school and hospital buildings in zones where the noise level exceeds 70
phons.
(c) Dwelling houses and school and hospital buildings in zones where the
level of vibration exceeds 70 dB.
2. Work to be executed
(a) Noise-abatement and vibration-damping work, in principle. When
circumstances compel, relocation work is executed.
(b) Noise-abatement work on dwelling houses is divided into two
categories, depending upon the noise level, and that on school and hospital
buildings into four.
(c) The number of rooms of a dwelling house on which the noise-abatement
work is to be executed depends upon the size of the family, but is limited to
four at most.
(d) The vibration-damping work is executed in the manner described for the
noise-abatement work.
3. Method ofexecuting work
(a) Work is executed by the owner, and JNR grants financial aid up to the
limits calculated according to the standards it has set.
(b) Administration for financial aid may be entrusted to the local
authorities concerned.
Execution ofnuisance-prevention work: setup and progress
The present number of buildings and houses on which nuisance-prevention
work is to be done located along the Shinkansen between Tokyo and Hakata
to which the work rules are applicable is estimated at 18,000 (where the noise
level is over 80 phons). Although the work has to be accomplished within the
target period of 3 years set by the Environmental Quality Standards, this is
extremely difficult since the number of buildings to work on is so large.
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For execution of the work, the Track and Structures Department was in
charge at the Head Office, and the Environment Control Section of the
Shinkansen Administration was in charge as the local organ. However, as the
issue of the Environment Quality Standards on Noise and the
Recommendations on Vibration expanded the area of work, an Environmental
Preservation Department was set up in the Head Office in April 1976 to
specialize in the administration, while branch offices of the Environmental
Control Section, Shinkansen administration, were newly set up for all local
blocks. The Construction Divisions, which are in charge of large-scale
construction and improvements, are also doing part of the work. The setup is
shown in Fig. 14.6.
However, as the administrative capacity of JNR itself is still inadequate, it is
planned to entrust a considerable part of the execution of the noise-abatement
work on dwelling houses and school and hospital buildings in the areas of 80-
85 phons wherever possible to the local authorities concerned.
OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
So far, mainly noise-abatement and vibration damping have been dealt
with. There are, however, other environmental problems concerning the
Shinkansen:
Interference with television reception
The opening of the Shinkansen gave rise to complaints about interference
with TV reception. Based therefore on the investigation made by the NHK
(Nihon Hoso Kyokai-Japan Broadcasting Corporation), JNR in cooperation
with NHK executed improvements in some 9000 households during 1965 to
1966. The same complaint has been received in great numbers since about
Head Office Local organs
Envirorunental Pre servation Dept. - Shinkansen Administration -
Environment Pollution
Countermeasure Sec.
LBranch Offices
Construction Div. -
Shinkansen Environment Pol-
lution Countermeasure Sec.
Building Construction Div. -
Shinkans en Envirorunent Pol-
lution Countermeasure Sec.
Fig. 14.6. Setup for nuisance-prevention work on houses.
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1970. This is presumably because the frequency of trains has increased, color
televisions sets have become popular, and the public's awareness of its rights
has increased, and so, new complaints began to come in from districts where
no such trouble had occurred before. JNR therefore enlarged the areas for
improvement work in 1972 and it is intended that all complaints will be dealt
with in the near future. The households whose television reception is to be
improved number as many as 150,000.
Noise generated during track maintenance work
As no intervals are available for track maintenance during the day,
maintenance work is done at night. InitiallY, an engine generator was used as
the motive power source in maintenance works. To lessen its noise low-voltage
power-distribution circuits were set up for an electric generator. Efforts
were also made to decrease the noise of multiple tie-tampers and other track
maintenance machines. Some of the noise-proof contrivances developed are
already in use, and with great success.
Sanyo, Tohoku, and Joetsu Shinkansen Lines
The Sanyo Shinkansen was opened between Shin-Osaka and Okayama in
March 1972 and between Okayama and Hakata in March 1975. In the
construction of this Shinkansen, experience gained from the Tokyo-Shin-
Osaka Section (the Tokaido Shinkansen) was exploited. Since many newer
technical developments were used on the Sanyo line, considerable
improvement is noted over the Tokyo-Shin-Osaka Section in the noise and
vibration levels. Noise, for instance, is below 80 phons along almost the whole
line. Places where vibrations exceed 80 dB are extremely few. The items
improved are:
Track. 60 kg/m rails are laid along the whole line
Structures. No ballastless steel girders have been used; heavier-weight
structures have been constructed; upright or sound-barrier walls with
overhang have been set up; foundation structures have been strengthened.
Others. Sidewalls and streets have been provided, in cooperation with local
authorities.
The Tohoku Shinkansen (Tokyo-Morioka) and the Joetsu Shinkansen
(Tokyo-Niigata) are under construction. In these, not only will the recent
new technical achievements be introduced, but also the results of experiments
to be conducted using a partially completed section of the Tohoku Shinkansen
as the test line. Further improvement is thus expected.
Technical Development Setup
Well aware of the importance of environmental preservation, JNR is
continuing its research, studies and development to that end. The organs
engaged in technical development are listed in Table 14.7.
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TABLE 14.7. Setup for technical development
Item Principal organs Organs concerned
Technical Development Dept.
Rolling Stock Design Office
Structure Design Office
Basic policy Technical Committee for Departments concerned
Prevention of Shinkansen
Noise and Vibration
Drawing up of basic Environmental Preservation
policy Dept.
Technical Development Dept.
Introduction of new Railway Technical Research
techniques Institute
Departments concerned
Technical Committee
Policy
Basic studies
Plan deliberation
{
Design and study
Planning
Deliberation of
plans drawn up
Railway Technical Research
Institute
Railway Technical Research
Institute
Technical Development Dept.
Departments concerned
Rolling Stock Design Office
Structure Design Office
Construction Div.
Departments concerned
Technical Development Dept.
Departments concerned
Railway Technical Research
Institute
Shinkansen Administration
Construction Div.
Departments concerned
Execution
Overall {
adjust-
ment
Experiment
Study on the
outcome of
experiments
Overall
adjustment of
all plans
Shinkansen Administration
Construction Div.
Railway Technical Research
Institute
Railway Technical Research
Institute
Departments concerned
Technical Development Dept.
Environmental Preservation
Dept.
The Railway Technical Research Institute is engaged in basic studies. Its
internal setup, which has recently been strengthened, is shown in Fig. 14.7.
In the study of railway noise the subjects are diverse: rolling stock, track,
structures, electric apparatus, and basic theories. A laboratory has been set up
for each subject. Now that the level of noise generated by each component has
become about the same, the study has reached the stage where improvements
of all the components must be effected at the same time. Hence all the noise
specialists have been gathered together from the laboratories into a Noise
Analysis Project Research Laboratory.
Past and present technical committees deliberating on the course of
technical development since the Shinkansen opening are the following:
RAI LWAY TECI-fiICAL
RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
DIRECTOR
DEPUTY DIRECTORS
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- TRACK LAB
--- TRACK MATERIALS LAB
- STRUCTURES LAB
- ARCHITECTURE LAB
- SOIL MECHANICS LAB
- GEOLOG Y LAB
- DISASTER PREVENTION LAB
- TROLLEY LAB
- ROLLING STOCK STRUCTURE LAB
- ROLLING STOCK DYNAMICS LAB
- PHYSICS LAB
- NOISE ANALYSIS PROJECT LAB
Fig. 14.7. Railway Technical Research Institute organization chart (for noise and vibration).
1. Noise Study Group (1965 to 1969).
2. The Noise and Vibration Sub-Committee of the Shinkansen
Construction Committee (1971-1972) was set up to consider the standards for
construction of new Shinkansen lines.
3. Technical Committee for Prevention of Shinkansen Noise and Vibration
(1972 to the present).
The first two committees consisted of JNR experts only. When the basic
studies had been completed and the course of technical development set, the
second committee was reorganized to form the Technical Committee for
Prevention of Shinkansen Noise and Vibration, including outside experts, so
that wider knowledge could be gained.
Future Targets
So much for the present state of environmental problems involving the
Shinkansen and the steps taken to overcome them. The basic policy in dealing
with these problems, past and future, may be summarized as follows:
1. To combine technical development with the aim of diminishing noise and
vibration levels at their sources and to strive for the prevention of noise and
vibration propagation.
Comment. If the lower limit of noise is to be kept down to 80 phons or
thereabouts at the sound sources, as at present, it will certainly be difficult to
attain the standard of 75 or 70 phons; and the reasonableness of this standard
value is itself questionable. The zones where the noise level reaches 75 phons
extend 75 meters each side of the track center (or 150 meters in the case of 70
phons) and the number of houses located within these zones is staggering,
calling for huge amounts of money to execute the nuisance-prevention for
houses on them all. A problem of national proportions will arise: that of
making the most effective use of land in such a small and densely populated
country as Japan.
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2. To try to secure as much space as possible between the track and the
houses.
Comment. This has to be considered when locating the route. By the nature
of the primary mission of a railway, it is unavoidable that a railway line should
run into existing built-up areas, at least near the stations, but apart from this,
the environment should never be polluted. Hence, in selecting a route, its
effect on the environment must be considered to the fullest extent along with
the economic aspects.
In order to attract to places along the line such public establishments as
streets, parks and green-belt zones that can act as buffers against
environmental pollution, close cooperation with local authorities' planning is
needed when coordinating JNR's plans.
If it becomes necessary, regulations to restrict the location of houses and
buildings along the route must be considered. Since the Shinkansen
commenced service, many houses were built even when the residents were well
aware of the adverse effect of noise and vibration from trains. This may be
thought very strange, but it does show that evaluation of the effect produced
by the Shinkansen varies from person to person. However, if things are left as
they are, there will certainly be more trouble in the future. It is my personal
opinion that some regulations should be imposed which would ban the
building of houses along the line or compel the owners to sound-proof their
houses at their own expense.
3. To deal with the residents' complaints as promptly as possible.
Comment. Residents' complaints must never be treated with unnecessary
suspicion. Residents must not be suspected of using complaints as a means to
foment social unrest, a means of self-advertisement or of obtaining
compensation money. Complaints must be dealt with; they must be listened to,
investigated, and the situation rectified. Since there are many difficulties and
restrictions it has been customary to avoid listening to complaints or to delay
answering them properly. This has often fostered mistrust of JNR.
Blindly fulfilling the wishes of complainers will never do, either. They must
be shown the basic policy and reasonable counter-measures and their
understanding must be asked for. This is the duty of those engaged in
operating public services.

15. The Shinkansen as an Environmental
Component ojJapan
H.UZAWA
I should like to congratulate Mr. Yorino on his excellent survey of the
environmental problems of Japan in general and of the Shinkansen in
particular. I would especially like to point out the impartial nature of his
analysis and the accuracy of his assessments of the social and political
implications of such a large public enterprise as the Shinkansen project. This is
very difficult for one who is himself a party to this highly sensitive and
potentially explosive dispute.
Since Mr. Yorino's papers deal with the problems of the environmental
impacts of the Shinkansen so extensively and exhaustively, I do not think I
have much to add to his analysis, either in the form of comments or as a
critical appraisal. Instead, I wouid like to present an alternative approach to
this highly complicated and delicate problem: namely, to regard the
Shinkansen as one component of the "environment" in Japan, and to try to
indicate a number of implications that can be obtained from such an analysis.
In his concluding section, on political aspects, Mr. Yorino notes that the
environmental problems of the Shinkansen cannot be analysed independently
of its relationship with the broader class of social and natural environments,
such as urban infrastructures in general and housing environments in
particular. I should like to take up this remark as a key to the following general
problem.
The Shinkansen may be regarded as a component of the overall
"environment" which forms the basic infrastructure of Japanese society and
plays a fundamental role not only in tbe economic processes of resource
allocation but also in shaping the cultural and social characteristics of the way
people live in Japan. The environment in the broadest sense, as used here,
includes all natural, social, and physical infrastructures underlying Japanese
society; perhaps it is better to define it as social overhead capital, to borrow
from the terminology commonly used in economic theory. Social overhead
capital in economic theory is defined as all those scarce resources which are not
to be appropriated to private individuals or institutions, either for technical or
social reasons, but are to be owned and managed jointly by "society" as a
whole. Social overhead capital thus comprises natural capital such as rivers,
oceans, forests, and social capital such as roads, harbors, and urban
infrastructures such as education, medical, and transportation capital. The
Shinkansen, or the public transportation system in general, is a vital
component of the framework of such social overhead capital, exerting a
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profound and permanent effect upon the mode of life and cultural pattern in
Japan.
We have seen that the Shinkansen has already changed the methods of
communication and travel between various cities; not only between the large
urban centers directly involved, but also between many cities in the
surrounding areas, and the pattern of urban development of Shinkansen cities
has been markedly different from those observed for cities with only
conventional railway stations. This is also shown in Mr. Okabe's paper on
"Impact of the Sanyo Shinkansen on Local Communities".
The Shinkansen has made certain significant changes in the pattern of
personal movements between major cities involved, resulting in significant
increases in the amount of travel for business and personal reasons and for
tourism.
The papers presented at this Conference have all eulogized the merits of the
Shinkansen and the efficiency, safety, and modernity of its operation in the
last 13 years. I do not want to dispute the main theme of their opinions, but, if
we look at the Shinkansen as one component of social overhead capital in
general in Japanese society and compare its function with other social and
cultural components of social overhead capital, we would have an entirely
different picture. We would be particularly struck by the extreme imbalance
which exists in the various components of Japanese overhead capital, and this
imbalance has accelerated during the period of rapid economic growth in the
last two decades. The Shinkansen is one of the most glaring cases observed.
That is to say, while the social overhead capital for the urban infrastructure,
such as sewage systems, housing environments, medical and educational
systems, was, from the start, extremely poorly endowed there have been no
significant attempts in the last two decades to allocate scarce resources and
human efforts to the increase and enrichment of such social overhead capital.
Another vital component of social overhead capital has also not fared well,
as is suggested by the significant number of pollution diseases and the large
number of environmental disruptions in the period of rapid economic growth.
I do not have enough time to dwell upon the details of these phenomena,
which will be discussed in another paper at the International Energy Agency
World Congress, Tokyo, August 1977.A will only argue that the relative
scarcity of this social overhead capital has been intensified in the last few
years, and is approaching a point where a complete reassessment of the
rationale of all the development policies in Japan should be considered. My
opinion is that this is one of the most urgent and critical questions facing us in
Japan.
16. Environmental Problems·
N. SAKASHITA
I almost fully agree with Professor Uzawa when he points out that there is a
large imbalance between the social overhead capital, mainly relating to
industrial activities like Shinkansen, and that relating to the daily life of the
people. However, Professor Uzawa did not mention the fundamental cause of
the imbalance. Although I am sure he has a definite idea about it, I would like
to discuss this problem because I believe the imbalance is not an accident.
What is the cause of the imbalance? Is it a fault of the capitalist system in
general? Perhaps yes. However, the imbalance in Japan is much worse than in
other capitalist societies in Western Europe or North America. I think a major
reason is the overconcentration of public administration, political power,
information and cultural activity in Tokyo, a single metropolitan capital in
Japan. I have to go to Tokyo so frequently (150 times in the last 5 years!) in
order to obtain scientific information, particularly in the form of "fresh"
data, because it is not easy to obtain such material quickly, even in Osaka.
Nowadays, almost everything is concentrated on Tokyo, especially the great
power of the central authorities in the form of' 'administrative guidance"
(gyosei shido) on private economic and social activities. Accessibility to Tokyo
is indispensable for the survival of local communities. People in the Aomori
Prefecture, for example, are eagerly awaiting "their Shinkansen" in order to
obtain better access to Tokyo, not in order to go to Sendai which is nearby.
If the administrative power in Japan is considerably decentralized, people in
local communities may not wish to have another Shinkansen and may
concentrate their efforts on improving their daily home-life. In this sense, my
conjecture is as follows: the only effective way to restore a balance between the
industrial infrastructure and the infrastructure of social life is to introduce
federalism into the public administration of Japan, and to diversify the
administrative power among local governments to the limit. Only by such a
policy can the local communities of Japan regain their own social
characteristics. When this is accomplished, the need for a giant network of
Shinkansen or expressways would become much weaker and public capital can
take other directions which would bring about the improvement of social and
private life in local communities.
·Comment on H. Uzawa. The Shinkansen as an Environmental Component ofJapan. Chapter 15
in these Proceedings.
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17. Application ofan Environmental
Frameworkfor the Study of the
Shinkansen
S. IKEDA and D. FISCHER
In this section dealing with the environment, we have had two papers by Mr.
Yorino of JNR, and some very interesting comments by Professor Usawa of
the University of Tokyo. These presentations have brought out important
points of environmental considerations associated with high-speed mass
transportation systems.
Mr. Yorino opened with a description of the general environmental
protection situation in Japan and some background material on the
environmental problems associated with the Shinkansen system. The main
environmental problems are those of noise and vibration, and additional
comments were made on the efforts of JNR and the Japanese Government to
solve these technically and economically difficult problems. The policies
designed to deal with the lowering of noise and vibration levels were then
explained in terms of environmental standards and administrative guidelines
along with possible future directions involved in seeking solutions for
Shinkansen noise and vibration difficulties.
To facilitate the discussion, I would like to present some applications of a
framework for studying the environmental management system, and show
how we can apply this approach to the Shinkansen. Professor Fischer, in his
introduction to this session, briefly explained the analytical framework we
have used in the case studies of the Bratsk-Ilimsk Territorial Production
Complex and the North Sea petroleum development program. This conference
and the subsequent field study will aid us in collecting Japanese experience in
creating and integrating the management of Shinkansen impacts. For this
purpose, our approach to the Shinkansen will include the concepts of
integration and comprehensiveness both in a retrospective and a prospective
mode.
High-speed mass transportation can bring great benefits to passengers and
to the regional economic systems in which they operate, provided that they
offer rapid accessibility, reliable service, a high degree of safety, and are
coupled with low operating expenses and relative energy efficiency. Noise has
always accompanied such transportation means. In the past the attitude of
people towards noise was reconciled with the social and economic constraints
of their time. It has become evident, however, that along with the rapid growth
of individual travel and the expansion of transportation facilities which are
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TABLE 17.1. Estimation ofpossible damage in OEeD countries (European part)
Land use Noise Air Visual incom- Ecological
(km') (population) pollution patibility effect
Main issues:
Destruction of
balance for
flora and fauna
Pollution from
tourism
4800km
(11070)
680
1260 4.4 x 1()6 13 x 106 tons/yr 4300 km No quantitative
65 dB LIO 0.8 x 106 tons/yr (9%) measure
hydrocarbons
1.3 x I()6 Indirect
67 dB CNEL (electro-power)
Road
Railway
Airport 700 4.9 to 9.0 x 106 Indirect
> 67 dB CNEL (access traffic)
0.1070 of total 2070 for road
2.6 x 1()6 0.6070 for rail
2.5070 for air
Visible to
adjacent
housing
able to carry huge volumes of traffic, the industrialized nations of the world
are experiencing a turning-point in terms of environmental quality. The
deterioration of environmental quality is especially evident in noise and
vibration levels, in air and water qualities, and in levels of amenities. In
addition, in most of the industrialized countries, there has been very little
incentive and few mechanisms to reduce noise and vibration. In this context,
IIASA has great interest in the new Japanese experience of environmental
policy and management applied to the future.
Generally speaking, we can divide the environmental elements associated
with an interregional or intercity transportation system into six categories:
1. Land absorption - the transformation of land areas from traditional uses
to transportation infrastructures, including such items as railways, roads,
stations and parking lots.
2. Noise and vibration.
3. Airpollution - the result of road traffic, but indirectly affected by
railroads and airlines.
4. Visual incompatibility - the loss of amenity of the inconvenience, direct
or indirect, of being deprived of places or landmarks formerly used to
obtain such amenities.
5. Ecological change - the construction or operation of a transportation
system which results in damage to the natural ecosystem balance.
6. Incidental effects - the items of pollution caused by an unexpected
increase in tourism, motorway congestion, and infrastructure changes.
An example of this type of evaluation of an interregional transportation
system is shown in Table 17.1. This study was done by OECD and covers the
European part of the OECD countries. • Estimation of possible damages is
shown in this figure under the categories of land absorption, noise levels
·Personal communication with Steering Committee on European Intercity Requirements, OECD,
Paris, 1976.
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according to population, air pollution, visual incompatibility and ecological
changes. These categories are distributed according to roads, railroads, and
airlines. The total population subjected to traffic noise can be deduced as
approximately 2010 for roads, 0.6% for railroads, and 2.5% for air traffic.
Visual incompatibility in this figure refers to the visible distances of roads and
railways from adjacent housi,ng. At present there is no definitive measure for
ecological damage. The main question is how data of this type should be taken
into account for the development of a system of environmental management.
Figure 17.1 illustrates the changes in public opinion concerning industrial
development as opposed to accompanying pollution.
Figure 17.2 illustrates public reaction to the question of sharing noise-control
costs. It shows that more than 60% of those asked about the Shinkansen and
80% of those asked about the automobile with regard to sharing noise-control
costs were of the opinion that they should be entirely or partly charged to
users. This change of people attitudes, together with the international
movements for environmental protection, has caused great pressure on the
Government to endorse some type of environmental program.
Returning to the environmental management problems of the Shinkansen
system, Fig. 17.3 depicts the interconnections of the major environmental
issues and shows the impacts on the environment of a Shinkansen development
program. Some impacts occur at the national levels and others at the local
level. The number of people subjected to noise and vibration is extremely small
-----
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Fig. 17.1. Attitude of the public towards industrial development and pollution. Categories are
answers to the following question: Must environmental pollution be tolerated to a certain extent
for a nation's industrial development or are you categorically opposed to any form of
environmental pollution? Source: Prime Minister's Office Opinion Poll, Japan.
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Fig. 17.2. Public reaction to sharing noise-control costs. Source: Environment Agency survey,
Dec. 1974.
in relation to the number of users of the transportation system. In addition,
the environmental damage, such as changes in landscape and ecosystems, may
also be small. Nevertheless it appears that we are facing a conflict between the
derived benefits for the community in general on one side, and the suffering
minority and environmental preservation on the other side. Indeed, the larger
the scale of development and the more concentrated and complex the project,
the larger are the environmental changes which ensue, even after taking into
account the wide range of economic benefits. This is why one of the major
aspects of our studies dealing with large-scale development programs is
concerned with studying the integration of environmental factors into the
development system.
Table 17.2 and Fig. 17.4 depict the approach presented by D. Fischer as
applied to the Shinkansen environmental management system. Table 17.2
shows a comparison of the development-environment system which leads to a
classification of the environmental program into five basic activities necessary
for a response to the possible impacts: research, planning, regulation,
monitoring, and communication. According to their roles in environmental
management, we can then determine the detailed elements that should be taken
into account.
Figure 17.4 shows the elements of an environmental protection program for a
transportation system.
Table 17.3 sums up JNR's development choices, indicating possible
environmental issues and JNR's response to them. For example, the choice of
separate line, high-speed, elevated track, and increase of transportation
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TABLE 17.2. Developmentojenvironmentprogram
Elements Role Special features
*Citizens movement against pollution
*Change of public attitude to environ-
mental quality
*Development-oriented systems
*No standard measuring methods for
psychological health effects
Identify problems, provide research *High density of population in urban
design, do analysis and synthesis areas
*Narrow flat area
*Housing condition
*Disasters (typhoons, earthquakes)
*No formal EIA procedure in 19605
*Strong demand for transportation
Create goals, assess and mitigate
short- and long-term impacts,
propose alternatives
Control construction operation
Identify origin of impacts,
measure their effect and induced
changes, provide data
Transmit basic information to
developers, users, public
Planning
Research
Regulation
Monitoring
Communication
TABLE 17.3. DevelopmenichoicesojtheJNR
Development Environmental issues JNR responses Environmental responses
Alncidence Avoid already
congested area
Public participation,
bans
Impact assessment,
alternatives
Impact assessment,
standards monitoring
contingency plans
Impact assessment,
public participation
Standards, monitoring,
public participation,
bans
Impact assessment,
public participation,
standards
Compensation in kind,
impact assessment,
public participation
AJob technology
New stations
Increase safety
automatic devices
New lines, advance
plans
Not JNR problem
Condemn properties
Impact assessment,
alternatives, public
participation
Technology at source, Standards, monitoring,
compensate, relocate, buffer zones, speed-
sound-proof house down
Technology at source, Standards, monitoring,
compensate, relocate, buffer zones
sound-proof house
Time limits
High noise and
vibration
High noise and vibra-
tion, all day
AType and location of
pollution
APassenger flows
High noise and vibra-
tion, loss of sun
Alncidence, Aland-
scape, commerce,
traffic
ALandscape, Aplans,
Aplans of residents
Continuous noise
Incidence, Aland-
scape
Rapid construction
Night maintenance
Extension of system
Elevated track
High speed
Frequent trains
Power source
Induced development
Separate rail line
Control system
capacity may result in specific environmental issues, i.e. increased noise and
vibration. JNR's response to these environmental issues is avoidance of
congested areas, technology development at source, sound-proof facilities,
compensation, etc. The last column gives possible environmental responses
which we would like to assess in the forthcoming field study.
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The major questions associated with the environmental management of the
Shinkansen can be summarized as follows:
How has the environment been perceived by all those impacted upon -
either negatively or positively?
How have these perceptions been implemented into the environmental
management systems?
What have been the actual responses of developers, public authorities,
users, and residents?
How well have the environment and development responses worked in
practice?
Are these responses comprehensive and are they well integrated into the
Shinkansen development program?

18. Discussion
The discussion session that followed the presentations covered three main
areas:
I. Possible solutions for those who are adversely affected by the
development of large projects, and the determination of compromises
among competing objectives.
2. Problems of noise generation and its control.
3. Environmental costs associated with noise suppression.
The presentation by H. Uzawa extended the idea of "environment"to include
the socio-economic environment of Japan, and raised questions concerning
the distribution of social overhead capital. This question of distribution of
social capital was also raised in the section dealing with implications of
national development in Japan, but no definite conclusions were reached on
the priority to be allocated to projects on a national basis. The discussion that
followed Uzawa's presentation was keynoted by an informal presentation
from N. Sakashita. He explained what he believes to be the fundamental cause
of the imbalance of social overhead capital in Japan. The text of his comments
is included as an appendix to this discussion session.
Main Discussion Themes
I. The first main discussion theme dealt with the determination of
compromises among competing objectives - specifically environmental
objectives versus development objectives.
(a) It was commented that one can approach the problem of environment
versus development by not treating them as separate entities but
combining them in a new approach to environmental management,
based on the thesis presented by D. Fischer in his presentation. A
possible application of a new environmental management approach
was also presented by S. Ikeda and D. Fischer and applied to the
Shinkansen. The discussion centered on the type of approach that JNR
could attempt in dealing with the environmental problems of the
Shinkansen.
(b) It was stated that JNR took a radical approach to development when a
totally new and untried system of ground transportation was chosen for
the Shinkansen lines, and that the same spirit could perhaps be applied
to the environmental problems associated with the Shinkansen.
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(c) Several suggestions were raised concerning the type of response: a more
equitable distribution of the revenues derived from Shinkansen -
reserving part of the ticket price for environmental engineering and
environmental solutions, compensation benefits for people adversely
affected by the Shinkansen, etc.
(d) It was also pointed out that even with the introduction of new types of
ground transportation systems such as the magnetic levitation process,
new environmental problems may appear. High-speed transportation
must be concerned not only with reliability and efficiency, but also with
the interests of people who would not use such a system even if it were
available. It is imperative to examine both environmental and
developmental aspects of programs from the very beginning of the
planning and formulation process - a comprehensive and integrated
approach towards the environment-development interface.
2. The second theme of the discussion dealt with the problems of noise
generation and environmental costs.
(a) The question was asked as to whether the use of 25-kV AC,
semiconductor rectifiers, and perhaps the auxiliary motors for high-
speed operation could induce large amounts of electromagnetic
interference. The reply was that there was indeed some interference, but
in the case of the Shinkansen this is almost exclusively limited to
television reception. Interference with other types of communication
has been effectively eliminated through the use of booster transformers
and the autotransformer.
(b) An additional question was asked about the noise generated from
maintenance activities, since maintenance on the Shinkansen lines is
undertaken at night, when the trains are not running. In the Federal
Republic of Germany, for example, the sound barriers along the tracks
are 3 meters from the center of the track. The German experience is that
the sound walls are too close to be effective, ~d they cause a wide
distribution of the sound. On the Shinkansen lines, mechanical
maintenance noise generation has been reduced through the use of
electric motors for the maintenance vehicles and covers placed over
tie-tampers. The Shinkansen noise barriers along the track have also
proved less effective than desired, and tests are therefore being
conducted on the use of overhead sound-depressing structures.
(c) The discussion on noise-absorbing structures led to a series of questions
dealing with attempts to limit noise generation at the source, the
contact of rail to wheel. The general conclusion reached was that in
spite of the considerable scientific and engineering research being done
at the Railway Technical Research Institute in Japan and in research
institutes the world over, the results have proved unsatisfactory since
there are too many unknown characteristics. It was suggested that one
solution of the magnetic levitation system for guided transport, which
avoids any physical contact with the guideway. This system could
theoretically result in speeds of 500 km/h. This suggestion raised an
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additional comment that, at such speeds, noise may still be a major
problem owing to the compression and decompression of air masses.
3. The last part of the discussion dealt with the problem of environmental
costs associated with noise suppression. It was commented that the
recommended standards for noise levels in Japan are extremely low in
comparison to those of the UK, for example. If the Japanese standards were
enforced in the UK, the railways would probably have to close. It was asked
what factors caused JNR to accept such a low noise limit, and whether the
costs of noise suppression were included in JNR discounted cash flows.
(a) It was generally agreed that the cost of noise suppression is heavy, but
work is continuing towards solution of the problem by compensation
payments and improved sound-proofing of housing structures near the
Shinkansen line.
(b) The preceding comments provoked a general discussion of possible
systems of charges for recovery of the environmental improvement
costs. Several possible methods were suggested, such as passing on the
costs to the passengers of JNR Shinkansen trains, that JNR should
absorb the costs, or that residents who move close to Shinkansen routes
after construction is completed should be charged.
(c) It was mentioned that in some regions of North America, similar
problems are being encountered in residential areas surrounding
airports: people move into airport areas and then complain of noise.
(d) This problem also occurs in Shinkansen areas but nothing has yet been
done about it.

Implications of National
Development in Japan

19. Background ofDevelopment in
Japan
N.GLICKMAN
The history of postwar regional development in Japan is one of very rapid
urbanization that occurred immediately after World War II, and involved a
high level of concentration in major metropolitan areas. In papers written in
1976 (Glickman, 1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1977c) metropolitan areas, called
Regional Economic Clusters (RECs), were defined which dominate urban life
in Japan. These RECs are similar to the Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas in the United States, and the SMLAs in the United Kingdom. The
Tokaido region, for example, consists of several interrelated sets of regions,
including Nagoya and Osaka. There is tremendous concentration along this
Tokaido belt, along which the Shinkansen was built. In 1975 two-thirds of the
total Japanese population resided in the eighty regions shown in Fig. 19.1. The
figure also shows eight areas, heavily outlined, which are defined as Standard
Consolidated Areas, and approximately one-half of the Japanese population
resides in them.
During the course of the research it was found that the cities were becoming
centralized over time. In other words, the large cities were growing at the
expense of the smaller cities and the rural areas. This was particularly true
between 1950 and 1970. Another important finding was that in comparison
with developed countries in the West, there was relatively little
suburbanization in Japan.
We recently had the opportunity to update some of this research by means
of some of the data that Professor Kuroda has presented at this conference,
and we indicated some of the events that took place between 1970 and 1975.
The population percentage changed between 1970 and 1975, and the RECs
grew by 6.2 million between 1970 and 1975 (of the 7.2 million growth in the
whole of Japan) which is about 86070 of the total population growth in Japan.
The non-REC areas grew relatively slowly, only about 3.3% between 1970 and
1975 compared to 7.8% for the major metropolitan areas. (This is shown in
detail in Table 19.1.)
The large regions of Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka also grew very fast. In spite
of some of the' 'U-turn" phenomena that we have been hearing about, these
major metropolitan areas continue to grow, and faster than the non-
metropolitan areas.
What has also been happening in the 1970s is that most ofthe growth in
these RECs is occurring in suburban areas: much more suburbanization has
been taking place, especially in the larger metropolitan areas. The smaller
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Fig. 19.1. Regional economic clusters and standard consolidated areas.
TABLE 19.1.
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Growth ofpopulation ofregional economic clusters. standard consolidated
regions. and Japan as a whole. 1970-1975
Area
All Japan
All regional economic clusters
All standard consolidated areas
Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka SCAs
All non-REC Japan
RECs as percent of Japan
SCAs as percent of Japan
SCAs as percent of RECs
Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka SCAs as percent of all RECs
Population
(millions)
1975 1970
111.9 104.7
76.6 70.4
57.9 53.3
48.0 44.2
35.3 34.2
68.42 67.30
51.73 50.89
75.61 75.63
62.89 62.73
Percent
change
1970-1975
6.926
8.705
8.716
8.659
3.264
areas exhibit much less suburbanization. A third phenomenon, one which
Professor Kuroda discusses, is that the middle-size regions are beginning to
grow faster than the larger regions. In the 1950-1970 period, the large regions
were experiencing rapid growth rates. Now it is the middle-size regions,
500,000-700,000 people, that appear to be growing fastest. The data to support
this observation is rather limited because it is only reported in 5-year periods.
To provide a better basis for argument, I looked at some of the data that
Professor Kuroda also used. Table 19.2 shows the migration in various regions
of Japan during the period 1954-1975. The first column shows the net
migration into the three major metropolitan areas: Tokyo, Kanto - Osaka
and Nagoya (Tokai) - and Kinki. Note that there was an increase in
in-migration from 1954 to 1962, then there was a sharply decreased net
in-migration. By 1975 there is very little in-migration, only 32,000 people.
In looking at the fourth column of Table 19.2, for the suburban prefectures
we see in the early years a trend of out-migration, but after 1959 there is
sharply increasing migration into these areas, peaking in 1970 and then
declining. The figures after 1970 show that there is not as much in-migration to
the suburbs as there used to be; more people are leaving the cores and going to
the suburbs. This is shown in column 5 of the table, where in the later years
there are the beginnings of positive in-migration. These results are
complementary to what Professor Koruda has said, and I have tried to amplify
his remarks.
The reason the data from the census in Glickman (l977a) shows a still
increasing metropolitan growth is that the birth rate is much higher in
metropolitan than in rural areas, owing to the age structure of the population.
Migration to the cities is mainly by younger people of child-bearing age. Birth
rates therefore continue to be high and are more than making up for the
decrease in in-migration.
The major goal of regional development policy since about 1960 has been to
decentralize the Japanese urban system. But regional planning has to be seen
within the context of national planning. There have been ten national plans
since 1955, the latest one issued in 1976. The major purpose of most of them is
to stimulate economic development, usually accomplished through the
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TABLE 19.2. Annual net migration to Japanese regions, 1954-1975 (thousands)
(7)
Prefectures
(I) other than
Kanta, Kinki (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) core, suburbs
and Tokai Other Core Suburban Exurban Peripheral exurbs and
regions" regionsb prefecturesC prefecturesd prefectures· prefecturesf peripheryS
1954 265.3 - 265.3 418.8 -35.1 -118.4 -59.2 -206.1
1955 242.2 - 242.2 383.0 -27.3 -113.5 -53.0 -189.2
1956 279.5 - 326.8 429.9 -24.4 -126.0 -50.8 -228.7
1957 371.2 - 371.2 523.9 -10.7 -142.0 -65.1 -306.1
1958 294.7 - 294.7 430.0 -3.6 -131.7 -50.3 -244.4
1959 370.4 - 370.4 482.8 16.7 -129.1 -82.7 -287.7
1960 491.9 - 491.9 552.3 43.8 -104.1 -121.0 - 371.0
1961 572.6 - 556.5 594.0 62.4 -83.8 -139.7 -432.9
1962 575.7 - 575.7 539.1 112.4 -76.2 -128.1 -447.2
1963 557.1 - 557.1 477.0 151.9 -71.8 -138.7 - 418.6
1964 521.4 - 521.4 421.2 166.0 -65.8 -108.2 -413.2
1965 426.1 - 426.1 337.9 158.7 -70.5 -78.6 -347.5
1966 348.9 - 348.9 251.0 174.2 -76.3 -61.0 -287.9
1967 374.7 - 273.8 229.5 195.4 -50.2 -62.2 -312.5
1968 399.6 - 399.6 231.3 208.5 -40.2 -60.2 - 339.4
1969 430.5 - 430.5 212.5 233.1 -15.1 -60.6 -369.9
1970 427.5 - 427.5 147.3 265.0 15.2 -49.2 - 378.3
1971 318.7 - 318.7 77.4 231.7 9.6 -28.7 -290.0
1972 229.1 - 229.1 -11.0 259.5 -19.4 -13.0 -216.1
1973 168.5 - 167.5 -105.4 244.3 28.6 -5.8 -161.7
1974 78.2 -78.2 -152.8 202.7 28.3 6.0 -84.2
1975 32.2 -32.2 -151.6 172.2 11.6 19.6 -51.8
"Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Tochigi, Ibaraki, Gumma, Yamanashi, Nagano, Shiga, Kyoto,
Nara, Wakayama, Osaka, Hyogo, Shizuoka, Aichi, Gifu, and Mie prefectures.
bprefectures not included in column (I); see footnote a.
CTokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, Aichi, and Kanagawa prefectures.
dGifu, Nara, Saitama, and Chiba prefectures.
"Gumma, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Shizuoka, Mie, Shiga, Wakayama, Yamanashi and Nagano prefectures.
fMiyagi, Fukushima, Okayama, Hiroshima, Yamaguchi and Tukuoka prefectures.
sPrefectures not included in columns (3) through (6); see footnotes c-f of this table.
stimulation of exports and investment. Regional development policy has
followed the various stages of national development policy. Professor
Miyazawa is quite correct in his discussion on some of the stages of growth
policy, and it is important to consider regional development policy in this
context. T~e important thing, of course, is the implementation of regional
policy. The stated goal is to try to decentralize the population, and to some
degree this has been reflected in the public investment patterns as seen for the
different regions.
Data on the relative level of public investment for the major regions of
Japan (Glickman, 1977b) show that most regions that were less favored in
earlier periods (1959-1961) become more favored later on (1973). The Tohako
region provides a good example of this trend. In Japan public investment can
be seen to be highly centralized in the Pacific belt. To understand the
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Shinkansen investment, one should look at it in the context of the investment
policy during the late 1950s and early 196Os. A large amount of public
investment was concentrated in the Tokaido region, and the Shinkansen was
just one element of this investment, which included the development of ports,
roads, conventional railroads, etc., which was going on during that period.
Reactions were observed in the late 1960s indicating that there was too much
pollution and too much concentration of population. The data I have
discussed indicates that the Government responded in some degree, to these
reactions in the late 1960s and began to decentralize investment spatially.
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20. Migration, Population Distribution,
and Population Policy in Japan
T.KURODA
1. Introduction
Migration of population is closely related to economic development; this can
be fully documented by experience in the advanced countries. In the process of
modernization, migratory movement of population tends to function as a
movement which equalizes aggregate socio-economic disparities between
regions [1], and also tends to mitigate regional population pressures by
syphoning off excess population in one area into areas of greater opportunity
which demand a labor force. In this sense, internal migration is a device for
maintaining a social and economic balance for the nation among communities
and is a mechanism of personal adjustment by achieving a more satisfactory
selection of residence and job through migration [2].
In broad terms, Japan's modernization is not unique. In particular, the
relationship between economic development and migratory movements of
population in the postwar period was very typical. Population movement in
postwar Japan has increased rapidly, with economic motives as the principal
causal factor. However, it should be noted that migration, in addition to
contributing greatly to rapid economic growth, has brought about a severe
dichotomy of overcrowded and depopulated areas, creating new socio-
economic and administrative difficulties in both areas. In the field of
demography too, Japan has experienced an extraordinary change of regional
vital statistics, resulting in overall higher birth and natural increase rates in all
industrial-urbanized prefectures over all rural prefectures, amounting to more
than 30.
However, there are clear signs of basically changing national patterns of
migration and redistribution trends of population. This paper examines the
historical change of migration and population distribution in relation to
economic development, and, in particular, indicates a new migration
dimension based on the mobility transition hypothesis [3].
2. Bifurcation of Population Concentration and Metropolitanization
Historically, the population distribution of Japan is basically characterized
by bifurcation into Tokyo and Osaka. Even before the Meiji Restoration in
1868, these cities had been bifocal points of attraction to population as
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political or industrial cores. The rural-to-urban type of migration has in fact
been a Tokyo-Osaka oriented movement. Rural-to-urban migration was on
the increase even in the prewar period, but was not significant compared with
the magnitude and pace of increase in the postwar period, particularly after
about 1955, when rapid economic growth began after the postwar economic
recovery. The average annual number of migrants in Japan was about 5
million for the second half of the 1950s, rising to more than 6 million in the
first half of the 196Os, and 7.6 million in the second half of the same decade;
finally exceeding 8 million per year in the first half of the 1970s.
There were three major sources of this enormous number of migrants in the
postwar period. First, the very large number of repatriated and demobilized
soldiers, young adults, looking for employment opportunities. Second, this
inevitably brought about a marriage and baby boom. The average annual
number of births amounted to about 2.7 million for the period 1947-1949,
when the birth rate was roughly as high as 33-34 per thousand of the
population. Although the birth rate began to fall very quickly, this baby-boom
population contributed towards meeting the heavy demand for a young labor
force later. Third, the remarkable decrease of the population engaged in
primary industry, in which the agricultural population was dominant. Nearly
half of the working population was engaged in primary industry in 1960.
However, the numbers started to decrease rapidly to 33070 in 1960, and 19% in
1970; a decrease from 17 million in 1950 to only to million in 1970. The
population shift from primary to secondary and tertiary industries can be
roughly and indirectly explained by migration estimates between urban and
rural areas, because those population increases in secondary and tertiary
industries are reasonably assumed to be out-migration from rural, agricultural
areas, particularly from those in an earlier stage of economic development.
Table 20.1 and Fig. 20.1 show how the migration trend has been strongly
oriented to the Tokyo and Osaka metropolitan areas in the postwar period.
Table 20.2 gives estimates of interregional net migration based on the vital
statistics method.
It can easily be seen from Tables 20.1 and 20.2 that only two regions,
Minami-Kanto and Keihanshin (the most urbanized areas centering upon
Tokyo and Osaka cities), have continuously shown enormous net in-
migration. In other words, Tokyo and Osaka and their metropolitan areas
have been bifocal growth points, absorbing a very large population from all
other regions in the country. This is clear from the fact that all remaining
regions, excluding Chukyo, have continued to show net out-migration.
Even in the prewar period, both regions continued to absorb population
through migratory movement from local regions. For example, Table 20.2
shows that the Minami-Kanto, i.e. the present Tokyo Metropolitan area,
showed more than 600,000 net in-migrants for each 5-year period since 1920.
The Keihanshin region, i.e. the present Keihanshin Metropolitan area, also has
net in-migrants comparable to the Tokyo Metropolitan area. However, it
should be noted that the Tokyo Metropolitan area has exerted a much stronger
population-absorbing capacity than the Keihanshin Metropolitan area. Table
20.1 shows that net in-migrants in the former exceeded I million in each 5-year
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TABLE 20.1. Interregional net migration in postwar Japan (thousands)
Source: Annual Report on Internal Migration Derived/rom the Basic Resident Registers, Bureau
of Statistics, Prime Minister's Office, Japan.
Region 1955-1959 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974
I Hokkaido + 23 - 151 - 199 - 223
2 Kita-Tohoku - 160 298 - 250 - 215
3 Minami-Tohoku - 280 361 - 219 - 125
4 Kita-Kanto - 285 201 - 90 +247
5 Minami-Kanto + 1442 -+ 1854 +1452 + 899
6 Hokuriku - 245 254 - 212 -122
7 Tosan 222 137 - 87 - 49
8 Chukyo 70 + 311 + 157 +111
9 Keihan-Shuhen 57 34 + 22 + 124
10 Keihan-Shin + 633 + 929 + 526 + 44
II San-In 87 I 15 - 93 50
12 San-Yo 127 185 - 53 + 22
13 Shikoku - 212 289 - 199 84
14 Kita-Kyushu - 177 606 - 407 - 23 I
15 Minami-Kyushu 293 - 461 - 343 -235
Note: Each region shown here is a geographical area (see Fig. 20.1), including several prefectures,
with the exception of Hokkaido, as follows:
2 Kita-Tohoku: Aomori, Akita, and Iwate
3 Minami-Tohoku: Miyagi, Fukushima, and Yamagata
4 Kita-Kanto: Ibaragi, Tochigi, and Gunma
5 Minami-Kanto: Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba
6 Hokuriku: Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, and Fukui
7 Tosan: Nagano and Yamanashi
8 Chukyo: Aichi, Gifu, Mie, and Shizuoka
9 Keihanshin-Shuhen: Shiga, Nara, and Wakayama
10 Keihanshin: Osaka, Kyoto, and Hyogo
II San-In: Shimana and Tottori
12 San-Yo: Okayama, Hiroshima, and Yamaguchi
13 Shikoku: Kagawa, Tokushima, Ehime, and Kochi
14 Kita-Kyushu: Fukuoka, Nagasaki, Saga, and Oita
15 Minami-Kyushu: Kumamoto, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima
"+" denotes net in-migration and "-" denotes net out-migration.
period, with the exception of 1970-1975, but the net in-migrants ofthe latter
were much less.
The Chukyo region has come up as a third metropolitan area only in the
postwar period, but the number of net in-migrants in that region was smaller
than the Tokyo and Keihanshin Metropolitan areas.
Table 20.1 indicates that some new changes in migration seem to have
begun, and these will be discussed in Section 3.
As a result of a remarkable concentration of population due to shifts of
population in the twin giant cities, Tokyo and Osaka, and their suburbs, the
populations of these two metropolitan areas have shown extraordinary
expansion. In the 25 years between 1950 and 1975, the population of Japan
grew from 84,115,000 to 111,933,000. Against a national population increase
of 27,818,000, the population of the two metropolitan areas grew by
20,682,000, In other words, the greater part (74.3070) ofthe population growth
of Japan was accounted for by the population increase in these two
metropolitan areas, Against a national population growth rate of 33.1070, that
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1 Hokkaido
2 Kita-Tohoku
3 Minami-Tohoku
4 Kita-Kanto
5 Minami-Kanto
6 Hokuriku
7 Tosab
8 Chukyo
9 Keihanshin Shuhen
1 0 Keihanshin
11 San-In
12 San-Yo
13 Shikoku
14 Kita-Kyushu
15 Minami-Kyushu
Fig. 20.1. Map of Japan to illustrate Table 20.1.
of the metropolitan areas was 93.8070. Although they occupy only 7.6% of the
country, their share of the nation's population was 26.5% in 1950, but
increased to 38.2% in 1975. Table 20.3 shows the population growth of three
metropolitan areas: Tokyo, Osaka, and Chukyo.
3. New Dimensions of Migration and Distribution of Population
Table 20.1 indicates clearly that in terms of net migration among regions:
(a) Net in-migration in both Minami-Kanto (i.e. Tokyo Metropolitan area)
and Keihanshin (i.e. Keihanshin Metropolitan area) regions reached their peak
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TABLE 20.2. Interregional net migration, 1920-1940, in 5-year periods (thousands)
Source: Net migration is calculated by subtracting the natural increase derived from vital statistics
from population increase based on census returns by prefecture.
Region 1920-1925 1925-1930
1 Hokkaido -110 + 49
2 Tohoku -145 -190
3 Kita-Kanto - 93 - 109
4 Minami-Kanto + 605 +619
5 Hokuriku and Tosan -192 -182
6 Tokai + 31 - 28
7 Keihanshin +456 +434
8 Areas surrounding No.7 45 - 41
9 Sanin 32 - 26
10 Sanyo - 47 - 68
II Shikoku - 91 - 92
12 Kita-Kyushu - 89 + 0
13 Minami-Kyushu - 76 - 59
1930-1935
- 24
-238
-137
+619
-300
+ 8
+778
- 35
- 55
- 18
-177
- 35
-150
1935-1940
- 56
-404
-142
+751
-281
- 17
+453
- 94
-61
- 0
-197
+-104
-249
Note: The prefectures included in each region are as follows:
Tohoku: Aomori,lwate, Akita, Miyagi, Yamagata and Fukushima.
Kita-Kanto: Ibaragi, Tochigi and Gunma.
Mitami-Kanto: Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama and Chiba.
Hokuriku and Tosan: Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Yomanashi, and Nagano.
Tokai: Aichi, Gifu, Mie, and Shizuoka.
Keihanshin: Osaka, Kyoto, and Hyogo.
Areas surrounding No.7: Shiga, Nara, and Wakayama.
Sanin: Tottori and Shimane.
Sanyo: Okayama, Hiroshima, and Yamaguchi.
Shikoku: Kagawa, Ehime, Tokushima, and Kochi.
Kita-Kyushu: Kumamoto, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima.
.. +" denotes net in-migration and .~.. denotes net out-migration.
TABLE 20.3. Population growth in three metropolitan areas
Source: National censuses.
Population (thousands)
Metropolitan area 1975 1970 1965 1960 1955 1950
Tokyo 27,037 24,1/3 21,017 17,864 15,427 13,051
Keihanshin 15,696 14,538 13,070 11,405 10,174 9,000
Chukyo 9,417 8,688 8,013 7,330 6,838 6,396
Total 52,150 47,339 42,100 36,579 32,437 28,447
Japan 111,933 100,467 98,275 93,419 89,276 84,115
As 070 of national population
Tokyo 24.2 23.2 2\.4 19.1 17.3 15.7
Keihanshin 14.0 14.0 13.3 12.2 I\.4 10.8
Chukyo 8.4 8.4 8.2 7.8 7.7 7.7
Total 46.6 45.6 42.8 39.2 36.3 34.2
Japan 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Metropolitan Tokyo centers upon Tokyo Metropolis and includes the three neighboring
prefectures of Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba. Metropolitan Keihanshin includes Osaka, Kyoto,
and Hyogo prefectures. Metropolitan Chukyo includes Aichi, Gifu, and Mie prefectures.
Populations for 1950 and 1975 include Okinawa prefecture.
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in the 5-year period 1960-1964, and then started to decrease rapidly.
(b) Nearly all other local regions characterized by traditional out-migration
have begun to show declining trends of net out-migration after peaking in the
period 1960-1964 - some of them earlier. Chukyo Metropolitan area follows
the same pattern as Tokyo and Keihanshin. Hokkaido is the only exception,
still keeping an increasing trend of net out-migration.
(c) Minami-Kanto and San-Yo have reversed from net out-migration to net
in-migration in the last period, 1970-1974, a fact which deserves special
attention. Keihanshin-Shuhen, comprising the three prefectures of Shiga,
Nara, and Wakayama, which are just outside the cities of Osaka, Kyoto, and
Kobe, has already shown net in-migration since 1965-1969. mainly because
they are conveniently located as suburban areas for the Keihanshin
Metropolitan area.
These findings demonstrate that new dimensions of migration have emerged
from the mid-1960s. In addition to suburbanization [4], which began earlier,
particularly in the Tokyo and Osaka areas, a new return migration pattern has
appeared. This is really new in the sense that it has not been experienced
before, and consequently migration in Japan has entered a new stage, which
should be examined fully in the economic and social context.
The decreasing trend of net out-migration in local regions like Tohoku and
Kyushu is due to two factors. One is the decreasing in-migration into
metropolitan areas from local regions, and the other is the increasing trend of
out-migration from large metropolitan areas like Tokyo and Osaka to local
areas. These changes of migration streams can be seen from the Annual
Report on Internal Migration DerivedJrom the Basic Resident Registers,
compiled by the Bureau of Statistics, Prime Minister's office.
Return migration in Japan seems to be more or less specific because most of
them are youths or young adults· returning to their home towns or nearby. I
have called such return migration a "V-turn". Large numbers of young people
who came up to metropolitan areas to obtain better jobs and enjoy a socially
and culturally advanced environment had grown up and were educated in their
home towns, where parents, relatives, and friends were still living. Why did
they decide to return? This is a controversial question. In trying to answer it,
the fact should be noted that the majority of the "V-turn" people are young,
mainly 20-24 and 25-29 years old [5,6]. This suggests that half of them are
probably already married and may have one or two children, and that they
have presumably seriously considered their future life in the social and
physical environment of great urban centers like Tokyo and Osaka, where the
great concentration of industries has made the environment remarkably
unsuitable for family life. On the other hand, various regional development
policies have been initiated and intensified by the central and local
governments during the postwar years, and they have gradually created and
increased employment opportunities in rural areas. This has been a very strong
factor in bringing back young people who left their home towns to look for
·Okazaki [5J estimated net migration rates by age groups of males by prefecture for the periods
1965-1970 and 1970-1975; see also Nishikawa [6J.
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jobs in urban centers and who have begun to look for somewhere else to live
and work. A better environment, and lower cost of living are additional
attractive factors, even though the social infrastructure and amenities are still
lagging behind urban centers.
There are other indications that imply a redistributive movement of
population in addition to an interesting pattern of return migration. The 1975
census gave much interesting information on national population distribution.
First, the number of prefectures losing population in the 5-year period 1970-
1975 decreased considerably to only five, the least developed, compared with
twenty prefectures in the period 1965-1970; twenty-five in 1960-1965, and
twenty-six in 1955-1960. Moreover, rates of population decrease have declined
remarkably. This means that many prefectures which continued to lose
population through net out-migration have shifted to gaining population
through decreasing out-migration and increasing in-migration.
Second, large cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants have shown a lower
rate of population increase, only 4.3010 for the 5-year period 1970-1975, while
small and medium-sized cities with populations of more than 100,000 to less
than 500,000 have shown about a 13% increase for the same 5-year period.
These cities are classified into four groups according to the size of population.
The rates of population increase for 1970-1975 are as follows:
Size of cities
300,000-499,999
200,000-299,999
100,000-199,999
50,000- 99,999
Population increase
(in thousands)
1432
1072
1380
1558
Rate of increase (0,10)
13.6
12.6
12.7
12.5
Third, it should be noted that the number of minor civil divisions, city,
town, and village (shi, machi, and mura in Japanese), which showed more
than a 10% decrease in the 5-year period has shrunk considerably, from 937
for the previous 5-year period (1965-1970) to 443 in the 1970-1975 period.
More than 10% decrease of population in a 5-year period is one of the
conditions for local governments (shi, machi, or mural to qualify for
assistance from the Central Government through subsidies, etc.
In addition to return migration, intrametropolitan or intermetropolitan
migration and interlocal migration should be mentioned as increasing
migration streams. In particular, migration between adjoining local regions
should receive special attention. For example, the migratory flow between
Kita-Tohoku and Minami-Tohoku, and between San-In and San-Yo, and so
on, had formed a new migration pattern [7].
4. Policy and Development
Considerations of policy have always had two aspects, one economic and
the other demographic. The demographic aspect concerns fertility, mortality,
and migration. Recommendations to reduce mortality have been included in
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all policies. Population policy considerations in the postwar period are
characterized by a shifting of emphasis from reduction of fertility to
redistribution of the population. In the first decade after the war, the major
concern was fertility control:
The mid-1950s was probably a socio-economic and demographic turning-
point. The demographic transition was completed, with birth and death rates
stabilizing at a very low level. At that time the rapid postwar economic growth
was also in its early stage.
A "double income program" was initiated by the Government in 1960 to
achieve rapid industrial growth based on local development programs and
heavy industry and chemical industry. Public and private investment was
greatly expanded, and economic growth rates continued to exceed those
expected by the Government. The greatest emphasis was, however, placed on
economic development in order to approach as quickly as possible the
advanced level already attained in the more highly developed countries.
Consequently, the Government tended to neglect the impact of social
development on the population.
The rapid economic growth that began in about 1955 was made possible by
concentrating and accumulating population and industries in a few limited
urban areas, primarily in the three giant cities, Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya,
and in the large metropolitan areas surrounding them. The heavily crowded
urban areas inevitably began to produce environmental disruption. Rural
areas became depopulated and contained a high proportion of older people,
owing to the heavy migration of the young to urban centers. More and more,
after 1960, government attention was concentrated on various diversified
development plans and programs at national, regional and local levels. 11'1
August 1963 the Population Problems Advisory Council, at the request of the
Minister of Health and Welfare, submitted opinions on regional development
from the standpoint of population problems.
The council had two basic objectives. One, the goal of any regional
development, was to increase the actual welfare of the population, either of
the nation as a whole or of a region. The other was to balance the growth of
regional economic and social development. With these goals, and taking into
account the serious effects on human welfare of massive migratory
movements, the Council recommended an adequate population redistribution
policy, to be achieved by adjusting the volumes and speed of migration. For
that purpose, implementation of regional policies designed to locate and
develop industries requiring the employment of many people in local areas was
suggested as the most desirable solution.
Other important points in regional development policy are: (a) the shrinking
trend towards increase in productive-age population and the increasing trend
towards a middle-aged and older population, accompanied by the change in
age composition of the population; (b) the need to modernize agriculture and
small-scale enterprises in cities; (c) the creation of urban areas with a high-
quality environment; (d) the promotion of health and welfare, etc.
In the postwar period, the nature and emphasis of population problems
changed as economic progress and social change proceeded. Basically there
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were two changes: the shift from quantitative to qualitative problems of
population, and the transition from the economic-oriented to the equilibrium-
oriented problem between economic and social development. Unprecedented
overlaps of demographic and socio-economic transformation produced
population problems of a different nature, and policy also shifted from simple
fertility control to quality improvement and, more recently, to migration and
redistribution factors.
As rapid growth started about 1957 and accelerated every year, rural-to-
urban migration increased quickly and heavily. A nation-wide migratory
movement brought an enormous young labor force into great cities like Tokyo
and Osaka from all rural and agricultural areas, as discussed in Section 2.
The country was then polarized into two distinctive areas, one heavily
crowded and another heavily depopulated. Both public and private sectors as
well as central and local governments have become keenly aware of the
extremely adverse effects on people's welfare of an extreme imbalance of
population distribution.
As early as 1962 the Government recognized that excessive concentration of
population and industries in great cities should be prevented and that balanced
regional development should be promoted. In 1962 a National Overall
Development Project was adopted, and a New Industrial Cities Promotion
Law was enacted. The principal aim of the law was to establish several new
industrial cities that were expected to be growth points in local areas and,
consequently, slow down the migratory flow into the great cities. At the same
time, measures to stimulate industrialization in underdeveloped areas were
adopted, including the passage of a law for this purpose. Its basic principle
was that regional development should give priority to the welfare of the
citizens rather than to the advancement of industrial production.
Finally, in 1971, a law to stimulate the reallocation of industries was enacted
in order to accelerate decentralization of industries to local areas. To
implement the duties prescribed by this law, a new organization was
established in 1972.
The public's increasing awareness of environmental disruption in great
cities - e.g. air and water pollution, traffic congestion, inadequate housing,
noise disturbances, etc. - and increasing employment opportunities in local
cities and towns seemed to function as incentives to return migration. The
results of the 1970 census also indicate that major transformations in
population redistribution are under way. During the 5-year period 1965-1970.
great cities for the first time showed depopulation or a remarkable slowing-
down of increase. Population increase rates in the last intercensus period in the
three great metropolitan areas were the lowest in the postwar period. The
fastest growth rates for urban entities were registered by medium-sized cities
with populations between 200,000 and 300,000 and not by the larger cities.
However, it is also true that heavy accumulation of population is still
continuing even though the speed has been reduced. Various expert
committees of the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister came to
the same conclusion, namely that the decentralization policy of population
and industries should be adopted in order to attain the greatest possible benefit
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to the public. Effective implementation of the redistribution policy is a
formidable task for the Government. The policy extends over various fields of
social, economic, and fiscal arrangements and of urban, rural and
environmental problems. The entitlements and desires of people who are
selecting places of residence and work are basic factors in formulating
redistribution policy. It seems clear that the migration and redistribution of
population is now the most urgent population policy facing present-day
Japan.
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21. The Shinkansen and the Future
Image ofJapan
T. SANUKI
The Problem
When plans were formulated for the construction of the Tokaido
Shinkansen, it was the general belief in Japan and the rest of the world that
transport systems would no longer be railway-oriented but centered on motor
vehicles. It was no wonder that the project should be severely criticized. To
give an extreme example, the undertaking was cited as one of the three largest
but most useless projects of the world, the three being the Great Wall of
China, the Japanese battleships Yamato and Musashi, and the Tokaido
Shinkansen.
Amongst the most critical were university professors and politicians, who
claimed that it was incomprehensible why all three should be in Asia, with two
in Japan to make matters worse. Although they have not yet said a word about
their mistakes, it is to be noted that these very people are now making great use
of the Tokaido Shinkansen as a safe, reliable and speedy means of transport.
This paper attempts to analyze from facts the positive and negative effects
produced by the opening of the Shinkansen. Based on this analysis, the
function and role of the Shinkansen in relation to the future image of Japan is
dealt with as a proponent of an integrated transport system. For this it was
necessary to make an estimate of the future volume of passenger traffic,
develop an OD chart therefrom, and clarify the share to be borne by each
mode of transport. Estimates obtained by the gravity model and the Fratar
method are presented, to which the author's "third productivity theory" will
be applied. Then the future image of Japan is discussed. Finally, some
proposals are made on city planning in relation to the Shinkansen stations.
The Shinkansen and Economic Growth
In 1947, after the termination of the Pacific War, the scale of the Japanese
economy was only 3600 million dollars in GNP, but it has grown to the present-
day 463,600 million dollars. The years from 1945 to 1955 may be regarded as
the rehabilitation period and the 20 years from 1955 to the present as the
growth period.
In the 20 years from 1955 to 1975, the Japanese economy showed a
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tremendous nominal growth of 16.70 times at the annual rate of 15.1 %, and
real growth of 5.29 times at the annual rate of8.7%.
This may be broken down into four periods:
Periods
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
(1955-1960)
(1960-1965)
(1965-1970)
(1970-1975)
Real growth (annual)
8.70/0
9.7%
11.7%
5.2%
Nominal growth (annual)
12.8%
15.2%
17.4%
15.3%
In line with this economic growth, the per capita national income rose
rapidly, and Japanese society changed from poverty to affluence:
Year
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
Per capita national income
$227 (1.00)
$395 (1.74)
$735 (3.24)
$1560 (6.87)
$3394 (14.95)
Desired commodities
Black and white television,
refrigerator, washing machine
Car
Car, color television, air
conditioner
Car, cottage, cooker
(electronic range)
Quality of life
Average wages have risen to the high level of 23.28 yen per 60 seconds, and
the jobs of factory workers have changed from physical labor to mental
technical work. Assuming that it takes 6 minutes to smoke one cigarette, it
means that the state has been reached where 139.68 yen (or $0.49 at $1 = 285
yen) will go up in smoke when somebody passes the time smoking one
cigarette.
With the rise in income level, passenger transport demand grew rapidly, and
the increased spendable income led to more frequent use of transport facilities.
As shown in Fig. 21.1, the volume of passenger traffic by various means grew
4.98-fold between 1955 and 1974. The growth was 81.2-fold by aircraft, 54.6-
fold by automobile, 5-fold by bus, and 2.4-fold by Japanese National
Railways (JNR). The growth of JNR was relatively low compared with that of
aircraft and automobile, but the share of the railway and motor vehicle has
now been reversed, as shown in Fig. 21.2.
In spite of this trend, the passenger traffic by the Shinkansen grew 5.I-fold
from 1965 to 1975, showing a different and much higher pattern of growth
than the other JNR lines. Particularly outstanding is the fact that this growth
far exceeded that of the GNP (2.2 times in real terms) and per capita national
income (4.1 times), as shown in Fig. 21.3.
A comparison of the annual growth rate of the Shinkansen traffic and GNP,
given in Fig. 21.4, shows that the growth rate of Shinkansen traffic exceeded
that of the GNP, except in 1969, 1971, and 1972. Even in 1969, the growth rate
was 8.6%, which is still quite high. When considering that the 1971 low was a
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repercussion of the 1970 high brought about by EXPO '70, it may be said that
the elasticity of the growth has been high. What was the reason? In short, the
economic growth had raised the level of incomes to where the public could
easily use the Shinkansen.
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Interregional OD Structure of Shinkansen Passenger Traffic
The interregional 00 structure of Shinkansen passenger traffic, given in
Table 21.1 and Fig. 21.5 for 1975, reveals that:
I. the Shinkansen is fulfilling its function as a means of high-speed
transport in the Tokaido megalopolis, linking the three great
metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Nagoya and Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe;
2. the Shinkansen is serving as a traffic artery between the Tokaido
megalopolis and the four regions of Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu, and
Hokuriku;
3. a breakdown of the 00 structure by station shows that the Shinkansen is
being used for journeys in the 150-160-km range; and
4. in most recent years, a rapid increase is seen in the use of the Shinkansen
even in the 70-IOO-km range.
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Positive and Negative Effects of tbe Sbinkansen
The transport revolution brought about by the Shinkansen may be likened
to a double-edged sword.
IMAGE CHANGING
In the past, Japan was to foreigners "the land of Mount Fuji, cherry
blossoms and geisha girls". This image of Japan has greatly changed, and it is
now' 'the land of precision machine industry, the Shinkansen, dense
population and Tokyo's most beautiful neon signs". Thus, one impact of the
opening of the Tokaido Shinkansen can be seen in this image-changing effect.
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TIME PRODUCTION
In the period of 11 Y2 years, from its inauguration on 1 October 1964 to 31
March 1976, 977 million people have used the Shinkansen. This has yielded a
saving of 2246 million hours, which is the extra time that would have been
spent by using conventional trains. In terms of wages, this amounts to
2,527,600 million yen, based on 1964 prices. Assuming that this time saved is
assigned to working, the effect would be the creation of one year of working
time for 1.22 million people, with 2 days off a week. This work force
235
corresponds to 1.7 times the working population of Kyoto, which
demonstrates the great time-production effect of the Shinkansen.
The faster service has greatly widened the scope of a day's trip. A journey
between Tokyo and Osaka, and return, used to be considered a 3-day trip,
with two nights at the destination, but by the Shinkansen it is an easy day trip.
This, in turn, has changed travel patterns.
The traffic volume on the Shinkansen has therefore continued to grow and
the line is expected to become saturated around 1979, giving rise to the need of
a second Tokaido Shinkansen, as shown in Fig. 21.6.
AIRPORT FUNCTION
The opening of the Tokaido Shinkansen had a great effect on city functions,
a typical example of which may be seen in the function of Nagoya Airport.
Just before the inauguration of the Shinkansen, this airport had
accommodated 300,000 passengers, ranking fifth of the 88 airports in Japan.
In 1967, when the Shinkansen Hikari trains began full-scale operation, this
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236
volume shrank to one-quarter, lowering the rank of the airport to the
nineteenth, and it took 7 years to return to the pre-Shinkansen level. The
function of this airport in the Tokyo-Nagoya -Osaka trunk air route had
disintegrated, narrowing down to interaction with off-route local cities. This is
seen in the reduction of the Tokyo-Nagoya flights from eight per day to one;
and also, with the load factor at 18010 in 1970 and 40.8% in 1975, the flight has
become unremunerative.
This change may be understood from the standpoint of time-benefit:
Time-benefit = B-A/C-D
where
A = cost of Shinkansen,
B = cost of flight,
C = time required by Shinkansen,
D = time required by plane.
The time required for travel between CBD of Tokyo and Nagoya is less by the
Shinkansen, and, when calculated in money terms, it would not be worthwhile
to go by air unless the airline company reimbursed the user at the rate of
20,250 yen per hour.
The advent of the Shinkansen has made it necessary to reexamine the
appropriateness of current social overhead investments. Its impact points to a
greater need of an integrated transport system, and this deserves attention.
Upon construction of the Sanyo Shinkansen to Hakata, the airports along
the newly laid line were greatly affected. Hiroshima and Fukuoka Airports
had a reduction of 397,000 and 1,027,000 passengers per year, respectively,
after the inauguration of the line, following the same pattern as Nagoya
Airport. Air passenger traffic between Tokyo and Fukuoka dropped 16.2% in
a year, and that between Osaka and Fukuoka dropped 46.3%. This again
indicates the need for an integrated transport system.
THE NUCLEUS-CONTROLLING FUNCTION
It was not only the function of Nagoya Airport that disintegrated after the
inauguration of the Shinkansen; the nucleus-controlling function of this city
was to face a similar situation. The nucleus-controlling function in Japan
disintegrated from the [Tokyo]-[Nagoya]-[Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe] pattern into
a bipolar one of [Tokyo] -[Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe], as may be seen from the
marginal managerial personnel coefficient shown in Fig. 21.7.
Further, taking the head office function and the financial function (loaning
function), a drop was seen not only in Nagoya but also in the Kyoto, Osaka,
Kobe area, pointing to the higher degree of concentration of these functions in
Tokyo.
This trend was more pronounced in the Stock Market, which has come to be
dominated by Tokyo. Of course, the transport revolution by the Shinkansen
was not the only cause; added to that were the various forms of information
revolution such as data communication, facsimiles, etc. The changes in these
functions are given in Table 21.2.
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Fig. 21.7. Comparison of growth in nucleus-controlling function. Source: Tosio Sanuki, Gendai
Toshi Ron. Gakushu Kenkyusha, 1975, p. 311.
TABLE 21.2. Effect on nucleus-controlling function
Source: Head Office, Financial and Stock Market Functions
Difference in growth (Three city spheres)
City = 100
Tokyo
Nagoya
Osaka
Head office function
103.7
92.8
98.3
Financial function
(loaning)
105.1
92.8
98.3
Stock market function
105.1
86.8
95.1
COMMERCIAL AND TOURISM FUNCTION
Wholesale function
As shown in Fig. 21.8, the wholesale function will be reorganized among the
base cities, but as the Shinkansen is exclusively a passenger service, it will not
have much direct negative effect. Instead, a greater negative effect will most
likely be induced by a combination of expanded freight-liner service on the
other narrow-gauge lines, new expressways, and data communication systems,
which will lead to reorganization of the base cities.
Retail and hotelfunctions
The inauguration of the Shinkansen had a great effect on the retail function
of the cities at which the Shinkansen trains stopped. A typical example is
Shizuoka City. Of the retail business of the city, the sale of high-class
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Fig. 21.8. Time-distance and the wholesale function. Source: Tosio Sanuki, Gendai Toshi Ron.
Gakushu Kenkyusha, 1975, p. 314.
merchandise and fashion goods at specialty shops rapidly fell. But, with the
cooperation of the Shizuoka Bank, Shizuoka Economic Research Institute, the
local Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and local shopping centers, the city
was redeveloped. New management and operational strategies were
introduced, which made the city more commercially attractive. This led to
subsequent development and growth, proving that negative effects can be
reversed to the positive, depending upon the efforts of the local community.
Table 21.3 shows the effect on the retail commercial function and the hotel
(tourist industry) function of the cities along the Shinkansen line. Except for
cities with deficiencies in city planning, such as Mishima City, considerable
positive effect has been seen. This will probably also trigger further
development of the cities themselves. The extent of the positive and negative
effects on the cities along the Tohoku and Joetsu Shinkansen lines which are
still under construction depends, of course, on city planning and other
measures yet to be taken.
Rapid growth was seen in the first stage of commercial development in
Japan, which followed the pattern: economic growth - income growth -
TABLE 21.3 Effect ofthe Shinkansen on commercial and hotelfunctions
Commercial function Hotel function
City
Along Tokaido {Atami
Shinkansen Mishima
Along likaya
Sanyo Hiroshima
Shinkansen Kita-Kyushu
ukuoka
Along {MOriOka
Tohoku and Sendai
Joetsu Niigata
Shinkansen Takasaki
Sales increase
(070)
33.1
25.9
35.3
31.1
58.8
56.5
69.5
64.1
58.7
50.0
Greater pros-
perity of city
(070)
16.2
75.8
78.9
80.6
74.5
95.6
86.2
84.6
100.0
91.0
Greater use 0 f
hotels
(070)
42.5
86.3
83.3
65.3
46.2
75.0
85.7
64.3
68.8
40.0
Greater pros-
perity of city
(070)
25.0
24.5
83.3
78.6
30.8
80.0
100.0
85.8
93.8
80.0
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refinement, diversification, and uniqueness of commodities. In this phase
there was competition between shops. In the second phase, along with the
advancement in urbanization, city redevelopment took place, and the
competition was between shopping centers. In the third phase, owing to the
transport revolution by the Shinkansen, the competition was between cities.
Moreover, along with the advancement of urban redevelopment projects
prompted by the inauguration of the Shinkansen, the function of cities as
commercial bases is being reoriented, and this leads to competition between
shopping centers within the cities themselves.
It should now be clear that whether or not the fullest use will be made of the
effects of the Shinkansen depends on how appropriate the city planning, land-
use system, and the underlying software system have been in bringing city
functions into full play.
General Appraisal of the Shinkansen
It would be a mistake to make an appraisal of the Shinkansen per se. This
should rather be made from the viewpoint of the positive and negative effects
on Japan as a whole and on each city, and whether the strategies for
augmenting the positive and reducing the negative have been successful.
MULTIPLE PRODUCTIVITY
For appraisal of the Shinkansen from the standpoint of an integrated
transport system, Table 21.4 and Fig. 21.9 compare its efficiency with that of
aircraft. It is found thlJ.t in each of six productivities, the efficiency of the
Shinkansen is two to nine times higher than that of aircraft.
TABLE 21.4. Comparison ofefficiency ofTokaido Shinkansen and aircraft
Tokaido
Unit Shinkansen Aircraft
fA) A,,"01 ",;,01 Passenger-kml 0.62 (1.82) 0.34
charges on ground yen
Capital installations
productivity (B) Annual capital Passenger-kml 1.41 (5.64) 0.25
charges on vehicle and yen
plane
Land productivity (A)
(Transport efficiency per unit of Tokyo-Nagoya- Passenger-kml 3261 (3.34) 976
Osaka right-of-way land area) m'
(B)
Passenger/m' Il.ll (3.97) 2.80
Labor productivity (no. of passengers per employee) Million passenger- 2.9 (2.64) l.l
km/employee
Energy productivity Passenger-kml 0.96 (8.81) 0.11
kcal
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Note: AircraIt:: 1.00
Capital productivity
(I-A)
Energy
productivity
(1Il-C)
Labor
productivity
(II)
Land productivity
(1Il- B)
Fig. 21.9. Efficiency ofTokaido Shinkansen compared with aircraft.
SAFETY
Despite the tremendous volume of over 1000 million passengers carried by
the Shinkansen since its inception, there has not been a single casualty. Taking
JNR as a whole as I, with its other lines included, the incidence of deaths in the
case of private railways is 5, that for aircraft is 166, and for motor vehicles
611, as shown in Table 21.5.
TIME-BENEFIT
The Shinkansen offers its passengers a great advantage over aircraft, as
shown in Table 21.6. A problem lies in how long, ergonomically speaking, a
passenger can tolerate sitting in the same seat. This is a determinant to the
passenger in selecting the means of transport. Taking this factor into account,
in Japan the 50-70-km range suits the non-Shinkansen railways and
automobiles, 70-600 km suits the Shinkansen, and over 600 km is appropriate
for aircraft.
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TABLE 21.5. Safety ofdifferent means of transport
Traffic volume Passenger
(A) deaths Casualty
(100 million passenger- (B) rate
km (Persons) (B/A) Index
Shinkansen 2551 0 0.000 0
rNR O,h" ",,, 16,468 54 0.003 I
Railways Total 19,019 54 0.003 I
Private railways 9473 146 oms 5
Aircraft 878 437 0.498 166
Motor vehicles 24,715 45,338 1.834 611
TABLE21.6. Time-benefit ofthe Shinkansen compared with aircraft
Between Between
Tokyo and Osaka Tokyo and Nagoya
Difference
Cost to user
Time required
8300 yen 5700 yen
14,900 yen 11,100 yen
3h 10 min 2h 01 min
2h 05 min 2h 05 min
+ 6600 yen + 5400 yen
-Oh 04 min
-20,250 yen/h
Ih 05 min
6094yen/h
Shinkansen (A)
Aircraft (B)
Shinkansen (C)
Aircraft (D)
Difference in cost
(B-A)
Difference in time
(C-D)
Time benefit (B-A/C-D)
It will therefore be necessary to create a transport network according to this
concept, and to shape the future image of Japan accordingly.
While the spatial distance has remained the same, faster means of transport
is shrinking the time-distance between Tokyo and local cities, as shown in Fig.
21.10, and the configuration is coming closer to a circle. On the other hand,
the time-distance within the city sphere may possibly lengthen, depending on
how the urban transport system is to be formed, as shown in Fig. 21.11.
Conclusion
Figure 21.12 is obtained when the volume of passenger traffic between the
Tokyo-Yokohama-Chiba region and other regions is estimated using the
gravity model and the Fratar method to form a nationwide Shinkansen
network, based on the preceding studies and in the context of an integrated
transport system. Further, an estimate of the interregional passenger traffic
00 structure and the share to be borne by the Shinkansen and aircraft, based
on the above estimated values, gives Fig. 21.13. It is seen that there is a clear
demarcation in the spheres of activity of the two.
In these circumstances land development must be carried out accordingly
when shaping the future of Japan. Limitations of space permit only three
Fukuoka
Takamatsu
Sapporo
Okayama
242
Osaka
Unit: Hours
---- June 1969
____ After inauguration
of Shinkansen
Fig. 21.10. Change in time-distance from Tokyo by JNR.
National highway No.2
Hyakukengawa 4.3 km
( t960 = 100 )
1960
1965
1971
Fig. 21.11. Change in time taken from Okayama Station.
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(Unit: 10 thousand passengers)
_ 90 million passengers
10 million passengers
I million passengers
Fig. 21.12. Estimation of passenger traffic volume between the Tokyo.-Yokohama-Chiba Region
and other regions.
additional figures to expand and illustrate this idea. The first (Fig. 21.14) is a
flow chart of the twenty-first-century image of Japan as conceived by the
Kenzo Tange Group, of which the author was a member engaged in the task of
compilation. The second (Fig. 21.15) shows the software system for realization
of the image, and the third (Fig. 21.16) is a flow chart for remodeling the
Japanese Archipelago.
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22. Comprehensive National
Development Plans in Japan: Their
Logic and Reality
K. MIYASAWA
1. Logical Structure of Regional Development Problems in Japan
1.1. POLICY, STATE, TARGET
Japan is divided into 47 administrative regions called prefectures,
and each prefecture is divided into several administrative regions called cities.
The administrative organization has a hierarchical structure consisting of three
strata; under the central government there are several prefectural authorities
under each of which are several city authorities (Fig. 22.1).
Let us denote by Gn a plan of the central government for the work and
construction related to land, water, and space, and let us denote by In its plan
for public investment, fiscal measures, etc., related to Gn. We call the set Sn ==
(Gn'/n) a development policy of the central government or of the nation. Let
I:n be the set of all possible policies of the nation. Similarly we define
(development) policies Sp,Sc and the sets of policies 'I;p and 'I; c of a prefecture
p and a city c, respectively.
When the central government is going to implement a policy Sm if a policy
Sp of a prefecture p is not one which is the realization of Sn with respect to the
prefecture p, i.e. if Sp contradicts Sn in a logical sense, then it is not possible to
implement both Sn and Sp simultaneously. For example, when Sn implies
construction of a railway network through all the prefectures in the country, if
Sp implies that a prefecture p will not construct a railway in the prefecture,
then it is not possible to implement Sn and Sp simultaneously.
Let the set of all policies Sp of a prefecture p which do not contradict Sn, i.e.
those which can be implemented with Sn simultaneously, be denoted by up(S"j.
Generally, a policy Sn of the nation will be stated in a rather general, abstract
form and a policy Sp of a prefecture p will be stated in a more concrete form.
Therefore it may happen that Sp refers to items which are not referred to in Sn'
Even in such cases, so far as Sp does not contradict the general statements of
Sn, we understand that Sp can be implemented with Sn, i.e. Sp E (Jp(S"j.
Accordingly, the set (Jp(S"j may consist of many policies of a prefecture p.
Similarly we define the set (JcfSp), cEp, where cEp means that a city c is in a
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Fig. 22. I. Set of states of nation.
prefecture p. Conversely, for instance, when a city c is going to implement a
policy Se a prefecture p (E c) is not one such that SeE ue(Sp), then it is not
possible to implement both Se and Sp simultaneously.
Definition 1 (Consistency among policies)
If Sp E p(Sn), we say that Sp is consistent with Sn' If each of the policies of
the set {Sp, VpJis consistent with Sn and all the policies of the set can be
implemented simultaneously, then we say the set of the policies (Sp, Vp) is
consistent with Sn' Similarly we define the consistency relation between Sp and
SCJ vcEp, vp. Finally, if the set (Sp, Vp) is consistent with Sn and the set
255
(Sm veEp) is consistent with Sp, vp, then we say the policies Sn; SJP vp; Sc> VC
are consistent.
Proposition 1. The central government, all the prefectures and all the cities can
implement their policies Sm' Sp, Vp; Se, Vc simultaneously if and only if they
are consistent.
An example of the case where each Sp is consistent with Sn, but where the set
of such policies Sp, vp cannot be implemented simultaneously, will be given
as follows. Let Sn be a policy of the central government which implies
constructing an art gallery in one prefecture by granting it a subsidy of 1
million dollars. Then for each prefecture p, a policy Sp which implies
constructing an art gallery by getting the subsidy from the Government is
consistent with Sn. But it is not possible to implement such policies Sp, vp for
all prefectures because the government can grant a subsidy of 1 million dollars
to only one prefecture.
Now let us define a state Sp, I' = n, p, c, of the administrative region I' as a
detailed objective statement concerning everything in the region v, where v =
n, p, c means the nation, a prefecture, and a city, respectively. Of course, a
state Sy is meant as being at a specific time point t, and ought to be written
Sy(t), but for simplicity, we shall often omit the t.
From our definition, a state Sy may consist of an infinite number of
components, but a person facing a state Sy will recognize only a finite number
of components of Sy. So, we denote a state recognized by a person as R(sy) =
Sy and call Sy a recognized state. Then the following should be noted:
1. There are many states Sy which give the same recognized state Sy, Le. for a
given recognized state Sy there are many Sy such that R(sy) = Sy.
2. It is possible that the recognized state Sy of the state Sy may differ
depending on who is recognizing it, i.e. depending on what components
of Sy are being recognized. Therefore it is quite natural that the different
evaluations of the state Sy may occur among different people for this
reason.
When Sy is a state of the nation, let the statement concerning a prefecture p
in Sn be denoted by [sn]p and call it the projection of Sn on a prefecture p.
Similarly we shall define the projection of sp on a city cEp and call it [sp]c- If
the state of the nation, a prefecture p, and a city cEp at the time-point t are
sn(t), sp(t), and sc<t), respectively, then it should follow that sp(t) = [sn(t)]p
and sdt) = [sp(t)]c-
When the state of the nation at the time-point t is sn(t), it could be assumed
that the state sn(t +~t) of the nation at the next time-point (t +~t) is
determined by the consistent policies Sn; Sp,vp; Se, V c taken by the nation, the
prefectures and the cities, and by many other factors which we shall denote in
a lump by U(t). For convenience we shall express the relation as follows:
sn(t +At) = ~ (Sn; Sp, vp; Se, VC I sn(t), U(t»,
and, as stated above, the states sp(t +At), se(t +At) of a prefecture p and a
city c at the time-point (t +At) are given by:
sp(t+At) = [~(Sm' Sp, Vp; Sc> Vc Isn(t), U(t))]p,
se(t +At) = [[~(Sn; Sp, Vp; Sc> Vc Isn(t), U(t))]p]c>
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When a regional development becomes an issue, it will be disputed whether
it will bring about a desirable future state. Now, let the set of all the recognized
state s;, with which the administrative authorities v will be satisfied if it could
be brought about in the future by a certain regional development be denoted
by ~~ and call it a (development) (recognized) target. Let the set ~~ be defined
by
'"~~ ;: (sv; R(sv)E~~1
and call it a (development) target of v, v = n,p,c. From the definition it is clear
that ~~ is determined only by the values of the components of Sv which specify
a recognized state Sv and is free from the values of other components of sl'" In
that sense ~~ may be said to be a cylinder set. There will be the problem of who
will specify a target ~~, but we assume that when we say. for instance,
that 'J.p is the target of a prefecture p, it is the target of the people of the
prefecture p as well as that of the prefectural authorities. For the assumption
to hold, it may be necessary to go through some democratic discussions
between the authorities and the people of the prefecture, but we shall not enter
i!,tto this problem here. * We assume the same assumption also applies to.1n or
~e'
At a time when public awareness of regional development problems was not
great, it is clear that even if the target ~n of the nation is being set up, the
targets :1p and ~e of the prefectures and the cities are not set up explicitly.
Such cases will be considered in Cases (Ll) and (1.2). Recently, however, the
awareness and concern of the public concerning regional development has
been increasing and the nation, the prefectures and the cities are setting up
their respective targets 'J.n, irp, and ire of regional development. In such a
situation, the kind of problems connected with regional development will be
studied later in Cases (ILl). (11.2), and (11.3).
We define a policy Sn of the nation as desirable if it is judged that a desirable
state 5;,Eln•Le. a certain state sn such that snEt::.n will be brought about in the
future when the policy Sn is implemented simultaneously with the policies
S~, V p; S~, V c such that Sm' S~, V p; S~, V c are consistent. Let us denote the
set of all desirable policies of the nation by O(~ n)' Similarly let us define a
policy Sp of a prefecture p as desirable if it judged that a desirable state s;, E~p,
(Le. a certain state sp such that sp E ~p) will be brought about when the policy
Sp is implemented simultaneously with the policies S'm' Sp, vp '* p,' S'O VC
such that Sm' Sp, Sj" Sp, S' 0 VC are consistent. Let the set of all desirable
policies of a prefecture p be denoted by O(Ep). Similarly we define a desirable
policy of a city as the set O(Ec>' (The reason we so define a desirable policy
comes from the relations (*), (U), and (*U).)
Even though we have assumed, for example, that the prefectural authorities
and the people of the prefecture agree concerning the target ~p, the following
problems may arise. Let Sp be a desirable policy from the viewpoint of the
prefectural authorities because they judge that the policy Sp will bring about,
-This is the same problem as one to be considered later as Case (II.3). The paper does not take into
account the residents of a city explicitly, but it should be noted that the logic studied in the paper
does not depend on the number of levels of the hierarchy.
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with other consistent policies, a state sp such that SpE 3..p. But the people of the
prefecture may judge that the pollcy Sp will bring about, with other consistent
policies, a state sp such that sp ft t1p and the people object to the policy Sp. In
fact, as is seen in (.), ("), and (•••), the future state sp depends not only on
the policy Sp but also on many other unpredictable factors such as U(t). So it is
quite possible for such disagreements to occur. We assume, however, that by a
certain democratic procedure the authorities and the people of the prefecture
have reached the same opinion concerning whether the policy Sp, with other
consistent policies, will bring about a state sp such that sp E i5.p or such that
sp $ ~p. Therefore O(Ep) is the set of desirable policies Sp for both the
authorities and the people of a prefecture p. We assume the same condition
concerning O(En) and O(Ed.
1.2. WHEN ONLY THE TARGET ~n IS BEING SET UP
In the case where the central government has been setting up its recognized
target :in but the prefectures and the cities do not have advance knowledge of
their recognized targets ~p> Vp and:io vc, the decision procedure of the
policies of the prefectures and the cities has followed one of the following two
cases in Japan.
Case(l.I)
When the entire population is united in attaining the target An of the nation,
the policies of the prefectures and the cities will simply be determined by the
following process. Once the central government expresses its policy Sn to
attain the target 3n> the prefectures and the cities will gladly take the policies
Sp and Sc such that Sm' Sp, vp; So Vc are consistent. So this is no problem.
It will be shown in Section 2 that in Japan the following case has often
occurred.
Case (1.2)
First, the central government sets up a target 3..n of the nation and states
that it will adopt a policy Sn == (Gn,In) which is judged to bring about (with the
consistent policies of the prefectures and the cities) a desirable recognized state
sn E l n> i.e. a state sn E l:i m where In implies the following. If a prefecture pis
going to cooperate with the central government by accepting a policy Sp such
that SpE 0p(Sn). then the government will offer an inductive policy measure Dn
to the prefecture p. Here an inductive policy measure Dn usually means that
the government will give a prefecture: (1) a favorable fiscal policy such as a
public investment and/or a subsidy; (2) a favorable taxation system; (3) a
favorable financial policy such as a low interest rate, long-term loan, etc.
Therefore, a prefecture p which is offered an inductive policy measure D n will
be able to extend its original set of policies Ep and let the extended set of
policies be denoted by Ep(Dn). At the same time, a prefecturep being offered
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an inductive policy measure Dn is required to accept a policy Sp such that
Sp E Ep(Dn)n (JiSn)' On the other hand, if a prefecture p accepts a policy
Sp E Ep(Dn)n (Jp(Sn), then, usually, it is almost certain that the policy Sp (with
Sn and other consistent policies) will bring about a much more desirable state
than the present state of the prefecture. So it is natural that a prefecture p will
set up a new target Ap which consists of the above state and other states that
are more desirable, at least, than the present state, and will endeavor to obtain
the inductive policy measure from the government, explaining to the people
that it will enable the prefecture to attain the target Ap . Therefore, in ihis case,
there will be keen competition between the prefectures to obtain the more
favorable inductive policy measure from the government. In Japan, a
"petition battle" developed among the prefectures, which had the effect of
strengthening the authority and power of the central government.
In this way, the prefectures will finally be induced to accept the policies Sp,
and similarly the cities will be induced to accept the policies Sc such that Sn;
Sp, V p; SoV c are consistent. In this case the nation, the prefectures, and the
cities can all be satisfied by accepting such policies.
Now, let me make the following remark. It will take a considerable time to
complete the implementation of the policy Sn which is considered desirable by
the government. During that time, owing to the unexpected change of U(t), the
recognized state s;, (t) may take an undesirable course of change:
1. The establishment of a certain mechanism with the following function
will therefore be requested. Once the state sn(t) begins to show a
movement that does not lead to the target An> the information is rapidly
transmitted to the government, which will modify the policy Sn according
to this information so that the movement of:?n (t)will tend to An.
2. In regional development, however, it will be almost impossible to change
the policy Sn so often in a short period of time. For instance, it will be
very difficult in practice to suspend railway construction work which is
in progress or to change the course of a railway once it has been built.
Therefore it is obvious that in deciding a development policy we must
give careful consideration to the future and prudently perform the
environmental assessment, etc.
3. After implementing a policy Sn> even if the targetl n has not been
attained, it often happens that it has not been made clear who should be
responsible for the failure. It may be because the future state sn(t) is
determined not only by the policy Sn but also by many other factors
such as U(t), which is beyond the control of those concerned with the
development program. Even so, it is hoped to establish an organization
which will make clear where the responsibility lies in the processes of
decision and policy implementation.
1.3. WHEN THE TARGETS An. Ap• AcARE ALL BEING SET UP
Recently, as a result of the upsurge of public interest in regional
development, not only the central government but also the prefectures and the
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cities have been setting up their recognized targetslmlp,~c> respectively,
and as a result serious trouble has occurred over regional development
problems. We would like to find the source of such troubles. For that we
define
Definition 2 (Consistency among the targets)
We say that the recognized targets Sn; Sp, vp; So "Ie of the government,
the prefectures, and the cities are consistent if there exist their policies Sn; Sp,
V p; Sc, "Ie such that
(I) SnE O( ~n); SpEO(~p), vp; ScEO(~c). "Ie,
(2) and they are consistent.
Then we have the following:
Proposition 2. Under the hierarchical structure of administration such that at
the top there is the central government, under which there are several
prefectures, and under each prefecture several cities, there can exist their
policies Sn; Sp, vp; So "Ie such that they can be implemented simultaneously,
and the central government, the prefectures, and the cities can all be satisfied
by accepting those policies, respectively, if and only if the recognized
targets Sn; Sp, vp; So "Ie that they are setting up in advance are consistent.
Proof If conditions (I) and (2) hold, then because of condition (2), all the
policies Sn, Sp, and Sc can be implemented simultaneously. Therefore, by (*),
(**), and (***) in Section 1.1, they will bring about the states Sn, sp, and Sc such
that sp = [snlp, Sc = [splc, c Ep. Further, from condition (I) and the definition
of the set O( ~ v), V = n,p, c, the government, the prefectures, and the cities are
judging, respectix.ely, with regard to these_states sn' sp' and Sc that R(sn) =
sn ESn, R(sp) = SpESp and R(sc) = scEilc. Accordingly, the government,
the prefectures, and the cities are all satisfied with the policies Sm Sp, and So
respectively. The truth of the converse is clear.
As an example, let the target Sp of a prefecture p imply the construction of
a sewage-disposal plant somewhere in the prefecture. This is a target which all
the inhabitants of the prefecture agree with. On the other hand, let the target
Sc of a city cEp imply that the sewage-disposal plant should not be
constructed in the city c, veEp. Then it is clear that Sp, So veEp are not
consistent. This is the situation where all the inhabitants of the prefecture want
to have a sewage-disposal plant in the prefecture, but anyone of them is
against the construction of the plant in his city. Where should the plant be
built?
As can be seen from this example, it seems that the difficulties we face today
in the regional development problems basically come from the fact that the
targets Sn; Sp, vp; So "Ie which are being set up by the hierarchical
administrative authorities are not consistent. For, in such a case, by
Proposition 2 it will be impossible to discover the policies which all the
administrative authorities are satisfied with. Then what should be done? Let
me refer to a couple of cases.
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Case (II. 1)
First, the central government sets up the recognized target An and
announces a policy Sn, saying that it will bring about a desirable recognized
state s~ E An if the prefectures and the cities cooperate with the central
government in the following way. Usually the policy Sn will imply a certain
inductive policy measure Dn as one of its conditions. The government then
forces the prefectures to accept a policy Sp such that SpE };p(Dn)n Up(Sn)'
Vp and the set (Sp, vpJ is consistent with Sn. Then the prefecture p accepting
such a policy Sp forces the cities e, veEp to take a policy Se such that SeE Ee
n ue(Sp), Ve and the set (So veEpj is consistent with Sp, Vp. In this case.
if [sn]p = sp E I).p for the target I). p which is being set up in advance by the
prefecture p, Vp, then there is no problem. But if sp = [sn]p~p' i.e. the
recognized state sp which is expected to be brought about by the compelled
policy Sp is not desirable for the prefecture p, then the trouble occurs. In such
a case the governor of the prefecture p will be in a dilemma. being forced by
the government to accept the policy Sp and at the same time being forced not
to accept it by the people of the prefecture. This trouble comes from the fact
that An,· Ap• Vp are not consistent. Later. we shall brieflY discuss how to
handle the trouble. The same situation will occur when a prefecture p forces
the cities e (EP) to accept its policy in the above sense.
Case (II. 2)
There seem to me to be some people in Japan who advocate that regional
development in the true sense of the term should be for the benefit of the
inhabitants and that the development targets should be set up. conversely to
Case (11.1). from the bottom to the top in the following way. (I hope the
second half of the contention is due to my misunderstanding.)
At first. each city e sets up its development target Ae based on the demand
of the citizens and then the cities require the prefecture p (3e) to set up a
target Ap such that Ap and Ao VeEp are consistent. Then each prefecture
p, accepting the above claim. requires the government to set up a target An
such that the targets An>· Ap, vp,· Ao Ve are consistent. But it is clear that in
this procedure there are logical contradictions.
1. Even if a city e needs to attain a state SeE I).e by taking a policy So as is
shown in (... ). (...... ). and (......... ) in Section 1.1. the city's future state Se is
determined not only by the city's policy Se but also by the policies of the
prefectures and the nation. Therefore when the targets are settled by the
above procedure. there is no guarantee that the city e will be able to
attain its desirable state Sc E Ae- For example. let us assume that all the
cities set up the targets Ao Ve, such that each target Ae requires the
improvement of the inhabitants' welfare and a quiet environment by
expelling all the factories from the city. If both the prefectures and the
central government accept these cities' targets. it is clear that the national
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economy would collapse and there would be no hope of improving the
inhabitants' welfare, Le. of attaining the target Ee-
2. If all the prefectures set up their targets only from their own point of
view, then it may happen that it is not possible to attain these targets
simultaneously because they are competing with each other. For
instance, in the example related to Definition 1, each prefecture p may set
its target Ep such that the prefecture p has an art gallery built with the
government's aid. But these targets Ep, 'rip cannot be attained
simultaneously, as is shown there.
Thus we cannot accept the above-mentioned contention. What should be
done when the targets being set up in advance by the government, the
prefectures, and the cities are not consistent? Let us briefly consider such a
problem as the next case.
Case (II.3)
When the targets En; Ep, 'rip; iSo 'ric which are being set up in advance by
the government, the prefectures, and the cities are not consistent, it may be
said that they should be modified to the consistent targets. Only if they become
consistent through modification, as shown in Proposition 2, could all parties
concerned with the regional development problem be satisfied. But such
consistent targets could not be reached by compulsion from the top as in Case
(ILl) nor by the drive from the bottom as in Case (11.2). It could be hoped that
such consistent targets could be attained through the repetition of certain
democratic consultations between the government, the prefectures, the cities,
and the citizens. But it may take too long to reach the consistent targets, or
there may be no guarantee of reaching them through consultations. Therefore,
before reaching them, the states 5", S;, and Sc may deteriorate. Something will
have to be done. It seems to me that there is no way for the solution but to
legislate a certain democratic rule for consultations between the government,
the prefectures, the cities, and the citizens, which is likely to lead them to the
consistent targets.
Many people in Japan have recently contended that it is necessary to
legislate the rule of participation by the inhabitants in regional development
problems. I agree with this contention so far, at least. as the above statement,
but we have not yet succeeded in making such a law. Is not this one of the
basic causes of the difficulties we are facing with regional development
problems?
2. Land Development in Postwar Japan
INTRODUCTION
In this section we discuss in retrospect how the land development in postwar
Japan has taken place so far, dividing the whole process into several time
periods each of which is characterized by its own development policies. It
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should be borne in mind that the country concerned has a population of about
120 million, living in an area of 377,435 km 2 , with extremely poor domestic
resources. We have followed the logic considered in the preceding section,
using the same notation. An overview of development is given in the
Appendix. Figure 22.2 shows new industrial cities and the special areas
designated for industrial development.
2.1. 1945-1959: THE POSTWAR REHABILITATION PHASE, THE PERIOD OF
COMPREHENSIVE SPECIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT PLANS (RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM)
During the period immediately following the end of the Second World War
(1945), Japan adopted the development target En (1945-) and the policy Sn
(1945-) as outlined below. The development procedure in this period
corresponds to Case (1.1).
d n(l945-): To bring the postwar confusion under control, to increase
production of foodstuffs, and to restore the nation's standard of living to
the prewar level.
Sn (1945-): To develop energy resources, to ensure an adequate system of
irrigation, and to prepare infrastructures for industrial development.
The country strove to attain the target, and the results were remarkable.
However, it soon became obvious that in order to implement the policy
effectively, Le. to realize a comprehensive and balanced progress unhindered
by bureaucratic sectionalism, a special legislation for the comprehensive
development must be enacted. Thus the Comprehensive National Land
Development Act was created in 1950, with the aim of ensuring comprehensive
utilization, development, and conservation of the nation's land, and to
provide adequate infrastructures for industrial development and for improved
social welfare. The establishment of this law was an epoch-making event in the
history of national land development in Japan. It defined comprehensive
national land development as a comprehensive national development plan, a
comprehensive prefectural development plan, a comprehensive regional
development plan, and a comprehensive special area development plan. One
of the most critical problems associated with these plans was that many
government agencies were involved, and that each of them tends to insist on its
own policies and prerogatives. To resolve this problem, the new land provided
for the establishment of the Comprehensive National Development Council as
an organ for coordinating the opinions of the various government agencies
concerning national land development. In retrospect, while the Council was
endowed with very important authority and responsibility under the text of the
law, one could say that it was very often influenced by diverse political powers.
Of these four categories of land development plans, the comprehensive
special area development plan was the first to be introduced. In this plan, the
national targetln (SA) and the policy Sn (SA) were basically as follows:
irn (SA): To achieve a self-supporting economy by means of development of
resources and industry, preservation of land, prevention of disasters, etc.
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Fig. 22.2. The new industrial cities and the special areas for industrial development.
Sn (SA): To designate a certain number of special areas and introduce a series
of inductive policy measures D n, such as public investment, to those
designated areas for a period of about 10 years as a means of achieving
the target Kn (SA).
Under this plan, it was natural that the development procedure followed the
process of Case (1.2). In fact, every prefecture competed for designation as
special areas. Since 42 prefectures out of 47 became candidates, the number
had to be reduced in order to use the limited capital resources efficiently. This
proved an extremely difficult task because the comprehensive national
development plan was not yet in existence and the government had difficulty in
determining the criteria on which such designations should be made. Finally,
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without any logical reason and simply as a political compromise, 21 areas
representing roughly a quarter of the total land were designated special areas.
In fact, such a scale could no longer be qualified as "special". As a political
compromise, it only amounted to an all-round policy. Most of the 21 special
areas were underdeveloped regions along rivers, and the target of development
/Sp (SA) and the policy Sp (SA) of the special areas were more or less as
follows:
/Sp (SA): Comprehensive development of rivers as a means of developing
hydroelectric power; increase of agricultural output; antiflood
construction and afforestation. The development should contribute to the
progress of agriculture in the surrounding areas and to improvement of
the standard of living through electrification.
Sp (SA): To build multipurpose dams in most of the designated areas for flood
control, generating electric power, and for irrigation. It was understood
that the development system of the Tennessee Valley Authority would be
a good guide to the realization of the policy.
The state S; (SA) which arose as the result of implementation of the policy
was recognized as follows:
S; (SA): Although the dams built were allegedly multipurpose, they were
eventually used almost exclusively for hydroelectric power generation
because of the massive involvement of capital from the electric power
utility companies. For this reason, it is questionable whether the dams
contributed directly to the economic welfare of the regional inhabitants in
any remarkable manner. However, the policy definitely increased power-
supply capacity, thereby contributing to the development of industry.
In the meantime, the international situation and the resulting economic
environment of Japan (U(1950-» had undergone significant changes.
U (1950-): The outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 brought the "special
procurement boom to Japan" , and the San Francisco Peace Treaty in
1951 enabled Japan to resume international trade with other countries.
Private sectors reflecting these events started to show a strong willingness
for capital investment. As a result, the emphasis moved to expansion and
modernization of infrastructures for production and to the construction
of industrial zones with petrochemical and other large-scale plants.
Reflecting these situations, the New Long-range Economic Plan of the
Japanese Government in 1957 placed the main emphasis of public
undertakings on construction of highways and other key industrial
infrastructures, and priority of public investment was given to those
advanced industrialized areas. Consequently, the designated "special
areas" began to suffer from inadequate funding backup.
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2.21960-1968: NATIONAL INCOME DOUBLING PLAN, COMPREHENSIVE
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (THE NODAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM)
In 1960 the Ikeda Cabinet announced the National Income Doubling Plan,
with the following target and policy:
En (10): To double the national income in real terms in 10 years from 1961 to
1970.
Sn (10): To create new industrial zones by taking advantage of geographical
conditions in the "Pacific Coast Belt" connecting the four large industrial
areas, Kei-Hin, Chukyo, Han-Shin, Kita-Kyushu, in order to promote
large-scale expansion and combination of production units. For this an
inductive policy measure Dn to invest more than 16 billion yen for
preparation of such industrial infrastructures as roads, ports,
construction sites and water supply in the new zones would be introduced.
In fact, during the 5 years from 1961 to 1965, nearly 70070 of the total
public investment was put into the Pacific Coast Belt. Again, this resulted
in the process of Case (1.2), namely,
Sp (10): Prefectures located on the Pacific Coast Belt vigorously competed to
qualify for the inductive policy measure Dn. They tried hard to attract
industry and carried out regional development centered on "combinato",
i.e. the complexes of large-scale production units.
~ (10): Enterprises were by no means less eager to take advantage of the new
policy and intensified capital investments in the interested areas.
Consequently, huge "combinatos" (complexes of steel, petroleum,
petrochemical, and energy-generating plants) mushroomed all along the
Pacific Coast Belt.
However, from the viewpoint of the nation as a whole, the following state
sn (10) came to be recognized during that 5-year period:
Sn (10): Because priority of public investment was given to industry located in
the Pacific Coast Belt endowed with favorable geographical conditions,
and as the industry's enterpreneurship was greatly enhanced by the new
environment, the economic growth of Japan considerably exceeded the
targets set by the National Income Ooubling Plan. However, because
population was increasingly concentrated in industrialized urban areas
and because there was an imbalance between private capital stock and
social capital stock, many people began to be conscious of the evil of
excessive concentration. However, such "evil" was understood not as an
evil of overcongestion in the modern sociological sense but rather as
bottlenecks to further production growth. On the other hand,
dissatisfaction was growing among people living outside the Pacific Coast
Belt who could not benefit by the public and other investments. There was
growing concern over the regional differentials in the income level.
266
The need for a comprehensive national development plan was thus ever
more imminent, and 12 years after the establishment of the Comprehensive
National Land Development Act, the Comprehensive National Development
Plan was adopted in 1962. The target of the plan was:
En (CND): Promotion of well-balanced regional development through
effective utilization of Japan's national resources and adequate
distribution of capital, labor, technology, and other resources among
regions, at the same time preventing uncontrolled growth of urban
population and decreasing economic and other gaps between the regional
areas.
To achieve these objectives, the first thing to be done was to promote
decentralization of industry, while avoiding dispersion of industry all over the
country without due regard to capital efficiency. The policy actually
undertaken was the following:
Sn (CND): This policy is called the "nodal system development program"; in
other words, areas excluding Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya and their suburbs
are classified according to their own characteristics and each area thus
classified is endowed with a node for large-scale development which is
matched to its own characteristics. Furthermore, nodes for medium- to
small-scale developments are arranged in consideration of their
relationship to the central node as well as to the agricultural and fishing
villages surrounding them. These nodes are linked in an organic way by
means of a good transport and communication network. This achieves a
stimulating interrelationship between the nodes, and at the same time the
surrounding rural areas benefit from such relationships. Development is
promoted by a sort of chain reaction among the constituents. (Taking
transportation for example, the first step was to build the Shinkansen
railway between Tokyo and Osaka as the main artery, and the plan stated
that further extension of the Shinkansen to the west beyond Osaka would
be considered depending on the needs of transportation in the areas
concerned.)
This policy Sn (CND), which is the essence of the nodal system development
plan, materialized as the following two policies:
Sn(l) (NI): Construction of new industrial cities, and
Sn(l.) (SI): Development of the special areas for industrial development.
These policies can be described as follows:
Sn(l) (NI): To build several new industrial cities with comprehensive urban
functions for industrial development mainly in those areas which are
suffering from relative absence of benefit of the accumulation of external
economy (i.e. Tohoku, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu). Initially,
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efforts would be made to develop heavy chemical or petrochemical
industries closely connected to sea-ports. The central government will
provide the inductive policy measure Dn(l), which implies that those local
public bodies from one of those new industrial cities would be given
financial assistance by the government, and those enterprises willing to
operate in such new cities would be given favorable treatment in
development finance, etc.
It is, however, more advantageous for the efficiency of capital to develop
areas surrounding already established industrialized zones which have
favorable opportunities for industrialization rather than develop new
industrial cities which must start from the provision of the infrastructures for
production. For this reason, the following policy would also have to be
implemented:
Sn(2) (81): Those areas which satisfy certain of the above conditions, i.e. those
located on the Pacific Coast Belt, would be designated a Special Areajor
Industrial Development, and several coastal industrial bases would be
built in them. The government would assume an inductive policy measure
Dn(2), similar to that applied to the new industrial cities.
Corresponding to such policies of the central government, the prefectures
and cities followed Case (1.2) in deciding their development policies.
Prefectures competed vigorously in petitioning the government to be
designated a special area. After very complicated political negotiations, fifteen
new industrial cities and six special areas for industrial development were
finally selected.
The basic idea of the nodal system development program can be
summarized as follows. If the government is successful in attracting heavy
chemical and petrochemical industry to a given area by making public
investment for constructing industrial infrastructures in the nodal area, this
would stimulate the development of related industries in the same area, while
agriculture in surrounding rural areas would also be much improved.
Consequently, the level of income would rise in the area as a whole,
contributing to increased revenue for the local governments. This would in
turn permit an expansion of public investment which is desirable for the
improvement of living standards, and finally contribute to the improvement of
the welfare of the inhabitants. If we examine the actual results of these
policies, the following observation can be made regarding the recognizable
states 5;{l) (NI) and 5;(2) (81) of the new industrial cities as well as the special
areas for industrial development as the embodiment of the government
policies Sn{l) (NI) and Sn(2) (81):
5;(l) (NI): Private industry advanced actively into those areas where
accumulation had already reached the stage of providing an effective
basis of production, and the scale of economy expanded further.
However, in those less fortunate areas which had required several years to
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acquire designation as a special area, or where there was difficulty in
securing sufficient sites, the willingness and desire for development often
cooled off. In some areas, although public investments were obtained,
attempts to attract industry remained unsuccessful. Several areas thus
failed to reach the projected level of industrial development. According to
the national census, the average annual growth rate of population in the
new industrial cities was a mere 5.4070 for the period 1965-1970, while the
annual growth rate of the total Japanese population for the same period
was 5.5%. It cannot, therefore, be claimed that the new industrial cities
have contributed to any significant extent in lowering the concentration of
population in the large cities, nor would they seem to have made any
substantial contribution to improving the standard of living of local
inhabitants.
'Sp(2) (SI): In these areas, there has been some increase in the proportions of
population and industrial output to those of the country as a whole. It
must be pointed out, however, that the public investment was
concentrated on providing the necessary infrastructures for production
and that practically no progress was achieved in providing the
infrastructures for the daily life of inhabitants. As a result, these areas
began to suffer from the environmental pollution that has become a
major social issue, now that public awareness of such matters has begun
to change significantly.
In these circumstances, ~, the recognized state of the nation as a whole,
could be identified as follows:
s" (1962-1968): The national economy achieved a high growth rate, far above
the original expectation. However, in spite of the adoption of the nodal
system development program, the trend towards population
concentration in the large cities was increasingly serious, to such an extent
that overconjestion became a major social problem along with
environmental pollution. At the same time, the population continued to
drain out of rural regions, which found it increasingly difficult to
maintain such basic facilities for living as schools, hospitals, and fire
stations. The excessive decrease of population in these areas was
considered a serious social problem in the sense that these areas could not
maintain their functions as communities. The problem of regional
differentials began to be recognized, not only as the problem of disparity
in income level but also in the standard of living - the level of living
environment in a broad sense. The Comprehensive National Development
Council therefore recommended to the Prime Minister in 1966 that the
Comprehensive National Development Plan should be redrafted, to
include a thorough review of the systems of public finance, taxation and
private finance. As a result, the New Comprehensive National
Development Plan was adopted in 1969.
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2.3.1969-1971: THE NEW COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
PLAN (LARGE-SCALE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT SYSTEM)
The New Comprehensive National Development Plan of 1969 extends until
1985, covering 20 years. Its targets may be summarized as follows:
~n (NCND): To create an affluent environment for human beings by
harmonizing the following four requirements with the aspirations of an
advanced welfare society:
1. To maintain harmony between humanity and nature and to preserve
and protect national environments permanently; to satisfy the people's
desire for contact with nature, which is expected to intensify as
urbanization proceeds, and to conserve nature perpetually.
2. To modify the basic conditions of development and to provide a
proper balance in potentialities for national development by the
efficient utilization of all land areas to avoid uneven utilization of
particular regions (in fact, at that time, 48% of the total population
lived in areas representing only 1.2010 of the total land).
3. To reorganize land utilization systems and improve efficiency by
promoting independent regional development programs and
modification to fit local conditions.
4. To promote and conserve safe, pleasant, and cultural environmental
conditions throughout the urban and rural sectors and to protect
people from discomfort and peril as a result of increasing economic
and social activities and the higher density of economic and social
activity.
To achieve these objectives, it was further contended that it is necessary to
have a strategic, large-scale development project which can realize a new land-
management generating system that will correspond to technological
innovation, the so-called information society, and the full-fledged progress of
urbanization. Such a large-scale development project was summarized in the
following policy:
Sn (NCND):
1. A network of communication, air traffic, high-speed railways and
road systems must be constructed to prepare for a new network
affecting all the islands of Japan.
2. Large-scale industrial development projects will be implemented in
relation to the new network so as to suit particular regional
characteristics. For instance, industrial production development has
reached its limit in large urbanized areas because insufficient suitable
space is available; hence, large-scale production bases must in future
be built in Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kyushu, and other remote areas.
3. A large-scale environment conservation program will be promoted.
4. Broad activity zones are to be established (with a radius of 30-50 km
for major urbanized areas and 20 km for local cities) in order to secure
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a national standard of living environment. The environmental facilities,
means of transport, and communication within the zone are to be
improved effectively to assure a safe and pleasant life to the
inhabitants of the zones. If necessary, adjustments are to be made on
jurisdictional zoning of administration.
The government is requested to take appropriate public financial measures
to implement the policy. Further, in order to make efficient use of private
funds for development, positive participation of private capital is requested by
means of the establishment of public-private joint working bodies (the' 'third
sector") and of private developers in the development projects. (This may
mean participation by large private capital in the development but not
necessarily by the inhabitants themselves.)
The New Comprehensive National Development Plan aimed at a sort of
division of work in the whole country, and required a combination of the
specialized areas by means of a network, so that the entire country could be
organized as an efficient organic entity. The plan was a very ambitious and
well-conceived scheme for development, but it failed to pay due regard to the
feelings of the people. As a result, at a time of greatly increased public
awareness of the effects of industrial development on the environment, the
plan was doomed to failure.
2.4. 1972: SEARCHING FOR A NEW SYSTEM OF DEVELOPMENT
When the New Comprehensive National Development Plan had barely
started, overcongestion in some areas and underpopulation in others,
combined with environmental pollution, was becoming increasingly serious.
The Comprehensive National Development Council recommended in 1971,
only 3 years after the adoption of the plan, that it should be thoroughly
reviewed, and it was recognized that the state of the nation after 1970 was as
follows:
Sn (1970-): Even after the adoption of the New Comprehensive National
Development Plan, the trend towards population concentration in major
cities continued and the living environment in those cities showed further
deterioration. Activities in a megalopolis are balanced precariously, and
even a minor accident might result in a large-scale catastrophe whose
influence would very quickly extend all over the country. Expansion of
the large cities had almost reached the limit. Not only the population but
also the economic functions of the nation were excessively concentrated at
the major cities, so the time had come to disperse the functions of both
physical production and central management.
It is generally agreed that the very fast growth of the Japanese economy in
the 1960s was realized through the unilateral enjoyment of the benefit of
agglomeration by enterprises which in turn forced the inhabitants to accept the
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disadvantages of agglomeration. However, by the 1970s, the inhabitants were
no longer prepared to accept the sacrifice.
Another serious issue concerned the availability of land space for
development. Owing to the high liquidity of finance after 1971, massive
speculation in real estate began all over Japan in anticipation of the
implementation of the New Comprehensive National Development Plan. The
value of real estate skyrocketed and the destruction of nature took place due to
indiscriminate development. The rise in price of land caused individual capital
gains to reach 55 to 69 billion yen and those of corporations to reach 24 to 30
billion yen during the 6 years from 1964 to 1970.
In the meantime, the Tanaka Cabinet, which began in 1972, proposed the
Remodelling of the Japanese Archipelago. This was essentially the same type
of large-scale development program as the New Comprehensive National
Development Plan in that both of them tried to improve the nation's welfare
by means of accelerated growth of economy. While the Remodelling Plan was
being actively debated, the Tanaka Cabinet collapsed in 1974. The oil crisis of
1973 had changed international economic conditions and greatly influenced
the Japanese economy, temporarily creating a chaotic situation. The
spectacular growth of the Japanese economy is now over and we are seeking a
stable economic growth within the unfavorable international environment.
Public concern over regional development had grown in the meantime. The
needs of the Japanese people have become more complex: they are no longer
interested in a higher level of income for its own sake; they want a better living
environment as human beings, better conservation of environmental
conditions and participation by the inhabitants in regional development.
However, as we have seen in Section I, there was an obvious contradiction in
the process of setting up the targets .io .ip, and .in> starting from the
inhabitants and proceeding upwards in the hierarchy as in Case (11.2). This
leads to the conclusion that we are now at the stage where there is a real need to
find some solution to the problem referred to in Case (11.3).
In 1974 the National Land Use Planning Act was established to curb the
accelerated rise in land and to control improper utilization of land, mentioned
earlier in conjunction with ~ (1970-). This Act is vitally important to regional
development because it imposes additional restrictions on private rights over
real estate. For instance, public agencies can now intervene in land
transactions and apply various restrictive measures in connection with prices
and use of lands. It can be considered as epoch-making legislation.
At this point, a few words on environmental issues are in order. While it
may often be difficult to identify and locate the source of pollution, there is
little question, once it has been identified, that the polluter should be held
responsible for stopping it at his own expense, i.e. the "polluter pays"
principle should be applied. We cannot, however, assume that the market
mechanism or other existing economic systems will automatically ensure this,
and the only practical approach would be, by means of legislation, to oblige
the polluter to stop it. At this point, the question arises where to set the quality
standard of environmental conditions in order to condemn pollution as such.
Many aspects of environmental conditions have not yet been made clear
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scientifically. Therefore, the different positions of interested parties such as
inhabitants, enterprises, and public agencies could justify different claims
concerning the quality standards of environmental conditions, and these
conflicting situations must be resolved. This difficult problem is essentially the
same as the one discussed in Case (11.3).
It is not fair merely to claim, as many people in Japan now do, that regional
development should be promoted on the initiative of the inhabitants, without
making sincere efforts to solve the problem of establishing basic rules for
reaching the consistent targets ~n> ~P' and ~c, referred to in Section 1.3.
The National Land Agency, inaugurated in 1974 to coordinate the public
administration of national land, is responsible for drawing up the Third
Comprehensive National Development/or 1976-1985, which considers the
prospect up to the year 2000. At the time of the writing of this paper the Third
Plan has not yet been published, and one of the many reasons for the delay in
publication is obviously the difficulty of solving the problem as stated in Case
(11.3). We are waiting for the publication of the Third Comprehensive
National Development Plan which, it is announced, will establish standards of
quality of life and welfare to match the increase in population, and will explore
the possibilities of economic growth and industrial development under the
constraints of resources, environment, usable land space, and water supplies.
It is said that the implementation of this plan will bring us a welfare society
with the beauty of nature preserved and with good amenities.
National development in Japan from 1945-1977 is shown in Figure 22.3.
23. Goal and Conflict Analysis of
Public Policy Plans
D. v. WINTERFELDT
Formal models to analyse policy plans and decisions are rare, partly because of
the lack of formal training of policy analysts and partly because of a suspicion
among analysts that formal models will not provide any additional insights
into planning and decision-making that go beyond the policy analyst's
experiences and insights. Yet, formal models can provide structure, make
transparent the process by which the policy problem is analysed, identify gaps
and inconsistencies (in the model's terms), and allow a precise communication
of ideas and findings. I think Miyasawa's model of national, prefectural, and
city policy plans clearly demonstrates these possible benefits of formalizations.
Here at IIASA we have made a somewhat similar attempt in structuring and
analyzing decision-making by using goal-tree and decision-tree approaches
borrowed from the field of decision analysis. These formal tools were used to
study the regional strategy setting in the development of the Tennessee Valley
Authority and the Bratsk-Ilimsk Territorial Production Complex process, as
well as for analyzing more specific decision processes on power production
planning [1,2,3].
Our analytic approach has much in common with that of Miyasawa, and the
purpose of this brief presentation is to sketch these common points, discuss
some major differences, and indicate the solution of some of the policy-setting
problems that Miyasawa mentions.
Goal trees specify the hierarchical structure of policy objectives in terms of
general supergoals, intermediate objectives and subgoals, and lower-level
attributes. Decision trees put into logical order the basic policy alternatives
and subsequent external events; they.follow up actions, etc. Goal trees
correspond roughly to the concept of state variables s and target ~ in
Miyasawa's model. The span of logical decision alternatives (without their
linkage to external events) corresponds to Miyasawa's concept of development
policies S. External events in the decision-analytic approach correspond to
Miyasawa's "unpredictable factures U". Thus, there are some substantial
structural similarities between the models.
However, there are also some important differences in the logic of the two
approaches. The main one is the difference between objectives and targets
which will be discussed in the following example of the New Comprehensive
Development Plan of Japan.
In Miyasawa's model, targets are desirable points in the state space that are
being set up by all three levels of planning and decision making: the national,
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prefectural, and city levels. In goal trees, on the other hand, only desirable
state variables or dimensions are specified, no points. Thus, rather than setting
up a certain target of reducing air pollution by, say, 20010, the goal tree
approach would list the objective of "minimizing air pollution". Another
difference is the way in which goals are disaggregated as distinct from the
three-level dissaggregation of targets in Miyasawa's model. In the goal tree
approach the disaggregation of objectives sometimes leads to a disaggregation
of regions and subregions, but sometimes the disaggregation stays solely
within one decision level, say the national. Fig. 23.1, for example, a simple
goal tree is structured for the New National Comprehensive Development plan
of Japan. The goal "to provide a proper balance in the national development"
that was part of this plan can be disaggregated to operational attributes purely
within national level objectives. Thus subobjectives like "avoid crowding" or
"improve mobility and communication" refer to nationally defined measures
of success of a plan. Here no specific objectives would be set up for the
regional or subregional level.
On the other hand, if one considers the goal "to promote the efficiency of
regional land development" , the most natural disaggregation principle is that
of regions and subregions, i.e. the disaggregation would put into a hierarchical
order the various subobjectives specifying the notion of "efficiency" for each
region.
An intermediate case is illustrated by the goal of "promotion and
conservation of environmental conditions". Here, a goal tree could, as a first
step, define on a national level what is meant by this goal, namely, a reduction
of air pollution, etc. Then, on the next step of disaggregation one could use the
regional disaggregation logic and define for each region and subregion what
these objectives mean in regional and subregional terms; for example,
reduction of water pollution in a specific river, lake, or sea shore.
Since in these goal trees no specific targets as points in the state space are
identified, the issue of consistency o!targets, a main concept in Miyasawa's
model, does not arise. Rather, the idea of conflicting objectives is central to
GOAL TREE
MAINTAIN HARMONY
BETWEEN MAN AND
NATURE
Fig. 23.1. Illustrative application of the DT approach to the new comprehensive national DP:
goal tree.
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the goal-tree analysis. Ideal decisions would maximize each objective, but
since such decisions are not available in the real world, crucial trade-offs have
to be made between the conflicting objectives. In a goal-tree analysis these
trade-offs can often be expressed by weights attached to the various sub-
objectives. Thus, the goal-tree analysis approach to the issue of coordinating
the interests at the three levels of decision-making is largely an issue of setting
appropriate weights rather than identifying inconsistent targets.
In the case of purely national disaggregation of a goal, e.g. "provide proper
balance in national development", these weights will have to be set up on each
level. On the national level, weights must be set up which reflect the national
policy priorities among subregions, etc. Finally, on the lowest level, weights
must be set up which reflect the trade-offs among various efficiency criteria.
(This case corresponds to Miyasawa's Case II.) In each case the conflicts arise
in the process of setting up the weights among objectives, and the conflict
resolution process is a process which would allow each level to set up its
weights in due consideration of the interests of the lower decision-making
levels.
I think this approach of constructing a goal hierarchy and analyzing the
conflicts by weighting schemes has some advantages over Miyasawa's
approach of constructing targets and analysing consistency. First, it
disentangles two notions that the idea of target consistency compounds:
preference and feasibility. Goal-tree analysis is only concerned with different
types of preferences, and it formalized these differing preferences through
different objectives and different weights. Target analysis, on the other hand,
is concerned with both preference and feasibility. Targets express preferences
by defining desirable states. In this sense one could perform a conflict (not a
consistency) analysis on targets similar to the goal-tree analysis by studying the
implicit preferences expressed in targets. On the other hand, targets also
restrict the feasible set of policy solutions. Thus the question becomes one of
the feasibility of a joint resolution of targets of different levels. Mixing
feasibility of a joint resolution of targets of different levels. Mixing feasibility
and desirability (preference), as Miyasawa's model does in the concept of
consistency, can sometimes cloud the issue where conflicts actually lie - in the
distribution of positive and negative effects on different levels of the policy
setting or in the physical economic unfeasibility of a joint realization of
different policies.
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24. Discussion
Relationship of JNR Policy to Japanese National Development Policy
The Shinkansen has had great influence in centralizing the population along
the Pacific coast of Japan. The papers by Sanuki and Kuroda, however, both
mention that the current Japanese development policy is one of
decentralization. It was therefore asked how this current policy of
development influences JNR decision-making concerning the construction and
extension of new Shinkansen lines?
It was suggested that the difference between mobility and migration may
have been misunderstood. The papers were concerned with migration in
particular, and in this sense the Shinkansen does not conflict with stated
national policy. The Shinkansen has certainly had a remarkable effect on the
mobility of people in the heavily populated regions of Japan, but it is very
difficult to attribute migration to the Shinkansen per se. The general opinion
was that future construction of Shinkansen lines would not conflict with the
present Japanese national development policy.
The additional Shinkansen lines that are currently being constructed in
Japan and those which are under consideration in order to link the entire
country could be considered as just one part of the comprehensive Japanese
national development plan. This plan proposes targets designed to decentralize
the Japanese system, to stop the growth of population in large cities, and to
halt the tendency to underpopulation in rural areas. In this sense, JNR's plans
for the extension of Shinkansen lines do not conflict with national
development plans.
Migration and Public Investment
It was suggested that it would be very difficult to show that the Shinkansen
had any influence on migration. There are many reasons for trends towards
centralization of population, and one of them may be the availability of an
efficient transportation system. One factor that should be considered,
however, is that a transportation mix would be desirable which would suit any
particular user's choice. With the right mix and the user being able to make a
variety of choices, centralization may diminish.
One personal view was that the Tokaido Shinkansen did affect the
acceleration of population growth within the Tokaido corridor. It was also
recommended that the historical perspective of the Tokaido Shinkansen be
taken into account. At the time of the Shinkansen's construction, Japan's
economic level was lower than it is today. The average person could not afford
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an automobile or an air ticket. Mobility, however, is an important factor in
stimulating economic growth. From this point of view, construction of the
Tokaido Shinkansen was necessary.
The issue of how public investments of the Shinkansen type affect income
distribution was raised. In a real sense, the Tokaido Shinkansen investment
may be considered a regressive investment in that it took general tax money
and redistributed it essentially to the service of people with higher than average
incomes - the regular passengers on the Shinkansen. This was rebutted by the
statement that it would be very difficult to determine the total contribution of
the Shinkansen within a social system. It was pointed out that the Shinkansen
operations contribute a large sum of money to JNR in general and helped to
support certain unprofitable local lines operated by the JNR. Such an ad hoc
distribution policy may not be desirable, but its existence cannot be denied.
The indirect influence of the Shinkansen was mentioned. Even if it were
assumed that some regions in Japan suffered owing to capital diversion for
such projects as the Shinkansen, national development in Japan has been
extremely rapid during the last 25 years, partly due to the extremely heavy
concentration of industry, such as factories and shipyards, in the Tokaido
corridor. It follows that much of the development of Japan was not made in
rural areas, but in the Tokaido corridor itself. This increase in industrial and
economic output and in the population base would not have been possible if an
equal distribution of taxes and public investment had occurred. This
retrospective view shows that it is not easy to determine what type of strategy
should be followed. It appears that sometimes when public and private
investment (which in Japan was even greater during this period) is
concentrated in a comparatively small region, the resulting changes in the price
and wage structure may be distributed to regions outside where the growth
occurs. Equalization of investment is not always good for the poor; it may
sometimes be bad for them.
Saving Time
One paper determined the benefits from Shinkansen operations, and used
"time saved" as a criterion. This brought several comments, one of which was
that the induced time factor of travelling with the Shinkansen should be taken
into account. The total travel time spent by passengers on the Shinkansen is far
greater than the total travel time of people on conventional trains.
It was generally agreed that although the use of the time saved as a
determination of one of the benefits of the Shinkansen represents a good
starting-point for analysis, careful consideration should be paid to
determination of the value of time units.
Planning and Organization of the
Shinkansen

25. Decision-Making and Planning
of the Shinkansen
H.KNOP
In keeping with our mode of studying large-scale development programs in
IIASA's Management and Technology Research Area, I shall concentrate on
an analysis of decision-making as part of the planning of the Shinkansen
program, using the logical structure developed for the previous studies (see
Fig. 25.1). This logical structure assists the analysis of goal setting by taking
into account the needs and values, the external and internal goals of the
program. This includes planning activities of needs/demand forecasting
identification of the degree of possible and necessary social acceptance of these
needs for a clearly defined period, and derivation of goals and objectives
which follow. In addition an analysis is made to determine how quantifiable
and non-quantifiable goals are weighted against each other and how priorities
are set. The analysis takes into account the fact that a target function in
decision-making is always a function of different goals (On) and their weights
(0: n):
The process of finding feasible solutions is also studied. This includes
finding and selecting variants/strategies related to the volume and structure of
the output of the program studied, feasible, effective and resource-conserving
technologies, and the siting of facilities and activities. The process of
programming is analyzed, on the basis of goals and feasible
strategies/variants, with emphasis on the methods and models used for
handling interdependencies and uncertainties and the scheduling of activities.
The foregoing is intended to present a rough idea of our approach to
planning and decision-making problems in all of the cases studied in the
Management and Technology Research Area. Using this approach, let us now
turn to the Shinkansen to underline major aspects of planning and decision-
making which can be found in the papers; from these we can derive certain
questions that need clarification.
First, I would like to emphasize one point. The Shinkansen represents much
more than just a rail transport system operating at high speed; it represents a
new quality, a new step in transport systems. There are many places in the
world where high-speed operations are performed but, to the best of my
knowledge, not on a scale as extensive as the Shinkansen and not utilizing the
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new approaches to safety and operation which the Shinkansen employs to a
very high degree.
Price has been treated as playing a certain role in the determination of
alternatives relating to the entire transport system. This corresponds to the
forecasting procedures dealing with expected national income and future
traffic volume and with the internal goals of JNR. Other internal goals are
listed in Fig. 25.1.
The external goals for the transport system are those relating to regional
development, urban development, the environment, and others also listed in
Fig. 25.1. I shall ask some questions about them. The first deals with the
forecasting of national income and traffic volume. Mr. Nishida's paper
contained information on the significant deviation of actual development
from the forecast. It would be interesting to know more about the reasons
behind this deviation between forecasting and actual development.
Another set of interesting and topical questions concern the value system
and its actual use in the decision-making process. In many cases, large-scale
programs are developed with a set of standards and normatives related to
social needs. The Shinkansen presentations also indicate that this was an
underlying assumption during the examination phase of the Shinkansen
project. There was a forecast of social needs for transport, and there was a
determination of possible solutions to meet these needs. But between the
forecast of needs and the development of alternatives lies the question of what
is feasible at certain stages of development of a society. In many cases,
attempts are made to fix this evaluation of needs in terms of standards and
normatives. Was there such an attempt in the case of Shinkansen? If so, what
role did these standards and normatives play and, in more general terms,
which role do quantified values play in the setting of priorities and are these
values related to the goal-setting process?
A great deal of information on the problem of finding feasible solutions
(Fig. 25.2) is contained in the Japanese papers. However, the papers did not
fully explain how the relationships between different modes of transport -
air, rail, sea and road - were determined and linked to each other. It would
be interesting to know how different modes were examined, what calculations
were used, and what was the main criterion in arriving at the final decision.
The next set of questions concern technologies which were analyzed. The
papers contain a very extended description of different technological concepts
expressed in different average and maximum speeds with different tyPt:s of
trains, different electrical systems, and different track guages. I do not think
this needs more explanation, but it was indeed surprising to find that the most
technologically advanced solution was the cheapest, according to the criteria
established. This does not appear to be fully understandable in the light of the
additional R&D effort which was necessary and the creation of a new institute
for railroad research which needed additional space, personnel, training, etc.
The construction principles employed for the Shinkansen were also of a
completely new type. How was it possible to calculate the most advanced
solution as the cheapest? A very simple question, but probably without a
simple answer.
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Logical structure:
Planning activities: Finding a selection of variants/
strategies related to:
---- ~ ------• Output structure • Technologies • Siting
and volumes
Shinkansen:
Criteria of
selection:
Questions:
• Modes of transport
mix - variants
- Rail
- Road
- Sea
- Air
• Speed
• Train form
• Electric system
• Gauge
Construction cost
"'"'CE~·O
• Determinat ion
of route
• Location of
terminals
Which variants?
How calculated?
Wh ich cr iter ia?
Why is most advanced solution cheapest?
Which operation costs?
Fig. 25.2. Finding feasible solutions.
The third aspect of the Shinkansen I should like to raise for discussion is
that of programming or scheduling (Fig. 25.3). One part of programming is
the method of handling interdependencies within the system itself,
construction, energy supply, training, etc.; and interdependencies between the
system, the nation, and the rest of the national economy.
What kinds of interdependencies had to be taken into account and which
instruments and models had to be used in order to calculate and deal with
them?
The last item I should like to raise for discussion is the scheduling and time
dependencies of the original Shinkansen program. The most important feature
of the Shinkansen project, which makes it different from the other programs
we have studied, is that there was a strict time limitation; a distinct time
constraint within which the scheduling had to proceed smoothly in order to
reach the target. This was actually accomplished in the Shinkansen with only a
small deviation from the target date initially set for operation. What methods
were used by the Shinkansen to accomplish this scheduling and how were the
costs in relation to time determined in order to arrive at an optimal solution?
Logical structure:
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Planning activities: Handling interdependencies
(uncertaintiesl
Scheduling
•Scheduling under distincttime constraintShinkansen:
Questions:
• Railway supply
Industry export?
• Construction industry
• Energy grid
• R&D
• Training
• Others
?
Cost 7 ?
Jl1
Time
Which important?
Which instruments/models?
Fig. 25.3. Programming.
Which cost - time dependence?
Which methods of scheduling?

26. The Shinkansen Project:
Formation and Construction Setup
M. NISHIDA
Discussion on Construction of the Shinkansen
The decision to carry out the Shinkansen Plan was taken in the form of a
Cabinet approval following discussions with the Tokaido Line Build-up
Investigation Commission of JNR, in 1956, the Japanese National Railways
Trunk Line Investigation Commission of the Ministry of Transport, in 1957,
and the Council of Ministers Concerned in Transportation, organized by the
Economic Planning Agency, in 1958.
TOKAIDO LINE BUILD-UP INVESTIGAnON COMMISSION
In 1956 JNR appointed the Tokaido Line Build-up Investigation
Commission headed by the vice-president of engineering, consisting of the
departmental directors concerned, and discussed the following points for
about a year: future traffic demand; quality of the future transportation
service; type of transportation to adopt in order to increase capacity; type of
motive power, rolling stock, repair system, etc.; and other related items.
After various plans had been discussed, JNR requested the Minister of
Transport in July 1957 to consider the following points from the national
point of view:
The Tokaido Main Line was the most important trunk line in the country
and had already reached the limit for a double-track line. To meet the
increasing traffic volume generated by the growing national economy, the
existing line would need to be quadrupled. Assuming the target year for
quadrupling the whole line to be 1963, and taking the construction period
into account, it would be necessary to start work in the next fiscal year.
It would be feasible either to lay another narrow-gauge double track
alongside the existing narrow-gauge double track or to lay a separate
standard-gauge double track line.
JNR had appointed the Investigation Commission and had studied feasible
measures, but, since the final decision concerned the country as a whole
and not JNR alone, the Government was requested to consider the
problem. In the meantime, JNR would continue its studies based on the
feasible plans (Table 26.1).
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TABLE 26.1. Feasible plans/or the Shinkansen
Narrow-gauge track plan Standard-gauge track plan
Train form:
Passenger:
Freight:
Speed (km/h):
Maximum:
Scheduled:
Travelling time
(Tokyo-Osaka)
Construction cost
Electric railcar train
Locomotive hauled train
130-150
100-120
4 h 40 min - 5 h 30 min
153,100 million yen
Electric railcar train
Electric railcar train
200-250
160-200
2 h 30 min - 3 h 30 min
138,900 million yen
JNR TRUNK LINE INVESTIGATION COMMISSION
On receipt of JNR's request, the Minister of Transport established in
August 1957 the JNR Trunk Line Investigation Commission within the
Ministry, consisting of thirty-four members: permanent Vice-Ministers of the
Ministries concerned, university professors, leaders of industry and Chambers
of Commerce along the railway line, presidents of city banks, journalists, and
the President and Vice-President of JNR. The Commission studied the
following:
Necessity for a new line
Transport demand on the Tokaido Line.
Various modes of transport:
superhighway between Tokyo and Kobe,
coastal shipping,
airlines.
Date when the Tokaido Line service would reach saturation.
Form of the new line
Narrow or standard gauge.
Method of transport, system of track usage and traffic volume on the new
and old lines.
Terminals and route.
Motive power and locomotives.
Track specifications.
Travel time.
Construction period and funds needed.
Funds, construction work, and operation of the new line
Funds needed for construction.
Fares and charges.
Balance between revenue and expenditure.
Method of procuring funds.
Method of expediting construction work.
Method of operation.
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NECESSITY FOR A NEW LINE
Transport demand on the Tokaido Line
In estimating the transport demand on the Tokaido Line, the following were
considered: population, gross national product, cost-of-living index, industrial
activity index, etc. The most conservative estimate disclosed that passenger
traffic in 1957 would be almost doubled by 1975, that freight traffic would
increase more than three-fold during the same period and that traffic would
continue to increase thereafter.
Various modes o!transport
In estimating the demand on the Tokaido Line, it was also necessary to
estimate the traffic that might be diverted from the Tokaido Line to other
modes of transport as a result of various general transport plans. The
following conclusion was reached:
Superhighway between Tokyo and Kobe. The superhighway between Tokyo
and Kobe was much involved with the Tokaido Line. So, in estimating the
traffic to be diverted to it from the Tokaido Line, the two plans for the
construction of the Chuo and the Tokaido superhighways had been studied
carefully in detail. It was estimated that about 1O-19llJo of the passengers and 4-
5llJo of freight would be diverted to the Tokaido Superhighway when its
Nagoya-Kobe section opened in 1962 and the Section between Nagoya and
Tokyo opened, as planned in 1965.
Coastal shipping. Although traffic by coastal shipping along the Tokaido
area was increasing every year freight had been diverted from coastal shipping
to land transport during and after the war, and coastal shipping traffic had
considerably diminished. It was therefore assumed that freight traffic diverted
from the railway to coastal shipping would not reach a significant level unless
drastic changes took place in tariff rates or in the economic situation.
Airlines. The growth of air traffic had been spectacular of late years but
although further growth was expected, it was very much less than rail traffic.
It was assumed that traffic diverted from the railway to airlines might be
qualitatively affected, but quantitively it would be negligible.
Date when the Tokaido Line service would reach saturation
The saturation year of the Tokaido Line was calculated by subtracting the
traffic to be diverted to other modes of transport from the transport demand
on the Tokaido Line. It was concluded that the transport capacity of the
Tokaido Line would most likely reach saturation-point in 1961 or 1962, even
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when the maximum traffic diverted was considered in relation to the minimum
transport demand.
Conclusion
It was concluded that a new Tokaido Line had to be constructed as soon as
possible.
FORM OF THJ:: NEW LINE
For the form of the new line, three plans were conceived: an additional
narrow-gauge line alongside the existing one; another separate narrow-gauge
line; and a separate standard-gauge line (see Table 26.2).
The additional narrow-gauge line meant building a narrow-gauge double
track in addition to the existing Tokaido double-track line to form a quadruple
line, using the existing stations as they stood. The separate narrow-gauge line
meant a line of narrow-gauge double track connected with the existing
Tokaido Line only at the main stations of the existing line.
For the separate standard-gauge line, since no interline train operation
would be possible owing to the difference in size of rolling stock, the plan
called for transfer of passengers, when required from one line to the other at
the major stations. For the freight service, a through train between the major
stations only was possible.
TABLE 26.2. Comparison of three plans
Source: JNR, Tokaido Shinkansen Construction Chronicle.
Additional narrow- Narrow-gauge
gauge line separate line
Standard-gauge
separate line
(I)6h30min
6 h 30 min (2) 4 h 30 min
Express and local trains Through express
passenger and
freight trains)
300-310 times a day (I) 300-310 times a day
(2) 250-280 times a day
Total length
Maximum speed
Travelling time
(Passenger express
train)
Track used for
Combined transport
capacity of existing
and new lines
Difficulty of
purchasing land
Level-crossings
Use of rolling stock in
common
Passengers to areas
farther than Osaka
Electrification system
Construction period
Construction cost
556km
120 km/h
Great
Many
Possible
No transfer
DC 1500V
7 years
Not less than 250,000
yen
500km
(I) 120 km/h
(2) 150 km/h
Small
None
Possible
No transfer
DC 1500V
5 years
192,000 million yen
500km
250 km/h
3h
Through express
passenger and
freight trains)
330 times a day
(converted into narrow-
gauge, 375 times a
day)
Small
None
Impossible
Transfer
AC 20,000 V
5 years
162,000 million yen
293
Comparison of track capacity
The first matters to be discussed were how to make maximum use of the
total capacity of the new line and the existing line and how to speed up the
trains in order to meet the social demand. It was decided to use the existing line
for local passenger trains and freight trains, which ran at nearly the same
speed, and to use the new line for the through express passenger and freight
trains. The track capacity of each line in this case was then studied:
(a) The existing line, with 180 trains operating one way, passenger trains at a
top speed of 95 km/h and freight trains at 65 km/h.
(b)An additional narrow-gauge line, with 120-130 trains one way, passenger
trains at a top speed of 120 km/h, and freight trains at 75 km/h.
(c) A separate narrow-gauge line, with 70-100 trains one way, passenger
trains at a top speed of 150 km/h, and freight trains at 75 km/h, or 120-
130 trains one way, passenger trains at a top speed of 120 km/h, and
freight trains at 75 km/h.
(d) A separate standard-gauge line, 150 trains one way, passenger trains at a
top speed of 250 km/h, and freight trains at 150 km/h (converted into
narrow-gauge, 195 trains one way).
Comparison ofadditional narrow-gauge line plan and separate narrow-gauge
line plan
An additional narrow-gauge line would not be more profitable than a
separate narrow-gauge line for the following reasons:
the track would be longer;
no high-speed trains could operate owing to the small curve radius;
elimination of all the level crossings (up to 1060) would present many
difficulties;
the cost of removing the numerous plants, stores, houses, etc., located along
the line would be enormous and would take a long time;
no epoch-making modernization, such as reduction of the travel time, could
be expected of the additional narrow-gauge line.
The plan to construct an additional line was therefore abandoned.
Comparison ofnarrow-gauge separate line plan and standard-gauge separate
line plan
A comparative study of the separate narrow-gauge line and the standard-
gauge separate line was then made:
Handling offreight on the existing and the new line. The narrow-gauge
separate line had an advantage in freight handling by the fact that interline
train operation would be possible. However, if express passenger trains for
294
through operations were to run on the narrow-gauge separate line, few freight
trains could be scheduled on it because of the difference in speed. With a
standard-gauge separate line, on the other hand, no rolling stock could be used
in common with the existing line, but faster service would be possible. It was
assumed that by building new freight stations in the Tokyo, Osaka, and
Nagoya regions, the standard-gauge separate line would have about 80010 of
the potential traffic.
Handling ofpassengers on existing and new separate lines. It was concluded
that the majority of long- and medium-distance passengers would be diverted
to the new standard-gauge separate line, owing to its great advantage over the
other in reduced traveling time, if efforts were made to provide proper transfer
facilities and adequate seat-booking arrangements.
After the relationship had been studied between the train frequency needed
for each line and its track capacity, it was decided that to combine the existing
line and a standard-gauge separate line would be more advantageous than to
combine the existing line and a narrow-gauge separate line.
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS CONCERNED ABOUT TRANSPORTATION
During the deliberations of the JNR Trunk Line Investigation Commission
set up in the Ministry of Transport, it became necessary to investigate the need
for the Shinkansen in connection with the plans for the construction of
superhighways. A Council of Ministers Concerned in Transportation was
therefore appointed in February 1958 in the Economic Planning Agency. A
plan for the construction of a superhighway between Tokyo and Kobe via
Nagoya and Osaka had taken concrete form and a part of the road was already
under construction. The schedule aimed at completion of the expressway
between Nagoya and Kobe in 1962 and that between Tokyo and Nagoya in
1965, and much was expected of the superhighway by men of learning.
Lively discussions ensued concerning the transport capacity of an
expressway in comparison with a railway line. With little knowledge of the
superhighway, people in Japan made all sorts of predictions. The generally
accepted idea was a figure of about 40,000 automobiles a day on a four-lane
superhighway at the average speed of 70 km/h. Eventually, it was concluded
that the transport capacity of a superhighway is far below that of a double-
track railway line and, in addition, that the highway requires more than twice
as much land as the railway.
It was also disclosed that the traffic to be diverted from the railway to the
superhighway would presumably be about 10010 of passenger traffic and about
5010 of freight, and that since the railway and the highway each has its own
function, it would not do to strengthen either one of them alone to meet the
increasing transport demand.
Thus the Tokaido Shinkansen construction plan was approved at a Cabinet
meeting in December 1958 and the construction cost was appropriated in the
budget for 1959.
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Incidentally, the present number of motor vehicles on the Tokyo-Nagoya
Expressway is about 44,000 a day. The train frequency on the Tokaido
Shinkansen is about 240 a day. In its initial period the Shinkansen train
consisted of twelve cars, but is now made up of sixteen cars.
Construction Setup
Every facility and all the rolling stock of the Tokaido Shinkansen was
produced, with all the know-how of civil and electrical engineering, track and
rolling stock techniques, that had been accumulated over the 90 years since the
railway was introduced in Japan, backed by up-to-date technology in every
field.
The Railway Technical Research Institute of JNR played an extremely
important role in the development of the Shinkansen railway technology. The
Shinkansen owes very much to this Institute, which had devoted itself
modestly to basic studies over many years. Its careful planning, produced
brilliant achievements, as a result of which the Shinkansen Construction
Standard Investigation Committee, headed by the vice-president of
engineering, was set up in the JNR Head Office, and, after careful
deliberation, the construction standards for train operation at the maximum
speed of 210 km/h on a standard-gauge line were agreed on.
The Shinkansen construction plan was worked out under an inclusive
administration system separate from the rest of JNR. To hasten the
construction work, the Shinkansen Administration, staffed by competent
experts, was established in the Head Office of JNR.
For the execution of work, four local organs, known as the Shinkansen
Construction Divisions, were set up in Tokyo, Shizuoka, Nagoya, and Osaka,
staffed by civil, electric, mechanical, and construction engineers, as well as
land-purchasing experts. At the peak, some 4000 experts were mobilized to
work for these four divisions. They carried out surveying, geological
investigations, designing, right-of-way purchases, supervision of work, and
negotiations with local authorities, such as road and river administration and
power plants.
Rolling stock was designed by the Rolling Stock Design Office, an auxiliary
organ of the Head Office, and orders were placed with manufacturing
companies. Work was executed mainly by contractors.
All sorts of consultants, civil engineering companies, steel-frame and girder-
makers, track construction companies, electric machinery installation
companies, rolling-stock makers, and many others from different fields
participated in creating the Shinkansen.
TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM
The Railway Technical Research Institute had been carrying out studies on
high-speed train operation. Since 1954 it had repeatedly experimented on the
shape of high-speed rolling stock and a wind-pressure brake, using models in
the wind tunnel, and on a method of measuring the resistance of rolling stock
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in the water tank. Various kinds of rolling stock were tested on the AC
electrified section of the line. The results of studies and experiments were
collected in May ]957 and the possibility of a superexpress train running
between Tokyo and Osaka in 3 hours was announced. Construction of the
Tokaido Shinkansen was heralded in this way.
The Railway Technical Research Institute then built its research system
around the Shinkansen Plan, which began to take concrete form. To
strengthen its research organization, it established the Shinkansen
Investigation Laboratory in April] 960 and assigned to it specialists and
experts in all fields to hasten the systematization of Shinkansen technology.
The subjects of Shinkansen research are shown in Table 26.3.
The Shinkansen Plan was accepted after careful study and testing over many
years in the fields of civil, electrical, and track engineering and rolling stock. It
was necessary, however, to conduct technical confirmation tests of everything
by laying actual track and running full-size commercial cars. A section about
32 km long was constructed at a place where it could be completed quickly. In
April] 962 a model line control depot was set up and test running began a
month later. On 3] October] 962 a speed of 200 km/h was recorded and this
was followed on 30 March] 963 by a maximum speed of 256 km/h. Testing on
the model line section continued until March] 964.
DRAWING UP CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS FOR THE SHINKANSEN
To investigate and study the construction standards for the Shinkansen by
which trains would operate most efficiently at high speed in greatest safety, the
Shinkansen Construction Standard Investigation Committee was organized in
the Head Office of JNR in April] 958. The Committee was headed by the vice-
president of engineering, and consisted of the departmental directors
concerned and outside men of learning and experience. Twenty meetings were
held, the last one in August] 96] .
The items studied and decided on by the Committee were as follows:
gauge,
car clearance,
track clearance,
TABLE 26.3. Railway Technical Research Institute: subjects ofShinkansen research
Field No. ofsubjects
Track structure for high-speed operation
High-speed rolling stock
Operation of high-speed rolling stock
Control systems for high-speed operation
Trolley wire structure for high-speed operation
AC electrification
Signalling system for high-speed operation
Automatic train operation system
Total 173
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curve radius,
cant,
transition curve length,
tangent length between curves,
circular curve length,
grade,
longitudinal curve radius,
distance between track centers,
rail,
formation level breadth,
load-bearing capacity of bridges,
stations (effective length of main line, height of platform, distance between
platform and track centers),
electric system,
height of trolley wire,
facilities to safeguard train operation.
ORGANIZATION FOR CONSTRUCTION
The construction of a new railway is roughly grouped into construction of
roadbed (tunnels, bridges, viaducts, earthwork), stations, tracks, and electric
facilities. Figure 26.] shows the organization for the construction of these
facilities and the part taken by each organ. It can be seen that the Head Office
organs exercised overall control of the construction work, formed the basic
policy, gave advice, controlled the budget, etc., and purchased the principal
materials, machines, and equipment.
Local organs acted as the vital centers in hastening investigations and
construction work under instructions from the Head Office organs. They
negotiated with local governments, made land purchases, etc., and engaged in
surveying, designing, drawing up contracts for work execution, inspection,
etc.
The local organs set up field organs to supervise construction work in the
field, such as work on the roadbeds, stations, buildings, the track, electric
power, communications and signals. As the work was mainly executed under
contract, it was done by outsiders, various consultants, construction
companies, track construction contractors, steel-frame and girder-makers,
electric facilities construction companies, and many others. The field organs
gave advice and supervised the execution of the work as stipulated by the
contracts.
ROLLING STOCK PRODUCTION
The roles of the various organs in the production of rolling stock are shown
in Fig. 26.2. The important items, such as technical development, production
planning of new rolling stock, decisions on capacity and structure, designing
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Fig. 26.2. Setup of rolling stock production.
of accommodation, specification compiling, etc., were dealt with by the Head
Office organs and the auxiliary organ to the Head Office.
Placing orders and drawing up contracts with manufacturers for rolling
stock were the responsibility of the Head Office organs concerned with
purchasing and stores. Supervision of the production of rolling stock and main
components was exercised by the auxiliary organ to the Head Office. Rolling
stock and principal components were manufactured by rolling stock
manufacturing companies on orders from JNR.

27. The Organization ofJNR with
Special Reference to the Shinkansen
S. HOSHINO
Legal Status of JNR
The Japanese National Railway was appointed a public corporation in
]949 to operate the Japanese railways. Legally, it is neither a part of the
Government nor a private enterprise, but is an independent legal entity with its
capital invested entirely by the Government. As a public corporation, JNR is
expected to promote public transportation with all the efficiency of modern
industry and is responsible for its operation to the people through the Diet and
the Cabinet.
Short History of JNR
The history of the railway in Japan covers a century, during which its legal
status has undergone many changes, influenced by the needs of the times.
With the unification of the feudal state in ]868, Japan joined the family of
modern nations and effected many political, economic, and social changes.
The resulting economic development was spectacular and transport demand
rose rapidly, prompting the Administration to construct trunk rail lines. In
]872 the first railway between Shimbashi (Tokyo) and Yokohama was opened
for passenger traffic. Construction of the Government railway continued and
the Tokaido Line was completed in ]889.
Meanwhile, the national economic growth encouraged private capital to
invest in railway construction. In ]892 private railways appeared all over the
country, with a total route length of 2] 24 km, against the Government
railway's 885 km.
Inadequate standardization and the resulting shortcomings of through
service in the private lines soon became apparent, and as a result of the
depression of ]900, some private railways lost money. Nationalization was
considered necessary for economic and military reasons. The Government
passed the Nationalization Law in ]906, under which private lines were bought
and operated by the Government, with the exception of some local lines.
Railways in Japan developed further during the boom years of World War
One. With the increase in route kilometers and haulage, the Railway Board
which had been functioning as a small section of the Cabinet, was raised to an
30]
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independent Railway Ministry in 1920. In 1949 the Government passed a law
to reorganize the national railways into a public corporation in order to
improve management and operation. This arrangement was strongly
influenced by the occupation forces, and studies for the changeover were thus
insufficient. Consequently, JNR is formally an independent public
corporation but retains many characteristics of ministerial management in its
organization.
World Railway Organizations
Railway enterprises are usually state-owned and more or less controlled by
the government in countries with both free and centralized economies. This
public ownership and participation has been brought about by many complex
political and economic factors.
Free competition between railway companies often results in waste of
natural and human resources and causes economic confusion. Moreover,
railways operate most effectively on a large scale. In such an industry it is
necessary to limit competition and practice state-coordinated development.
This calls for reshuffling of the economic structure of private enterprises into
nationalized or public-controlled organizations.
Railways have a large external economic effect on the local areas along the
line. Private companies which are profit-oriented often care little for external
social benefits. A public enterprise, operating in the public interest, can make
its total economic effect on the basis of wide and long-range considerations.
With the development of other modes of transport, railway companies
deteriorated financially in recent years. The railway however, is one of the
most efficient means of transport in terms of labor productivity, energy
saving, surface utilization and pollution. Governments and local communities
began to subsidize railway operation with public funds, and this forced the
companies to submit to public control.
In the USA, for instance, although there are rare exceptions of privately
owned railways, the situation is gradually changing. Urban transportation
services in densely populated areas of the USA are administered by newly
established corporate public bodies, and in 1971 a new corporation, Amtrak,
was established to provide intercity rail passenger service by public funding.
Organization Structure
Although world rail management is commonly under public control, its
organization is of various kinds. A railway may be operated as a government
department, as a public corporation, or as a joint-stock company, and there
are also some intermediate patterns.
As a government department, control of the enterprise is as tight as the
usual administrative institutions. On the other hand, the most distinctive
feature of a public corporation is its independence of the government in
operation and finance. In a jointstock company, the government exerts its
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influence as a stockholder. Each form was created out of the historical
experience and economic conditions of the country concerned. Thus it would
be unjust and incorrect if the merits and faults of an organization were to be
judged out of its context.
In Japan the railway had long been under direct government management.
The public corporation was introduced for the railways in 1949 in order to
stabilize the serious industrial disputes which were developing in the public
sector at that time. Trade unions of such government enterprises as railways,
telegraph, telephone, and postal services were among the most militant. With
the establishment of public corporation, the employees of the national
railways and tobacco monopoly were separated from the other government
servants and were controlled by new labor mediation and arbitration
procedures.
Many serious people at the time visualized an ideal public corporation that
would democratize government enterprises and increase their efficiency. To
this end, it was believed that a Japanese Government Railway ought to
concentrate its efforts on efficient management rather than its accountability
to the Diet. The legislation, however, did not take this view into consideration
and JNR was not given the same degree of managerial independence as public
corporations in other countries enjoy.
Problems of the Public Corporation
It is generally agreed that the most delicate problem of the public
corporation is the strained relationship between corporate management and
government supervision. The state owns the corporation and is finally
responsible to the people. Therefore, some kind of supervision by the state is
required. On the other hand, the public corporation can only attain high
operational efficiency if it makes its own technical and economic judgements.
In addition, the political neutrality of the corporation can only be maintained
by managerial independence.
The theory has been expressed that the Minister responsible for the
management should be given no power to issue general directions or to
concern himself with programs of operation. Others consider that the board of
the public corporation is accountable to the Diet through submission of an
annual report and is immune from inquiry by the Diet into its day-to-day
administration. It seems that these classical principles of public corporations
should be modified in the light of the experience of recent years. The general
power of ministers over public corporations has increased in several countries,
and the relations between railway industries and the Government have
changed considerably.
The ministerial power over financial matters has increased owing to the
deterioration of the competitive position of railways. In the case of JNR, the
development of motor transport has adversely affected its financial condition
in the past 10 years. Its balance sheet showed a loss in 1966, and since then, the
deficit has increased rapidly, JNR was forced to ask for financial assistance
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from its government, and this has weakened the independence of the
management.
Ministerial control is exercised informally through discussions,
negotiations, and other kinds of pressure. The present cooperation between
JNR and its government seems to be adequate for the needs of the railway
industry in a highly organized modern society.
Relationship of JNR and the State
The Japanese National Railway is operated by the following organs:
- The Board is the highest organ for making decisions on important
matters and is composed of the President (Chairman), Vice-President
(Vice-Chairman) and seventeen other members (part-time members and
full-time Managing Members). Matters requiring action by the Board
are: establishment of departments within the Head Office and
subordinate offices and other important matters relating to
organization; important rules and regulations concerning the
organization functions; budget, operational plan, fund plan; settlement
of accounts; long-term and short-term borrowing and issue of r~ilway
bonds; and redemption plans for borrowing and bonds.
- The executive organ of JNR consists of the President, the Vice-President
and several Managing Members of the Board. The President is appointed
by the Cabinet and holds the highest responsibility for carrying out the
functions of JNR in accordance with the decisions of the
Board. The Vice-President and Managing Members of the Board are
appointed by the President upon approval of the Minister of Transport
and they assist the President in performing JNR's functions. The
Managing Members of the Board are in charge of particular branches of
the work and they concurrently assume staff and decision-making
functions.
The President, under this system, has great authority in both decision-
making and execution, and is responsible for the operation as autocratically as
the Ministers of their respective Ministries.
Higher executives of public corporations can be appointed in various ways.
For example, the President can be ap?ointed by the Cabinet with Diet
approval, or he can be nominated solely by the competent minister. This
depends on the social and economic importance of the public corporation and
on the degree of executive independence of the President. The appointment of
higher executives of public corporations could be made strictly by Diet
nomination, and in compensation, they could be given greater authority. This
point deserves discussion. The power of the State to choose the executives of
the public corporation is usually seen as a minimum measure of public control
in case there is no other regulatory means. The core of corporate independence
lies in the extent of government control over the corporation, in addition to
this minimum power.
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Every year, JNR has to prepare a draft budget of the anticipated revenue
and expenditure and submit it to the Minister of Transport, who consults with
the Minister of Finance, makes necessary revisions and submits it to the Diet
after Cabinet approval. The budget becomes effective only when the Diet has
voted in favor of it.
These procedures are almost the same as for the budget of a government
department, and it is a little different from other small public corporations,
whose budgets become valid upon the approval of the competent minister.
In carrying out the budget, JNR is allowed flexibility to adjust it to the
increase in transport demand and economic change. When changes in
budgetary appropriations are considered necessary, money can be diverted
from one budgetary item to another, except for certain restricted items. Even
for these restricted items, e.g. salaries and wages, diversions to or from such
items can be made with the approval of the Minister of Transport.
The results of the budget executed during the fiscal year are submitted to the
Cabinet through the Minister of Transport. The Cabinet sends them to the
Diet for approval after they have been audited by the Government's Auditing
Board.
The basic fares and rates can only be revised with Diet approval, and
revisions in less important categories of tariff can be made with the approval
of the Minister of Transport.
When JNR intends to raise the tariff, it prepares a revision draft and
submits it to the Minister of Transport. In dealing with this request, the
Minister has to inquire of the Transportation Advisory Committee and make
its decision in deference to the intention of the Committee. This Committee,
formed of seven members who are appointed by the Prime Minister upon
approval of the Diet, makes a recommendation after a public hearing. The
Minister submits the amendment draft for tariff increase to the Diet after
Cabinet approval. The bill proposed in the Diet is discussed and adopted by
the Standing Committee of one of the Houses, and is put to a ballot in the
Plenary Session of the House. The same steps are taken in the other House,
and the bill becomes law on approval of both Houses.
The most important factor governing the level of rates and fares is the
principle of covering the total cost of the services rendered, and a number of
substantial increases have been made to meet the rising costs of material and
labor in recent years. Generally, rail fares have a commercial character and are
strongly affected by the national economy. The legal process in the Diet,
described above, is considered inappropriate for economic price-making for
the following reasons:
The process is extremely complicated, and revision is often made too late.
Rail transportation has lost its monopoly and hence there is no need for
strict regulation by the state.
The request for tariff increase is often treated from the political standpoint.
Studies are therefore now being made to improve the tariff-fixing process.
Investment in important work such as construction of new lines and
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additional track, electrification and large-scale improvement, is made upon
approval of the Minister of Transport.
When the Shinkansen construction plan was prepared by JNR, the Cabinet
decided to establish the JNR Trunk Line Investigation Committee in the
Ministry of Transport. At that time, the important role of a high-speed railway
in intercity transportation was not commonly understood. This special
government-level committee was expected to give careful consideration to
whether the construction of the new line would meet future transportation
needs.
After the great success of the Tokaido Shinkansen, each local government
began to ask for new Shinkansen lines to link their areas with the Tokaido
megalopolis, and a new legislation to control the Shinkansen network for the
balanced development of the country was established. By this law, the Minister
of Transport plans the route of the new line and consults the Railway
Construction Committee, which is composed of dietmen, government
officials, the JNR President, and experts. Following the conclusions of this
committee, the Minister makes a provisional decision on the route, and
instructs JNR to conduct a technical survey of it. The Minister makes the final
decision after the survey and gives the order for the construction.
Main Organization
There is a hierarchy of four tiers of organization to control the total
activities of JNR: the Head Office, the Regional Office, the Operating
Division, and the field unit.
The Head Office is in charge of planning, research and administration of
important basic matters. The regional offices are responsible for regional
management, headed by some of the Managing Members of the Board. The
operating division under the regional offices are the controlling units of the
transportation service. They have general authority in a limited area and
include many management service staffs and specialists.
The field units are stations, marshalling yards, engine depots, maintenance
depots, repair shops, etc., in charge of their own limited functions.
There are some problems in forming the management system of railways.
The number of tiers have a bearing on the organizational efficiency. In JNR it
has often been asserted that the regional office and the operating division
should be unified to simplify the intermediate organs. Generally, the smaller
the jurisdictional area of the operating division, the more important it is to
have a regional office, because the Head Office will not be able to administer
many divisions directly. This depends on the balance of each hierarchical
organ, and, fundamentally, on the total scale of the enterprise.
In other industries, the operational authorities are usually delegated
downward to the local office. Decentralization of rail management is,
however, somewhat difficult owing to its nature as a continuous network. A
distinctive feature of railway organization is the concentrated power of the
head office and the large number of working forces.
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There are two ways of fixing the limits of the operational territory of a local
division. Normally, its managerial power is limited to a geographical area. The
old Tokaido Line running parallel to the Shinkansen is controlled by three
regional offices, together with connecting feeder lines. For the Shinkansen, a
special intermediate office, equivalent to a regional office and called
Shinkansen Administration, was established with the object of controlling thIs
line only, first from Tokyo to Osaka and later to Hakata in Kyushu. It is the
first line control system operated in JNR and was established for the following
reasons:
JNR received a loan from the World Bank to fund the Shinkansen, and it
was necessary to confine the executive responsibilities of the line to one
single office.
The operation system, the system of maintenance, and working conditions
were fundamentally different from the old line system, reflecting the new
technology, and had to be administered together by one organization.
With the extension of the Shinkansen down to Kyushu, the jurisdiction of
the Shinkansen Administration lengthened linearly to a distance of lOOO km.
One office would obviously not be able to cover this unusually large area. The
Shinkansen Administration has also had some problems concerning
administration territories. While the Shinkansen Administration controls the
operation of the Shinkansen Line, the regional offices administer other trunk
lines and feeder lines in the same region. As a result, there seem to be two
regional agencies representing JNR, and this has caused some confusion in the
relationship with the local governments.
Thus, improvements of the present control system of the Shinkansen are
being considered. It is planned to abolish the Shinkansen Administration, in
which case the Shinkansen will be administered in sections by the regional
office, which also control the old line.
Conclusions
Is this legal form of public corporation the most effective for the
administration of the Shinkansen, or for JNR in general? It is very difficult to
give a clear answer at present. The following comments, however, may be
made:
- The Shinkansen is constructed and operated at the highest technical
level, which exceeds by far the former world standards. Long-term
research and the accumulated experience of management made this
project a reality. If JNR had been a privately owned company, this huge
program involving great uncertainty would not have been achieved. The
Shinkansen is the product of the nation and of the publicly owned
corporation.
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- It is incredible that, after the great success of the Shinkansen, the balance
sheet of JNR has shown a deficit in recent years. This is said to be caused
mainly by the delay in timely revision of rail fares caused by complicated
legal procedures. If the past tariff increases had been made at the proper
time, as JNR proposed, most of the current loss would not have been
accumulated. The present economic state of JNR may be due, in a sense,
to insufficient managerial independence.
It is hard to appraise the effects of the organization on the achievements of
the Shinkansen. In general, the successes were the result of a long series of
decisions and executions. Some of the good decisions may have come from the
appropriateness of the organization, some from the personal ability of
executive managers.
The organization structure, as well as other problems, will continue to be
reviewed for the benefit of the people of Japan.
28. Organization of the Shinkansen
R. TUCH
Before proceeding with the discussion, I should like to present a short review
of the basic organizational analyses conducted by the Management and
Technology Area, and explain how these will be applied to the Shinkansen.
Many of you are aware of our first two case studies on large-scale planning
programs - the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the USA and the
Bratsk-llimsk Territorial Production Complex (BITPC) in the USSR [1]. The
Shinkansen will be the third such study undertaken by the Management and
Technology Area. I shall not present the complete analysis used in the previous
case studies, but only enough to present the basic idea of the types of
information we desire and how this information is used in our basic
framework.
Figures 28.1 and 28.2 depict the hierarchical interests we want to deal with.
Figure 28.1 shows that the TVA was examined not only on the basis of its
internal organizational structure, but also in relation to a system of
organizational interactions external to the TVA. These external organizations
follow from the international to the national level, proceed to the sectoral
level, then to the regional level, and finally to the subsystems which operate in
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Fig. 28.1. Management of Tennessee Valley Region.
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Fig. 28.2. Management of the BITPC.
the region concerned. We try to trace the authority and communication lines
and the systems of coordination that are developed or being developed.
The same basic approach was applied to the Bratsk-Ilimsk study. The role of
Bratsk is first examined in its relation to the existing socio-economic system in
which it operates according to the same levels of interest: international,
national, sectoral, regional, and its subsystems (Fig. 28.2).
The next stage of analysis deals with the internal organization of the object
under study. We define the following (Fig. 28.3):
Changes in organizational structure and impetus for these changes.
The primary organizational factors and their roles in the internal
management system.
- IDEIHIFICATlOIl OF CHANGES IN ORGANlZATlOIlAL STRUCTURE
- IPlPETUS FOR CHANGES
- TIE IDEKTIFICATlON OF THE PRIMRY ORGANlZATlOIlAL ACTORS
- TIE IR Rlll£S 1NTHE INTERNAL 1'IANAGEllENT SYSTEl'l
- TIE RDLE OF ORGAIIIZATlDNAL UNITS IN FIVE MIN
CATEGOR ICAl FUNCTI ONS:
~ POlICY JUNCTIONSPLANNING FUNCTIONS!CONTROL FUNCTI OIlSCOOR!l11AT1ON FUNCTIONSIIlPLEllENTATI ON FUNCTI OIlS
IPlBEDDING OF THE 1'IANAGEllENT SYSTEl'l INTO THE TOTAL
SYSTEl'l OF THE CASE UNDER STUDY
Fig. 28.3. Analysis of the internal organizational system.
311
The roles of organizational units in five main categorical functions: policy
functions, planning functions, control functions, coordination functions,
and implementation functions.
And finally, define the imbedding of the management system into the total
system of the case under study.
Using the above basic approach, let us now turn to the Shinkansen to bring out
the organizational information presented in the papers, and raise questions to
start the present discussion and to prepare for the field study which is to
follow.
Mr. Hoshino has given us a very good basis for discussion. He opened with
a concise history of JNR, compared it with international experience, and made
special reference to the public-corporation aspect of JNR. He pointed out
some of the advantages and disadvantages of this relationship.
Mr. Hoshino's account of the relationships between the State and JNR are
of special interest in the light of the basic approach we have followed with the
two previous studies. However, this account is mainly concerned with JNR as
a whole and not with the Shinkansen. Figure 28.4 attempts to clarify this idea.
It shows in diagrammatic form the imbedding of JNR into the external
systems. The main encompassing area is, of course, the national system.
Within this national system we find the regional, or prefectural system, and
the local or subsystem levels. We see that JNR serves as a connection between
all of the external-system components and operates on the same plane. The
Shinkansen, however, as interpreted from the papers, operates within JNR but
on a different plane. We could call the Shinkansen system a "third-
dimensional component" of JNR. If this concept is accepted, we need to
procure information not only on the JNR but also on the Shinkansen
component of JNR.
Figure 28.5 gives a rough idea of the imbedding of the JNR management
system into the total system. In this figure, Shinkansen administration is
JAR
JAPANESE IlATilIlAl SYSTEll
SUB-RE6ICIIAl. SYSTEll
Fig. 28.4. Imbedding of JNR into the external systems in diagrammatic form.
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Fig. 28.5. Imbedding of JNR management system into the total system.
depicted as a separate sectoral-regional section of JNR. This special
relationship is also brought out in Mr. Hoshino's paper.
In line with the external management relations of both JNR and
Shinkansen, I should like to direct the first set of questions on this subject.
1. Could we be provided with more information about the management
system of JNR and Shinkansen in its external relationships at each level?
2. In line with this, is there a special relationship between Shinkansen
administration and the external system?
3. If so, what are the organizational relationships designed to accomplish
this?
4. Are any plans currently being undertaken to improve JNR and
Shinkansen relations with the external hierarchical systems?
The next set of questions deals with the internal management system of JNR
and Shinkansen. The basic structure of JNR management was given by Mr.
Hoshino but, unfortunately, he only touched on some of the particular
relationships of JNR management with Shinkansen management. From other
papers in these Proceedings we learned that, initially, the Shinkansen
administration was located within the Head Office of JNR. Mr. Hoshino has
stated that the present administrative status of Shinkansen is outside the Head
Office and functions as a regional unit of JNR. What was the impetus for
removing the Shinkansen administration out of the Head Office, and at what
stage in the Shinkansen's development was this accomplished? Is there at
present a special division for Shinkansen within the Head Office?
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Mr. Hoshino also touched on some of the difficulties being encountered
between Shinkansen administration and JNR normal administration. This
implies that attempts towards conflict resolution are being undertaken. It
would be interesting to know what are the present mechanisms employed for
conflict resolution among sectoral and regional objectives, among objectives
of different sectors, and among objectives of different operating divisions and
field units. Do conflicts occur because of the nature of the budgetary system,
i.e. is the budgetary system of Shinkansen separate from that of other JNR
lines?
The remaining questions are concerned specifically with the management of
Shinkansen. To what extent does the management system of Shinkansen
differ from that of the more conventional lines? What types of management
system are being considered for the future?
These questions, dealing with the internal and external management
relations of JNR and Shinkansen, do not, of course, cover the full spectrum of
information we shall need to conduct the field study. Hopefully, the questions
will serve as a catalyst for the participants of this session. During the
remainder of the conference the members of the Management and Technology
Area will work together with our Japanese colleagues and with the conference
participants to clarify both these and other questions relating to the
management of the Shinkansen and JNR. It should be borne in mind that the
main information we desire is on the Shinkansen management system coupled
with the internal JNR management and the external relationships of both.
Reference
1. Knop, H. and A. Straszak, eds., The Bratsk-llimsk Territorial Production Complex: A Field
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29. Discussion
The Role of Technological Innovation in the Decision Process
(a) It was suggested during the presentations that the choice for the
development of the Shinkansen was perhaps a biased one, in that the
alternatives were weighted so as to foreordain a decision in favor of the new
and advanced technology of the Shinkansen. This view would seem to show a
bias that appears to be built into evaluative processes; a bias against the new
and the innovative. Reference was made to the opinion of the Austrian
economist, Joseph Schrumpfrader, that innovation made progress, that old
and proven methods should be replaced by new and radical ideas. He would
like to encourage individuals to take risks and to receive fair reward for those
risks because they are necessary for progress.
Institutions which analyze decision processes appear to start off by saying,
quite correctly, that various driving forces are involved in a project proposal.
We could go a step further and define these driving forces as being of the
problem type or of the opportunity type. Having said opportunity, the usual
course appears to be to return to the problem or need, and then generate the
logical structure that leads to a decision involving the alternatives A, B, or C.
It was suggested that nine out of ten such procedures have a built-in tacit
assumption - that technology stays constant; nothing can be done about the
technology. It just has to be decided what costs the most and who will benefit
the most.
If the delegates did not believe this, they need only examine the history of
past innovations and ask how they would have fared under the evaluative
processes now in use.
Since the discussion took place on the 1000h anniversary of Nicholas Otto's
first run of the internal combusion engine, the history of the automobile in
society was reviewed. The first production automobile appeared around 1908,
some 30 years after Otto's engine. The airplane is another good example of
innovative use of technology. Before either of these developments took hold in
society, there were a number of inventions that were technological and
economic flops; it was only through continuous development and
improvement that their value was proved.
It was suggested that what appears to be happening today in modern
societies is a shifting of decisions for innovation from the private to the public
sector. Society appears to be making it harder for the private sector to decide
what to do. The private sector does not really need a process of decision-
making because the individual in charge has the option of operating on
intuition - if he is wrong he gets fired, but if he is right he is a hero.
The shift of decision-making responsibility to the public sector suggests that
315
316
the public will not make decisions without wrapping them in the cloak of
respectability. It was suggested that this cloak of respectability is analysis;
analysis of the type evolved in such places as IlASA where scientists are
examining how decisions are made and how large projects happen.
It was suggested that a new type of research emphasis may be needed, where
the present standard of technology is given and then projected. How would
improvements in technology contribute towards the advancement of society?
It was suggested that this type of research is very necessary and very useful.
What is vitally needed in modern societies is the cloak of respectability, a
way of thinking about making innovations in the public sector that represents
a more radical change of technology, and which may not come to total fruition
for 25 or 30 years. Public decision-makers need a process by which they can
analyze and choose without fear of possible repercussions - an analytic
procedure that is scientifically respectable and has scientific support. It was
suggested that institutions should pay more attention to problems of this
nature.
(b) The preceding comments led to a discussion of the role the Railway
Technical Research Institute played in the development of the Shinkansen. It
was mentioned in the presentations that the Institute played a very strong role
in the development and application of technology. Questions were asked about
the organization of this research and its management, and the importance of
foreign technology at the time.
(c) It was difficult for the delegates from JNR to remember the situation
when research on the possibilities of Shinkansen started - the time span is 25
years. However, one of the delegates who was present during that period was
able to describe the basic organization structure. The organization of research
was loosely controlled by one office with an overall director. Meetings were
held once a week for progress reports and discussion. The spirit of the
researchers and the sense of mission were very important factors, neither of
them easy to quantify.
(d) The transfer of foreign technology was not an important factor in the
Shinkansen development. The main support for Shinkansen technology was
derived from the 100 years of Japanese railway experience and from the many
workers from military and aviation research institutes who transferred to JNR
and the Railway Research Institute after the Second World War.
(e) Research on railway technology is continuing. There are still many
problems to be solved such as noise and vibration control, increase of speed,
and the development of new guidance systems such as the high-speed (500
km/h) magnetic levitation system.
The Options and Cost Estimates Presented by JNR for Government
Approval
(a) A question was asked about the models prepared for estimating costs of
the Shinkansen development. The reply was that no "models" in today's
sense were available at the time of the original proposal. Predictions or
projections were made, based on past and expected experience, but the
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expenses turned out to be about twice the original estimate, using constant
yen. The most important factor for this discrepancy was the unexpected
growth of the Japanese economy and of inflation, both of which doubled
during the period of construction of the Tokaido Shinkansen.
(b) The discrepancy between the actual and predicted costs did not affect the
completion of the project. Competition for government funding and approval
was very high at that time, but the economy was increasing so fast that the
Shinkansen was not seriously affected once the decision to construct was
made.
Operating Costs and the Effects of the Shinkansen on Development
(a) No precise data is available for comparison of operation costs with
construction costs. JNR separates operation costs into three parts: personnel,
goods and maintenance. Projections of operation costs for the Shinkansen
were made on this basis, but the higher than expected number of passengers
made expenditure on operation lower than was originally calculated; the net
result was increased operational efficiency, an operating ratio of about 62010.
(b) It is still difficult to determine all the effects of the introduction of the
Shinkansen on its sphere of operation. It most certainly participated in the
growth of the Japanese economy. The most obvious result was the remarkable
passenger acceptance and use of the new system, and a certain promotion of
industry. The latter was not expected by JNR at the beginning of the
Shinkansen development.
The Use of Advanced Technology and Why It Was Cheaper Than More
Traditional Technology
(a) The reason why the most advanced technology was the cheapest was the
following. The Tokaido corridor is the most densely populated in Japan.
Expansion of existing lines would have required the purchase of highly priced
land in populated areas. The Shinkansen line could be routed through less
populated and cheaper land.
(b) It was asked why the limit of 220 km/h was chosen as a target, and why
not 250 or 300 km/h? The answer was that JNR pursued the most advanced
ideas available at the time.
Organization of the Shinkansen
(a) The Shinkansen Administration controls the operation division of the
Shinkansen. In the other JNR lines, operational supervision is divided between
the regional offices and the field units, the latter having a high degree of
competence in train operations. The Shinkansen lines, however, are more
firmly controlled by the Shinkansen Administration.
(b) The stations are the most important for external relations, but they are
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under the control of the conventional divisions. The Shinkansen has its own
relationship with the external systems, but much less than the normal
operating divisions. Responsibility for conventional lines is set according to
divisional boundaries. The Shinkansen, however, is completely separate from
the normal territorial divisions, which results in some minor conflicts but no
serious problems. It is planned to bring the administration of Shinkansen lines
into line with that of the conventional lines.
(c) Before the official opening of the line, the Shinkansen Administration
was one department in the Head Office of JNR. On opening day, the
Shinkansen Administration was raised to the level of a local office. The reason
was that planning and construction were finished, and only the operational
function remained. The change was carried out very smoothly. Six months
before the Shinkansen opening, the Shinkansen Administration had the
characteristics of both a departmental division in the Head Office and a local
office.
(d) No major problems are anticipated in the coming changes of Shinkansen
Administration when it fits into the conventional administration. The
management system of the Shinkansen is fundamentally the same as that of
the conventional lines, and technological innovations have also been made on
the narrow-gauge lines, so that the technological level of both lines is similar.
The main future problem for improved management will be the reaction of
employees to the necessary management changes.
The Construction of Rail Lines
(a) Two bodies are involved in the construction of rail lines; one is JNR and
the other is the Railroad Construction Company (RCC). The RCC was formed
by the Government when JNR found it impossible to construct the necessary
local lines and still maintain their responsibilities on the major trunk lines.
Had JNR been forced to construct the large number of local lines required, it
would have found itself in a very difficult financial situation.
(b) Shinkansen lines are at present being constructed by both JNR and
RCC. JNR construction is usually done on a short-term contract basis after
planning and designing is completed. The lines for construction are usually
divided into stages, with contracts running for a 1- or 2-year period; usually
fixed-term contracts, but in case of high inflation the terms of the contract
may be changed.
High-Speed Operation, Train Safety,
and Operational Management

30. The Role of Transportation
Studies at IIASA
H. STROBEL
It could be asked why such a specific engineering and technical topic as the
Shinkansen is a relevant research subject for an institute like nASA, especially
in view of the limited resources of nASA in comparison to much larger
research institutes in other countries.
A partial answer to this question was given by nASA's first Director,
Howard Raiffa, in a speech delivered at the first nASA Conference in 1976.
He quoted an American writer: "There are two ways of spreading light - the
first is to be a candle, and the second is to be a mirror and reflect the light
generated by other candles." If one accepts this analogy, then the candle is
IIASA's role in fundamental research while the mirror characterizes nASA's
"clearing-house" function, which includes the exchange of information
between nASA's NMO countries, the preparation of state-of-the-art surveys,
and evaluation of the experiences gained in advanced large-scale development
projects.
It is obvious that nASA's Shinkansen research activity is related more to its
"mirror" than to its "candle" function. This is expecially true for the
technologically oriented part of the study. Nevertheless, any fundamental
research at IIASA dealing with socio-economic, environmental, or regional
development aspects of high-speed ground transportation systems needs input
information on the following question: What contribution towards the
solutions of major transportation development projects could one expect from
the application of advanced technologies and management methods?
The papers presented in this technologically oriented section provide
information for answering this question. Two different categories of
technology can be distinguished: (1) guideway and vehicular technologies, and
(2) systems technologies.
The papers by T. Yorino and S. Kubo give a very good overview of the first
category of technology, I.e. of the design principles for vehicles and ground
facilities, as well as the organization of the R&D work.
The significance and the management of the maintenance tasks are
discussed by S. Kubo in regard to vehicles and Y. Muto in regard to fixed
facilities - the guideway, communication, and control systems. One is
impressed to learn that when the trains reach the end of their normal life-span
of about 12 years they are destroyed in a specially equipped workshop and
replaced by new trains. No other railway organization in the world applies
such strict rolling-stock replacement rules.
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The second aspect of technologies, the systems technology. deals with the
application of sophisticated control and computer systems. A characteristic
feature of the Shinkansen is that it makes extensive use of this type of
technology according to the following hierarchy of control and management
tasks.
1. Computerized Top Management: the "Resource Control-Statistic"
software package and the telecommunication network control system
DACS (Data Agent Control System).
2. Computerized Sales Management: the Magneto-electronic Automatic
seat Reservation System (MARS) and its touchtone telephone-based
version.
3. Computerized Operation Management containing two parts:
the Computer Aided Traffic Control (COMTRAC) System used for
optimal planning and real-time control of train operation:
the Shinkansen Management and Information System (SMIS) used for
making up daily maintenance programs of tracks and rolling stock
as well as for cost analysis of the jobs.
4. Accident prevention and train control carried out by the following
subsystems:
the Automatic Train Control (ATC) System, which includes a speed
control and Automated Train Stop (ATS) system installed aboard
the vehicle;
the Centralized Traffic Control (CTC) system; and
the Automatic Route Control (ARC) system.
The systems for accident prevention at the lowest level of this control and
management hierarchy are described by Y. Muto. He shows that the highly
sophisticated electronic control systems are of vital importance for the
implementation of a high-speed train of the Shinkansen type. Y. Oguro's
paper on the Train Operation Control System covers topics of the third and
fourth levels, the COMTRAC system for the former, and the ATC and CTC
systems for the latter. Of special interest are his comments on the distribution
of the whole supervision tasks to the different dispatchers and the resulting
problems of the design of a combined man-computer real-time management
system. The management of maintenance problems, a level-3 task, is discussed
in the paper by S. Kubo.
The two highest levels of the hierarchy are considered in the paper by M.
Harada. The seat-reservation system MARS is discussed, followed by a
general survey of computer applications at JNR. The Seat Reservations
Computer Complex represents one of the largest computer centers in the whole
of Japan. One of the outstanding features of the MARS system is the
possibility of reserving seats by means of a touch-tone telephone keyboard.
Here, the prospective Shinkansen passenger can communicate directly with the
seat reservation computer. He puts the required data (date, train number, etc.)
into the touch-tone telephone keyboard and gets the answers from the
computer acoustically, i.e. in the form of recorded human language.
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The second part of Harada's paper makes it clear that JNR is operating a
large number of computerized management systems. The systems developed
for the first (administration-management) level of the hierarchy led to a
remarkable manpower saving on the order of more than 1800 employees. In
addition to the Shinkansen system, other computerized management and
control systems installed by JNR include:
Yard Automatic Control System (YACS);
Kojo (workshop) Information Control System (KICS);
Effectual Planning and Operation of Container System (EPOCS);
Freight Operational Control System (FOCS);
and five other minor systems.
The resulting manpower saving as a result of the installation of these
systems is shown to reach a total of 3250 people.
This final section of the Shinkansen Conference provides a unique
opportunity to learn from JNR scientists who were deeply involved in the
creation of Shinkansen, and to obtain an excellent survey of the technological
and management aspects of this high-speed ground transportation system. The
papers in this section represent one of the most comprehensive explanations of
the Japanese experience on the Shinkansen given from a systems analysis point
of view outside Japan, and in a language other than Japanese. It is very
difficult to deal with questions of fundamental research in socio-economic,
environmental, population, and other aspects of a large program without a
good background on the management and technology side of the program.
This section presents the necessary background for such continuous research
activities.

31. High-Speed Operation System:
Ground Facilities
T. VORINO
Primary Conditions
The Construction Standards for the Tokaido Shinkansen were established in
August 1961 by the Investigation Committee for Construction Standards. The
Committee was set up in April 1958 and held twenty committee meetings and
nine subcommittee meetings before establishing the Standards.
The Standards intended to meet the following three requisites for
constructing adequate ground facilities for high-speed train operation:
sufficient bearing strength of structure to sustain the load of high-speed
trains;
alignment of the track to ensure stability of high-speed running; and
adequate power supply to high-speed trains.
System for Supporting Higb-Speed Trains
LOAD CONDITIONS
At the early planning stage of the Tokaido Shinkansen, it was assumed that
the line would offer only passenger services for some time after inauguration
and that freight services would be added later. It was therefore decided that the
construction and track structure should be capable of meeting both passenger
and freight loads.
The principal dimensions of the rolling stock were decided according to the
transportation and rolling stock operation plans. The load conditions were
then set up for the purpose of structure design, as shown in Fig. 31.1.
The standard live loads for passenger electric railcars (P-Ioad) and freight
electric railcars (N-Ioad) were decided as in Fig. 31.2, which shows that each
axle load is 16 tons, whether for passenger or freight train. The difference in
axle arrangements has varying effects on the structural bearing power of
bridges, and therefore the bridges on a very small portion of the line for
exclusive passenger service were designed to meet only the P-Ioad.
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Fig.31.1. Load conditions.
N- Load (Freight train)
---------.,
I
:
____J2_!~j
00
,..-------------,
I I
I l
ULLL_l&-Jt>J
00 00
,.------------,
, I
I I
I I
Llk.--lL__.lL16J
00 00
f------
I
I
~2__!9 Axle load (t)
00
63 lUi 2B 12.21 63 J22j 28 1221 63 1221 2B 1221 6.3 Length (m)
13.5 135 I 135 13.5
P- Load (Passenger train)
00 00 00 00
1221 28 122) 12,8 12.11 2.8 Inl 12.8 Length (m)
200 20.0
Fig. 31.2. Standard loadings.
12,8 1221 28 j221 12.a
---------, ,..---------- ------., r-------------- - -., r--------
I I I I I I
I : : : : I
_12__LQ.J l!2_J.L LL!.6..J l!L!.2 !9_12J UQ_!9 Axle load (t)
00 00
TRACK STRUCTURE
It was at first suspected that ballasted track could not bear the 200-km/h
impact loads which might cause loosening and creep of ballast gravels and
make maintenance work difficult. Asphalted track and ballastless track were
at one time considered as alternatives. Continued research on the ballasted
track led to the conclusion that even under very heavy high-speed loads, the
rate of ballast sinking and deterioration could be kept down to the same limits
as for conventional railway track standards. This conclusion was based on the
assumption that the designs of the rails, rail-fastening devices, and sleepers
would be improved. The development work included the theoretical
calculation of the ballast deterioration, model tests, and field experiments on
the test-run section. In view of all these factors, it was decided that the track
structure should, except in special cases, be composed of stone ballast,
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prestressed concrete sleepers, double elastic fastening, long-welded rails, and
movable nose turnout.
Estimation of track deterioration
The magnitude of external forces which cause track deterioration is
proportional to the train load (Le. annual passing tonnage and train speed)
and is also related to the spring performance of roIling stock and to the ratio of
sprung to unsprung load. To express the influence of these external forces in
quantitative terms, the idea of the load coefficient (L) was conceived. The
degree of track deterioration due to external forces depends, however, on the
type of track structure and is proportional to the ballast pressure and ballast
vibration acceleration. This liability to deterioration was represented by the
structure coefficient (M). The dimensions and speed of rolling stock determine
the value of the coefficient L. Various values of the coefficient Mwere
obtained by combining different types of rails, sleepers, rail fastenings and
ballasts. Therefore, the product of L x M showed the degree of track
deterioration (see Fig. 31.3).
The calculation analysis showed that the coefficient (L) of the Shinkansen
was about 1.5 times as large as that of conventional 1067-mm gauge railways,
and the coefficient (M) was only 0.6 times as large. This is why, at the planning
stage, the degree of track deterioration of the Shinkansen was estimated to be
almost the same as that of the conventional track.
Rail
Use of50- Trail (53.4 kg/m). In deciding the rail type to be adopted, the rail
shape, the weight per unit of length and the composition of the material must
be considered (see Fig. 31.4).
In determining the rail weight per unit length, the following points had to be
considered:
Track deterioration
Load coefficient
Passing tonnage
Train speed
Ratio of
sprung load to
unsprung load
Structure coefficient
Ballast pressure
Ballast vibra tion
accele ration
Fig. 31.3. Track deterioration (block diagram).
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Shape, Weight per
unit length
Material
composition
Bending strength
Fatigue strength
Local stress
Track deterioration
Maintena nee
Ease of production
Strength
Weldability
Durability
Axle load
Spacing of sleepe rs
Passing tonnage
Ballast deterioration
Late ral force
Transportation,
Laying, Renewal
Fig. 31.4. Factors in the choice of rail type (block diagram).
bearing and fatigue strength of rail against the axle load and passing
tonnage;
capacity of maintenance work to cope with track deterioration (particularly
ballast); and
economic feasibility.
The adoption of 50-60-kg/m rails presented few problems of internal stress
from the axle loads in the range of 15 to 25 tons (16 tons in the case of the
Tokaido Shinkansen). Therefore, maintenance was the principal factor in
choosing the unit weight of the rail. There are two ways of preventing
increasing track deterioration: qualitative and quantitative improvement of
maintenance work and adoption of stronger track structure.
For the improvement of maintenance work on the Shinkansen, it was
expected that efficient mechanization could be realized by working at night
when trains are not running. To strengthen the track structure, heavier rails,
better rail fastening systems, stronger sleepers, and ballasts are required.
The unit rail weight was decided by economic comparison. The heavier the
rail, the stronger the track, and the less the maintenance cost, but, on the other
hand, the construction cost is higher. These comparisons were made on the
assumption that general repair work takes place every year and renewal work
every 15 to 20 years. The proposed passing tonnage was estimated at 30
million tons per year in 1969 (fifth year after inauguration) and 36 million tons
from 1972 to 1975.
The calculation to minimize the annual track maintenance and construction
costs led to the conclusion that the most economical rail weight was 52 to 53
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kg/m, corresponding to the passing tonnage for the year 1969, and 54 to 56
kg/m from 1972 to 1975. Consequently, the 53.3-kg/m rail was adopted for
the Tokaido Shinkansen.
The 60-kg/m rail in place of the 50-Trail. The rail for the Tokaido
Shinkansen was chosen to have the least possible cross section and the lightest
possible unit weight. After inauguration, however, a heavier rail was found to
be more desirable because the volume of maintenance work and passing
tonnage was greater than expected. The scarcity of maintenance labor was also
unexpected.
On the Tokaido Shinkansen, the 50-Trails are now being replace by 60-
kg/m rails because the 60 kg/m rails can be easily fitted to the present 50-T rail
fastenings and heavier rails help to reduce vibration and noise.
The Sanyo Shinkansen planned from the beginning to use the 60-kg/m rail.
Ballast
At the early stage of planning, it was proposed to make the specification for
ballast quality and grading stricter than for the conventional1067-mm track
structure. However, the short period allowed for laying, and the massive
quantity of 2,000,000 cubic meters of ballast required, forced the adoption of
the same specification as for the conventional narrow-gauge line.
The minimum depth of ballast was determined at 300 mm, except in special
cases, according to the theoretical calculation of track deterioration and
economic considerations. From the experience of actual maintenance work on
ballast structure on the Tokaido Shinkansen, it had become necessary to
develop new track systems such as direct fastening of track (slab track) to
ensure accurate alignment and maintenance free performance. On the Sanyo
Shinkansen, the slab track without ballast has been employed on a large scale.
Sleepers
Research was carried out on conventional prestressed concrete cross
sleepers. Others examined were longitudial sleepers, 10 m long, and frame-
type sleepers 1.0 to 1.9 m long. These two types have the advantage of greater
bearing area, heavier track skeleton weight and increased resistance against
ballast. This is offset by the high production cost, the length of time required
for fabrication, the laying cost and the difficulty of maintenance.
After analysis and comparison of these three types, it was concluded that
prestressed cross sleepers would be most suitable after study and
improvement.
The design requirements for cross sleepers were:
sufficient bearing strength for the repeated loads of high-speed trains;
utilization of technical data already available at home and abroad to offset
the short study period;
possibility of mass production.
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Roadbed structure
The roadbed consists of materials such as earth, concrete, and steel, which
take the form of embankments, elevated tracks, and bridges. The design
criteria for roadbed structures were drawn up taking into account the load
conditions and safety factors (see Fig. 31.5).
Table 31.1 shows the breakdown of structure on the Tokaido Shinkansen.
The embankments are built mainly in rural districts. In urban areas, where the
acquisition of right-of-way is expensive, elevated tracks were built to
economize on space.
Wide-span bridges over roads and rivers were constructed of less steel.
These, however, have been causing environmental problems of noise, and
sound-proof work is now being done on some of the steel bridges on the
Tokaido Shinkansen. After this experience, bridges on the Sanyo Shinkansen,
including wide-span bridges, were built of ballasted concrete.
System for StabUity of Higb-Speed Operation
TRACK GAUGE
The adoption of the standard gauge (1435 mm) was based on such
fundamental conditions as transporting capacity, travelling time, running
TABLE 31.1. Breakdown of structures on the Tokaido Shinkansen
Type of structure
Embankments
Elevated tracks
Bridges
Tunnels
Total length
Length (km)
274.3
115.8
57.1
68.6
515.8
(OJo)
53
23
II
13
100
Roadbed structure Strength standards
Embankment
Elevated track
Loading conditions including
seismic load. etc.
Rural district
Urban areas
River bridge, highway
ave rbridge
Ballasted concrete bridge
Noise prevention
Fig. 31.5. Roadbed structure (block diagram).
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safety and possibility of incorporating modernized systems (see Fig. 31.6). The
main technical reasons for the choice of gauge were the following:
At the early stage of the Shinkansen planning, speed records of 331 km/h
had already been recorded on the standard-gauge railway by the French
National Railways (SNCF) and more than 200 km/h in the United
Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy. Although these
were only trial run records, they indicated good prospects for commercial
operation at 200 km/h.
Some railways in other countries have a gauge of more than 1500 mm, but
they do not always show good performance in high-speed running and
riding quality. Further enlarged track gauge and car width would not
necessarily result in improved riding comfort and economy. Increasing
the number of seats on each side of the center aisle from two to three or
four would not be conducive to passenger comfort, and would only
increase the weight and width of the cars.
A track gauge of more than 1500 mm was therefore not considered
advantageous, and the international standard gauge (1435 mm) was adopted
for the Tokaido Shinkansen.
MINIMUM RADIUS OF CURVATURE
The minimum radius of curvature is one of the most important factors
limiting maximum train speed, and the maximum speed on a straight line
would not be restricted by curvature.
In determining the minimum radius of curvature the following criteria must
be satisfied (see Fig. 31.7).
Stability against car overturning
The quantity of actual cant should be set so that the high-speed train passing
on the curved track would be secure from outward overturn due to centrifugal
force and outward-directed wind force.
lnt. rnational .tanda rd I
(wide gauge, standard
gauge, narrow gauge l
Speed, transportation
~ Disadvantage of capacity,track maintenance,narrow gauge arrangements of tractions
motors
Disadvantage of Right of way. :I
wide gauge sleepe r length,
increase of car weight
Fig. 31.6. Track gauge (block diagram).
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Centrifugal force due to
the maximum speed
1-----+----1 Stability at a halt
L R1dlng quahtyMamtainabilityRadIus of curva.ture. Radius of curvature,I Z, 500 m 1-------...., 4,000 m
(Speed increase
expected in future)
Fig. 31.7. Minimum radius of curvature (block diagram).
The car should also be safe from inward overturn caused by the force of
gravity and inward-directed wind when the train is running at a low speed or is
at a halt on a curved track.
Influence on riding quality
The limit value of lateral acceleration from riding quality is estimated to be
under 0.1 g when the train runs on a curved track.
Maintenance work
The actual cant should be properly set so that the increment of maintenance
work due to unbalanced loads could be maintained within the allowable limits.
After due consideration, the Construction Standards of the Tokaido
Shinkansen prescribed that the minimum radius of curvature be 2500 m,
except in special cases, and that the maximum cant be 200 mm.
For the Sanyo Shinkansen, the minimum curvature radius was 4000 m on
ordinary sections and 3500 m in unavoidable cases, so that almost the same
riding quality could be attained as for the Tokaido Shinkansen, even at a
future speed of 250 km/h.
MAXIMUM GRADE AND LENGTH OF GRADE SECTION
The factors influencing the choice of maximum grade (see Fig. 31.8) are the
temperature rise of electric traction motors on an uphill grade, and the
temperature rise of the dynamic control resistor for braking on a downhill
grade. The temperature-disposing capacity of the latter being greater, it
follows that the temperature rise of the traction motors is the dominating
factor.
One car for the Tokaido Shinkansen was equipped with four traction
motors, each with an output of 185 kW. Under these conditions, the grade and
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Maximum grade and
corresponding length
of track
Temperature rise of traction
motors at up-hill grade
Temperature rise of dynamic
control resistor for braking at
down-hill rade
15/l 000 for ordina ry section
20/1000 for a stretch of 1 kIn or less
Fig. 31.8. Maximum grade and corresponding length of track (block diagram).
corresponding length of track are limited as follows from the temperature rise
of the main electric traction motors:
about 7 km - a grade of 15/1000,
about 1 km - a grade of 20/1000.
Accordingly, the Construction Standards provide that the maximum grade
should be:
15/1000 or less for the ordinary section,
18/1000 or less for a stretch of track not exceeding 2.5 km,
20/1000 or less for a stretch of track not exceeding 1 km.
The traction motors of the car for the Sanyo Shinkansen were increased to
an output of 200 kW x 4. Thus, the Standards for the Sanyo Shinkansen
stipulate that the maximum grade should be 15/1000 for the ordinary section
and the average grade 12/1000 or less for a lO-km stretch.
MEASURES FOR REDUCTION OF IMPACT FORCES DUE TO HIGH-SPEED
RUNNING (FIG. 31.9)
There is a growing tendency for many railways in the world to adopt long-
welded rails so as to get rid of rail joints - the vulnerable portion of the track.
For high-speed operation, the long-welded rails are necessary to keep the
ballast from deteriorating at rail joints and to lengthen the cycle of
maintenance work. These rails not only reduce the wheel pressure due to the
Measures for
reduction of
impact forces
due to high- speed
running Perceptible gravity
change by hurnan
body
Fig. 31.9. Measures for reduction of impact forces due to high-speed running (block diagram).
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rail joint impact and diminish vibration acceleration of the rails but also
decrease environmental nuisances such as vibration and noise outside the track
structure.
A new type of movable nose turnout has been developed and used on the
Shinkansen. This turnout avoids the mechanical shock which occurs at the
joint gap between the wing rail and the nose part in the conventional fixed
crossing. The movable nose turnout has a longer nose rail, and the nose tip can
be turned so as to be fixed to the wing rail. The train can then run on a
continuous line of rail without any joint gap at turnout.
The riding quality during high-speed operation is affected by the radius of
vertical curve and of transition curve. For the vertical curve, the vertical
acceleration acting on the rolling stock becomes a problem. The actual
acceleration of the conventional railway (maximum speed 110-120 km/h) is
about 0.033 g. For the Tokaido Shinkansen, the value of the vertical
acceleration was to be 0.03 g, and the corresponding radius of vertical curve
was chosen to be 10,000 m.
The length of the transition curve was chosen so as to maintain the lateral
acceleration within the limit of 0.03 g. The length of the transition curve was
chosen from the longer one, L-I, L-2, or L-3 described below.
L-I is the length of transition curve necessary for comfortable riding based
on the time-rate change of the deficient cant. The deficient cant is the
difference between the theoretical and the actual cant, the theoretical cant
being calculated from the train speed and the radius of curvature. L-2 is the
required length of transition curve determined from the limit of time-rate
change of actual cant. L-3, which is calculated from the train operation
safety, is far smaller than L-I and L-3 and is not a detemining factor.
MEASURES AGAINST AERODYNAMIC IMPACT OF HIGH-SPEED OPERAnON
The relative speed of two trains passing each other at the same speed of 250
km/h reaches 500 km/h and causes aerodynamic impacts. The results of
aerodynamic research on the conventionall067-mm gauge line at the relative
speed of 200 km/h showed maxium air pressure of 37 kg/m 2 (the equivalent
wind velocity is 20 m/s).
On the basis of this research, it was found that the air pressure could be kept
below the region of 37 kg/m2 at the relative speed of 500 km/h if the following
conditions (see Fig. 31.10) were satisfied:
streamlined train shape,
smoothly finished exterior surfaces of the carbody,
distance between trains of 0.8 m.
The distance between track centers was therefore set at 4.2 m by adding 018 m
to the width of the vehicle gauge, which was 3.4 m.
The distance between the car side and the inner edge of the workers' passage
was determined so as to secure a safe space where the workers could take
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Enlargement of the distanceI between track cente r.
Aerodynamic IS . rd· b !
'-----l.__~ ecur2.ty 0 lstanee etween
impact due to r ~ car a.nd maintenance
high-speed I workers I pas8age
running
----1 Tunnel section of double track I
--1 Streamlining the train front I
Fig. 31.10. Aerodynamic impact due to high-speed running (block diagram).
shelter safely. This distance was set at 0.8 m so that the wind velocity would be
less than 17 mis, which is the limit for the safety of the workers. All tunnels
were double-track sections since a single-track tunnel section would not allow
the track maintenance workers to carry out inspection safely under the
aerodynamic impacts.
TESTING OPERAnON ON THE MODEL LINES
To hasten the design process of the Shinkansen, a number of high-speed
experimental operations were carried out together with laboratory tests, model
tests, and theoretical analyses.
High-speed test on the conventional1067-mm gauge line
In 1960 a single-track test line was constructed over a distance of 1.3 km in
parallel with the Tokaido Line, and full-size field tests were conducted for
various types of track structures, bridges, and overhead lines. Conventional
electric express trains were employed for the tests and a maximum speed of 175
kmlh was recorded.
The measured data for the ground facilities concerned were: stress of track
components, impact force, displacement, aerodynamic impulse due to high-
speed running, noise, vibration, lateral forces, track irregularities, derailment
coefficient (the ratio of lateral force to axle load), current-collecting
performance, etc.
The basic factors necessary for the Shinkansen design were confirmed by
three field tests.
High-speed running tests on the model section of the Tokaido Shinkansen
Although the fundamental design data were obtained from the field tests, it
was still necessary to carry out actual running tests on the Shinkansen in order
to prove the safety and stability of high-speed operation before putting it into
service.
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The test section, a distance of about 40 km, was completed between
Yokohama and Odawara in June 1962, more than 2 years before the
inauguration of the line. Test runs were immediately conducted on the section
and the speed of test trains was gradually raised until it reached 210 km/h in
October 1962.
These runs tested the safety by measuring the wheel lateral force and
derailment coefficient. The lateral force did not exceed the previously fixed
limit value of 6 tons. The derailment coefficient did not exceed the safety limit.
The oscillations of the vehicles were measured on the floor just above the bogie
center. The test results showed that there was ample margin for safety. The
maximum amplitude of vertical acceleration was 0.2 g and that of lateral
acceleration 0.25 g.
The experiments also measured rail stress, the stress of rail-fastening
devices, lateral forces acting on rails, displacement of trolley wires, wind
velocity, and aerodynamic forces caused by high-speed trains. The data
confirmed that performance was maintained almost within the desired limits.
Improvements based on these results were adopted for the actual system.
Power.Supply System
The Tokaido Shinkansen connects Tokyo and Shin-Osaka, a distance of 515
km, in about 3 hours at a maximum speed of 210 km/h. This remarkable
operation demands the most reliable and economical power supply, the
technical success of which is attributable to the completion of both the
electrification and current-collecting systems. The studies for their
development were based on experiments and experience on the conventional
lines.
SELECTION OF ELECTRIFICATION SYSTEM
The choice between AC and DC was one of the most important (see Fig.
31.11). DC electrification has two advantages: light weight and simplification
of rolling-stock construction (the DC cars do not need to be equipped with
transformers and rectifiers); and ease of current insulation because oflower
supply voltage.
The DC feeder voltage, however, is limited in actual practice to about 3
kV, and a train such as the Shinkansen, with a big output, requires large
feeding current. DC electrification therefore has the following disadvantages:
greater voltage drop and consequently increased number of substations
shorter interval of substations);
the need to augment current capacity of feeder line (larger lines);
increased abrasion of pantograph and contact wire due to large amount of
current collecting at the pantograph.
The AC electrification system can supply a high voltage (20 kV or more)
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with lower currents, and this results in very much more favorable substation
intervals, feeder line capacity and current-collecting capacity than for the DC
system.
The AC system, however, has a disadvantage of inductive disturbances on
telecommunication lines and imbalance due to single-phase load on three-
phase power surfaces. To combat the inductive disturbances, a method of
reducing the rail and earth current was adopted. The installation used is
composed of a negative feeder and a booster-transformer (BT) (Fig. 31.12)
which have been applied on the conventional AC electrified sections.
The effects of unbalanced loading on the three-phase power sources were
also expected to be diminished by increasing the three-phase short circuit to the
utmost capacity at the receiving point, and by using Scott-connected
transformers employed by the conventional electrified sections.
The AC system was finally adopted for the Tokaido Shinkansen. However,
one of the disadvantages of the BT system is the complicated feeder network
necessary to counteract the electric arc that occurs at the booster sections
required by the BT system.
The Sanyo Shinkansen has adopted the new auto-transformer (AT) system
(Fig. 31.13), constructed of positive feeder and transformer, as an improved
measure against the inductive disturbance on telecommunication lines. The
AT system contributes to improved performance of the Shinkansen system in
the following ways:
there are no sections where complex devices against electric arc are required;
the feeder voltage from the levels of substations is twice the value of the BT
system;
the feeder distance can be theoretically lengthened four times as much as the
BTsystem.
L----=='-J..l..'l--'-:;----'-=---+--*---L-.l/,..-....L/,---'-__--'T:..:r"'-o=lle y wire
(contact wire)
Rail
25 kV
Fig. 31.12. Booster-transformer (BT) system.
Positive feeder
Rail
1i4-_----AbOUl lOkm -----11
Fig. 3\.13. Auto-transformer (AT) system.
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The reasons why the AT system was not employed from the very beginning
of the Tokaido Shinkansen are as follows:
the calculations of the inductive voltage and current influencing
telecommunication lines are so complicated that they need the aid of
electronic computers which were not available at the initial stage of the
Shinkansen;
it was estimated that the BT system which had been adopted on the
conventional lines could also be applied to the Shinkansen.
Thanks to the AT system, the distances between substations on the Sanyo
Shinkansen were increased, with the results that substations with greater
capacities were required to cope with the increased number of trains running
on the feeder section of substations.
It followed that substations had to receive their power supply by extra-high-
tension transmission line, and therefore special transformers were studied and
developed which considerably reduced the cost.
The average distance between substations on the Tokaido Shinkansen is 20
km, and on the Sanyo Shinkansen 50 km.
CHOICE OF FEEDER VOLTAGE
The AC system on the conventional line has been provided with a single
phase of 20 kV. For the Shinkansen, however, a system of higher feeder
voltage and lower feeder current is desirable as trains demand a greater power
run at frequent intervals on the line (see Fig. 31.14).
The AC system economizes on electric ground facilities by allowing a greater
distance between substations and ensures a trouble-free feeder system. The
feeder voltage for the Shinkansen was not restricted to the 20-kV voltage of the
conventional line. Three proposals were accordingly submitted for
consideration:
Distance between
substations
Loading conditions
Dielectric etrength of
rolling stock
Voltage drop
Insulation space in
tunnel section
(Restriction for
maximum voltage)
Feeder voltage
(Reetriction for
I m~m"m ""'".. , M'••o", '.'0" _••,,-
I J,....-----, r r_an_g_e_Io_r_rO_lI_in
g
stock
--, 25, 000 v r------1lnternational standards
Fig. 31.14. Choice of feeder voltage (block diagram).
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20 kV (conventionally employed);
20 kV (international standard);
40 kV (voltage to ground of 70-kV three-phase power, which is
commercially supplied to most parts of the Tokaido area).
The determining factors in choosing the feeder voltage were:
insulation space in tunnel sections;
dielectric strength of rolling stock;
voltage drop due to load;
distance between substations;
critical voltage and shielding problems due to accident current on
telecommunication lines.
Tunnel cross-section and insulation space
The present route of the Tokaido Shinkansen mainly follows the route of
the "bullet-train" project planned between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka in 1940.
The standard tunnel section of the Tokaido Shinkansen was chosen on the
design of the Tanna Tunnel of which some sections had already been
constructed.
The three voltage proposals were studied with special attention to
pantograph height of the rolling stock, structure of the overhead contact line,
and assurance of sufficient insulation space. The result of the study has shown
that the 20-kV and 25-kV systems are both technically possible, while the 40-
kV system would involve difficulties in maintaining the required insulation
space in the standard tunnel section.
Dielectric strength ofrolling stock
The AC 20-kV system already in use on the conventional line suggested that
the AC 25-kV system would pose few problems, although the AC 4O-kV
system might give rise to disadvantages such as enlargement of rolling-stock
gauge, increment of axle load and, finally, economic penalties.
Voltage drop and distance between substations
In comparison with the conventional lines, the Shinkansen has a larger
headway of train schedule due to the high speed and very much greater electric
loads.
For voltage drop, the distance between substations is nearly proportionate
to the square of the voltage ratio. Calculations based on some assumptions
indicate that the distance of substations corresponding to feeder voltages of 20
kV, 25 kV, and 40 kV are 15 km, 25 km, and 40 km, respectively, Le. the
higher the voltage, the greater the distance between substations.
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Shieldingjor induction on telecommunication lines
The shielding ratio of telecommunication lines should be kept at about 60010,
40%, and 30% against the feeder voltages of 20 kV, 25 kV, and 40 kV,
respectively, in order to prevent inductive disturbances on the
telecommunication lines, especially in view of the critical voltage in the case of
accident current. There are technical and economical difficulties in
maintaining the shield ratio at 30%.
Locations ojsubstations and transmission equipment
It is desirable to locate substations at favorable places where suitable power
sources could be found and connected easily with the shortest link to the
commercial power sources. The Tokaido Shinkansen runs almost parallel with
the Tokaido Line and DC substations are distributed along these lines and
connected with suitable power sources. It is therefore comparatively easy to
select the ideal locations of power-receiving points for the Shinkansen. Taking
this into consideration, discussions concentrated on a comparative study of 20
kV and 25 kV systems. In view of the advantages of a longer distance between
substations and since 25 kV was chosen for the AC electrification system in
Europe, the 25-kV system was adopted for the Tokaido Shinkansen.
HIGH-SPEED CURRENT COLLECTING
Even before the planning stage of the Shinkansen, research on increasing the
maximum running speed of conventional trains up to 130 km/h had been
carried out for pantographs and catenary systems as well as for roIling stock
and track. On the basis of these studies, a new pantograph and catenary
system adequate for 210 km/h high-speed operation has been developed.
One difficult problem was the design of a pantograph that would not suffer
uplift changes due to the wind pressure from 21O-km/h operation. High-speed
current collecting (see Fig. 3I. I5) presented problems in an almost unknown
field, since there was little previous experience at a speed of 210 km/h. The
test-manufactured pantographs finally chosen, which, after testing, showed
little upward force change and identical characteristics regardless of wind
direction, were put through a series of wind-tunnel tests and test-run
operations. In this way, a pantograph for the Shinkansen was designed, small
in size and about half the working height of the conventional pantograph.
Aluminum was chosen for the pantograph shoes and the linked frames
which support the shoes, in order to realize a lightweight pantograph, which
could follow car oscillations well during high-speed operation and would not
affect current-collecting efficiency. The standard effective range of working
height of the pantograph for the Shinkansen and for the conventional lines are
500 mm and 1000 mm, while the standard upward force of both pantographs is
5.5 kg.
The overhead contact line was studied for stabilizing current collection
during high-speed operation under three basic conditions: uniformity of
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contact line height; unvarying state of spring constant; and quick damping of
contact line oscillation.
The uniformity of contact line height from the rail level reduces the working
range of the pantograph, resulting in a smaller pantograph and therefore a
reduced effect of wind force. The height is kept uniformly at 5 m. The
overhead height of the conventional lines, however, ranges from 4.6 m at
tunnel sections to 5.2 m at grade crossings.
To ensure uniformity of spring constant in the overhead contact line system,
the following four catenary systems were chosen and given static laboratory
tests and repeated high-speed operation tests on straight tracks on the
conventional lines (maximum speed 175 km/h):
continuous mesh catenary (Fig. 31.16);
Y-line compound catenary (Fig. 31.17);
twin-simple catenary (Fig. 31.18);
composite type compound catenary with elastic and damping adjuster (Fig.
31.19).
Y -line
Auxilia ry me s senge r
wire
Fig. 31.16. Continuous mesh catenary.
Messenger wire
Fig. 31.17. Y-type compound catenary.
Messenger wire
Fig. 31.18. Twin simple catenary.
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Composite wire adjuster
Auxilia ry me SBenge r
wire
Fig. 31.19. Composite type compound catenary.
It was decided to use the composite-type compound catenary for the
Tokaido Shinkansen in view of its low construction cost and ease of assembly
at the site. However, this system showed somewhat flexible constructional
characteristics which caused great push-up deviations and vibrating
movements of contact lines every time the train passed. The metal fittings
which suspended the catenary system were very frequently loosened or broken
owing to vibration fatigue.
Temporary measures were taken to reinforce the metal fittings. For a basic
solution, however, a catenary system had to be devised that would permit little
push-Up displacement. This took shape as the heavy compound catenary type
overhead line developed and adopted for the Sanyo Shinkansen. This
overhead line is equipped with thicker contact wires, stronger tension force,
and rather rigid catenary characteristics which reduce the upward deviations
due to pantograph uplift.
The total tension of the messenger wire, auxiliary messenger, and contact
wire of the composite type compound catenary system for the Tokaido
Shinkansen is 3 tons and that of the heavy compound catenary type for the
Sanyo Shinkansen is 5.5 tons.
The catenary system of the Tokaido Shinkansen is reaching the end of its
service life and requires replacement work. It is planned to replace the old
system by the heavy compound catenary type overhead line. Renewal work is
now under way along some sections of the Tokaido Shinkansen.
32. High-Speed Operation System:
Vehicles
S.KUBO
The structure and the performance of railway vehicles are governed by the
specifications of existing track, and new vehicles have to be operated together
with older ones. It is therefore often impossible to meet the optimum
conditions expected of new vehicles.
The Shinkansen was constructed as a new railway, independent of other
lines, and, in designing it, there was much discussion of how rationally the
specifications, particularly those for track and vehicles, should be
coordinated. The vehicle system was therefore not determined independent of
the track. For convenience, however, it is dealt with in this paper separately
from the fixed facilities.
Multiple-Unit Train System
For a high-speed railway, the form of traction is no less important than the
track gauge and form of electrification when deciding on the system of train
operation (see Fig. 32.1). For the Shinkansen, the choice was made in favor of
electric multiple-unit traction, with motors on every car, for the following
reasons:
The dispersion of motive power over the whole train and the equalization of
wheel loads would reduce weight and size in the specifications for track
and structures, leading to reduction of initial construction cost.
The multiple-unit form of train facilities reverse movement, leading to
simplified facilities and operations at the terminal and to greater
utilization of station platform.
Sole reliance on the friction brake for a train running at the high speed of
about 200 km/h incurs not only danger but also enormous costs for
expendables, and it would be more rational to resort to the dynamic
brake. For this reason, a multiple-unit train with a motor on each axle was
considered suitable for such high-speed operation.
A multiple-unit train can continue to run even if some of the cars are out of
order.
An electric multiple-unit train can easily supply power to service facilities
such as air-conditioning.
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Electric Electric
multiple-unit multiple-unit Locomotive-
train train hauled train
Motive car 5 Motive cars
only and trailers
Structure of
track;
Structure of
terminal yard
Dynamic or
regenerative
brakes
Single 112 cars 3 cars II 4 cars
nlotive for a unit for a unit for a unit
Flexibilitv of 1 1train-composi-tion:
- -Distribution of
weight
Space for
equipnlent;
Weight 01 car
Price of car
I MM' unit system I
o :::. Cheaper or applicable or advantageous
A = More costly or inapplicable or disadvantageous
Fig.32.1. Form of traction.
As to the composition of the multiple-unit train, it would be preferable, in
terms of electric circuit, to combine several cars into a unit, because to make
each car an independent motive unit would increase the weight and cost.
Hence, it might have been economically more advantageous to increase the
number of cars making up a unit, but two cars were chosen as a unit because a
larger one would impair the advantages of the multiple-unit system for the
following reasons:
It would be difficult to equalize the weight of each car owing to the
increased weight of the power source equipment, such as the transformer.
Further, there would be less freedom of car employment in train
composition and, if a car went out of order, the burden imposed on the
rest of the train would increase.
The two cars are usually handled as a permanently coupled unit, but the
combination can be altered when it is desired to change the order of the
train composition or the kinds of cars. The Shinkansen cars vary in their
accommodation facilities, but they always have the same arrangement for
the main equipment installed under the floor. It is designed so as to enable
repair and inspection to be conducted in a standardized manner.
347
Determination of Vehicle Structure
As a railway exclusively for passengers, the Shinkansen aims at mass
transport, hence the vehicle gauge and structure gauge have been specified a
little wider than the VIC standards, weighing construction cost and transport
capacity (see Fig. 32.2). A major factor is the five-seat arrangement abreast,
two on one side of the aisle and three on the other, for the ordinary
accommodation car, which can seat a maximum of 110 passengers.
The length of the car should be determined so as to provide sufficient space
for passengers and space for housing the main equipment under the floor.
Further, to limit the total weight of the car to 64 tons, the length was specified
at 24 m, and the car body has been lightened by the use of thin weather-
resistant steel plate.
With the exception of the pantograph and air-conditioner, which are
mounted on the rooftop, the electric equipment and brake equipment are all
installed under the floor, so they must be both light and compact. Even the
high-voltage electric equipment, usually installed on the roof, is
accommodated under the floor, inside a locked high-voltage equipment box,
so as to protect the pantograph from air disturbances and avoid saline
contamination. The underfloor equipment is grouped into comparatively big
blocks to facilitate repair and inspection.
The toilet, provided in the odd-numbered cars, has a soil tank equipped with
a circulation-type disposer to keep the waste from being strewn. The train can
Fig. 32.2. Determination of vehicle structure.
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keep running for some 48 hours without returning to the base for the disposal
of human waste.
The basic structure of the car body and the arrangement of the equipment
follow the ordinary coach design, with whatever modifications are necessary
to suit specific use, e.g. special equipment such as power source for cooking
and kitchen appliances in the dining car.
The kinds of cars built first were the ordinary car, the "green car" (with
superior accomodation) and the buffet car. When the line was extended to
Hakata, a dining car and a car with facilities for the physically handicapped
were added.
The safety system is explained in the next paper (by Y. Muto). Here it is only
mentioned that the car body is constructed with non-combustible materials
and that the dining car is equipped with a fire sensor and fire extinguisher.
Table 32.1 gives the main features of a Shinkansen train, and Fig. 32.3
shows the structure of the Hikari train.
Determination of Vehicle Performance
Several factors must be taken into account in determining the performance
of rolling stock. It is impossible to change the performance character of the
all-motored multiple-unit train by changing the number of cars, although this
can be done with locomotive-hauled trains; neither can surplus output be
allowed since it would increase the weight and price of the cars. Therefore, a
compact, rigidly trimmed vehicle design is required (see Fig. 32.4).
The performance characteristics of the vehicle were taken into account in
choosing the route and location of the stations for the Shinkansen, and a
standard was set on the maximum grade and the minimum station-to-station
distance.
Once the detailed plan for tracks is established, it is possible to determine
the performance characteristics required of the vehicles minutely by
computerized simulation, based on such data as the track grade, and the
location of tunnels and stations.
The maximum permissible speed of the vehicles in use at present is 210 km/h
but, for speedier service in the future, vehicles capable of running at 260 km/h
have also been produced on a trial basis. Unlike ordinary trains, the
Shinkansen train is run at 200 km/h constantly between stations, so it is
required to attain the maximum speed in a comparatively short time. Its
average acceleration rate is therefore 1 km per second.
The tractive force of the vehicle, which is directly related to its output, is
determined from the track gradient, running resistance, the interval between
start and stop, etc. The maximum grade is specified as 15 per mil, or 12 per mil
if continuous, so that high-speed operation may be maintained and the
braking distance and brake capacity may not become unduly great. The
running resistance naturally increases with the speed. As this is particularly so
in a tunnel, this effect cannot be overlooked in Japan where there are many
tunnels. The distance between stations also has a great effect on the output.
Since the Kodama train, which stops at each station, runs equally as fast (200
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TABLE 32.1. Main features ofa Shinkansen train
Item Description
Braking
Rated capacity
Air conditioning
Gear ratio
Type
Wheel base
Wheel diameter
Length over couplers 25,000.25,150 (Mc, Mc')
Width of car body 3383
Maximum height 3975 (M). 4325 (Mc). 4490 (M')
Distance between bogie centers 17,500
Type DT200 type two-axle bogie, IS type axle-box
supporting device and air-spring are used
2500mm
910mm monoblocked wheel with brake
disks
25 kV, 60 Hz
1440kW
3700 kg/167 km/h
21Okm/h
MT200B type DC series winding motor,
4S-2P
185 kW, 415 V, 490 A (cont.) 225 kW (I h)
Parallel cardan driving system with gear
coupling
Helical gear 29:63 = 1:2.17
TM201 shell type, silicone-oil circulating,
forced ventilation
Primary: 1650, Secondary: 1500
Tertiary: 150kVA
RS20I type silicon rectifier, forced ventilation
1627 kW (cont.)
S1800 type (2500 V, 800 A) diodes 6S-IP-4A
Low-tension side tap control, LTC 200A type
motored cam-shaft controller (25 steps)
Dynamic brake and electropneumatic straight
air brake, CS46 type motored cam-shaft
controller
Tertiary (single phase) 220 V
Two-phases 100 Vm 60 Hz, 20 kV
Single-phase 100 V, 60 Hz
Sirocco-fan 380 mm Aq, 30 m'/min (for air
intake and exhaust)
Unit type heat pump mounted on the ceiling,
7-12 units/car
4500 kcal (cooling) unit
2500 kcal (heating) unit
Single side band, frequency modulation type
Speed-pattern comparison type
Duplex plus checking system
Command in accordance with
two out of three
Electric system
Output
Tractive effort speed
Maximum speed
Type and connection
Main transformer
Motor-generator
Invertor
Ventilation
Type
Rated capacity
Number of elements
Powering
Rated capacity
Type
Signal receiveT
Speed checker
System construction
Overall dimensions
(mm)
Main rectifier
Performance of
two-car unit
(cont.)
Running gear
Main transformer
Bogie
Traction motor
Passenger service
device
Control system
and type of
controller
ATC system
Service power
km/h) between stations as the Hikari train, which makes only limited stops so
as to maintain the' 'parallel diagram" , enlargement of the output would be
inevitable if the distances between stations were short.
As the average distance between stations was shorter and the tunnel sections
greater on the Sanyo Shinkansen than on the Tokaido Shinkansen, the output
of the traction motor of the newly built cars was made larger. For this
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Fig. 32.4. Determination of vehicle performance.
purpose, the temperature rise of the traction motor and main transformer was
calculated beforehand by simulation.
To enable the train to keep running without any delay, and make use ofthe
advantages of the multiple-unit system, even when one unit of cars is out of
order, the cars are designed to have a margin of output to cover the output of
the dead unit.
Facton Making Hlgb-Speed Operation Possible
HIGH-SPEED BOGIE
Running stability
In designing vehicles for high-speed operation, the securing of running
stability is fundamental, since the conventional bogie construction is apt to
cause self-exciting hunting motion. To solve the problem, the present bogie
design evolved from comparative studies of several types of bogies produced
on trial and the improvements after basic research at the Railway Technical
Research Institute (see Fig. 32.5).
The methods for preventing bogie hunting motion are as follows:
minimal inclination of wheel tread;
assurance that there is no play in the axle box supporting device which
connects the wheel set with the bogie frame, and that it has appropriate
longitudinal as well as lateral rigidity; and
suitable resistance in rotation between bogie and car body.
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Fig. 32.5. Bogie construction for high-speed running.
The incline of the wheel tread, 1/40, was made smaller than that of the cars
for other lines, and the IS type axle box supporting device is a new idea which
combines flat springs and rubber bushings.
The body weight is supported by side bearers and, for suitable resistance in
rotation, a synthetic resin bearer seat is fixed on the bogie frame.
In addition to suppressing hunting motion and reducing lateral force, it is
important to minimize wheel-load fluctuation. Although this is closely related
to the evenness of the track, it is one of the major concerns of railway vehicle
designers, since a heavy wheel load accelerates the deterioration of the track
and a light wheel load increases the derailment quotient. To reduce wheel-load
fluctuation for vehicle structure, the significant factors are: reduction of
unsprung mass, true circularity of the wheel, and dynamic balance of rotating
parts.
As the traction motor is mounted on the bogie and connected with the gear
rigging by toothed wheel coupling, the unsprung load is the weight of the
wheel and axle and about half of the gear box. The whole surface of the wheel
is machined as the brake disk is fitted on the side, so dynamic balance of the
wheel is very good. The brake disks are symmetrical, which also contributes to
good dynamic balance.
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Securing adhesion
The securing of adequate adhesion between wheel and rail is very important
for high-speed operation. A multiple-unit train with all cars powered does not
require so high an adhesive force for acceleration as the locomotive, but it is
apt to skid when braked. The adhesion coefficient decreases remarkably when
the rail is rusty, as in the early morning, and when it is snowing or raining.
A wheel tread brake is not used in case it should deform the tread, but a tire-
cleaner is used to rid the surface of contamination, thus preventing
degradation of the adhesive force. There is also a skid-detecting device to
control the brake force and prevent wheel flats.
Strengthening ofbogie parts to withstand repeated fatigue
If the vehicle is to run at 200 km/h over most of the line, as for the
Shinkansen, it must not only have good running stability, but also a bogie
strong enough to withstand the heavy repeated stress sustained by its parts.
JNR's Railway Technical Research Institute has a machine to test the
repeated fatigue of the wheel, axle, and bearings, and has obtained data for
improvement of materials and shape. But, in view of the extremely high
working rate of the Shinkansen cars, amounting to an average of 1200 car-km
per day, their wheels, axles, bearings, and springs are closely examined
whenever the cars undergo general overhaul, and thus field data on metal
fatigue have been obtained.
Based on those data, repeated improvements have been made since the
opening of the line on the shape of the axle, the method of heat hardening, the
material of bearings, the processing method, etc., and the reliability of the
product has been raised.
AERODYNAMIC PROBLEMS
Considering the high speed of the train, the air resistance and aerodynamic
problems cannot be overlooked. As regards the shape of the car body, a
contour determined by wind-tunnel experiments to be least liable to resistance
was chosen. The rooftop was made as flat and smooth as possible by removing
any projecting objects that might adversely affect the stability of pantographs,
and housing them all under the floor. Wind-tunnel experiments were also
made to determine the shape of the pantograph which would minimize the
effect of wind pressure on its push-up pressure.
The train speed affects the intake and discharge of the air used for cooling
the equipment, and therefore the vanes shaped for small head loss were chosen
after the wind-tunnel experiments.
The air pressure changes abruptly when a high-speed train enters a tunnel,
and although its impact on the window pane and car body is not great, it is
unpleasant to the ear of the passenger. Therefore, the vehicle as a whole is
made airtight and ventilated through a duct provided with cutoff valves. The
valves are worked by a device placed at the entrance of the tunnel, and the
I
i:\
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whole car is shut off from outside air while the train is in a tunnel. By this
method, the ventilation becomes inadequate as the tunnel becomes longer. For
this reason, the Hikari cars, which run straight to the Sanyo Shinkansen, are
ventilated by the subsequently developed turbofan and the inside air pressure
is kept constant.
MOTIVE POWER CONTROL SYSTEM
To determine the appropriate system for the traction motor and its control,
a number of parts were produced on trial and compared. It happened to be the
time when the silicon rectifier elements for electric power conversion were
beginning to find practical use. Reliability tests on this type of rectifier
produced good results, so it was decided to adopt the rectifier method using a
DC motor of simple winding (see Fig. 32.6).
It was known that the rate of pulsating current in the rectified circuit
accounted for different degrees of inductive disturbance of telecommunication
lines. Hence, a car whose rectified circuit had a pulsating rate of about 30070,
as had been used in the past, and another of high pulsating rate (50%), with
laminated yoke traction motor, were produced for testing. The commutation
of the traction motors and inductive disturbance was also investigated. Based
on the findings, the rectifier of higher pulsating rate was adopted.
For the control of the traction motor, the voltage control was adopted,
I Tap control
I
ITap control
I
Thyrister
at low at high control
tension side tens ion side I
Space [or I (,lot put toinsulatlOn practicrtl use
at the time)
Inflammability
Silicon
rectifier
DC motor DC motor
with high with low Commutator
pulsating pulsating motor
factors factors
1CommutationMa i nte nance of
carbon brushes
~
Inductive
disturbance to
telecom-
munica tion
o = Cheaper or applicable or advantageous
£::J. = More costly or inapplicable or disadvantageous
Fig. 32.6. Power control system.
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which made the most of the characteristics of the AC vehicle. To safeguard the
equipment housed under the floor, the low-voltage tap-changing method was
adopted, and noncombustible silicon oil was used for the insulating oil of the
main transformer.
Since the traction motor is affected directly by high-speed operation, its
centrifugal force and commutation characteristics have been carefully
attended to. Reduction of weight was of great importance to the equipment of
the main circuit as a whole. A great effort was therefore made to design a
small, lightweight, structure, employing new insulating materials and to make
the allowable limit of temperature rise as high as practicable.
BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEM
The braking system of a high-speed railway is one of the most important for
safe operation at high speed. The brake should be capable of absorbing the
extraordinary energy and, preferably, should not increase the volume of
maintenance work. Its control should be failsafe and its reliability maintained
by multiplex systems and other means (see Fig. 32.7).
Snow, rain
Gradient (down)
Vehicle weight
Power supply
systelTI
Protective
power stoppage
o = Cheaper or applicable or advantageou8
6. = More costly or inapplicable or
disadvantageou8
Fig. 32.7. Brake control system.
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Normal braking consists of the dynamic brake and the pneumatic brake,
each working with a varied braking force depending upon the following speed
range:
210-160 km/h
160-110 km/h
110- 70 km/h
70- Okm/h
1.5 km/h per second
1.9 km/h per second (on level track)
2.4 km/h per second
3.6 km/h per second
Normally, the dynamic brake precedes the pneumatic brake and is
automatically switched over to the pneumatic brake when the train speed has
lowered to 50 km/h or below, or when it has failed.
When the train is running on the main line, the ATC (Automatic Train
Control) system normally issues the braking command, and hence the driver
works the manual brake only when he adjusts the train halting spot at stations
or when the speed has to be further stepped down in a low-speed section.
Before arriving at the present system, the following brake control systems
were studied and compared:
(1) All-electric control system
A system where brake commands are analog-controlled from the head-
end car.
(2) Pneumatic pressure-control system by straight airpipe
(i) Brake commands are given by pneumatic pressure to the brake
controller of all cars, and their feedback is made by a straight air
pipe extending through the whole train.
(ii) Brake commands are given by electric circuit to the brake controller
of all cars, and their feedback is made by the straight air pipe
extending through the whole train.
(3) Pneumatic pressure-control system by brake pipe
The brake pipe pressure is controlled directly by brake valve or the
electric analog controller which is worked by ATC commands, and the
brake pipe pressure is fed back electropneumatically by pneumatic
pressure convertor.
Method (1) had not been developed when the Shinkansen was being
designed. Of the two methods under (2), the first had been tried with the
vehicles on the other lines, and the second was tested to ascertain its reliability,
but adequate results were not obtained. Method (3) was found to be no better
than the SAP system as it required increased equipment.
The electromagnetically controlled straight air-pipe system previously used
was eventually adopted, and, as a supplement, an urgent brake worked off-
control by electric circuit was additionally installed to back up the regular
braking in cases of failure of the straight brake or other exceptional cases such
as separation of the train. This is a very simple system and its braking force is
constant irrespective of train speed.
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Research and Development
In developing the technology for the Shinkansen vehicles, fundamental
problems of high-speed running were studied by the Railway Technical
Research Institute, based on experiences with the high-speed electric multiple-
unit trains and AC vehicles used on the existing JNR lines. Table 32.2 gives the
TABLE 32.2. Sequence ofresearch and development
Parts Combination test Vehicle
Railway Technical Basic Study
Research Institute
Existing line High-speed test
(l7S km/h)
Rolling Stock Design Designing of parts for trial production
Office
Manufacturer
Railway Technical
Research Institute
Trial production
Main circuit
equipment
Bogie
Brake equipment
Wind-tunnel test High-speed test
Bogie
Running gear
Hamamatsu Workshop Trial production of steel
body and strength test
Rolling Stock Design Designing of test purpose vehicle
Office
Manufacturer
Railway Technical
Research Institute
Production of parts on
trial
Wind-tunnel test
Test of main circuit
equipment
combination
Test of auxiliary circuit
equipment
combination
High-speed test of bogie
Production of test-
purpose vehicle
A:2cars
B:4 cars
Model line Test run of test-purpose
vehicle
Record:2S6 km/h
Rolling Stock Design Designing of commercial vehicle
Office
Manufacturer
Railway Technical
Research Institute
Model line
Mass production of Test of main circuit
parts for commercial- equipment
use vehicle combination
Test of auxiliary circuit
equipment
combination
High-speed test of bogie
Production of
commercial-use
vehicle
Test run of first 6 cars
of commercial-use
vehicle
358
sequence of research and development work. Trial parts were designed by a
project team, including the engineers of manufacturers, in accordance with the
standard specification laid down by the Rolling Stock Design Office, an organ
of the JNR Head Office. The performances of the trial-produced parts were
checked and their various combinations with other kinds of equipment were
tested and compared. Data for the bogie and traction motor were obtained at
the high-speed bogie testing plant in the Railway Technical Research Institute.
The pantograph, which is much affected by wind velocity, underwent repeated
wind-tunnel experiments with actual models. When new materials were to be
used, their reliability was tested by repeated load and heat cycle tests.
All these data constituted the foundation for the manufacture in 1962 of six
cars built for test, arranged so that several different kinds of parts could be
used and compared. The six cars were brought to the test-run section (model
track) completed earlier in the same year, and given overall tests, including
interaction with the way facilities. The speed was successfully raised to 256
km/h, and much valuable data was obtained. The change of air pressure when
a train rushes into a tunnel at high speed was one of the phenomena discovered
on this model track.
The vehicle judged from the test results to be the most stable was selected
from the trial cars, and further improvement was made on it from the
maintenance standpoint. Thus, the vehicle for commercial service was created.
The vehicles and the numerous parts are manufactured by more than one
company, but all deliveries are of exactly the same construction, since all parts
are standardized through joint design by the Rolling Stock Design Office and
the manufacturer. This is important for interchangeability and maintenance
practice.
A series of tests was made for mass production of the parts: first with the
individual part, and then with the individual part used in combination with
other parts; finally, the overall performance test was made with the first six
cars produced ahead of the rest, and run on the model line. In this way, the
improvements made were incorporated in the subsequent commercial vehicles.
Despite these precautions, some problems remained after the inauguration
of the line; for example, the effects of weather conditions such as snow, and
certain passenger amenities. These problems were solved whenever they arose,
and 3 years after inauguration, stability was achieved.
33. Accident Prevention System
Y.MUTO
Aims of the System
The system for preventing accidents during train operation is designed to
satisfy the following conditions:
the designated speed should not be exceeded;
there should be adequate preventive measures against obstruction on the
track, but in the event of obstruction, the train should be adequately
protected;
natural disaster should be forecast and damage minimized;
disruption of train operation due to installation breakdown should be small,
and in the event of such disruption, rehabilitation should be adequate.
Speed-Control System
To keep the train within the designated speed is an essential point in railway
accident prevention. (The term "designated speed" includes 0 km/h, i.e.
stopping of train.)
The framework of the speed-control system for the Shinkansen train,
running at 210 km/h, is as follows (the design principles of signalling facilities
are also given):
determination of the designated speed;
notification to the driver of the designated speed; and
method of compliance with the designated speed.
DETERMINATION OF DESIGNATED SPEED
The maximum speed for the Shinkansen train is 210 km/h, on the basis of
the available railway technology and the potential for further technological
development. Although the feasibility of 250 km/h was suggested by engineers
of the JNR Railway Technical Research Institute, the maximum speed was set
at 210 km/h after analysis of the factors concerned, including economy (see
Fig. 33.1).
This maximum speed applies when there are no special speed-limiting
conditions. In the following conditions, however, speed must be decreased:
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Maximum speed
Accumulation of railway technology
Technical development
Economy
Distance from preceding train
Slowdown due to
maintenance work
Permitted speed at turnout
Radius of curvature, cant
Route setting for
station yard
Track conditions
Braking distance
Restricted speed
Fig. 33.1. Determination of designated speed (block diagram).
on approaching a preceding train;
on entering a station;
when the radius of track curvature is small;
when track maintenance work is under way, or track condition is not good.
The braking distance of a train at 210 km/h is about 3000 m in a level
section, and reaches 4000 m in a descending grade. To stop the train at a
required point, the stop signal must be indicated at a point 5 to 6 km in front,
because allowance must be made for the time lag between the driver's signal
identification and his brake handling, and the resulting difference in braking
distance. If this section of 5 to 6 km is treated as one section of the stop signal,
the train would stop at a point far in front of the required spot when it enters
the section at low speed. Therefore, this section is divided into two, with the
160-km/h speed indication given in the first 3-km section, and the stop signal
in the remaining section.
The speed of 160 km/h was chosen because the braking distance for
reducing speed from 210 km/h to 160 km/h is about the same as for reduction
from 160 km/h to a stop. For the 3-km section with stop signal indication, the
actual handling is, however, as follows:
the 30 km/h signal is indicated first;
when speed has been reduced to below 30 km/h, that speed is allowed;
the stop signal is indicated at about 100 m in front of the required stopping
point.
This 3-km section, called a block section, is set up by making use of the
track circuit, Le. rails, partitioned by insulation every 3 km, are used as
conductor of the track circuit. When a train enters a block section, the rails are
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short-circuited by the wheels and axles, thus indicating the presence of a train
and showing the 30-km/h signal in the section 3 km behind and the 160 km/h
signal for the section a further 3 km behind, as shown in Fig. 33.2.
In addition to these four kinds of speed limit for the Shinkansen (210 km/h,
160 km/h, 30 km/h and 0 km/h), two other speed limits have been set: the
11O-km/h limit for the section with small radius curvature and the 70-km/h
limit when the train passes over the turnout side on entering a station. The
length of the block sections for these special signals is less than 3 km,
according to each braking distance, as shown in Fig. 33.3.
For slowdown due to track maintenance work or for other reasons, the 160-
km/h and 70-km/h signals are used. In this case, when the required procedure
is followed, even if there is no train ahead, speed signals exceeding 160 km/h
or 70 km/h will not be indicated.
Table 33.1 shows the designated speeds for the Shinkansen.
TABLE 33.1. Stages ofspeed control by A TC
Stage of speed
control (km/h) Controlled item
210
160
110
70
30
o
Maximum speed for commercial operation
Gradual speed decrease, speed limit for sharp curve, slowdown operation
Speed limit for sharp curve, slowdown operation
Speed limit for passage over turnout side, slowdown operation
Last stage of gradual speed decrease
Stop
Speed
(km/h)
210 km/h
200 _
160 km/h
150
50 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
When confirmation
button is not pressed
,
'Stop
30 signal :Signa
.
100 - - -. - - - - . - - _. -- - . -
o a out
3 km
Followi g
-+~...u.iLU4--i~ ::.~--+-..;
Signal indication
of following 210 signal 160 signal
train
Fig. 33.2. Function of ATC between stations (when a train approaches a preceding train).
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Speed
(km/h) 210km/h
200 - - - - - - - - •
160 km/h
150 - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - . -
100 - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - -
bb
50 - - - .. - - --
~out about
-f out .......Is3 km~"'" 3 km 2_41,m~200- 600 m ,
: I Platform I :
:/ .....B point : :
,iSignal 210 signal 160 signal 70 signal 30 signal hopindication
Fig. 33.3. Function of ATC when coming to a stop at station.
METHODS FOR INDICATING DESIGNATED SPEED
On the conventional lines, the driver is notified of the designated speed by
the wayside signal that indicates three kinds of color signs: blue for proceed,
yellow for caution, and red for stop. When the train approaches a red signal,
an alarm sounds in the cab and warns the driver to use the brake. If he fails to
do so, the Automatic Train Stop System (ATS) functions and stops the train
automatically.
It is not sufficient, however, to apply this method to the Shinkansen because
first, it is almost impossible for the driver in the cab to distinguish wayside
signals when the train is running at 210 km/h, and, second, there are
numerous kinds of speed limit. The Automatic Train Control System (ATC)
was therefore developed (see Fig. 33.4) in which the designated speed is
indicated on a panel in the driver's cab. The actual speed is compared with the
designated speed. Being interlocked with the brake device, the actual speed is
automatically lowered to the designated speed and the brake is then
automatically released.
In this system, the information on the designated speed is composed by the
relay equipment in the signalling device room, on the basis of factors such as
the distance from the preceding train and route conditions in the station to be
entered. This information is transmitted as AC of about I kHz to the track
circuit forming the block section described above. The signal current is
induced in the receiving antenna installed under the car body, causing the ATC
receiver to indicate the designated signal.
If there is no train, the signal current running through the track circuit goes
back to the signalling device room to be received by the ATC receiver there.
When a train enters the track circuit, the signal current to the ATC receiver
in the signalling device is interrupted owing to the short-circuit of the current
Ada;>tability for
high-speed operation
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'--------1 Cab signal system
(Transmitting of
speed signal)
,
: (Automatic)
I
Fig. 33.4. Methods for indicating designated speed (block diagram).
by the wheel and axle, thus detecting the presence of the train. This
information is put into the logical circuit of the ATC, and by deciding the
speed conditions in the block sections (track circuits) behind, corresponding
ATC signals are formed and transmitted. These actions are carried out each
time the train enters adjacent block sections. The framework of ATC is as
shown in Fig. 33.5.
When the train is running outside the station yard, speed conditions in the
track circuits behind the train are decided by the position of the preceding
train. In the station yard, the route condition in the yard is also dealt with, i.e.
setting the turnout for the direction of the track which the train is to enter,
locking it to prevent turning before the train passes through, and then
indicating the "proceed" signal.
In the conventional lines, each track has its home signal and starting signal
to let the train enter or leave the station. To secure safety by connecting these
signal indications and route setting, including turnout locking, the relay
interlocking device is used. This device is also applied at the Shinkansen
stations to secure the safety of the route. The ATC speed is used for home or
starting signals, indicating in the driver's cab the speed signal corresponding to
the speed restriction when passing through the turnout. The following signals
are shown:
for a train not scheduled to stop at the station - 21O-km/h signal;
for a train scheduled to stop - 70-km/h signal for passing through the
turnout, and 30-km/h signal on reaching the platform at which it is to
stop.
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There is therefore no wayside starting or home signal for each track.
In the conventional lines, route setting at the station is carried out by the
stationmaster according to the scheduled arrival or departure time of the train.
For the Shinkansen, this process is centralized in the General Control Center in
Tokyo. The Centralized Traffic Control System (CTC), which had been
experimentally used in a few of the conventional lines, has been improved to a
high standard by the introduction of modern electric technology, and is used
on the Shinkansen. With this system, the location and number of every train
can be known at the Control Center, and in case of disruption of operation,
adequate counter-measures can be swiftly taken. Every train is equipped with
wireless telephone so that the engine-driver and the dispatcher can
communicate directly.
In the early stages of the Shinkansen, route setting at each station was
carried out each time by the dispatcher in the Control Center with the aid of
the train location and number indication panel. As the number of trains
increased, however, this process had to be automated. The Automatic Route
Control System (ARC) was therefore introduced in the first stage and the
Computer-aided Traffic Control System (COMTRAC) in the second.
In ARC, automatic route setting for intermediate stations is carried out as
follows:
a train approaching a station sends out a signal electric wave toward the
track surface to indicate whether it will stop at the station.
the receiver coil on the track, on receiving this signal wave, sends the
information to the route-controlling device, which sets the route for the
train.
In COMTRAC, the train diagram (time-table) for the day is stored in
advance in the computer, and the location and number of the trains are input
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by CTC so that the proper route will be outputted to operate the route-
controlling device through CTC when a train approaches a station. In this
system, automatic route-setting can be performed not only for intermediate
stations but also for terminal stations with several tracks.
COMTRAC also has the following functions:
to monitor constantly the state of train operation;
to calculate train delay time and display it whenever required by the
dispatcher;
to warn of considerable delay so that appropriate measures, such as
modification of the train diagram, can be taken.
Should COMTRAC break down, the following alternatives take its place:
ARC, the first-stage automatic system, is used for route setting in
intermediate stations;
route setting in terminal stations is done manually by the dispatcher in the
Control Center;
in case of breakdown of CTC itself, route setting is done by the
stationmaster in the same way for conventional lines in which case, ARC
can be used for intermediate stations.
Recently, CTC has also been widely applied to conventional lines, bringing
the lines under CTC to about 4500 km.
Misoperation by COMTRAC or dispatcher in route setting for a station or
misinformation to the station route-setting device due to lowered performance
of CTC transmission can be checked by the relay interlocking device. For
example, route setting into a track already occupied by another train, or
indication of a 21O-km/h signal for passing into the turnout side, can be
prevented without fail.
Even when a train scheduled to pass through a station erroneously takes the
route of a train scheduled to stop at the station, the speed when passing
through the turnout is automatically brought to under 70 km/h, and finally to
a stop. Measures for prevention of train accidents such as rear-end collision
and derailment are thus performed through both ATC and the relay
interlocking device equipped at each station, independently of CTC or
COMTRAC.
SPEED-CONTROL SYSTEM
The speed-controlling function of the ATC system is characterized by
automation of deceleration control, Le. when the actual speed exceeds the
designated speed, it is automatically braked to the designated speed (see Fig.
33.6). Acceleration, however, is performed solely by the driver, with only the
cab signal rendered. Furthermore, the speed range subject to ATC automatic
deceleration control is, as a rule, from 210 km/h to 30 km/h, and the action
for stopping a train at the station is performed manually by the driver.
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Manual braking
dy driver
(Acceleration)
Fig. 33.6. Speed-control system (block diagram).
To prevent overrunning due to the driver's mishandling in stopping, an
overrun-protection device is installed about 50 m in front of the point where
the train has to stop absolutely. The stop signal transmitted from this device is
received by the receiving antenna, causing the emergency brake to be applied
automatically. The length of 50 m corresponds to the braking distance of the
emergency brake at the train speed of 30 km/h. The guiding stop mark for the
driver has therefore been placed at a point about 60 m in front of the absolute
stop point.
For completely automatic operation without a driver on board, technical
development and tests for practical use have been completed for both the
designated constant-speed operation and stopping of the train at the
designated point by mini-computer. However, it is not at present planned to
put this into practice because even during automatic operation, at least one
technician is needed on board for temporary repairs of the rolling stock in case
of trouble, and the passengers would become uneasy if there were no driver. In
addition, the driver also acts as monitor. Various disorders have often been
detected at an early stage through the driver's report by train radio of
abnormal phenomena perceived during operation, e.g. excess vibration and
instantaneous change of cab signal indication.
PRINCIPLES IN DESIGNING SIGNALLING DEVICES
New systems for train control, such as ATC, CTC, ARC and COMTRAC,
have been developed and put into practice in a short time. This is mostly due to
the earlier efforts of JNR staff in introducing new technology to the
conventional lines. For example, the adoption of the AC electrification system
made it impossible to use the track circuit of commercial frequency which had
been used for the DC electrified section, but the audiofrequency AC track
circuit of the I-kHz band had already been developed. Also, the introduction
of the cab alarm equipment for preventing signal violation established the
system for taking the information transmitted from the track into the cab.
These technical achievements have greatly contributed to the development of
the ATC system.
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The principles in designing these signalling devices (see Fig. 33.7) are as
follows:
to increase the reliability of the device in order to prevent its breakdown;
to design the device to work on the fail-safe principle.
The principal measures for increasing the reliability of signalling devices are
as follows:
to duplicate the system, and detect and repair at an early stage any disorder
on one side by constant monitoring and periodical inspection;
to replace the electronic tube and relays by solid-state electronic equipment
such as the transistor and to replace the rotary equipment by stationary
equipment;
instead of accommodating instruments separately in boxes near the wayside,
to house them together in a strongly built air-conditioned room
unaffected by the vibration of passing trains, in the optimum
environment for stable operation;
for quick repair of equipment, to set up a device indicating the point of
failure and the measuring terminal for failure detection and to design unit
parts so that they can be replaced;
to establish substitutive measures in breakdown of equipment.
To secure "fail-safe", equipment has also been designed to stop the train
when the system fails. The principal methods are:
to construct the wiring of the relay so that the proceed signal is indicated
when the moving contact touches the upper terminal, and the stop signal
tbitization of parts
Establishment of substitutive measures
<t-- Electronic tube
Duplication
Transistor
Stationary
equipmentHigh reliability
Fail· safe
Stop signal indicated at dropaway side
of relay contact
Fig. 33.7. Principles in designing signalling devices (block diagram).
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is indicated when it touches the lower terminal. In this way the contact
touches the lower terminal by gravity when the relay fails, indicating the
stop signal.
to construct the wiring of the relay so that the proceed signal is indicated
when the electric current flows, and the stop signal or no signal is
indicated when the current stops. In this way, the stop signal or no signal
is indicated when the relay coil breaks or the cable on a route breaks or
short-circuits, and the train is then made to stop.
to constantly monitor multicore cables by means of the core contact-
detecting device so that the device may work automatically to suspend all
transmission through the cable concerned in case contact is detected. This
is because, when multicore cable is used for transmitting ATC signals, the
possibility exists that a signal may be changed to the improper upper-level
signal by the contact of cores in the cable.
to construct the circuit with enough noise-suppressing characteristics for
the ATC not to indicate erroneous signals due to the noise induced from
the power source or to the cross-talk of different circuits and to form the
circuit so that preference will be given to the lower-level signal when two
or more signals are erroneously received.
Track-Obstruction-Protection System
When there is an obstacle in the way of a train on the Shinkansen track, the
train must be stopped. When the obstacle is the preceding train, the following
train is automatically stopped by ATC. When the obstacle is not a train,
however, it cannot be detected by ATC.
In the conventional lines, the driver constantly watches ahead, and when he
finds an obstacle he stops the train by using the emergency brake. Moreover,
ground patrolmen notify the engine-driver of the obstacle by a signalling
detonator or a signalling fuse.
These methods are not adequate for the Shinkansen trains because of their
extremely high speed and long braking distance. The roadbed structure itself
has therefore been devised to prevent obstacles, and a system has been
introduced to detect an obstruction and to make the train stop immediately.
PREVENTION OF TRACK OBSTRUCTION
As most track obstructions on the conventional lines occur on rail/road
crossings, the following protective measures have been taken for the
Shinkansen:
to construct all crossings on a different level from the road;
in making the separate levels, to erect protective fences to avoid damage to
the girders by the cargo of automobiles when the road goes under the
track and to prevent the automobiles from falling when the road goes
above the line;
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to fence off the entire line from intruders and enact special laws to prohibit
trespass on the track.
DETECTION OF TRACK OBSTRUCTION AND TRAIN PROTECTION
In addition to the above preventive measures, the following steps have been
taken to deal with obstruction on the Shinkansen line.
Clearance-obstruction indicator
Clearance-obstruction indicators have been installed at points where any
other railway line or road runs very near, in order to detect the intrusion of
automobiles or other trains on the track. When an intrusion occurs, the
detection rods of the clearance indicator are knocked down, cutting the electric
circuit, and making the ATC indicate the stop signal.
In this system the priciple of fail-safe has also been applied, Le. even in the
case of breakdown of the clearance-obstruction indicator itself or breakage of
the cable connecting this indicator with the ATC equipment room, ATC
indicates the stop signal. Such breakdowns can thus be detected immediately,
and trains are made to stop.
Detection by patrolmen ofdanger to trains
Train-protection switches are installed along the pathway at 250-m intervals
to be used by the equipment maintenance patrolmen. By pushing this switch,
the track circuit is short-circuited in an emergency and ATC indicates the stop
signal.
Train protection by driver
The emergency ground switch (EGS) installed in the cab is handled by the
driver of the train to cut the electric power for train operation, making all
trains nearby stop running.
Other methods
A strong guard is installed at the front end so that the train itself can remove
obstacles such as stones from the track. The front part of the cab is also
strongly built.
Maintenance work on the Shinkansen track is carried out at night during a
special time zone. When the work is over, a confirmation car is operated prior
to the operation of the first commercial train for the day.
Measures have been studied for automatic detection of obstacles on the
track by the running train itself and methods of constant watch on the ground,
but effective and economical measures have not yet been found. Even if
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found, they would not prevent an accident if an obstacle suddenly appeared in
front of the running train.
Preference was therefore given to construction work to prevent automobiles
and rocks from falling on the track, and to strengthening slopes to prevent
landslides.
System for Prevention of Accidents due to Natural Disaster
Natural disasters must be taken fully into consideration in securing safe
operation of trains. Japan is subject to natural disasters owing to its
geographical situation, and special measures must be taken to deal with them
immediately and adequately.
For the Shinkansen, the following measures for safe operation, including
improvement of the weather-information system, have been achieved by
utilizing statistical studies and past experience.
WIND
The main winds affecting train operation in Japan are typhoons and
monsoons. Typhoons strike Japan in late summer and early autumn, and
monsoons blow with the passing of atmospheric depressions in late winter and
early spring. The velocity of the typhoon is, in most cases, 20 to 40 mis, and in
rare cases about 50 m/s. The velocity of the monsoon ranges from 15 mls to
20m/s.
It is considered that a train will not be overturned by wind of velocity less
than 30 mis, allowing for a margin of safety, and for the conventional lines,
the train operation regulations were established on this principle.
For the Shinkansen, the following regulations have been set up:
Wind velocity
20-25 mls
25-30m/s
Over 30 m/s
Train speed
160km/h
70km/h
Stop
Anemometers have been set up at places where a strong wind or gusts are
likely, such as river basins and gorges. The information on the wind velocity is
transmitted to the nearest station and is automatically recorded there.
When the wind velocity exceeds 20 mis, 25 mis, and 30 mis, respectively,
the caution, warning, and danger signal is indicated and the alarm is sounded
in the station and the General Control Center. The dispatcher in the Control
Center, on receiving these signals, designates the ATC signal for the section
concerned at 160 kmlh or 70 kmlh and notifies the engine-driver through the
train radio.
In designing the overhead line, the supporting span has been designed so
that the line will not go off the pantograph even when a 30-mls wind expands
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it in a bow shape. Supports have been built strong enough to withstand a wind
of 40 mls and, at places where the wind is especially strong, of 50 m/s. The
strong-wind sections and locations for the anemometer were designated by
specialists from the Meteorological Agency based on past statistical records.
RAIN
As measures against heavy rainfall and flood, bridges have been built at an
ample height above the water level, on the basis of the past maximum water
level. In banking sections, the parts up to about 50 cm above the flood water
level are protected by concrete retaining walls. Hyetometers are installed along
the track at intervals of about 10 km, to automatically transmit the intensity
and duration of rainfall to the track maintenance organs concerned. Water
level surveillance under the bridge is carried out in accordance with the
information on the rainfall in the upper stream. According to this
information, the necessary track patrol and train operation restrictions, such
as speed control and suspension of operation, are executed.
As the effect of rainfall or the water level of a river varies according to the
roadbed structure, lapse of time, and special conditions of the region, a
"standard value" was chosen for each region and place. On request by the
maintenance organ concerned, the dispatcher in the Control Center starts to
regulate the train operation, on the basis of the actual situation and the
standard value.
SNOW
In the early phase of the Shinkansen a train running fast in a snowy section
would often drive the snow upwards and this would damage the insulation of
underfloor equipment. Also, lumps of snow clinging to the underpart of the
floor would loosen and drop on the track when the train entered a snowless
section, breaking equipment and window panes.
In the conventional lines, the main-snow measures consisted in removing
snow from the track and in melting snow that hindered the movement of the
switch; the problem caused by adhesion of snow under the floor and falling
lumps of snow had not been experienced.
For the high-speed Shinkansen, the effect of snow on train operation is
greater than for the other lines, even in light snow which would not hinder
high-speed operation itself; speed has to be lowered to that of conventional
lines to prevent the snow from being driven upwards. The underfloor
equipment of the Shinkansen was therefore more tightly enclosed and the
insulation strengthened. In addition, sprinklers were installed in snowy
sections to dampen the snow and prevent it from being driven upwards. In
snowy seasons, sprinklers are used according to reports on snowfall by track-
maintenance patrolmen and reports by engine-drivers. Speed is regulated
according to the snowfall and the snow adhering to the car bodies.
Removal of snow adhering to the rolling stock is carried out at a station
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outside the snowy section, in preparation for high-speed operation in the
snowless section. When snow accumulates during the night, the snowplough at
the nearest maintenance base clears the track for the first train of the following
day.
EARTHQUAKES
Japan has many seismic zones, and measures against earthquake are
essential. In the Shinkansen system, structures have been designed for
resistance to earthquakes.
When an earthquake occurs, operation is suspended and is resumed only
when safe running is assured. Anti-earthquake measures are as follows:
two kinds of seismometers are installed at substations 20 km apart, one for
medium and the other for severe earthquakes;
when anyone of the seismometers responds, the circuit breaker in the
substation works in combination with it, stopping the supply of electric
current for train operation;
when the electric current is cut, the trains in operation are stopped
automatically by the emergency brake;
whichever of the two seismometers has been activated is automatically
indicated in the Control Center;
when only the seismometer for the medium-intensity earthquake is
activated, the dispatcher in the Control Center switches on the circuit
breaker in the substation through the remote-control equipment.
In resuming train operation, the maximum speed of the train running in the
section to which power is fed by the substation concerned (about 20 km) is as
follows:
the first train runs cautiously at 70 km/h, watching the state of the track;
the second train runs at 160 km/h when no abnormality is found;
the third and subsequent trains run at 210 km/h.
When both seismometers are activated, train operation is not resumed until
safety is confirmed by a track patrol on foot, on the assumption that a severe
earthquake has occurred. The speed on resumption of operation is the same as
for a medium-intensity earthquake.
Measures against Breakdown of Installations
The preventive measures described so far are mainly against such accidents
as collision, derailment, and overturning of trains. However, the suspension or
disruption of operation due to such incidents as breakdown of equipment and
facilities could severely affect the high speed and frequent service of the
Shinkansen. In the event of an incident between stations, passengers could be
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kept in the train for a long time since the distance between stations is fairly
great. Highly reliable equipment and adequate maintenance are therefore
necessary to minimize installation breakdown. Also required is a system that
will facilitate rapid repair of a breakdown combined with adequate adjustment
of the train diagram in order to keep the disruption to a minimum.
CENTRALIZED MONITORING OF INSTALLAnON BREAKDOWN
The breakdowns of ground installations that would hamper the operation of
the Shinkansen trains can be roughly classified into damage to the rail, damage
to the overhead line, breakdown of a substation, and failure of signalling
equipment. Most of these breakdowns can be detected immediately by the
centralized monitoring device in the Control Center; their location is
indicated, in the case of overhead line or rail breakage, within an error range
of 1-2 km, and, moreover, details of breakdowns are often obtained from
engine-drivers nearby through the train radio.
Dispatchers in the Control Center, on the basis of this information, carry
out the following measures without delay:
instruct the maintenance organs concerned to begin the repair work;
investigate the scale and situation of the breakdown;
when necessary, after conference among dispatchers, adjust the train
diagram, and communicate the information to stations and passengers.
REPAIRS
Following the repair order from the Control Center, maintenance men hurry
to the spot, investigate, detect the cause of breakdown, and make repairs.
Usually, temporary repairs are executed first in order to resume train
operation, even at low speed, as soon as possible. During the period set aside
for maintenance work after train operation for the day is over, full-scale
repairs are carried out to ensure normal train operation the following day.
The Shinkansen installations are standardized in design and manufacture.
When it is feared that similar breakdowns may occur at other places, an
overall inspection is carried out to look for similar weak points and, if
necessary, they are strengthened and specifications for the next order
modified.
ADJUSTMENT OF TRAIN DIAGRAM
When normal train operation is hampered by the breakdown of installation,
the train diagram must be adjusted quickly. The dispatcher in the Control
Center carries out the following measures:
understands the nature of the breakdown as soon as it occurs;
estimates the time required for repairs;
374
takes such improvized steps as guiding a train stalled between stations to the
nearest station.
The dispatcher then simulates and decides the conditions for train operation
after repair, such as permissible passing speed, train cancellation and diagram
adjustment, program of rolling stock and train-crew rotation. In some cases,
he may have to arrange for the rescue of stalled trains and guiding of
passengers to other trains. The diagram adjustment system, with the General
Control Center as its core, was established to allow overall adjustment,
including these steps according to the scale and nature of the breakdown.
CHECK SYSTEM BY ACCIDENT-PREVENTION COMMITTEE
Accident-prevention committees have been established at the JNR head
office and regional organs. These committees, consisting of staff in charge of
every field, hold regular monthly meetings to review the accidents that have
occurred during the previous month and to establish measures for ensuring
safety by studying the statistics of past accidents.
To deal adequately with possible accidents on the Shinkansen, the Accident-
prevention committee reviews the counter-measures taken in past incidents,
from investigation of the cause to the decision on counter-measures, the
breakdown repair system, the diagram adjustment, and guidance for
passengers.
Moreover, by understanding statistically the trend of incidents since the
opening of the Shinkansen, effective preventive measures have been developed
and the effectiveness of these measures determined.
34. Train Operation Control System
Y.OGURA
General
The Shinkansen went into operation in October 1964 with 60 up- and down-
trains, 29,000 train-km and 360 vehicles. With the opening of the extension
down to Hakata in March 1975, these increased to 260 trains, 155,000 train -km
and 2224 vehicles. In June 1977, there were 275 trains, 176,000 train-km and
2336 vehicles. To operate these trains punctually and safely, up-to-date
technical devices have been adopted and every conceivable care is taken.
The General Control Center
NEED FOR A GENERAL CONTROL CENTER
To maintain the high-speed and high-frequency train operation that
characterizes the Shinkansen, it is necessary to decide what to dispatch and to
transmit the decision to the trains in operation and the field organs concerned
promptly and precisely. For this reason JNR, since the opening of the
Shinkansen, has housed all its passenger service, operation, track maintenance
and electric dispatchers in a General Control Center in Tokyo for gathering
information, transmission of dispatches and control of train operation,
supervising the service on the whole line as an integrated system. It is the nerve
center for control of the Shinkansen train operations. The laYout of the
General Control Center is shown in Fig. 34.1. A total of 240 staff are assigned
to the General Control Center. The organization and numbers of staff on duty
are shown in Fig. 34.2.
THE SHINKANSEN DISPATCHING SYSTEM
The Shinkansen uses Centralized Traffic Control (CTC) and Centralized
Substation Control (CSC) to control in groups the trains and the substations
operating on and along the line. The operating conditions of the trains and the
action of the substations are directly monitored. Wireless telephones are
installed for direct communication between the dispatchers and the crews of
trains in operation.
For punctual and safe operation of Shinkansen trains, the following
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Fig. 34.2. Organization chart of Shinkansen administration.
telecommunication installations, including the wireless telephones, have been
adopted:
.
train radio telephones for the exclusive use of operation dispatchers;
dispatching telephones for the entire passenger service; operation, track
maintenance, and electric dispatchers (to the stations and car-operating
and repair depots);
telephones for the exclusive use of maintenance operations (to the ground
facilities and rolling-stock maintenance bases);
facsimile telegraph;
protective wireless telephone.
These installations are shown in Fig. 34.3.
Once train operation is disturbed or a disaster occurs, all these
telecommunication devices are activated at the General Control Center, where
all the dispatchers are housed on the same floor, so that they can work in close
cooperation and make prompt and precise arrangements for restoration of
normal train operation.
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FUNCTIONS OF DISPATCHERS
Passenger service dispatchers
These dispatchers make sure that passengers travel in great comfort with no
hitches; they make various arrangements and control the traffic.
Should trains be delayed far behind schedule owing to an accident or a
disaster, or be damanged on the way, these dispatchers must grasp the
situation, transmit the information to the stations and conductors' depots,
indicate the proper way of guiding the passengers and keep the conductors of
trains in operation informed of the constantly changing situation, using the
wireless telephones that are for their exclusive use. They also make special
arrangements for connections with the conventional-line trains in consultation
with the dispatchers in charge of these lines.
In the Passenger Service Dispatchers' Room, an indication panel shows the
numbers and locations of all trains operating between Tokyo and Hakata.
Two sets of Character Display (CD) are linked to COMTRAC, and the field
data are monitored on demand.
Train dispatchers
These dispatchers know precisely at all times how the trains are running and
keep them operating according to the train diagram. If an abnormality arises
in train operation, the train dispatchers, according to the gravity of the
situation, change the refuge stations, the arrival and departure tracks, the
order of train operation; they stop trains, suspend some train operations, run
extra trains and instruct "recovery" train operation. They must also know the
exact meteorological conditions along the whole line and regulate or suspend
train operation, according to the standards provided, in order to protect the
trains from natural disasters, such as heavy rain, snow, and earthquakes. They
also give final confirmation of the beginning and end of track-maintenance
work during the night and indicate the time confirmed to all other dispatchers
to ensure the safe operation of trains.
The equipment for collecting information, dispatching trains, transmitting
information, and carrying out route control in all the stations for controlling
trains in groups, consists of the centralized train control system (indication
panel and control board), COMTRAC, train radio telephones linked directly
to the trains in operation, dispatching telephones and facsimile telegraph
linked directly to car-operating and repair depots, conductors' depots and
stations.
Electric railcar dispatchers
While keeping in contact with the train dispatchers, the electric railcar
dispatchers change motormen's trips, change rolling stock rotation, and
reassign the kind of car cleaning required for train operations. They also draw
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up the rolling-stock commissioning plan and rewrite the monthly inspection
plan on the basis of the long-range rolling stock inspection program. When a
car is out of order or breaks down, they use the train radio telephone to
instruct the crew to take emergency steps.
Track-maintenance dispatchers
These dispatchers give instructions to begin maintenance work and deal with
the arrangements required on its completion. They receive applications for the
use of track-maintenance cars, compile maintenance work and confirmation-
car operating schedules. They are aware of the weak spots requiring care, as
recorded by the general electric and track inspection cars, and of other
irregularities detected by the confirmation car and they instruct the organ
concerned in checking up or emergency patrolling, as the situation demands.
In case of an accident or a disaster, they, in cooperation with the train
dispatchers and others, request slow-downs of train operation as an emergency
measure, arrange for emergency track-maintenance work and instruct the
organ concerned to make the repairs. Control of job performance in the field
is exercised by the local track-maintenance dispatchers assigned to each track
maintenance depot.
Electric-power dispatchers
The electric-power dispatchers control remotely thirty-six substations, three
sub-feeder sectioning posts, and thirty-five sectioning posts set up along the
whole line, and supervise maintenance operations for these installations to
ensure normal train operation and safety in execution of work. For this, the
Centralized Substation Control (CSC) has been adopted. They are informed of
any accident or disaster by the indication on the supervisory remote-control
panel and they exercise any necessary control.
Signal and telecommunication dispatchers
These are divided into three groups, in charge of signals,
telecommunication, and COMTRAC. Their responsibilities are as follows:
Group in charge ofsignals. The dispatchers monitor irregularities of CTC
and ATC (ground facilities) and control the job performance of these systems.
Irregularities of signals are indicated on the signal supervisory panel. When an
irregularity is indicated, the dispatchers promptly notify the train dispatchers
to restrict train operation and at the same time instruct the local signal and
telecommunication dispatchers to investigate the situation and its causes.
Group in charge of telecommunication. These dispatchers supervise the
coaxial cable circuit used as the carrier of CTC and CSC control and
indication codes. They also supervise telecommunication lines, such as the
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train radio telephone which is essential to the smooth operation of the
Shinkansen trains; they regulate the maintenance operations and set up
temporary circuits in the event of a disaster.
Group in charge ofCOMTRA c. These dispatchers control a group of
computers for two systems of EDP for train operation adjustment and three
systems of PRC for train route control and the group of terminals. They
monitor the performance of the installations of these systems, repair any
system failure, and carry out an inspection.
TRANSMISSION OF DISPATCHING ITEMS
Dispatching items are transmitted by dispatcher telephones, train radio
telephones, facsimile telegraph, exchange telephones, and COMTRAC
terminals. They are transmitted to stations, car-operating and repair depots,
conductors' depots and motormen on duty. They are of two kinds, dispatch
transmission and information transmission, and are made either to all at the
same time or only to those concerned.
Dispatch transmission
Changes in safety system and cancellation of temporary safety system.
Emergency train operation and its cancellation.
Reverse operation.
Changes of arrival and departure tracks.
Suspension of train operation.
Changes in operating time.
Operation of extra trains.
Emergency feeder cut.
Emergency slowdowns.
Changes in rolling stock rotation.
Changes in the rotation of crew members.
Others.
Information transmission
Everything other than the items for dispatch transmission is called
information transmission and this is sent to motormen as reference for their
train operation.
EMERGENCY MEASURES
Classification ofemergencies
An emergency is the general term for "a state in which normal train
operation is incapacitated owing to some trouble". For the Shinkansen, the
measures to be taken in each emergency are prescribed in the Train
I
H
382
Dispatchers' Rule Bookfor Job Performance and the Work Guide. Training
meetings are periodically held to keep the organization ready to cope promptly
and precisely with an emergency. Emergencies are classified as follows:
When a train accident occurs.
When a safety installation for train operation goes out of order:
when CTC goes out of order,
when the track short-circuits,
when the station departure route or the entry route is not in order,
when the turnout goes out of order.
When train protection goes into force:
when the train protection switch is turned on,
when the clearance obstruction alarm goes into action,
when the protective grounding switch is turned on.
When emergency stop is demanded of a train in operation.
In case of emergency train operation.
In case of train operation under the substitute safety system.
When rolling stock goes out of order.
When track disorder is noted.
When power supply is not in order.
When a disaster occurs:
outbreak of fire on a train,
earthquakes,
strong winds,
heavy rain,
snowfall.
In these emergencies, train operation is adjusted according to the place and
time of occurrence, rolling-stock rotation, passenger conditions and the effect
on other trains. When drawing up a plan for suspension of service, account is
taken of the order of trains, congestion at stations, and the sale of reserved
seats.
Adjustment and arrangement of train operation and dispatchers concerned
Although it is desirable that trains operate in accordance with the diagram,
in reality interruptions and disasters of varying magnitude take place daily to
interrupt the services. When services are interrupted, operation is adjusted so
as to minimize the effects and restore normal services as quickly as possible.
The main steps usually taken for train operation adjustment and the
dispatchers responsible are shown in Table 34.1.
Dispatching Equipment
CTC
CTC stands for the Centralized Traffic Control apparatus. With CTC, the
train dispatchers control from the Center the turnouts and signals in the
stations and monitor the operating conditions of the trains. CTC has an
operation indication panel, control boards and diagram recorders.
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Operation indication panel
When the Shinkansen opened between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka, an operation
indication panel was installed fan-wise, composed of four blocks, each 2 m
high, 5 m wide, and 20 m long. When the Shinkansen was extended down to
Hakata, the length was increased to 27 m. The following items are indicated on
the panel:
Train location (band-shape indication lights are fitted for each track circuit
and a white light comes on when a train enters the circuit. In the section of
a station that indicates the approach of a train, a red light comes on.)
Train number.
Route opening.
Stop control. (When the 03 signal, which orders an absolute stop, is
transmitted on the stop control track circuit, an orange light comes on.)
Wind velocity warning.
COMTRAC behavior.
Temporary speed limitation signal.
Control board
Four control boards are set up about 3 m away from the operation
indication panel to face the train-operation indication panel. Their control
ranges are:
Board A Between Tokyo and Shin-Yokohama
Board B Between Odawara and Kyoto
Board C Between Shin-Osaka and Fukuyama
Board D Between Mihara and Hakata
Levers, such as the ATC route lever for each station, as well as the
telecommunication apparatus panel, are set in the control board. The
dispatchers, watching the indication panels, handle the levers and talk with the
men in charge at the stations and with the train crews, and give any necessary
instructions.
The levers set in the control boards are as follows:
Route levers. Two levers are built in, one for the ATC route in each station
and the other for the route to be indicated by the wayside signal for train
operation within the station yard. When the lever is lowered to the "L" or
"R" side, the route is set.
Automatic levers. These are built in for each station and for each up- and
down-train track. When a lever is lowered to the "R" side, the route is set by
the automatic route-setting apparatus. When a lever is lowered to the "L"
side, the route is set by COMTRAC.
Station-handling levers. These are built in for each station and up- and
down-train track. When a lever is lowered to the station-handling side, route
setting by CTC handling is shifted to station handling.
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Passing track levers. Set up also for each station and up- and down-train
track, when a lever is lowered to the passing track side, the departure route of
the train at a stop is set after a passing train has run past. Pulled down to the
"keep-on" side, the departure route of the train at a stop is set as soon as the
following train comes to a stop.
Diagram recorders
There are eight of these, each of which is capable of recording data on the
trains in operation in 160 track circuits. As the movements of the trains on the
track circuit are recorded every 10 seconds, the dispatchers can easily check
whether they are running according to the pre-set diagram.
COMTRAC
A ims of the system and details ofsystem development
Since its opening, the Shinkansen has been well equipped with CTC, train
radio telephones, facsimile telegraph transmission apparatus, and other
information systems. Centralized control of train operation has made it
possible to adjust the operation of numerous trains promptly and precisely.
However, the increasing number of trains put into service, the further
extension of the line, and the diverse types of train caused the volume of
information to increase rapidly and the work load of the dispatchers engaged
in route control to become heavier. Their primary work of collecting
information, making decisions, and transmitting their instructions has
increased, and in order to continue to offer a smoothly running service, more
efficient operation-control systems were studied. It was decided to use
computers to process information for route control and train operation
adjustment. This system was named COMTRAC (COMputer-aided TRAffic
Control system) and its construction began in September 1970.
The system developed at the first stage was put to practical use at the
opening of the Shinkansen down to Okayama in March 1972. Later, to enlarge
and consolidate the system, the second-stage development was launched, and
the use of COMTRAC capable of covering the whole line began in March 1975
when the Shinkansen was extended down to Hakata.
COMTRAC and operation dispatchers
At first, the dispatchers had to handle, among other things, route levers
pertaining to train operation and rolling stock rotation by watching the
indication panel at all times. They had to decide on operation adjustment and
make the necessary arrangements and issue instructions. After the
introduction of COMTRAC, the computer issues alarms to the dispatchers
through Character Display (CD) and Graphic Display (GO) and attracts their
'il
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attention dialog-wise, so that they can now concentrate on their main job of
making decisions.
Basic composition ofCOMTRA C
Linked to CTC, COMTRAC takes information from it such as train
numbers and locations, compares it with the information stored in its train file
for processing, and outputs the route control information to CTC. In the
course of processing, the system, in close man-machine contact, simulates the
tracing of train groups and adjusts train operation. The basic composition of
the system is shown in Fig. 34.4.
System structure
Hardware composition. The hardware of COMTRAC consists of the
computers of the route-control system, the train operation adjustment system
and the execution planning system, and the machines surrounding the
computers. Its structure is shown in Fig. 34.5.
(a) Route-control system. The route-control system, directly linked to CTC,
performs on-line real-time control, such as route control and departing train
control. As its performance directly affects train operation, great reliability is
required. Three control computers are therefore used in triangle formation,
two for ordinary use and the other in reserve, so that the system can work in
duplication.
(b) Train operation adjustment system. This system goes into action when
services are interrupted. It adjusts train operation, transmits instructions and
information, and allocates vehicles. As this job involves voluminous data and
bulky processing but does not need to be as reliable as route control, one
general-purpose computer is used. In case of system failure, however, the
execution planning system computer is used to back up the capacity.
(c) Execution planning system. This system performs the batch processing in
preparing the execution diagram file and statistics. For the same reason as in
(b) above, only one general-purpose computer is used.
Input/output machine. In COMTRAC, coordination between man and
machine is stressed. On the principle of having a machine do the work that it
can do best and a man do the work that he does best, a rational man-machine
system setup is designed so that the burden on the dispatcher is not too heavy.
CD and GD are used in this man-machine communication. As the
input/output equipment, the system has terminals at the necessary places for
transmission of instructions and information.
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Functions ofCOMTRA C
Operation execution planning. For the various judgements on route control
and adjustments of train operation, a train diagram for the day is required.
This diagram is called the execution diagram. From the basic train diagram
and basic rolling-stock rotation, which are prepared at the time of timetable
revision, the execution diagram is adjusted by changes as notified by directives
from the Shinkansen Administration. In COMTRAC, the details of the basic
plan prepared at the time of diagram revision are fed in as inputs in advance as
the basic diagram file; the additional data sent in from the Administration are
input as they arrive. The computer combines the diagram file and the elements
for change to adjust the execution diagram 7 days before the day of operation
execution, and stores it as the execution diagram file.
Route control. In COMTRAC, train positions and operating conditions are
known at all times from the information taken from the train position
detecting points set up in and between the stations, and these are compared
with the time of the execution diagram and with the order of trains stored in
the memory of the computer, and the route is automatically set when needed.
When disorder of train operation compels revision, the execution diagram is
revised by input of the dispatchers' instructions and the route is set according
to the revised diagram when required.
The position of the train is detected at the following five points, as shown in
Fig. 34.6.
(a) Point N (train number detecting point). A train number detector is
installed at a point 800 to 1200 m outward from Point R. When a train passes
this point, the train number is detected. When this is the number stored in the
memory of the computer, the train route is set as prescribed.
(b) Point R (the point oftrain approach to the station). The route setting is
checked by the data obtained at Point R. Point R is used as the back-up point
of Point N.
(c) Point H (station entry route point). With Point H data, the entry of the
train into the station is detected.
Point I Point L
(4TI (3TI (2Tl (1T)
Fig. 34.6. Train position detecting points.
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(d) Point I (stopping point). When a certain time elapses after Point I data
are produced, it is assumed that the train has come to a stop, and the arrival
time is noted. At an intermediate station, the departure route is set.
(e) Point L (departure route point). From Point L data the departure or the
passing of the train is detected.
Operation adjustment
In COMTRAC, train operation adjustment is performed by the dispatcher
and the computer engaging in a dialog by means of CD and GO, with the
computer providing information to help the dispatcher reach his judgement,
and the dispatcher making his decision on operation adjustment after
scrutinizing the very intricate general situation. He then instructs the computer
to carry out his decision. Among the operation-adjusting functions of the
computer are:
(a) Alarm. The computer keeps constant watch on the operation conditions
of the trains. When it detects something that must be brought to the
dispatcher's attention, it gives an alarm and displays a description on CD.
Alarms are for train delay, coincidence in the use of arrival and departure
tracks, and warning of the running kilometerage of rolling stock.
(b) Questions to the dispatcher. When there is disorder in train operation
and the computer detects a situation where train operation needs adjustment,
it displays on CD its suggestion for the procedure based on the logic that is
preset in it, and asks the dispatcher for the final decision. Such questions as the
placement of a train in the passing track and its cancellation, changes in the
order of a train originating at an intermediate station and a through train, and
in the order of train arrival and departure, are put to the dispatcher. On these
questions, the dispatcher has to input his decisions and the computer carries
them out.
(c) Direct input. When the dispatcher is to motivate some action by the
computer, he inputs the description of the action through CD or GO.
Suspension and resumption of train operation, changes in schedule, changes
of arrival and departure tracks, changes in rolling-stock rotation, and other
items needed in train-operation adjustment can be fed in as inputs.
(d) Monitoring. Complying with the demand by the dispatcher, the
computer indicates on CD the data it holds and prints them out by is line
printer. It thus monitors trains in operation and shows how many minutes they
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are behind schedule, the order of trains leaving each station, and rolling-stock
rotation.
(e) Diagram forecasting. With the current train positions as the starting-
point, the computer forecasts a diagram when the trains are operated as they
are, based on the travelling time between stations of each type of train, their
stopping time and delay time resulting from slow-downs and other
information stored in its memory. The forecast diagram is shown in a figure
on GO. Two kinds of forecast are made: forecast diagram and adjustment
suggestion diagram.
1. The forecast diagram predicts the diagram when the trains are operated
according to the plan as it stands. The diagram is constantly being
composed from the latest data and the computer sends out alarms on the
interferences anticipated, continuously indicating the interferences, so
that the dispatcher may know exactly how the trains are operating.
2. The adjustment suggestion diagram forecasts the diagram-to-be when
train adjustment is enforced. When the main points of operation
adjustment are input, such as suspension of service, operation of extra
trains and changes in rolling-stock rotation, a forecast is given of the
changes in the order of trains and the changes of the arrival and
departure tracks included. The dispatcher then changes this diagram.
The adjustment suggestion diagram is made repeatedly and the final plan
for operation adjustment is quickly and precisely produced. When the
dispatcher issues the instruction for operation as diagrammed, the
computer controls the order of trains and sets routes as shown in the
diagram.
The flow of information in train operation adjustment by COMTRAC is
shown in Fig. 34.7.
Transmission ofdispatching items
When, among the operation adjustment items that the dispatcher has
instructed the computer to carry out, there are items to be transmitted to
stations, car-operating and repair depots and conductors' depots, the
computer automatically prepares notices of instruction and transmits these as
printed outputs through the terminals installed at the places concerned. As the
instructions must be transmitted precisely, the stations and depots that receive
the instructions are obliged to input their responses to confirm receipt.
Transmission of information on operation delay
The computer constantly checks all the trains in stations from the
information collected from the train-position-detecting points and calculates
the delay times of all the trains for transmission to the organs concerned.
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Rolling-stock allotment
Out of numerous combinations of trainsets for rolling-stock rotation, the
computer draws up an optimum plan in conformity with the train operation
plan, rolling-stock running kilometerage, and the inspection plan. Keeping
constant watch on the trainsets in use, it also checks up on their running
kilometerage when changes take place in rolling-stock rotation and prepares
the plans for changes in rotation for the following day and thereafter.
OTHER EQUIPMENT
CSC (Centralized Substation Control)
For train operation, Shinkansen substations are supplied with power at
3-phase 77 ,000 V to 275,000 V by power companies through the power
transmission lines erected exclusively for that purpose. The power is
transformed to single-phase 25,000 V at JNR substations. These substations
and sectioning posts are all unmanned and remotely controlled from the
center. The system consists of the panel for the connection diagram of power
feeding and the control panel. The former indicates the power-feeding
network and the latter the operation of all the equipment in the substations
and sectioning posts, and their failures. For the connection between the center
and substations and the sectioning posts, a coaxial carrier circuit is used. The
information communication speed is about 7/100 second at a time.
Train Operation-Control System of tbe Future
COMTRAC SYSTEM AS ENVISIONED
The first-stage system of COMTRAC was introduced in 1972 and the
second-stage system, now in u<;e, in 1975. There have been continued
improvements and the system is fulfilling its expectations. What is desired of it
now is greater reliability and a wider range of performance. For the latter, the
following are contemplated and studied: control of data on train crews (the
number of crews needed, their trips, etc.) and on rolling-stock conditions,
which the present system lacks; and print out of dispatches and information
transmission on the terminals aboard trains through the COMTRAC circuit,
which would replace the present system of wireless telephonic communication.
PRESENT STATE OF SHINKANSEN TRAIN CONTROL TECHNIQUE
In train operation, the only automated function is brake control by signals
operated by ATC. For further automation, various methods of automatic
control of power running have been studied, with the aim of operating trains
at designated speeds in designated time and automatically bringing them to a
stop at designated spots. The first apparatus using a mini-computer was
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mounted on the 951-type Shinkansen test car manufactured in 1969. After
testing on commercial run cars and studying the performance of both
hardware and software, the No.2 apparatus, also capable of automatically
monitoring the functioning of all the electric machines and instruments of the
car and performing the necessary steps when the car is out of order, was
produced and mounted on the 961-type Shinkansen prototype car brought out
in 1973.
Its main functions are as follows:
On-time train operation control
After a train leaves a station, its time of arrival at the next station is
calculated every second, taking the actual speed as the maximum speed. When
the speed is the same as that given on the diagram, it is taken as the optimal
maximum speed. In applying the brake by ATC signal before arriving at a
station, the optimal speed within the allowed speed range in the ATC signal
section is also calculated all the time the train is slowing down.
Train operation control at fixed speeds
The function of this system is to control the train speed so that it will
conform with the target speed determined in the On-time Train Operation
Control. Train speed varies according to track grades and voltage fluctuations
of the power supply. To maintain the fixed rate of speed, the power running
notch (the brake notch in some cases) will occasionally have to be adjusted.
There are two ways to control the power running notch: one is to fix the notch
in response to the target speed and the difference in speed, and the other is to
fix the notch to be taken by judging from the difference in speed, acceleration,
and the notch conditions I second before. Under this system, both ways are
used for control, depending on the difference in speed, so that the frequency
of notch changes can be minimized.
Train-stopping control at designated spot
This is a device to bring a train to a stop at a designated spot in the station.
The stopping spot is detected from the wayside coil laid a certain distance
away from the station to be entered. The system determines and controls the
braking by calculating the speed, the distance up to the stopping point, and the
deceleration rate.
Performance
On-time Train Operation Control ... Time of arrival at station: ± 15 sec.
Train Operation Control at Fixed Speeds: ± 2 km/h.
Train-stopping Control at Designated Speed: ± 50 cm.
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Ideas for the Future
As a result of studies and tests, train-operation control has reached the stage
where it can almost be put to practical use. Before driverless trains can be
operated, however, there are still problems to be solved such as detecting and
treating rolling stock breakdown and damage, linking eTC with stations, etc.,
and confirming that the way is clear on entering stations. Further automation
is now under study.

35. Maintenance System: Vehicles
S. KUBO
Introduction
The Japanese National Railways have adopted a periodical inspection and
repair system for the maintenance of vehicles. The details and frequency of
inspection are determined according to the type of vehicle. All vehicles other
than freight cars are controlled by the vehicle's running kilometerage and
period of service, and the inspection and repairs are performed according to
operating conditions.
Kinds and Frequency of Inspection
The kinds and frequency of inspection for the Shinkansen electric railcars
are arranged, from experience of the conventional narrow-gauge line vehicles,
so as to raise the turnaround coefficient to the highest possible point (for
details see Table 35.1).
The daily inspection is performed during the night. Renewal of collector
strips, inspection of ATC behavior, and minor repairs of passenger
accommodation are conducted simultaneously with the cleaning of the car
interior and draining of the toilet tank. One train unit is dealt with in this way
in about 1 hour.
The regular inspection is conducted every 30,000 km. Here each train is
inspected, as a set, on the behavior of its installations and instruments; flaws
on its axles are detected by an ultrasonic detector, and brake blocks and
carbon brushes are renewed in about 4 hours.
When the installations and instruments are out of order, or when flaws are
detected upon inspection, minor parts are replaced at the time of the regular
inspection; but the train set is temporarily removed to a repair shop for
renewal of major spare parts.
The bogie inspection is conducted every 300,000 km, and the train is broken
up for replacement of each bogie by a spare. This is done for a set of eight cars
in about 8 hours. The bogies removed are disassembled for check-up of their
main components, wheel grinding and lubricant renewal, and these
components are used on the next train set coming up for inspection. The tread
surface of wheels undergo another inspection every 70,000 km and are
corrected, this time without the train consist being broken up. A flat tread,
however, is corrected whenever it occurs.
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TABLE 35.1. Kinds and periods ofinspection
General
overhaul
Do ~Ol---
300 thousand km or 900 thousand km
12 months or 30 months
Bogie
inspection
J---
Regular
inspection
I
o I I I
30 thousand km or
30 days
Kinds De scription Periods
Daily inspection Vital parts for safety Daily
operation inspected
Regular inspection Major parts of the Every 30,000 km or
vehicles as a train 30 days
set inspected
Bogie inspection Bogie disassembled Every 300,000 km or
and replaced by spare 12 months
bogie
General overhaul All components over- Every 900,000 km or
hauled 30 months
Wheel tread Tread surface of Eve ry 70, 000 km or
grinding wheels and flat tread when flat tread occurs
corrected
In the general overhaul conducted every 900,000 km, each vehicle is
disassembled for overhaul. This general overhaul takes about 10 days. A
detailed description of this overhaul is given later.
Distribution of Bases and Inspection Facilities
Main rolling-stock bases are located close to Tokyo, Shin-Osaka, and Hakata
stations, where the first trains of the day depart from. Minor bases are located
at intervening stations, varying in scale according to the number of first trains
leaving for the day. It is economic to set up these rolling-stock bases close to
the stations as this reduced the deadheading distance. However, as a base
occupies a large area, they have been located, of necessity, where land could be
easily acquired or where some railway facilities were already in use, and could
be made available for conversion to rolling-stock bases. The location of these
bases is shown in Table 35.2.
The general overhaul is conducted intensively at Hamamatsu and Hakata,
and the bogie inspection at Osaka and Hakata. The Hamamatsu Workshop,
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TABLE 35.2. Location ofrolling-stock maintenance bases
Accommoda- Daily Regular Bogie General
Base ting capacity inspection inspection inspection overhaul
(train sets)
Tokyo (Shinagawa) 16 0 0
Tokyo (Ohi) 25 0
Mishima 14 0
Shizuoka 2
Hamamatsu Workshop 0
Nagoya 6 0
Osaka 34 0 0 0
Okayama 12 0
Hiroshima 7 0
Hakata 23 0 0 0 0
Note: In addition to these bases, the trains are kept at the platforms of the major stations during
night.
located along the Tokaido Line, was originally set up for narrow-gauge line
trains. When the Shinkansen was about to be opened, its facilities were
updated and vastly improved so as to serve as a workshop that could also
overhaul Shinkansen electric railcars, and it is now planned to use this
workshop exclusively for them.
The bases where the daily and regular inspections are performed have pit
tracks in the roofed buildings, each capable of accommodating a trainset of
sixteen cars. Facilities are also provided for inspection and repair during the
night.
The daily inspection track has a passageway for pantograph check-up and a
platform (service deck) for cleaning the passenger-car interior. In the pit is a
cart in which the inspectors move about. For the inspection of ATC
installations, all sorts of simulation signals are transmitted from the test room
to check the brake performance in combination with the testor that indicates
the train speed.
In the bogie inspection and general overhaul, installations and instruments
are taken apart and put together, and major parts are broken up for inspection
and repair. In reassembling parts dismantled for inspection and repair, the
"spare-part rotation" system is adopted, by which the vehicle is fitted with
parts which have already been repaired, and this cuts down the vehicle's out-
of-service period. In the inspection and repair of dismantled parts, a number
of recently developed machines are used.
General Overhaul System
In the general overhaul and bogie inspection, the main components are
dismounted and broken up for inspection in order to ensure safe performance
and to maintain the high service level of the Shinkansen electric railcars. The
systems have evolved after much study aimed at raising the rate of operation
and reducing maintenance cost by cutting down the personnel and time
required for inspection and repair.
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DECREASING THE NUMBER OF DAYS FOR INSPECTION AND REPAIR
One of the most effective ways of raising the rate of vehicle operation is to
reduce the number of days spent in inspection and repair. Today the general
overhaul of a Shinkansen trainset takes 10 days, as shown in Fig. 35.1. It
would be uneconomic to reduce the number of days allowed for inspection and
repair of a complete trainset of sixteen cars as this would require the expansion
of facilities and a greater number of men. Each trainset is divided into three
blocks and the dismantling is performed over a period of 3 days, which enables
the inspection and repair of a trainset to be carried out smoothly and
satisfactorily.
The number of days required for inspection and repair depends on the time
taken for carbody repair and painting. The painting is an assembly-line
operation of washing, masking, painting, and drying. As it cannot be
performed at the same time as other kinds of work, it is performed as a 10-
hour continuous job, to shorten the work schedule.
Spare parts needing repair are put aside to be repaired later and to be fitted
on vehicles coming up for inspection later. The parts are rotated, and this
saves time in inspection and repair.
Installation of
cguipmcnt
~!
\6 0
15 0
I. I]
13 IJ
12 0
II 0
D
5 I D
0
0
0
0
IU
I
Insplction I Car blOdY Un!t te!:lt
painting
Dismantling of
equipment
10
Car body repalrlng &
partial remodeling
Fig.35.1. Standard schedule for general overhaul of electric railcars of the Shinkansen.
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The general overhaul, including test running on the main line, takes to days.
The train to be inspected is deadheaded to the workshop at midnight before
the first day of inspection. The inspectors report for work early in the morning
of the first day and look for the points that need repair. After the test run, the
train, with inspection and repairs completed, is deadheaded to the base by the
evening of the same day. As the train is ready for use the following day, it is
out of commission for very few days on account of inspection and repair, even
when it is being overhauled.
Two or three shifts for rolling-stock repairs are not desirable, for three
reasons. First, the cost of personnel goes up. Second, for reasons of safety, the
handling of heavy material and parts and testing at high voltage or high
revolution speed are not suitable for night work. Third, since the job
descriptions are not uniform, mistakes and oversights are apt to occur when a
job being performed by one shift is taken over by another.
It is very important that job performance does not lag behind schedule and
that a job is performed without error. Automatic testors and other up-to-date
devices are therefore used as much as possible.
STANDARDIZAnON OF WORKLOAD
Repair work is not so simple as manufacturing (as is shown in Fig. 35.2) and
workloads vary widely with the type of job. It is therefore necessary to
standardize the workload in each department in order to minimize the
Entering of trainset
Inspection Ir: preparation Ifor pulling out car body
I Lifting car bod y ~ ATe equipznent R-Disassembling I Dismantling of Interior equipmentof bogies equipment Electrical equipment IInspection &: Car body repairing &: Mechanical equipment
repair: partial remodeling
Bogie Inspection &:
Traction motor repair
Car body sanding &:
I washing (automatic) Spare parts
Assembling
I
Car body painting I, '".~ '''0"' fof bogies (automatic)Bogie testing I Installation ofMachine test equipment I repair
Spare bogies I Static inspection
I Dielectric strength ItestMounting of car body I
A.ir-tight test I
Unit test (two cars) I
Traine:et test I
Test rUnning in workshop yard I
Test running on the main line I
Forwarding I
Fig. 35.2. Standard block diagram for general overhaul of electric railcars.
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personnel and make sure that there is no idleness. For this there must be a
detailed inspection and repair program. As it is desirable for vehicles to enter
at regular intervals, the present arrangement is for them to enter every sixth
day, which suits the capacity of the workshop.
For time to be saved by fitting spare parts on different vehicles (rotation),
each of such parts must be identical. The same part may be supplied by various
manufacturers, but they must all be freely interchangeable with those from
other makers.
MECHANIZATION AND AUTOMATION OF TESTING OPERATIONS
The use of numerous standardized parts and the requirement for high-level
precision have expanded the mechanization and automatization of the
inspection and repair operations. In the initial period of the Shinkansen, many
inspection phases were dealt with by human hand. During the first decade,
however, various automatic inspection systems were developed and many
kinds of automated testing machines have been set up in the Hakata Rolling
Stock Maintenance Center, established when the Sanyo Shinkansen was
extended down to Hakata. The kinds and number of these machines are so
many (see Table 35.3) that no more than a few of the most important can be
described here.
A utomatic wheel-axle inspection line
In the maintenance of high-speed rolling stock, the greatest importance is
given to the bogies, of which the wheels and axles must be especially well taken
care of, as cracks occur due to the wear and metal fatigue caused by high-speed
operation. The metal used for axles has its fatigue strength raised by high-
frequency hardening. Since fine cracks, as small as 0.1 mm, have to be
detected to ensure safe operation until the next inspection, ultrasonic and
magnetic flaw-detection methods are employed.
Bearings are also strictly inspected for cracks, and when the accumulated
running kilometerage reaches 2.5 million, they are, as a rule, taken out of use.
Wheels are designed to maintain circularity, and the difference in diameter
of end wheels, the two pairs of wheels to each bogie, and those of the other
TABLE 35.3. Machines installed at Hakata rolling stock maintenaince center
Process- Mini- Other
computer computer Numerical automatic
Machines for: Ordinary controlled controlled controlled controlled
Power 4
Processing 90 4
Painting and drying 51
Washing and dust collecting 124 1
Testing 75 10 I
Parts transferring 299 3 3
Total 643 18 4
5
2 14
8
64
35
58
2 184
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bogies, are carefully checked. The flowchart of this inspection and repair line
is shown in Fig. 35.3.
Apparatusfor the testing ofbogie running
Under the conventional rolling-stock inspection and repair system, the
reassembled rolling stock undergoes test runs on the main line. For high-speed
rolling stock, however, the reassembled bogie is instead placed on the bogie-
running testing apparatus in case it should develop any trouble during the
testing which would impede the operation of other regular trains in service. On
this apparatus, the bogie is run at high speeds and the temperature and
vibration of each component are closely checked. In this test two sets of bogies
are placed on the test rai1loop. The traction motor of one bogie rotates the
wheels of the other bogie, which are linked directly to the rai1loop, i.e. the
traction motor is worked here as a generator in loadback fashion. The traction
motor is thus checked at the same time.
The rotation direction, the number of rotations and the time are preset in
the program for automatic control, and one testing cycle is completed in about
80 minutes.
IWheel set I
Axle box
dismantling ITlach.
Wheel set
washing unit
Induction heater nThrust bearing
IRoller bearingUltrasonic flaw Oil sealing devicedetector
NorITlal probe IInclined probe
Brake disk I Press machine IdisITlantbng mach.
Magnetic flaw I Washing &t Qil- Idetector (disk) flushing unit
Center hole boring
I
Magnetic flaw
Imach. (new wheel) detectorBrake disk
1
(axle, gear)
mantling mach. Auto. diaITleter Icenter hole I measuring deviceAuto. Imeasuring device r
Auto. s.torage rack I- Press machine (fitting) I II
Lathe
I
I
(wheel tread,
I
brake disk)
Axle box ITlantling Induction heater I
Oil-flushing unit
High-speed Itesting ITlachine
Bogie assembling
shop
Fig. 35.3. Details of wheel-axle inspection line.
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Apparatus/or general circuit testing
The difficult and vital job of checking the control and main circuits of the
reassembled Shinkansen electric railcars demands an extremely high technical
level.
For maximum automatic control of circuit testing, test terminals are set on
the rolling stock and a circuit testor with a control computer, main memory of
16 k-words, auxiliary memory of 96 k-words, is set up in the inspection shop
for the circuit testing, and a two-car unit test and a sixteen-car trainset total
test are performed. When the result is satisfactory, the data are printed out
and the work goes on to the next step. When something is wrong, the NG
indication appears and the test is suspended.
There are about 500 testing items in the case of electric circuits, and about
750 for braking circuits. Of this, 85010 are automatically tested and the
remaining 15% semi-automatically.
Rolling-Stock Maintenance Control by Computer
The cost control of job performance at JNR workshops is done by the
workshop accounting system. The repairing cost per vehicle has the standard
unit price set for each type of rolling stock.
The workshop must know the exact state of the vehicles in its charge for
inspection and repair, assign its men properly and optimize its manpower, plan
the use of its facilities, coordinate job performance and have supplies ready
for use in the most efficient way. For this, JNR operates an information
control system, Kojo (workshop) Information Control System (KICS) in
conjunction with the Shinkansen Management Information System (SMIS).
KICS is composed of the following six subsystems.
ROLLING-STOCK HISTORY SUBSYSTEM
Input in this subsystem are the manufacturing, remodeling, and repairing
data of each vehicle, as well as the data of its fittings of machinery and
instruments, since parts go from one vehicle to another under the spare-part
rotation system. From the data of its running kilometerage, the inspection
time is predetermined and the number of vehicles coming up for inspection
supplied to other subsystems. This subsystem also predetermines the repairs to
be performed and the materials needed and provides the data to the shop-in
plan and work process subsystem and the supplies subsystem. These data help
to improve the inspection system and to understand the degree of
superannuation.
SHOP-IN PLAN AND WORK PROCESS SUBSYSTEM
Under this subsystem the turnaround and historical records of rolling stock
are made known at any time, so that optimum plans well adapted to the
fluctuations of requirement work can be drawn up. Work-process plans are
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now set up for each day instead of for each month or to-day period, as before,
to control the progress of daily work, to ensure delivery exactly as scheduled,
and to optimize work assignments. The flow chart of mass information under
the system is given in Fig. 35.4.
PERSONNEL SUBSYSTEM
Formerly, work schedules were made to suit the fixed allocation of
personnel. Under the new system, men are assigned in a wider range according
to their qualitative capabilities, and an optimum allocation can be made to suit
the daily fluctuations of work now that the total man-power is known
immediately the men report for the days work and they can be assigned
individually according to their qualifications.
SUPPLIES SUBSYSTEM
Supplies are planned for each work unit based on the established standard
list of required articles. As the history of inspection and repair and the exact
o
Necessary information
Q
Feeding the evaluation back to all planning
Rolling stock Rolling stock Rolling stock
maintenance and parts history
standards histories sub-system
Suppl iee
-1 Inspection &. repair Isubsystem plan (year &: month) Personnel
Volume of work sub-system
Process of repair Personnel allocation Iplanning (yea r &. plan (year)
month)
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Major &: minor daily requlredEquipment
subsystem ( work process IRe,tirement &. adapta- I
scheduling han plan
Capacity of
----i Control of work load Total man-power I
equipment
( Detailed adjustment of \
Shop-in -----"'\ daily work process ./1 Attendance record I
inspection
Instruction for work
I(daily) Accounting
Work performance slip subsystem
Execution I
Progress control
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Fig. 35.4. Flow chart of mass of information in the shop-in and work process subsystem.
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quantities of supplies needed are made known, idle stock, surplus, or shortage
can be eliminated.
Supplies are now automatically distributed to each work unit from the
storehouse at the time shop-in dismantling begins, as indicated by the data of
shop-in inspection and the standard list of required articles. The planning and
processing for supplies are simplified and greater efficiency is attained.
ACCOUNTING SUBSYSTEM
Optimum costing quickly determines the work costs, and accounting is now
made more precisely, with expenses subtracted from the budget every day.
Formerly, the results were summed up monthly for feedback to planning. Now
that the day's plan becomes definite in the morning, the budget can be
controlled in advance.
EQUIPMENT SUBSYSTEM
The factors of a long-term investment plan are more minutely divided and
optimum planning is made possible by simulation. Taking into account the
rolling stock inspection and repairing plans, preventive maintenance is
planned in order to reduce the loss which would be incurred by the after-
maintenance as practiced formerly.
Actual Number of Cases of Vehicle Trouble: System for Dealing with
Vehicles in Trouble during Operation
Cars in trouble that delay the train over 10 minutes are classified as
"Trouble A" and those delaying the train less than 10 minutes or cars that are
replaced at the terminal station are designated "Trouble B". There has been
no fatal accident on the Shinkansen since its opening, but since train delays
cause traffic confusion, every effort is exerted to reduce the number of cases of
car trouble.
The cases of car trouble have been few (see Table 35.4). The main reasons
for this are the car inspection and repair system, and a series of general
improvements to rolling stock. Another important reason is that the
Shinkansen electric railcars are on a multiplicate system, so that even when
equipment goes out of order, a train is kept running by cutting out the car for
the rest of the way. 'Trouble B' is really part failure, and cases occur at the rate
of once per car per year. "Trouble A" cases are negligible.
When trouble develops during operation, the protection device goes into
action to close the circuit involved immediatelY, or the brake is applied. The
indication lamp on the panel in the car then lights up. So do the trouble-
indication lamp and the car-number indication lamp on the panel in the
motorman's cab t~warn the driver. The inspector checks the indication lamp
in the car concerned and examines the trouble. He then takes action according
to the instructions in the Manual, or confers with the electric railcar dispatcher
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TABLE 35.4. Cases ofrolling stock trouble
Trouble A Trouble B
No. of cases/ No. of cases/
Year No. of cases million car km No. of cases million car km
1964 24 0.37
1965 30 0.166
1966 28 0.118
1967 8 0.030 39 0.15
1968 12 0.038 62 0.20
1969 12 0.031 48 0.13
1970 6 0.012 62 0.13
1971 8 0.017 95 0.20
1972 16 0.Q28 81 0.14
1973 27 0.041 117 0.18
1974 47 0.072 106 0.16
1975 43 0.051 103 0.12
1976 63 0.072 118 0.13
of CTC via the train wireless. When the main circuit goes out of order, the unit
affected is cut out, and in the case of the auxiliary circuit, the power supply is
switched over to the other unit so that the train continues to run.
The train has to stop running only when ATC, the braking system, or the
bogie goes out of order, but the number of cases of such magnitude is kept low
by equipping such systems in multiplicity and by using highly reliable parts and
components.

36. Maintenance System: Fixed Facilities
Y.MUTO
Object of the System
The maintenance system for fixed facilities was set up with the object of
satisfying the following conditions:
Appropriate inspection, repair and renewal of facilities in order to maintain
their functions.
Speedy recovery from abnormality of the facilities.
Ensuring the technical capacity to meet the above requirements.
Maintenance of Functions of Facilities
To enable inspection, repair, and renewal of the facilities so as to maintain
their functions, special attention must be paid to the following requirements:
Establishment of standards of maintenance (cycles and methods of
inspection, repair, and renewal) suitable for each kind of facility.
Provision of machinery, tools, and other equipment or installations
necessary for inspection, repair, and renewal.
Securing the necessary time to make the inspection, repair, and renewal.
Establishment of an organization to assign appropriate staff to each division
of the cycle - planning the inspection, repair and renewal; executing
these plans; reviewing the results and reflecting them in subsequent plans
(Planning, Doing, and Seeing) - and to define the responsibility of each
division.
The system for maintenance of the functions of the Shinkansen is explained as
follows for each of the four items.
MAINTENANCE STANDARDS OF FACILITIES
While the adoption of the latest techniques made the Shinkansen facilities
highly maintenance-free and reliable (see Fig. 36.1), there was no advance
knowledge of the deterioration through age of the facilities serving high-speed
trains operating at 210 km/h.
In the early planning stage of the Shinkansen, it was intended that passenger
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Fig. 36.1. Maintenance standards of facilities (block diagram).
trains would run during the day and freight trains at night. It was expected that
sufficient time for maintenance of facilities would be provided by assigning
Saturday night for this purpose, when freight trains would not be running.
However, when the service began, it was found impossible to maintain the
facilities with maintenance work performed only once a week.
The Shinkansen train actually began to run at 210 km/h about 2 years
before the inauguration of the line, and this took place on the specially
constructed test line, about 30 km long. Running tests were repeated, using
two sets of experimental trains, one of two cars and the other of four. There
was a great difference between the volume of maintenance work actually
needed during commercial service and that expected from the experiments of
maintenance of facilities performed during the test period. In the beginning of
commercial operation, there were no more than thirty round trips a day, each
train consisting of twelve cars, but this was much more frequent than the runs
performed on the model line.
Maintenance of track and electric facilities of the Shinkansen began with
standards based on the experience of the conventional lines, taking into
account the new factors of high-speed operation. The effects of the
unprecedented speed were severer than expected and, for the first few years,
troubles with the way facilities occurred frequently. All of these problems were
investigated and laid the foundations for the present standards of
maintenance. The experiences on the Tokaido Shinkansen were utilized by the
more advanced facilities of the Sanyo Shinkansen, which requires less
maintenance and which enjoys more stable operation, almost completely free
of trouble.
The most noteworthy item of the Shinkansen maintenance system is
probably the operation of the track-and-electric inspection train, conducted at
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a standard cycle of 10 days for the purpose of inspecting the functions of the
way facilities. The inspection trains runs at the same speed as the commercial
train and automatically measures and records the dynamic characteristics of
the track and electric facilities under high-speed operation. The data derived
are processed by computer, compared with the allowable limits of
maintenance, and the spots in need of repair are identified and notified to the
field offices in charge of maintenance work. In addition to the inspection
train, vibration accelerometers are mounted on a commercial train every day
as a means of controlling the riding quality of the Shinkansen trains.
Facilities that cannot be measured by the inspection train or which cannot be
dealt with by the inspection train are individually inspected at an appropriate
cycle by field maintenance staff, and defects of rails are looked for at night by
the rail flaw-detector car.
Pieces of equipment whose service life can be determined in terms of age or
number of times of operation are excluded from the inspection and are
renewed or overhauled according to a predetermined schedule.
Facilities provided with a dual system undergo a switch-over test to the
standby unit at a specified cycle. This checks that the switch-over device and
the standby equipment are working properly, so that system failure can be
avoided. For systems that require especially high reliability, such as the ATC,
a device is installed to constantly monitor the function of both the working
and the standby unit, so that any trouble is immediately made known.
Equipment that is usually inactive, such as alarm and protective devices,
also have their function checked periodically and any disorder found is
remedied.
In addition to these individual inspections, an overall patrol inspection of
the whole system is made during the daytime every day or every 2 or 3 days.
This patrol concentrates on the detection of anomalies while observing the
working of the facilities. Changes in ambient conditions are carefully noted.
Detection of an anomaly is not always the result of the patrol inspection by
maintenance staff and the running inspection of the multiple-duty inspection
train: in many cases it is discovered from the reports of train crews. For
example, a geometric irregularity of the track is often discovered where the
crew felt an unusual train vibration, and the deterioration of the ATC system
or poor track circuit is indicated by an abnormal flicker in the ATC cab signal.
The train crews play an important maintenance role as monitors.
The maintenance standards governing routine inspection and repair have
been established in this way. Now, after more than 10 years of intense use since
inauguration, the Tokaido Shinkansen needs renewal of its facilities. In
carrying out this renewal, the facilities will be improved by the introduction of
the technological advances made in the interim; particularly, the remarkable
technical innovations in the field of electronic equipment.
The renewal work has to be done without interrupting commercial train
services, so the work is divided into portions of 4 to 5 hours of night work,
suspended in the morning to let the trains run as usual, the process being
repeated throughout the renewal. This is more difficult and troublesome than
constructing a new Shinkansen line.
'I
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Experience has already been gained in constructing three new Shinkansen
lines. Renewal work, however, is something new; some of it has already been
started and it must be carried out efficiently and safely, developing new work
methods. The Shinkansen railway system can only be said to have been
brought to completion when this renewal work has been carried out
successfully and the Tokaido Shinkansen is reborn as a new Shinkansen.
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT FOR MAINTENANCE WORK
The maintenance work of the Shinkansen has been mechanized as far as
practicable so as to attain the highest efficiency, safety of performance, and
quality of work (see Fig. 36.2). Use of mechanical power has been pushed
forward, for example, by the introduction of such heavy equipment as
multiple tie-tamper and track liner in track maintenance, a work car to carry
heavy materials (ballast, rails, etc.), the introduction of a catenary
maintenance car, and a contact wire-replacing car.
Maintenance bases have been set up along the line for storing and servicing
this equipment and for bringing in, stockpiling, and loading on the work
train the materials for maintenance.
Other physical arrangements for maintenance include the pathway (l m
wide) laid along the whole line for track patrol use, and telephones installed
along the pathway at intervals of about 500 m. Illuminators and train
approach alarms have been installed in tunnels.
Where electric power for lighting and work is required for night work, an
engine generator is generally used but, on account of its noise, a low-voltage
power distribution line and outlets have been installed along some sections in
residential areas.
",
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Fig. 36.2. Machinery and equipment for maintenance work (block diagram).
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TIME FOR MAINTENANCE WORK
Because mechanical power is used to a maximum extent and trains are
running at 210 km/h and frequently, the Shinkansen maintenance work, with
the exception of track patrol, is performed during the night in order to prevent
train accidents and to protect the workers. To make this possible, a time zone
exclusively for maintenance is set aside, clearly separating maintenance from
train operation time (see Fig. 36.3).
The maintenance work for the day has to be carried out efficiently and
safely within this limited time, and therefore the following measures have been
taken.
Establishment ofregional dispatcher
To enable the maintenance work to be performed smoothly and to prevent
accidents, a regional dispatcher is established in each region to exercise control
over work (approval of planned work, control of the time zone assigned to
maintenance work, approval of start of work and ascertainment of completion
of work, permission for trespass into right-of-way, collection and transmission
of information related to the work, etc.) and so coordinate the different kinds
of work (adjustment of work section in cases of duplication of different work
groups, control of use of maintenance cars and work cars, etc.). Keeping close
contact with the central dispatcher, the regional dispatcher is aware of the
movements of trains and exercises strict control over the start and end of the
time zone for maintenance work.
Operation ofsafety confirmation car
On completion of maintenance or improvement work, a safety confirmation
car (rail motor car) is operated prior to the operation of the first train to make
Safety of work
Prevention of
train accident
Control of work
Use of maintenance
machines
Establishment of
regional dispatcher
Operation of safety
confirmation car
Long interval between trains
Suspension of
train operation
Coordination of related works
Confirmation after work
Total replacement of turnout
Replacement of brid e irder
PR information to assen ers
Substitute trans ort service
Fig. 36.3. Time for maintenance work (block diagram).
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sure that materials, tools, etc., are not left on the track, and to confirm that
the track is safe for train operation.
In renewing the facilities of the Tokaido Shinkansen, the original 50-kg/m
rails are being replaced by 60-kg/m rails; in this connection, turnouts also have
to be replaced.
Since the turnout, about 70 m long and weighing about 50 tons, must be
replaced in one operation, and the normal maintenance work period is too
short, all train operation is suspended for a whole morning for this purpose.
When such a long interruption of train service is necessary, it is incorporated
in the plan for the year and conducted during the light traffic season. It is
made known to the public well in advance, and extra services are provided on
that day on the narrow-gauge Tokaido line and on the Tokyo-Nagoya
Expressway Bus route. This half-day suspension of trains for turnout
replacement began in 1976, and, taking place about ten times a year, will end
in 1981, according to the present plan.
For future replacement of bridge girders, more than half-a-day will be
required, but studies are being made to reduce this time.
ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF DUTIES IN FACILITIES MAINTENANCE
As indicated in Fig. 36.4, the organization for maintenance of fixed facilities
of the Shinkansen consists of the civil engineering side for maintenance of such
electrical facilities as substations, overhead contact system, signalling and
telecommunication facilities. Both are under the control and supervision ofthe
Shinkansen Administration, the civil engineering side coming under its Track
and Structures Department, and the electrical engineering side under its
Electrical Engineering Department.
They have their respective centers and depots as subordinate organs. Each
center draws up execution plans for maintenance, in accordance with the basic
____S1l.i~a.!ls~n A.9-111inisjT,!ltioll
- -
General Affairs 11 Finance &: Ac- Track Maintenance HTrack Maintenance I
Dept. counting Dept. Centers (4) Denots liZ)
[ Traffic Dept. [IOperation" Rolling (Track H: ReglOnaStock Dept.
facilities) Dispatcher,(4) Inspection gangs
- - -
ITrack &: Structure Dept. Y Heavy Equip- (40)
ment Centers (9)
L-r Central Dispatcher I Electric Mainte-
I
- -- - - - - - - - -- 1 Electric Mainte- ~ nance Depots
I Electrical Dept. nance Centers (4) (10)
~ Central Dispatcher I (Electric 4Regional Substation inspec-
I
facilities) Dispatche.. (4) tion gangs (II)
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T ele communications
I ·nspection gangs (11
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Basic plans, supervision &: inspection, Execution plans, management Execution
guidance &: administration of performanc s
Fig. 36.4. Organization and assignment of duties in facilities maintenance (block diagram).
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plans decided by the Department, and oversees the work. The depot is the
organ that executes the maintenance according to the plan drawn up by the
center, and it assigns inspection gangs to important places.
In addition, the Track Maintenance Center is assisted by the Heavy
Machinery Center which is in charge of mechanized track maintenance as well
as management of the use of large maintenance equipment, such as multiple
tie-tamper and track liner, and work cars to carry heavy materials such as
ballast and rails.
Daily maintenance work is controlled by the Regional Dispatcher, and is
carried out with full coordination between the track-and-electric facilities
maintenance organs.
Of all the work involved in facilities maintenance, that of knowing the
condition of the facilities (e.g. management of historical data on age, number
of operations, failures and repairs, and the time series management of
inspection results), planning of maintenance and the execution of inspection
are, in principle, undertaken directly by the railway, while the actual repair
and renewal work is conducted under contract. Simple but voluminous
inspections are done under contract, and repairs which can be readily
performed upon inspection are performed by the railway.
Recovery from Failure of Facilities
The fundamental method of keeping the facilities functioning is to renew or
repair them before failure occurs, either by prescribing a service life
commensurate with their working condition, environmental conditions, and
behavior traits correctly understood, or by forecasting the remaining life by
judging the degradation by means of inspection at an appropriate cycle. It is
impossible to completely eliminate failures, since maintenance standards are
liable to be short of perfection and there can be an oversight in the inspection.
The railway facilities are often damaged by natural elements and unexpected
external causes, since they lie outdoors and extend over a long distance.
It is therefore an important element of the facilities maintenance system that
arrangements be made for early recovery in the event of failure of facilities.
The means adopted to this end are as follows (see Fig. 36.5).
ESTABLISHMENT OF DISPATCHER IN CHARGE OF FACILITIES
With the aim of recovering from failure of facilities as quickly as possible, a
dispatcher in charge of facilities has been established. He constantly watches
the state of facilities with centralized monitoring devices and, on becoming
aware of a failure, ascertains its location and condition, and issues orders for
recovery.
The duties of the Facilities Dispatcher are performed by five dispatchers
who are in charge of track, power supply (substation and catenary), signalling,
telecommunications, and COMTRAC, each divided into the Central
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Fig. 36.5. Recovery from failure of facilities (block diagram).
Dispatcher (Tokyo) and Regional Dispatcher (seven places on the entire line
between Tokyo and Hakata).
The Central Facilities Dispatcher is located on the same floor of the same
building as the train dispatcher and the passenger service dispatcher, so that
they can all keep in close contact. In case of failure, an accident counter-
measure headquarters, composed of senior staff of the Shinkansen
Administration, is set up in the General Control Center and adjusts the train
operation plan and passenger traffic in accordance with the schedule for
recovery.
The Regional Dispatcher is located in the regional organizations in charge of
maintenance. Its normal function is to control and coordinate the maintenance
works as described above, but in case of failure of facilities it becomes a
regional Accident Counter-measure Headquarters.
CENTRALIZED MONITORING OF FACILITIES
In the Central Dispatcher in charge of facilities there is a centralized
monitoring device that keeps watch over the state of the facilities of the whole
line. As soon as an abnormality is found in the facilities, it issues an alarm to
inform the dispatcher and indicates the troublespot.
The items indicated are the place (station, equipment house, substation,
etc.) and the kind of facilities in trouble, e.g. "failure of tumout No. X of
station P" or "stoppage of circuit Y of substation Q". For facilities extending
over a long distance, such as rails and overhead line, the troublespot is given
within a range of 2 or 3 km, differentiating between up- and down-tracks, so
that the section in question can be reached by patrol and the trouble spotted. It
is also the practice to call, by train radio, the driver of any train that happens
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to be running in the section in question, instructing him to slow down and
report on the exact place and state of the trouble. Thus the general state of the
trouble is often known by the dispatcher before the patrol arrives at the site.
PLACING OF MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS ALONG THE LINE
The organizations for maintenance of facilities should be so placed and
staffed that daily maintenance work can be carried out efficiently, and early
recovery from failure should be possible.
The front-line groups directly undertaking the maintenance of fixed
facilities of the Shinkansen are placed as follows:
The groups in charge of track facilities and power-supply facilities
(substations and catenary) are each placed at an average interval of
20 km, staffed with ten and twenty persons, respectively.
The groups in charge of signalling and telecommunication facilities are
assigned to each station where such equipment is concentrated (average
interval 40 km), each staffed with about twenty persons.
Few maintenance workers are on duty during the day since daily
maintenance operations take place at night. There are thus not enough
available men to do the work of recovery from failures, although the initial job
of detecting the fault and finding the facts can be adequately dealt with. To
make up for this, workers off duty are called out in emergency mobilization,
and it is compulsory for the workers designated for emergency mobilization to
live in JNR official residences near the line.
Workers on patrol duty can be immediately called by radio in case of a
failure, as they carry a Radicall. For emergency communication, the Regional
Dispatcher sends out a radio calling signal, and the patrolman who receives it
calls back using a nearby wayside telephone.
To expedite recovery in case of a failure, the maintenance organizations in
the field have set up measures to be taken for various conceivable cases of
failures, such as the order of performing recovery work, preparedness of
materials for repair work, and the provision of motor vehicles for transport of
men and materials. The Shinkansen maintenance organizations have arranged
with maintenance organizations of other JNR lines nearby for mutual
assistance, and have also arranged with contractors for emergency help and
for the channel through which such help is to be requested.
TEST-PURPOSE TERMINALS AND UNITIZATION OF PARTS
Signalling and telecommunication facilities are made up of complicated
circuits, and the prompt detection of a faulty part is essential. To this end, the
process of measuring characteristic values (voltage, ohmage, etc.) in
accordance with the failure symptoms is prescribed to facilitate fault-finding.
Test-purpose terminals are provided where needed.
It is also the practice to unitize the parts so that a failure can be quickly
remedied by simply replacing the faulty unit by a spare.
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TROUBLE RECORDER
In cases of failure of such facilities as ATC, CTC, and signals at stations,
which constantly change their state, it is important to know how each of the
equipment composing the facilities was acting immediately before the disorder
occurred. For this, a trouble recorder has been developed which, when a
button is pushed, is capable of memorizing and storing all the data on the state
of operation for a certain time retrospectively from the moment the disorder is
discovered.
Securing and Improving Maintenance Techniques
The Shinkansen was planned and constructed to new specifications,
independent of the existing railway, and utilizes the latest technology. Most of
the engineers and technical staff engaged in construction were retrained as
maintenance personnel for some time after inauguration of the line. Being
familiar with the facilities, they were able to diagnose the cause of failure and
remedy it quickly.
Many of the experienced technical staff who engaged in the construction
and tackled the teething troubles are now reaching retirement age. In 10 years
time, the Shinkansen will have to depend solely on younger people lacking
construction experience or the trouble-shooting of the early days. It is
therefore important to secure the technical ability for prevention of failures
with complete knowledge of the important maintenance items, and the
technical ability for speedy determination of the causes of failure and their
remedies.
This requirement is common to all fields where technological innovation has
produced more reliable equipment and has widened the scope of maintenance-
free facilities dispensing with daily maintenance services, and, further, where
the number of failures has decreased so much so that the opportunities for
repair have diminished. The principal measures being taken by Shinkansen in
this respect are as follows (see Fig. 36.6):
TRAINING AT RAILWAY SCHOOL
JNR has its own schools to provide general training for new employees,
reassignment training on changing jobs, retraining for introduction of new
techniques, and supervisory training for management staff. Included in the
school curriculum are courses for technical training on the Shinkansen for new
employees and transferees from other lines.
TRAINING AT THE PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT
Workers who having received technical training on the Shinkansen at the
railway training school are instructed on the construction and functions of the
facilities, with actual objects serving as teaching materials, and are then
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Fig. 36.6. Securing and improvement of maintenance techniques (block diagram).
trained in daily maintenance work. Training facilities for this are set up as
required.
PREPARATION AND REVIEW OF MAINTENANCE MANUAL
A manual describing the structure, performance, and the concrete methods
of maintenance, the troubles that have occurred in the past, and the methods
of recovery from failure, has been prepared for each of the facilities and is
distributed to maintenance personnel.
The manual is periodically reviewed by all concerned, on the basis of the
analyses of causes of failures that have recently occurred, and on the
performance of maintenance. Amendments are made to the manual as
required. If reinforcement of facilities is considered imperative, the findings
are fed back to those responsible.
By letting everyone concerned take part in revising the maintenance manual
and the reinforcement of facilities, the technical ability of the front-line
workers is improved.
RECOVERY DRILL FOR FACILITIES FAILURE
Drill for recovery from various conceivable failures is periodically
conducted. For a highly mechanized and automated railway like Shinkansen,
training is necessary on the substitute means to be taken by operating
personnel in cases of failure of facilities until their recovery.
DIRECT UNDERTAKING OF WORK
Work for repair or renewal of facilities is, in principle, conducted under
contract, but a part is undertaken directly by JNR. The coverage of the direct
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undertaking is selected according to its value in nurturing the technical ability
for the maintenance of the facilities and recovery from failure.
The time has come for the renewal of the Tokaido Shinkansen facilities, and
this renewal work requires even higher technical capacities than the initial
construction. It may be expected that the technical ability of the workers
engaged in the renewal will be greatly enhanced. That the cycle of renewal of
facilities coincides with the cycle of refreshment of the technical capacity of
the maintenance personnel is something to be welcomed.
37. Seat Reservation System and
Computer Application in JNR
H.HARADA
Introduction
Some readers of these proceedings might visit Japan and happen to see a
ticket clerk working on a machine like a cash register at the open counter of a
JNR station or a travel agency. This machine is an agent terminal of the
Magneto-electronic Automatic Reservation System, called MARS, provided
for reservation of seats and berths. They might also have an opportunity to go
to the Computer Center located in the suburbs of Tokyo and see a group of 2-
megabyte class Central Processing Units (CPU) used exclusively for seat and
berth reservations. Approximately 30 billion yen have so far been invested in
this system, which covers about 1900 agent terminals, nine sets of CPUs and
special lines with the maximum of 2400 band. The system has in memory as
much as 99.9010 of the total seats and berths reservable, helping to earn
1.3 billion yen daily, or about 43% of the total passenger revenue in JNR.
Before the introduction of MARS I, the first type of this system, on an
experimental basis in 1960, booking clerks at seat reservation centers received
applications from each ticket window by headphone and recorded them in
books held in special rotating cases. Experiments were conducted until 1964
when MARS 101 was put to practical use. The system had since been
developed and capacity increased stage by stage from MARS 101 to 105. In
1969 MARS 201 and in 1975 MARS 202 were put into service for group
reservations, and again in 1975 MARS 150 for telephone reservations. These
developments are shown in Fig. 37.1. The system has thus become a large one
with 1400 kilostep programs, making an average of a million transactions
daily. At present, the system handles as many as 750,000 seats for 1700 trains a
day, playing a basic role in passenger service sales. It covers trains not only on
the Shinkansen but all other trunk lines where seats are reservable.
Functions of MARS
At present MARS consists of three subsystems: MARS 105,202 and 150.
MARS 105 enables a customer to make reservations for one to fourteen seats
on the train he selects 1 week before boarding, specifying their locations or
leaving the clerk to choose. When places on the desired train are all filled, the
train immediately before or after can be checked for available space. The
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system sells both reserved seats and fare tickets, calculating the basic fare and
charges, prints them on the ticket and records them separately, for statistical
data processing, thus saving much labor. The system is shown in Fig. 37.2.
Communication Computers (CC) accept the inputs from terminals through
Communication Control Multichannel (CCM), check their logical errors
(30 February, etc.), transfer them to either of the File Computers, FCI or FC2,
according to the train requested. FC1 or FC2 checks the validity of the request
(does the train really stop at the requested destination station?, etc.), searches
the files (magnetic disks) for the seats, and informs the CC whether they are
available. If they are available, it signals the terminal to print and issue the
ticket. This done, files are amended and statistical data processing goes on.
CCM relays the communications between terminals and Cc.
To further computerize ticket selling, MARS 202 was developed for group
reservations. This system enables an applicant for group travel to make
reservations for 15 to 980 seats on the train desired, 5 months before boarding,
specifying their locations or leaving the clerk to choose. When places on the
desired train are not available, the train immediately before or after can be
checked. These functions of MARS 202 are similar to those of MARS 105. The
difference is that the MARS 202 enables the applicant to reserve seats on many
different trains on many different routes, allowing him to alter the details of
the application several times, all items being kept in the central memory until
the final series of reservations is completed and the clerk in charge sends out a
signal for the final issue of the ticket. The distance for group travel is usually
long and the itinerary subject to change. The system is designed to meet this
characteristic, and its composition is shown in Fig. 37.3.
MARS 150 is a unique system that enables a customer to make reservations
without the aid of a ticket clerk, conversing with the central unit by telephone
(see Fig. 37.4). An applicant may use any touch-tone telephone provided
within the area (approximately 50 km radius of Tokyo) and call up the Audio
Response Unit (ARU). In response to this call, the unit asks questions one by
one, and the applicant answers them by pushing the buttons of the touch-tone
telephone to input the necessary data directly into the central unit of MARS
150. Based on the input data, MARS 150 makes inquiries of MARS 105, and
when places are available, records the results in the reservation file of MARS
150 while working the ARU, to transmit (in Japanese) the reservation number
and the purchase date to the applicant. When places are not available it works
on ARU to inform the applicant. When the applicant shows the reservation
number to a clerk at the ticket window of the station, the clerk works the agent
terminal of MARS 105 to read out the reservation file MARS 150 for
confirmation of the details of the reservation requested, and he issues the
ticket. At present, this reservation system is applicable only to the Shinkansen
trains leaving and arriving at Tokyo. (Details of the three subsystems will be
given later.)
Since 1965 rapidly growing national economy led to a demand not only for
increased passenger transport capacity, but also for greater comfort. To meet
this demand, JNR has continually put into service additional express trains for
which seat reservations are required. Without these computer systems the
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CPU
Fig. 37.3. Data-flow of MARS-202.
Boo:ting office
MARS·105
Fig. 37.4. Data-flow of MARS-ISO.
demand could never have been satisfied, even if the number of clerks at ticket
windows had been increased several times. It is no exaggeration to say that the
systems have contributed a great deal towards the modernization of passenger
services in JNR.
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Features of MARS
CC-FC SYSTEM - MARS 105
MARS 105 processes data in mass and at high speed; its central processing
unit deals with 1,600,000 calls a day in the busiest season or an average of 75
calls a second. A response is made within 6 seconds, or more accurately 6
seconds with the probability of 90070, counting from the moment when a key
on the agent terminal is touched to the moment the first letter is printed. As is
seen in Fig. 37.1, the system has been continually developed and improved,
especially MARS 103 and later models, with emphasis on the development of
the special Operational Systems for MARS and on improvement of the agent
terminals for processing the increasing data. The capacity that could meet the
demand of a certain year might not be sufficient to satisfy that of the following
year. On the other hand, if the system's capacity is enlarged, and a big change
in the system has to be made later, a considerable loss could be incurred. To
avoid this dilemma, the CC-FC system was devised, by which the central
processing unit is composed of two parts: Communication Computer (CC)
and File Computer (FC). CC gives and receives information to and from the
agent terminals, while FC controls groups of files for data on seats. Thus, the
FC part only can cope with an increase in the number of reservable seats, and
the CC part only could deal with a very large change effected on the whole
system (for instance, to connect MARS with other computer systems).
The Shinkansen network is scheduled to become larger in several years with
the number of reserved seats considerably increased, and MARS 105 is the
now being connected to the computer systems operated by the major travel
agents. Trials will prove that the CC-FC system is the most effective method,
needing the least modification.
MULTI-RESERVATION SYSTEM - MARS 202
Assume that there are trains a, ai, b, and c on the section between stations
X, Y, and Z, as is seen in Fig. 37.5. MARS 105 is designed for the reservation
of a trip for which such essentials as date, destination, train, etc., are definitely
given, fixed by the customer himself who has made his choice. Take, for
example, individual customers intending to travel from station X to station Y.
He will apply for reservation on train a I from among the trains a, ai, and c (on
the section between X and Y). All that is required of MARS 105 is to make it
clear whether or not a place on train a I is available, and if not available, it will
suggest a place on train a or c.
x y Z
I I I
I I I
I I I
I I I
l-a-1-b-1
I I I
I 1 I I
I-a-I I
I I I
I t---.I
Fig. 37.5. Arrangement of trains for the explanation of multi-reservation system, MARS-202.
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On the other hand, an itinerary for a group is usually uncertain at first and
apt to change. Customers will make it definite in consultation with the ticket
clerk. The multi-reservation system, MARS 202, has been developed with the
object of preparing such an itinerary.
MARS 202 can make a tentative reservation on train a for an applicant who
wishes to travel from X to Y, and can also suggest a lengthy trip down to Z in
order to sell him train b. It can make a reservation with many courses up to 29
per application. The central unit processes four applications per second, the
response time being approximately 8 seconds with 90070 probability. Suppose
reservations are made as follows:
C (customer representing a party of 20): We would like to make a trip from
XtoY.
R (JNR clerk): How about taking the train a?
C: O.K. We will take it, but not definitelY. (Tentative reservation (1) for
train a is made.)
R: How about extending your trip down to the sightseeing area Z? If you
take train b, there will be a 10% discount on the express charges.
C: Let me see....
C (another customer comes up): Excuse me, we would like to make a
reservation on train c. (Reservation (1') for train c is made for customer
C1.)
C: Reserve the train b tentatively. We will come back tomorrow with the
definite decision. (Tentative reservation (2) for train b is made for C.)
C (second day): Yes, we have decided to make a trip down to the sightseeing
area Z as you suggested. But we would like to take train c on the section
between Y and Z, not train b. And for the section XY, we would like to
take train a I instead of train a. [Tentative reservation (3), a I + c (for the
section Y Z) is made.]
C (third day): We would like to add one more person to our party, but our
budget is limited. On the section between Y and Z, instead of train c, we
would like to take train b, as you originally suggested, with the
discount. [Tentative reservation (4), a l + b is made and one member
added.]
C (fourth day): We would like to defer our departure for one day. [Definite
reservation (5) for trains a (one day deferred) + b (one day deferred)
for 21 members is made.]
MARS 105 could not make these four tentative reservations and one definite
reservation. In making the tentative reservation (3) all the items, including the
date of boarding, the number of people, etc., required for making the tentative
reservations (1) and (2) must be input into the agent terminal again, to search
for trains a and b in the seat file in order to cancel the reservations. New
reservations must then be made for trains a1 and c (on the section between Y
and Z). All other changes must be made in the same way.
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Take MARS 202 for making these reservations. First, input the data
required for reserving trains 0 and b for the tentative reservations (1) and (2).
Then keep these input data in the other memory, the Passenger Name Record
(PNR). On changing them into the tentative reservation (3), it would suffice to
take them out on the CRT-display, and just change the train 0 into oJ and b
into c. No other input is required, thus reducing input considerably.
Assumable in an actual situation is the reservation (11) for CI arising
between the tentative reservations (1) and (2). Compare two cases: case (A),
where two reservations are made separately, one for train 0 and the other for
train b, as in the tentative reservations (1) and (2), and case (B), where one
integrated reservation for trains 0 and b is made, as in the tentative reservation
(3). The fares and charges for case (B) will be different from those for case (A)
because of the tariff-tapering system now in use - the longer the distance, the
lower the rate of fares and charges.
MARS 105 cannot calculate the fares and charges for one integrated
reservation made for trains 0 and b as in case (B) when the reservation (11) for
another customer arises between reservations (1) and (2). The clerk in charge
will have to see whether or not the tapering fares and charges are applicable to
the case, and, if applicable, then he must cancel the two reservations for trains
o and b. Data must then be input afresh to complete an integrated reservation
for trains 0 + b.
Use here MARS 202 in place of MARS 105. To minimize the handling of the
exegese torifoire, cancellation and re-input, placed in front of the central unit
is the Agent Work File (AWF), through which data will be input into the
central unit. For the reservations exemplified, the reservation for train 0 is first
made in the AWF. The result is transferred to the Passenger Name Record
(PNR). Thus, clearing the AWF, the reservation for another customer is
made. Then the result is transferred to the PNR for C I , clearing the AWF
again. After this, the input data for train 0 is taken back from the PNR for C
to the AWF, and the data for train b is added. Automatically and accurately,
the fares and charges for the tentative reservation (3) on trains 0 and bare
processed in the AWF.
When MARS 105 is used to change the tentative reservation (4) into (5), two
inputs must be made separately, one to change the date of boarding train 0 and
the other to change that of train b. When MARS 202 is used instead, one input
would suffice to make changes of this kind - parallel date transfer changes.
MARS 202 can print and issue tickets automatically as in MARS 105. It can
also prepare a list of customers who have made reservations but have not
picked up their tickets 10 days before their boarding dates. When the boarding
dates approach and customers have not picked up their tickets, contact with
them might be required in which case such a list is very useful.
ARU - MARS 150
The demand for reservations by telephone increases year by year. If JNR
had set up as many manned telephone reservation centers as would be required
to cope with the growing number of telephone applications for train
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reservations, the fares of JNR, which are much lower than airlines, would not
have covered the cost operating these centers.
As is shown in Fig. 37.4, the JNR telephone reservation system has two
parts: the Audio Response Unit (ARU) and the Passenger Name Record
(PNR), the latter handled by MARS 150 computers.
A typical operation is shown in Table 37.1. A customer telephones the
system and inputs the reservation data by means of a touch-tone telephone
keyboard (about 300,000 were installed by Nihon Telephone & Telegraph
Corporation in the Tokyo area as of March 1975).
ARU repeats each item for confirmation and sends it to MARS 150, which
checks its validity and sends it to MARS 105. If the seat is available, MARS
150 assigns a reservation and records the information on PNR. The number
and the time limit for ticketing are answered in recorded human language
through ARU.
On giving this number, the customer obtains the ticket at a station or travel
agent office where a MARS 105 agent terminal is installed.
The average time for making one reservation, as shown in Table 37.1, from
Item 1 to Item 10, is estimated to be about 3 minutes. MARS 150 can deal with
20,000 reservations a day. The response time for booking (Item 9) is about 7
seconds, on the probability of 90070, measured from the moment when the last
key is pushed for "order code" on the telephone keyboard to the moment the
answer begins to be heard.
TABLE 37.1. A typical touch-tone operationjorseat reservation in MARS 150
Input Output
Example of
Item operation
Calling the booking center 9500
I Your telephone number 2126311
2 Request code
3 Departure date 0510
4 Train number 01025
5 Departure station 4000
6 Arrival station 6100
7 Number of tickets 2
8 Accommodation 2
9 Order code 0
10 Reservation no. 4312
Response (in Japanese) and Guide to Subsequent Input
This is the JNR booking center
Push your phone number, please
Your telephone number is 2125311.
Push your request code, please
Now, ready for booking.
Push your departure date, please
10th of May.
Push your train number, please
Hikari No. 25.
Push your departure station, please
From Tokyo Station.
Push your arrival station, please
To Shin-Osaka Station.
Push the number of tickets, please
2 tickets.
Push your accommodation, please
Ordinary class.
Push your order code, please
(booking the seats) Your reservation No. is 4312, repeat
4312.
Push your reservation number, please
Now reserved. Please get your tickets at the ticket
counter by 8 May. Thank you
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Two methods of audio output were considered, one editing pre-recorded
speech and the other simulating the human voice. For the latter, less memory
capacity is required, but the cost of channel parts is high and the quality of
audio output is not very satisfactory. The former method was therefore
employed.
The voice element was set at a I. I-second period in which most words, such
as station names, months, and numerals, can be recorded (512 words are
stored in one voice drum - 35 M-bits digital).
The word-editing part of the main control parts of the ARU picks up the
necessary words from the drum according to the programmed order with the
signals given.
Future MARS Problems
With a comparatively small modification, the current MARS would be
capable of dealing with as many as 1,400,000 seats and berths to cope with the
expanding network of Shinkansen lines. However, now that Japan has passed
the period of high economic growth and entered a period of stability, it is
necessary to improve MARS not only by increasing the numbers of reservable
places but also by making "package reservations" and by further savings of
manpower.
IMPROVEMENT OF AGENT TERMINALS AND EXPANSION OF TELEPHONE
RESERVATIONS
To reduce the number of clerks engaged in the front sales service, efforts are
being made to develop agent terminals operable by customers themselves as
well as agent terminals designed exclusively to cancel reservations. The latter
have been developed to deal with the considerable number of cancellations (as
many as 10% of places reserved) and avoid double reservations that are liable
to occur when cancellation is input by mistake. When a reservation ticket on
which optical codes are printed, is inserted into the cancellation agent terminal
specially installed at the fare adjustment office window, it will read into CPU
and cancellation automatically made.
Telephone reservations are at present limited in areas and trains. Efforts are
being made to expand these areas and to increase the trains for which the
system can be applied so that reservations could be made with minimum help
from clerks.
INTRODUCTION OF PACKAGE RESERVATION
Package reservation for train, rent-a-car, hotel, and airplane, if introduced,
would offer greater convenience to customers and increase train reservation
sales. The multireservation system of MARS 202 provides a technical basis for
realization of package reservation.
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Major travel agents in Japan operate a large network of hotel rooms and
aircraft seats, using their own computer systems. JNR and Japan Travel
Bureau (JTB) have jointly organized a project team which is now preparing to
connect the MARS of JNR with the TRIPS of JTB. Should this connection be
made, JNR and JTB could use their information and services jointly and offer
improved services to customers.
Conclusion
Unlike other railways overseas, passenger services assume great importance
in JNR. When further improved, MARS would become one of the strongest
pillars supporting the operation of JNR. One might even say that a system like
MARS, which deals with information required by the majority of the public, is
destined to leave the hands of an individual enterprise, in this case JNR, and
become part of the social assets of the nation.
We accept it as normal to endure certain inconveniences through lack of
information, usually arising because the information is in the hands of many
different specialists belonging to many different organizations. The joint use
of a central unit, however, gives the users access to all the information
required. Information is on the way to being "socialized" and a wider use of
MARS is expected in this direction.
Computer Application: Introduction
OUTLINE
This section outlines the JNR computer systems as a whole. A conventional
way to divide an industry's activities is into three parts: production, sales, and
administration. Nearly a hundred JNR computer systems are now in service,
and under this convention, they can be classified as shown in Table 37.2,
which lists the fields already computerized and lead to the following questions:
Why were those fields computerized?
How do the JNR computer systems under development differ from those in
other industries?
What problems are now being faced by JNR in further computerization?
Before these questions are discussed, some other major computer systems
are briefly described.
ON-LINE REAL TIME SYSTEMS
Freight operational control system (FOeS)
JNR operates 24,600 freight cars daily, of which FOeS deals with about
4,600 cars used for interblock express freight trains. The features of this
system are as follows:
II
432
TABLE 37.2. Outline ofJNR computer application
(Figures as 0 f 1976)
Production
Computers applied to: (I) (2) (3) (4)
(see notes on systems) COMTRAC SMIS YACS KICS
a Sum total invested 1.0 7.0 1.8
(Y billions):
b Manpower saved 30 150 120 980
(persons):
C Computer personnel 30 50 50 270
Hardware
CPUs installed at: Shinkansen Shinkansen 4 marsh- 9 work-
General General ailing shops
Control Control yards
Center Center
CPUs 500 KB or more (number of sets): 2
CPUs 65-500 KB (number of sets): 3 2 9
Less than 65 KB (number of sets): 10
Terminals (number of sets): 80 47 II 18
Software
Program steps (thousands): 650 315 950 300
Numbers of trains a day
(covered by the systems): 1300 400
Number of railway vehicles a day
(covered by the systems): 2320EC 4400PC dAll railway
vehicles
Other features
(covered by the systems): 35 stations 1100 km of
track
Input, in terms of calls per month 30,OOOOMR 1.1
(millions, unless otherwise shown): sheets
Rush-hour traffic, calls per hour
(thousands): 0.4
a Leased assets capitalized by aggregate rental (44 months).
b Actual decrease as well as prevented increase by computerization in the manpower of the
application jobs.
c Excluding terminal operators.
dEL, DL 4,214
EC, DC, PC 28,609
FC 144,537
Notes:
(I) COMTRAC
An on-line system applied to Shinkansen only, for:
(a) route-control throughout Shinkansen according to the given train diagrams;
(b) proposal by machine, of the optimum modification of the train diagrams in case of
disturbance.
(2) SMIS
An on-line system, applied to Shinkansen only, for making up daily maintenance programs
of tracks and of rolling stock, and for cost analysis of the jobs.
(3) YACS
An on-line system applied to major marshalling yards, for automatic classification of arrived
freight-cars and for formation of train new destinations, by way of a computerized control of
car-retarders, switching-points, etc.
(4) KICS
Batch systems applied to car-repairing workshops, for their resource control and for
checking the maintenance record of individual cars and parts.
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TABLE 37.2. continued
Sales Administration
(6) Five
(5) FOCS- (7) (8) minor Total
MARS EPOCS RES/STAT OACS systems JNR
25.0 4.4 4.2 0.4 0.6 44.4
270 2800 300 540 5190
130 80 1050 200 80 1940
Kunitachi Kunitachi 27 local KCC&
Computer Computer divisions 6 local
Center Center (ROD) divisions
(KCC) (KCC)
7 2 12
2 2 23 8 2 52
13 9 32
1950 361 900
1300 590 8360 1864 1100 15,429
1700 278
4300FC
900,000 700 430,000 employees' payment and
seats containers other statistical processing for
6000 organs
21.0 0.5 10.9 1.3
370.0 4.4 4.7
E for electric
o for diesel
L for locomotive
C for car
P for passenger
F for freight
(5) MARS
An on-line system applied to entire sales network, for the reservation of seats and berths.
(6) FOCS-EPOCS
An on-line system applied to freight service, for:
(a) reservation of freight-cars to be coupled to the interblock freight express trains, or of
containers to be loaded on the freightliner express trains;
(b) furnishing the consignees in advance with the arrival information on the cargo.
(7) RESOURCE CONTROLISTAT1STIC
Batch systems covering the whole JNR, applied to local operating divisions, for personnel,
accounting, stock control and for statistical review of the operations.
(8) OACS
An on-line system covering the whole JNR, used not for the particular application jobs but
for message switching and computer-combination, by way of the JNR-owned
telecommunication network.
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The nationwide flow of freight is patterned and this patterned flow is
incorporated into the diagram of freight trains, which is made public like
that of passenger trains.
The freight consignor chooses a train and applies to the station for the
number of freight cars required to be coupled to the train. When each car
number has been determined the station applies to the central unit,
through the agent terminal provided, to check whether they can be
coupled to the train.
The central unit decides whether or not this is acceptable, based on the
hauling capacity of the train. If it is acceptable, the unit informs the
station of origin to that effect and informs the destination station in
advance of the arrival.
The destination station conveys this arrival information to the consignee by
telephone. Since the freight car numbers are known, it is easy to locate any
of those cars in the yard, or anywhere else when necessary, especially in
case of an accident. (Locating a freight car is extremely difficult without
this system.)
This processing is performed and controlled between the central unit in
Tokyo and the agent terminals at principal stations over the whole system and
at major consignors' offices.
Effectual planning and operation ofcontainer system (EPOCS)
This system covers about 500 containers out of the 7500 handled daily. A
container train is made up in almost the same way as a passenger train, with
the number of cars in its composition and its schedule publicized in advance.
When a reservation is made to load containers on the train, the advance arrival
notice to the station of destination, the calculation of fares and charges, and
the issue of a freight note is all done automatically through the agent terminals
specially provided.
Yard automatic control system (YACS)
Using a computer, the system automatically breaks up a freight train
arriving at the marshalling yard into several parts and couples each part to a
train with a new destination. This system relieves the yardmen of the
dangerous work of freight-car coupling and uncoupling. Since the complicated
route setting in the central yard signal room has been fully automated, the
number of freight cars handled per man has become four times what it was
when manually operated.
Freight-terminal information system (FlS)
Computer-provided cranes automatically load and unload containers
between trains and trucks and guide trucks in the container terminal yard.
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OFF-LINE BATCH SYSTEMS
Resource control systems and statistic systems
Twenty main systems and their sixty-five subsystems comprehensively cover
the statistical processing of personnel, finance, and accounting, purchasing
and stores, passengers and freight, and train operations.
The railway-operating division (ROD), an intermediate administrative
organ, manually collects the regular reports from its field organs daily. These
reports are input into the computer provided at each ROD, together with those
reports prepared at the ROD itself. A small part of the output (e.g. that made
under the wage subsystem of the personnel system) is used at the ROD and the
rest is sent by train to the head office in the form of magnetic tapes. Part of the
report collected at the head office is fed back to the ROD as required.
One or two computers, large or medium, are provided at each of the twenty-
nine RODs and approximately 1000 men are engaged in maintaining these
computer systems.
Control system ofinstallations maintenance
The Shinkansen Management Information System (SMIS) controls the
maintenance of installations on the Shinkansen. On other lines this system also
controls materials such as rails and sleepers, the usable land, and track
maintenance, including measuring track irregularities by auto-inspection car.
Kojo (Workshop) information control system (KICS)
Specially developed for the JNR workshops, this system files, car by car, all
JNR vehicles, the data on troubles and repairs made, so that the workshop can
find the car to be inspected, foresee what sort of repair it will undergo, and
estimate the materials to be prepared for the repair. It also functions as part of
the Resource Control and Statistic System for each shop.
Management information on railroad construction system (MIRCS)
This system enables the staff in charge of construction to find information
on JNR installations designed in the past. It designs and draws automatically
certain kinds of structure such as simplified bridges, and deals with the process
control of the construction work. It also calculates the basic estimate for the
cost of construction work, and enters acquirements and removals in the book
of properties.
Reasons for Computerization in JNR
In 1965 the Japanese economy began its spectacular growth, and 10 years
later, in 1975, it began to stabilize. During this first period (1955-1964) the
computerization in JNR was prepared and some off-line batch systems firmly
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fixed. During the second period (1965-1975) urbanization progressed and the
national standard of living rose. Passenger transport experienced a remarkable
transformation, symbolized by the inauguration of the Shinkansen, all of
whose seats require reservation. Such computer systems as MARS and
COMTRAC were devised to meet the transport requirements of the decade.
Meanwhile, with the increasing social investments of the second period,
many improvements were made on roads, ports and goods circulation systems.
This called for transformation of freight services: faster through trains,
punctual arrival of freight cars, containers, etc. To this end, computer systems
such as FOCS, EPOCS, YACS, and FIS were developed and put to practical
use.
During the second period, wages rose and job seekers had the advantage of
employers in the labor market. The proposed upward revision of JNR fares
and charges was not approved, with the result that the increased personnel
expenses could not be covered by the revenues anticipated. Manpower saving
became one of the most serious problems in every sphere of railway activity
and, to solve the problem, computerization had to be promoted in haste.
Briefly, the tasks of computerization in JNR were two: modernization of
services and saving of manpower.
Features of JNR Computer Systems
EXTENT
JNR ranks first or second in Japan as an intranational enterprise, not only
by number of employees, assets, revenues, and expenditure, but also by
geographical extent and JNR's computer systems extend nationwide. Of the
100 or so computers used in JNR, forty-two are operated on-line and cover the
entire system.
Japanese telegram and telephone services are monopolized by law by a
quasi-governmental organ, Nihon Telephone & Telegraph Corporation,
whereas JNR is allowed to possess a nationwide network of transmission so far
as it is used for its own purposes. JNR has, therefore, an advantage over other
enterprises in a wider choice of data-transmitting lines and lower cost of
transmission. JNR also has the Data Agent Control System (DACS), using the
computer provided with the Operation System specially designed for
transmitting general data, utilizing solely the JNR-owned transmission
network.
INDEPENDENCE OF EACH SYSTEM
A large organization such as JNR must be divided into several
suborganizations. The principle of this division is functional rather than
regional, and computerization in JNR has therefore been effective only on this
basis.
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Computerization of one service inevitably affects that of others. In most
cases, however, computerization was developed independently, division by
division, each being completed without reference to the others, which
prevented the rational integration of various systems into a data bank system.
To counteract this deficiency, a Shinkansen Management Information System
(SMIS) is envisaged, with the object of making the different systems work
relatedly and comprehensively within the Shinkansen.
SAFETY CONSIDERAnONS
The services offered by JNR, especially train operation, must be carried out
smoothly and without interruption. Stand-by machines and devices must
therefore be duplicated or even tripled. Furthermore, a manual system is
required in order to complement the automatic system in case it fails to
function. The function of computers in train operation is not so much to cut
costs as to perform what human brains, hands, and feet cannot do so well.
COMPUTERIZATION IN MANAGEMENT PLANNING
The IIASA Secretariat suggested that I report on the application of
computers to planning and management in JNR. Application of computers to
planning means using computers to enable the manager to make a higher
category of decisions under what is called the Management Information
System (MIS). But if this means, as in the "business games", that computers
are used for proposing a production plan by commodities or a price policy for
a specific market in order to make the largest possible profit, JNR would not
be interested in it.
JNR, being a public corporation, is operated and managed on two
incompatible principles: public and commercial. From the commercial point
of view, there are comparatively well-fixed methods by which "profit" is
measured, a key guide to business activities. There are no key criteria,
however, by which JNR's public activities can be measured. To explain these
two aspects of a public corporation, a socio-economic and juridical thesis
could be necessary. Here, it may suffice to point out that the need has never
yet been envisaged for computerizing even a yearly budget.
In revising fares and charges, several plans are usually drawn up and
computers are used to prepare financial statements resulting from each of
these plans. This is one of the few cases where computers are used in planning.
Leaving aside management, and thinking only of operational planning, two
systems are of the greatest importance to JNR: COMTRAC, which is at
present used to propose an optimum diagram when train operations are out of
order, and SMIS which prepares a daily utilization plan for railway vehicles.
Future Problems of Information Systems
Since 1975, when the Japanese National economy ceased its spectacular
growth and entered a period of stagnation likely to last a long time, JNR itself
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encountered financial difficulties, and is facing the following problems in
information systems:
The present system must be completed and improved. Computerization
in JNR has been carried out starting from the "services easiest to
computerize". In other words, commencing with the services where
manpower saving was expected, computerization has been pushed
forward in a conventional way, often compromising with refusals made
by the labor unions. Consequently, the system thus computerized have
some deficiences, which are, however, repairable. One of the biggest
deficiencies is in the area between the field organs, where books/tables are
originally filled in, and the railway operating divisions. Data are carried
by train from the former to the latter. These off-line systems must be
made on-line in order to get rid of those books and tables still used at the
field organs. The saving of manpower here is long overdue.
As mentioned above, nearly every JNR computer system was developed
independently and departmentally, and sometimes the same input and
output are duplicated and the same data filed in triplicate. The systems
must be interconnected, taking into account the interrelationships, for
example, between COMTRAC/MARS, EPOCS/FIS, and MIRCS/
Finance & Accounting (Assets) subsystem, in addition to the function and
efficiency of each system. It must also be made possible to connect JNR
information systems with those outside.
To meet these requirements, the data-processing section and some systems
construction sections, each belonging to different departments, were merged
in 1975 into the Information Systems Department, which is now working on a
long-term plan to establish a comprehensive data-base system of two stages,
central and local.
Finally, since the data related to JNR are processed by the computers of
governmental agencies and industries, JNR intends to connect its own
computer systems effectively with these computers, securing harmony between
the public importance of information and the security of industrial secrecy, so
that such information may be used more extensively and efficiently as
Japanese social assets.
38. Discussion
The first part of the discussion centered on problems of maintenance and
renewal of track and vehicle facilities.
It was suggested that the maintenance problem could perhaps be attributed
to the distance between stations on the Shinkansen lines, 50-70 km, and the
fact that there are no track connections outside the station areas. If one of the
double tracks requires maintenance work, the entire track must be closed. In
the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, siding tracks are placed
approximately every 20 km between stations on the high-speed lines. In
addition to the siding tracks, connections are also employed which give an
average distance of unconnected rail of only 7 km. This allows necessary
maintenance work to be undertaken over increments of the 7-km distance; and
with the side tracks in both directions is possible. It was suggested that JNR
might examine such a system for the Shinkansen lines.
In reply, it was explained that the basic maintenance policy of JNR on the
Shinkansen lines is that maintenance work is undertaken only at night when
the Shinkansen trains are not running. Part of the reason for this is worker
safety. It was considered dangerous for workers to perform maintenance work
on one track when a train is passing at 200 km/h on the other. Another reason
for night-time maintenance work was the daily number of trains running on
the Shinkansen lines - as many as 275 trains between 6 a.m. and midnight. It
would be impossible to redirect the trains, even in a section as short as 7 km. It
is, however, planned to introduce a night train in the Sanyo section, and in
some parts of the Tokaido section, in which case, a siding system could be
introduced since only six or seven trains would be operating. One-track
operation would then become feasible.
It was mentioned that maintenance work on the conventional narrow-gauge
lines of JNR is operated on the system described in the first part of the
discussion.
The computer-activated control system was discussed.
Since the main reasons for introducing the Automatic Control System were
safety and the high frequency of operation, it was asked whether the
introduction of this system also contributed to a reduction in labor force for
dispatching. Comments on the modification of timetables were also requested.
In reply to the first question, it was stated that the introduction of a
computer system had been accompanied by an extensive cost/benefit analysis.
Since research and implementation of a computer system represents great
expenditure, a strict cost/benefit analysis would not show any comparative
advantage. The important objective was not to reduce the number of
employees involved in dispatching, but to ensure that additional employees
would not be needed and thus avoid organizational problems.
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It was emphasized that human beings are not infallible. With the increasing
complexity of Shinkansen operations, a system was necessary which could
continuously monitor all aspects of train operations and give sufficient
warning to the dispatchers of any abnormality. For example, if a train is
delayed for more than 4 minutes, the computer gives an alarm in the form of a
character display. The dispatcher simply monitors the display and gives
permission to proceed or hold. This particular alarm is not of great
importance, and it occurs in about 50% of train operations. There are about
forty different types of alarm, such as train delay, track maintenance, missed
signals, etc. If the alarm is significant, Le. if a train is significantly delayed, the
computer will make suggestions to the dispatcher to change operations to
another form. In this situation, the dispatcher gives an OK or WAIT. If the
dispatcher gives the WAIT signal he changes from the character display to a
graphic display and begins to simulate possible decisions. If the dispatcher
finds the optimal solution with the aid of the computer, he give the OK signal,
and operations proceed under the new plan. However, in rare cases there is a
very significant train delay or problem. In such circumstances, the computer
gives up the operational control and the dispatchers must give every
instruction to the computer. That is why it is necessary to have a sufficient
number of dispatchers on duty at all times of train operation. In a normal day,
the dispatchers have very little to do, but in an emergency, they are very busy.
It is therefore difficult to calculate the correct number of dispatchers after the
introduction of the computer system. Although such a system is very useful to
the dispatchers, computers cannot do everything.
There was a discussion on the maintenance and standards of fixed facilities.
To the question whether JNR had experienced corrugation of the rails, the
reply was that a limited amount of corrugation was experienced, and that it
must be eliminated not only for safety but also for noise control. The usual
counter-measure was to use hand and machine grinders.
In reply to a question, it was stated that the life expectancy of 60-kg rails
now being used was to to 15 years.
It was mentioned that in North America, the construction standards for
vehicles provide that a vehicle must be able to withstand a buff load on the
longitudinal members of approximately 400 tons, and in Europe the standard
is 200 tons. The construction standard for Shinkansen vehicles was given as
100 tons.
Train-delay statistics were discussed. In 1970 there were only 2 days when a
delay of more than 30 minutes occurred. In 1975 there were 16 days, and in
1976, 44 days with a delay of more than 30 minutes.
Some additional questions were asked about Automatic Train Control. JNR
is currently testing the use of on-board minicomputers on new trains, but the
cost effectiveness of such a system is questionable. JNR cannot reduce the
numbers of drivers (two motormen), partly owing to the reaction of
passengers. It has also been recommended by a human physics institute that if
the driver is not given specific duties, he will not be able to function efficiently
in an emergency.
It was asked how much of the approximately 19 million dollars cost of the
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OR system in JNR was spent specifically on hardware. The reply was that
hardware accounts for 35-40010 of total investments. For the MARS system,
however, the hardware accounted for the greatest share since so many
terminals were necessary.
In reply to a question on the design of the computer systems in operation in
JNR, it was stated that JNR had developed the systems now in operation.
The MARS system, for example, was constructed by JNR personnel over a
period of 13 or 14 years. Until the early 1970s, JNR had the most advanced
technology in the field of computers in Japan, the result of JNR's efforts in
the design and manufacture of systems. In the last 5 or 6 years, however,
computer technology in Japanese private industries had made great advances
and JNR was taking advantage of the technology becoming available from
private sources.
A question of general interest was raised concerning an opinion from the
JNR delegates on the contribution of the computing system to the success of
the whole Shinkansen. The general answer was that JNR views computer
operations as complementary to human abilities. The system should be able to
function without computers. There are basically two types of activity that
enable the Shinkansen lines to operate successfully: the train-operation control
system, and the sale of tickets and other passenger services. For the first,
computer systems are not essential - it is possible to run the Shinkansen
without computers. It would, however, be almost impossible to operate the
second without computers. The tickets could simply not be sold fast enough
during the time the train was in the station. Before the introduction of the
MARS system, long lines of ticket purchasers were formed. The Shinkansen
could not handle the tremendous volume of traffic experienced today, and it
would not be able to handle ticket purchases efficiently without computers.
An opinion was given that it would also be difficult to operate all of the
present Shinkansen lines without the aid of computers. The Tokaido
Shinkansen could be operated without computers, but the extension of the line
and the extra tunnels have increased. The original Tokaido line employed only
two types of train and two types of stopping station, but after the Sanyo
section was opened, the stopping station was different for each train. Control
of such a complicated system would now be extremely difficult without the aid
of computers.
The proposed linkup of the JNR MARS system with the Japan Travel
Bureau was enlarged upon. JNR plans to link the MARS system with the
reservation system of three travel bureaus in Japan, the largest being the Japan
Travel Bureau. JNR has organized a data committee to combine the files.
When this link up has been completed, it will be possible for JNR to search the
files of the travel agents for airline seats, hotel rooms, rental cars, etc., and the
travel bureaus will be able to reserve train seats. For connection to the files a
special relay computer must be used in front of MARS 105 for connection with
JTB's TRIP system and vice versa. The two systems are quite different as they
use different hardware. JTB uses IBM computers and JNR a different type, so
the work is complex.
The remaining discussion covered a number of other major topics. It was
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asked whether JNR must apply to a special Federal agency for certification of
systems used. The reply was that JNR is authorized to give certification. It has
its own rules, construction criteria, and testing procedures. The private
railways, however, are tightly controlled by the Ministry of Transport. In
principle, JNR has no special division for certification, but has a team to test
equipment, as well as an operational control division, attached to the buying
department, which decides on the standards for inspection, tracks, materials,
and electrical equipment.
Fire precautions on JNR trains were discussed. In 1972 a bad accident
occurred in a tunnel 13 km long, and about thirty passengers were killed in a
fire on the train. A special research group was then formed to study fires on
trains in long tunnels. Through the efforts of this group, many parts with a
tendency towards flammability have been eliminated, old cars have been
phased out, and special fire-extinguishing systems have been installed in each
car. The Ministry of Transport also requested a report from JNR on the
measures taken to decrease the risks of fire. These measures were all
accomplished in 1972.
The comment was made that speeds were reduced during high winds, during
heavy snowfall, and sometimes after earthquakes. During poor visibility,
however, there was no speed reduction. The trains take at least 3 km to stop so
sight is not a factor in train security.
It was asked whether JNR was satisfied with the present system, or whether
they planned to make any changes in the way of improvement. The reply was
that JNR is continuously improving the Shinkansen system, and there are still
many areas for improvement. JNR set a standard of reliability of design on the
original Shinkansen, and the results obtained have been better than originally
expected.
A question was raised concerning documentation: for example, if a man
who designs a system or a program retires, a new man has to use a program he
is not familiar with. It was asked what JNR was doing in this field of railroad
documentation. The reply was that JNR needs documentation to make up for
the increasing number of experienced people who are leaving. The JNR
information system established in 1975 requires each system-constructing
person to supply enough documentation on his way of thinking for a new
employee to be able to follow and use the system. In spite of short experience
in this field, JNR has accumulated voluminous papers on many subjects, such
as the use of computers, maintenance, etc. JNR has found it extremely
important to document the experience of seasoned engineers.
The final question concerned the development of automatic control in
station yards. The reply was that JNR has four major yards either under
construction or completed. Most of them are hump yards under a computer-
control system called YAKS. Linear motors were introduced into one of the
yards and gave some difficulty until the design of the motors was improved. In
general, automation of yards is very expensive.
Final Remarks
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39. Final Remarks
When the Japan Committee for IIASA accepted IIASA's proposal to hold
the Shinkansen Conference, we felt that we ought to do our best to contribute
to IIASA's efforts in international research. Professor Knop, the former
leader of the Management and Technology Area, was instrumental in
convincing us of the appropriateness of the Shinkansen project as an object of
study for IIASA. Professor Straszak has also made a great contribution
towards the realization of this Conference. During the preparations, we
maintained close contact Professor Straszak. I would like to thank him for his
very valuable and energetic support, and at the same time to express my sincere
thanks to all the participants in the Conference for their kind cooperation and
valuable comments.
A.STRASZAK
This Conference represents the first stage of our th"ree-step research format.
The first is, of course, the Conference; the second stage is a field study; and
the third stage is the preparation and distribution of the formal study report by
IIASA. We are therefore at the beginning of our research process.
I would like to add that my conclusions from the Conference are that
transportation problems are still as crucial, if not more so, than they were 5 or
10 years ago. The Shinkansen is a good example of modern transportation
considerations, and may prove beneficial to other countries in the near future,
10 or 20 years ahead.
This IIASA Shinkansen Conference has provided a unique opportunity for
interaction between experts and scientists from both East and West, between
systems analysts and economists involved in studying national and regional
problems, and between railway and transportation experts of several countries
and continents.
Transportation problems are very broad indeed and urgently need
international applied systems analysis. These problems require analysis from
many points of view - energy, environment, land use, population, human
settlements, management, profitability, socio-economic impacts, optimization
studies of different transportation modes, etc. What all this implies is that the
international dimension of fundamental research on transportation systems
represents an area of increasing importance in the study of modern
transportation systems.
It has been mentioned several time that this Conference is unique. This
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uniqueness stems from the international mix of delegates and the wide variety
of disciplines represented. We have discussed a new approach to rail
transportation by examining all its aspects and effects. Altogether, the
Conference has shown that transportation systems can be an object of future
research here at IIASA. It has shown that transportation systems of the future
will not only be regional, but also national and international; and Europe
could be considered an example of where such a view could be applied.
Highway systems in Europe are already reflecting this trend; they are
becoming more international and within the next decade could well be serving
the entire European continent.
Perhaps this Conference will lead to a future IIASA research task on
integrated transport program development. The Shinkansen Conference has
shown us an extreme case of transport utilization that may in the future be
heavily copied by other nations. It is my opinion that such a possibility
warrants research on an international basis, such as that being done here at
IIASA.
I want to thank all of the delegates at this Conference for enabling us to
examine the Shinkansen in the light of its systems - looking at the Shinkansen
not simply as a railroad but as a total system of technological application and
utilization - and for letting us see how the implementation of this system has
influenced the regional and national development of Japan. Naturally, this
Conference would not have been possible without the work of our Japanese
colleagues. They deserve special thanks, not only for their excellent
presentations, but also for the success of the Shinkansen system. In the name
of I1ASA and the Conference delegates, I congratulate them on their success,
and thank all the delegates for their efforts on behalf of I1ASA and the
Management and Technology Area.
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